The opinion
NOTICE
2025 IL App (5th) 230473-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 06/27/25. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0473 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
JEFFERY TODD HENSON SR., ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Macon County.
)
v. ) No. 22-SC-512
)
MACON COUNTY JAIL, ) Honorable
) Erick F. Hubbard,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice McHaney and Justice Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint as untimely where his tort
claim against the defendant, a local governmental entity, was brought beyond the
one-year limitations period applicable to such claims.
¶2 Plaintiff Jeffery Henson Sr. filed a complaint against defendant, the Macon County Jail,
alleging that the defendant caused him to lose over $500 in personal belongings when he was
transferred from the defendant’s custody to another jail and was not allowed to take these items
with him. He now appeals from the circuit court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss
his complaint.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On June 14, 2022, Henson filed a small claims complaint against the defendant seeking
damages in the amount of $500. He alleged that he was incarcerated there on federal charges from
1
approximately August 2020 to mid-January 2021, during which time he filed “over 50 grievances,
and 50 Freedom of Information [Act] requests.” He further alleged that, in retaliation for his
exercising his “administrative rights,” the jail administration requested his transfer to another
facility. Henson claimed that his subsequent transfer, which was done without any warning or time
for him to prepare, caused him to lose over $500 in clothes, personal hygiene items, stationery,
food, and drinks that he was not permitted to take with him.
¶5 After filing his complaint, Henson sent two communications to the court, both of which
included a request that the court issue an “order of remote appearance” to allow him to appear
remotely for all hearings at which his attendance was required. Henson was incarcerated in
Arkansas at the time. On October 21, 2022, the circuit court entered a docket order stating,
inter alia, that the court construed this request as one to participate remotely pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 45, which covered all nontestimonial court appearances. The court included
instructions for Henson to contact the court clerk and schedule a first appearance date at which he
could appear remotely; he would be responsible for scheduling all subsequent remote appearances.
Shortly after the court’s order, Henson sent correspondence to the court clerk requesting his remote
attendance at the next hearing.
¶6 On December 19, 2022, Henson filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Summary Judgment,” restating the allegations in his complaint. The court set a hearing date of
January 26, 2023, which Henson did not attend. In a docket entry from that date, the court reset
the hearing for April 20, 2023, noting that Henson appeared to be incarcerated out of state, and
could attend the hearing remotely via Zoom. The court stated that if he were unable to do so he
must file a motion to reschedule to a date and time when his remote appearance could be facilitated.
2
The court further instructed that Henson would be responsible for arranging a new court date if he
had to reschedule.
¶7 On March 8, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss Henson’s complaint pursuant
to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2022)). In
its motion, the defendant noted that while Henson did not state a cause of action in his complaint,
his allegations described the common-law tort of conversion. The defendant argued that the
applicable statute of limitations for tort claims against a government entity was one year, pursuant
to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act)
(745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2022)). Henson contended that he was transferred out of the Macon
County Jail in “mid-January of 2021,” which is when the alleged tort occurred. His complaint,
filed in June of 2022, was therefore time-barred.
¶8 In response, Henson disputed that his claim was one of conversion. Rather, he argued that
it was a deprivation of property claim involving a violation of his fourteenth amendment due
process rights. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. He alleged that a prisoner “unlawfully deprived of
property may bring a procedural due process claim against the government,” and that the due
process clause was “implicated if a property deprivation occurred as a result of ‘an affirmatively
established or de facto policy, procedure, or custom, which the state has the power to control.’
[Citation.]”
¶9 Henson also filed another motion, entitled “Motion for Order to Produce Plaintiff by
Remote Appearance,” alleging that because he was incarcerated, he required a specific order from
the court to allow him to appear remotely. Henson was absent from the April 20, 2023, hearing, at
which the court noted that there had apparently been an issue with his ability to attend remotely.
The court entered a docket order, listing the three outstanding motions—Henson’s motion for leave
3
to file a motion for summary judgment, the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and Henson’s motion
for an order to produce his remote appearance—and explaining that it would first address the
motion to dismiss, as it raised a statute of limitations argument.
¶ 10 The court also wrote that, pursuant to local rule 2.1(c) (6th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 2.1(c) (Nov.
6, 2014)), allowing oral arguments on motions was at the discretion of the court, and a judge may
choose to decide a motion without hearing oral argument. It noted that Henson had filed a response
to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and granted the defendant leave to file a reply. The court then
stated, “At the court’s discretion, no oral arguments will be heard and the court will rule on the
Motion to Dismiss within 28 days.”
¶ 11 The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on June 2, 2023. In its written
order, the court found that it was “reasonable to construe” Henson’s cause of action as conversion
based on the facts alleged in his complaint. The court ruled that his complaint was therefore subject
to the one-year limitations period set forth in section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act. As Henson
was aware of the defendant’s alleged wrongful withholding of his personal property when the
incident occurred, the court found that the statutory limitations period began to run in mid-January
of 2021, and would have expired in mid-January of 2022. Henson filed his complaint
approximately five months after the limitations period expired.
¶ 12 The court also addressed Henson’s argument that his cause of action was not conversion,
but a procedural due process violation. It first noted that Henson did not dispute the approximate
date on which his cause of action accrued. The court then found that Henson failed to articulate
the elements of a procedural due process claim, or the statutory limitations period that he believed
applied to his claim. The court further explained that while it had construed Henson’s claim as
sounding in tort, even if he had asserted a different type of civil claim against the defendant, the
4
same one-year limitations period would apply under the plain language of section 8-101 of the
Tort Immunity Act.
¶ 13 This appeal followed.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, Henson argues that the circuit court erred in construing the cause of action pled
in his complaint as conversion rather than a procedural due process violation based on a
deprivation of property. Due to this alleged error, he adds, the court should not have applied the
one-year statute of limitations provided in the Tort Immunity Act, but “the appropriate limitations
period for a procedural due process claim.” He also argues that the circuit court violated his due
process rights by denying his request to appear remotely at the hearing on the motion to dismiss
and deprived him of a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” by not allowing oral argument on the
motion.
¶ 16 A. Deprivation of Opportunity to Appear Remotely and Be Heard
¶ 17 Regarding the latter points, Henson is mistaken in alleging that he was denied access to
court proceedings and denied the opportunity to challenge the defendant’s argument in its motion
to dismiss. First, the record shows that the circuit court granted Henson’s request to appear
remotely in its October 21, 2022, docket entry, and instructed him on how to arrange such an
appearance. The court was also clear that it was Henson’s responsibility to arrange his own remote
attendance. When he did not appear at the April 20, 2023, status hearing, the court acknowledged
both at the hearing and in its docket entry from that date that there was an issue with his ability to
appear remotely due to his incarceration.
¶ 18 However, Henson had filed a response to the motion to dismiss and was not obstructed in
any way from challenging all of the defendant’s arguments in that response. Pursuant to the court’s
5
local rules, it had discretion to decide the motion without hearing oral argument. See 6th Judicial
Cir. Ct. R. 2.1(c) (Nov. 6, 2014). Furthermore, Henson alleges that he was prejudiced by the court’s
declining to hear oral argument on the motion to dismiss but does not explain what else he intended
to state in support of his position, that he was unable to include in his written response.
¶ 19 B. Henson’s Cause of Action
¶ 20 We next address Henson’s argument that the circuit court erred in treating his complaint as
pleading conversion rather than a violation of procedural due process. Illinois is a fact-pleading
jurisdiction, and a plaintiff is “required to set forth a legally recognized claim and plead facts in
support of each element that bring the claim within the cause of action alleged.” Rodriguez v.
Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 434 (2007). A small claims complaint is to
be liberally construed; the complaint is sufficient where it clearly notifies the defendant of the
nature of the claim. Porter v. Urbana-Champaign Sanitary District, 237 Ill. App. 3d 296, 300
(1992).
¶ 21 Despite the leniency of small claims proceedings, we presume that pro se litigants have
full knowledge of the applicable court rules and must comply with all rules and procedures to the
same extent required of litigants represented by counsel; we do not apply a more lenient standard
for pro se litigants. Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. A court “will not fill in
the blanks in a pro se complaint.” Rodriguez, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 434.
¶ 22 Henson’s complaint did not specify any cause of action. The core of his claim was that the
defendant retaliated against him for filing repeated grievances and requests under the Freedom of
Information Act by transferring him to a different facility “without warning or preparation”; in that
process, he lost approximately $500 in clothes, personal hygiene items, stationary, food, and drinks
that he was not permitted to take with him. It was only in response to the defendant’s motion to
6
dismiss that he first labeled his cause of action as a procedural due process violation. The circuit
court disagreed and found the complaint to sound in the tort of conversion.
¶ 23 In arriving at this finding, the court adopted the liberal standard afforded to small claims
complaints and applied the elements of a conversion claim to the facts pled. To prove conversion,
a plaintiff must establish that “(1) he has a right to the property; (2) he has an absolute and
unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property; (3) he made a demand for
possession; and (4) the defendant wrongfully and without authorization assumed control,
dominion, or ownership over the property.” Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill. 2d 109, 114 (1998).
The court also noted that it could rule out the possibility of a claim based on contract, as Henson
did not allege the existence of a contractual relationship.
¶ 24 We find that the court did not err in construing Henson’s cause of action as conversion.
Henson did not plead sufficient facts to allow the court to construe his claim as alleging a
procedural due process violation, nor does the term “due process violation” appear in his
complaint. Even a liberal construction of the complaint does not entitle Henson to having the court
read into the pleadings facts that simply are not there. See Rodriguez, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 434. After
the defendant filed its motion to dismiss, in which it argued that his complaint sounded in tort,
Henson made no effort to amend his complaint to properly plead a due process violation, if this
was his intention.
¶ 25 Henson now argues that the due process violation was the deprivation of his property
without adequate procedural safeguards. The fourteenth amendment “protects against the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Chicago Teachers Union,
Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 12; U.S. Const., amend.
XIV. However, it does not create property interests—rather, it protects interests “that a person has
7
already acquired in specific benefits.” Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566,
¶ 12. As our supreme court explained:
“[T]he federal Constitution does not create property interests. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. [Citation.] Therefore, the starting
point in any procedural due process analysis is a determination of whether one of those
protectable interests is present, for if there is not, no process is due. [Citation.]” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 26 Additionally, procedural due process safeguards “are meant to protect persons not from the
deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” East St.
Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. East
St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 415 (1997). After
answering the threshold question of whether there existed a liberty or property interest that had
been interfered with by the State, a court conducting a procedural due process analysis next
“examines the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such an interest through the procedures already
in place, while considering the value of additional safeguards.” Id.
¶ 27 Here, Henson pled that he was deprived of his property in the form of personal items
totaling approximately $500 when he was transferred to a different facility. He does not allege any
basis for why he was entitled to keep these items with him upon being transferred, or what
procedural safeguards he was due as an inmate in federal custody being transferred to a different
jail. To summarize, Henson merely pled that the defendant jail did not allow him to take his
personal items with him when he was transferred. Without anything addressing any elements of a
procedural due process claim, the complaint did not sufficiently notify the defendant that Henson
was bringing a due process claim. See Porter, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 300. The circuit court therefore
did not err in construing his complaint as sounding in the tort of conversion.
8
¶ 28 C. The Applicable Statute of Limitations
¶ 29 Having found that Henson brought a tort claim against the jail, we turn to his remaining
issue on appeal—whether the court erroneously dismissed his complaint as time-barred by
applying the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act. This
section provides in relevant part:
“(a) No civil action other than an action described in subsection (b) may be
commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless
it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of
action accrued.” 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2022).
¶ 30 Any tort action brought against a local government entity must be brought within the one-
year limitations period in section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act. Paszkowski v. Metropolitan
Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2004). Here, it is undisputed that
the alleged injury occurred sometime in mid-January of 2021, when Henson was transferred
without his personal items. Henson does not claim that the existence of his cause of action was
concealed from him or not discoverable for any amount of time after the transfer occurred, and
there is no argument for us to review regarding the possibility of the limitations period being tolled.
¶ 31 Henson filed his complaint on June 14, 2022, approximately one year and five months after
the alleged injury occurred. Therefore, his complaint was untimely, and the circuit court properly
dismissed it for that reason.
¶ 32 CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court granting the defendant’s
motion and dismissing Henson’s complaint with prejudice.
¶ 34 Affirmed.
9