The opinion
06/25/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs June 24, 2025
SHAMIKA FIFER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
No. 19-00838 Jennifer Fitzgerald, Judge
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No. W2024-01377-CCA-R3-PC
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Petitioner, Shamika Fifer, was indicted on charges of first degree murder (Count 1),
attempted first degree murder (Count 2), and employing a firearm during the commission
of a felony (Count 3). At trial, a Shelby County jury convicted her of Count 2 but could
not reach a verdict as to Counts 1 and 3. During a subsequent hearing, Petitioner pleaded
guilty to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder in Count 1 and Count 3 was
dismissed by the State. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years’
confinement. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-
conviction court denied following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that her guilty
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that trial counsel was ineffective.
Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Tenn. R. App. P. Appeal 3 as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER
and STEVEN W. SWORD, JJ., joined.
Rosalind Brown, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Shamika Elizabeth Fifer.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Johnny Cerisano, Assistant Attorney
General; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Kevin McAlpin, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. Trial
On August 6, 2018, Petitioner and co-defendant, Dave Wooten, confronted Brianna
Myles in retaliation for a physical altercation that had occurred between Petitioner and Ms.
Myles the previous day. During the confrontation, Mr. Wooten discharged his firearm,
striking Ms. Myles and fatally wounding a bystander, Brandon Lipsey. The Shelby County
Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for first degree murder (Count 1), attempted first degree
murder (Count 2), and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3).
Petitioner proceeded to trial in November 2021.1
The jury convicted Petitioner of attempted first degree murder but could not reach
a verdict on the charges of first degree murder and employing a firearm during the
commission of a felony.
Subsequently, on January 25, 2022, Petitioner’s case was set for sentencing and a
motion for new trial for the attempted first degree murder conviction in Count 2. However,
rather than proceeding with the motion for new trial, Petitioner opted to plead guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder in
Count 1 of the indictment. The record reflects that as part of Petitioner’s plea agreement,
the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-one years at 100 percent service for Count 1
and twenty-one years at eighty-five percent service for Count 2, to be served concurrently
with Count 1.2 Count 3 was dismissed.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
asserting that her guilty plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered and that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court appointed post-conviction
counsel, who filed an amended petition. On April 5, 2024, the post-conviction court
conducted a hearing on Petitioner’s claims.
1
Petitioner has not provided a complete record on appeal, instead including only transcripts from
the latter portion of the trial, the post-conviction hearing, and a bond hearing. Although the State noted this
deficiency in its appellate brief, Petitioner neither filed a reply brief nor sought to supplement the record.
As a result, our review of the facts is necessarily limited.
2
In the absence of the judgment forms, it is unclear from the limited record whether Petitioner
waived her right to appeal her jury conviction.
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B. Post-Conviction Hearing
Petitioner testified on her own behalf at the post-conviction hearing. Petitioner
stated that she had a good relationship with trial counsel (“Counsel”) until she declined the
State’s original plea offer of thirteen and a half years at twenty percent release eligibility
for the charge of facilitation of first-degree murder. After rejecting the offer, Petitioner
recalled that Counsel had a prosecutor explain to her that if “I don’t take the plea, [the
prosecutor] [was] going to make sure that I get convicted of something.” She explained
that this made her feel “coerced” into initially signing the plea agreement. As a result,
when she appeared before the trial court for the plea hearing, she informed the court that
she was not “comfortable” accepting the plea. Petitioner further requested that the court
appoint new trial counsel. She stated that Counsel had been “very rude,” had used profanity
towards her, and had conveyed inconsistent information to her and her family. However,
she recalled that the court indicated its belief that Counsel had done a good job and denied
the request for new trial counsel.
Regarding the second plea hearing—at which the Petitioner accepted the State’s
offer of twenty-one years at 100 percent—Petitioner ultimately testified that the trial court
“wasn’t informed the second time that I was being coerced.” She said that she was initially
unaware the hearing was for the purpose of entering a guilty plea, stating, “I thought I was
there to be sentenced on the charge that I was found guilty of at trial.” According to
Petitioner, Counsel approached her at the hearing with paperwork and said, “Either you
take this, or you’re going to get life. If you tell them that you want to go to trial again, I’m
going to make sure that you get life.” Petitioner claimed that she informed the court of
Counsel’s statement but proceeded with the plea anyway because she “was afraid.”
Petitioner agreed that Counsel definitively argued that she was not the shooter at
trial. She testified that her co-defendant, Mr. Wooten, was willing to testify on her behalf
that Petitioner never planned to shoot anyone.
Petitioner claimed that, following her guilty plea, she did not pursue a direct appeal
because Counsel failed to inform her of her right to appeal and did not file a notice of
appeal on her behalf.
Petitioner also recalled an instance in which she requested a business card from
another attorney, and Counsel responded, “[y]ou’re going to need all the f[***]ing cards
you can get to get out of this.” She said that Counsel used profanity toward her “at least
two or three times” during the course of his representation.
Petitioner further testified that during trial, Counsel questioned Ms. Myles in an
irrelevant and improper manner. Specifically, Counsel questioned Ms. Myles about
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working as a prostitute. Petitioner averred that this “had nothing to do with why me and
[Ms. Myles] got into a fight.”
On cross-examination, Petitioner acknowledged that the trial court informed her of
her right to appeal during both plea hearings. She also conceded that Counsel would have
been remiss in his duties had he failed to inform her of the risks associated with proceeding
to a second trial. Petitioner indicated that she ultimately chose to plead guilty because she
was afraid of receiving a life sentence.
On redirect examination, Petitioner recalled a Facebook post a detective read into
the record at trial. However, she denied having written the post. Petitioner further testified
that Counsel did not object to the introduction of the post at trial and did not seek to
authenticate the legitimacy of the Facebook account.
Petitioner testified that on the day of her trial, Counsel had brought her clothes to
wear but they did not fit. She stated that she asked Counsel where the clothes were that
her family had arranged for her to wear at trial. Petitioner’s father, Joe Rosser, testified
that Counsel never directed him or his family to bring clothes for Petitioner to wear at trial.
The State called Counsel as its sole witness. Counsel testified that he had been a
licensed attorney in Tennessee for almost twenty-seven years at the time of the hearing and
had been practicing criminal law during that entire time. Counsel stated that he had
primarily practiced in Shelby County and had tried well over 100 trials, approximately nine
of which were death penalty cases.
Counsel testified that he began representing Petitioner in May 2019 and met with
her between seven and twelve times at the jail. He confirmed that he had retained an
investigator to assist with the case but explained that there was “nothing to investigate”
because “the offense was entirely on video.” Counsel stated that the investigator attempted
to locate Ms. Myles; however, neither the investigator nor the State was able to locate her
for several months. He further noted that, aside from Ms. Myles, there were no other
witnesses and that the facts of the case were largely undisputed. To that point, the primary
defense was the legal argument that Petitioner was not criminally responsible for the
actions of her co-defendant.
Counsel testified that he discussed Petitioner’s options with her regarding how to
proceed with the case. He confirmed that Petitioner had the choice of either accepting the
State’s initial offer of thirteen and a half years at twenty percent release eligibility or
proceeding to trial. Counsel recalled that, once it became clear the State’s offer would not
improve, he advised Petitioner that a more favorable plea offer would not be forthcoming.
He further explained that, under the theory of criminal responsibility, Petitioner was likely
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to be convicted of first degree murder, stating, “she would absolutely get convicted”
because Petitioner and Ms. Myles had fought the day before, and Ms. Myles had “[got] the
better of her.”
Counsel indicated that his opinion regarding the prudence of the plea deal was based
on the strength of the evidence. He testified that, after Petitioner initially fought Ms. Myles,
she recruited Mr. Wooten the following day to seek retaliation. According to Counsel,
video footage showed Petitioner retrieving a crowbar from the trunk of a vehicle while Mr.
Wooten placed a firearm in his waistband. Upon seeing Ms. Myles, Petitioner chased her
with the crowbar. When bystander Brandon Lipsey asked what was happening, Mr.
Wooten shot him “point-blank” and then shot Ms. Myles. Following the shooting,
Petitioner told Mr. Wooten they should leave, and the two left the scene together.
Counsel recalled that at the initial plea hearing, Petitioner agreed to the plea and had
signed the paperwork necessary for the plea but changed her mind during the colloquy.
Following this, the State revoked all offers, and the case was set for trial. Counsel stated
that prior to trial, he spoke with Mr. Wooten, whom he anticipated would testify on behalf
of Petitioner. However, Mr. Wooten indicated that Petitioner was responsible for his
current incarceration and that his testimony would not be favorable to Petitioner. Counsel
stated that upon learning this, he made the strategic decision not to call Mr. Wooten as a
witness. Regarding the Facebook post, Counsel testified that it was “the least of our
problems” and that he did not believe he had reasonable grounds to object to the admission
of the post.
Counsel stated that, as a result of the trial, Petitioner was convicted of attempted
first degree murder, while the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of first
degree murder. He recalled that one juror acted as a holdout and effectively refused to
participate in the deliberations. Counsel testified that, following the trial, he secured a plea
offer from the State under which Petitioner would receive a sentence of twenty-one years
for second degree murder, to be served concurrently with the existing twenty-one-year
sentence for attempted first degree murder. The charge in Count 3—employing a firearm
during the commission of a felony—would be dismissed pursuant to the agreement.
With regard to the prosecutor’s presentation of the convicting evidence to Petitioner,
Counsel explained that this was a “reverse proffer.” He explained that “[a] reverse proffer
is where the defendant doesn’t say anything, and the prosecutor lays out the case against
the defendant and explains to the defendant how they would get convicted of what
charges.” He stated that he “was trying to convince [Petitioner] however I could from
whatever source I could to please accept [thirteen and a half] years at twenty percent . . . .”
Counsel confirmed that the reverse proffer took place prior to the first plea hearing.
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Counsel also described his conversation with Petitioner during the second hearing
where she ultimately pleaded guilty:
I explained to [Petitioner] her options, which were, have the sentencing
hearing as to the attempted first-degree murder, and you’re facing [fifteen]
to [twenty-five] years. The Court will probably give you somewhere
between [eighteen] to [twenty-one]. You’re stuck with that. Then, with a
sentence of [eighteen] to [twenty-one] years, the only question is what’s
going to happen with the first-degree murder? You can absolutely go to trial.
The count was [eleven] to [one] to convict. The only reason you’re not
serving a life sentence now is because one of the jurors chose not to
participate in the process. So, I don’t see what you’re gaining. Please cut
your losses. I’m glad she did.
C. Post-Conviction Court’s Findings
The post-conviction court made its findings in a written order entered August 15,
2024. The court first addressed Petitioner’s collective claims pertaining to whether her
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The court found that Petitioner entered the
plea to avoid a life sentence for first degree murder, not because she was pressured or
coerced. The court noted that the guilty plea hearing held on January 24, 2022,
demonstrated that each of Petitioner’s rights was explained to her and that Petitioner
affirmed that she understood those rights and chose to plead guilty. The court included in
its analysis a portion of the plea colloquy in which Petitioner specifically affirmed that she
was not being forced to enter a plea and that she was doing so freely and voluntarily. The
court concluded that “nothing in the record suggests that the Petitioner did not understand
her rights as they were explained to her.”
The court further found that Petitioner was fully informed when she entered her plea
following her conviction at trial. While Petitioner may not have known about the plea
agreement prior to the day she entered into it, the court determined that “[Counsel] acted
reasonably under the circumstances in informing . . . Petitioner about her rights and
options.” In particular, the court noted that Counsel advised Petitioner she would face a
sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years regardless of the outcome on the remaining counts.
Accordingly, Petitioner faced the choice of risking a harsher sentence by proceeding to
another trial or “cutting her losses” by accepting the plea agreement. The court observed
that although Counsel did not meet with Petitioner between the trial and the plea date,
Counsel nonetheless informed her of her rights and options prior to the plea. The court,
therefore, concluded that Petitioner’s receiving the plea offer on the same day it was
entered “had no bearing on whether the plea was free and voluntary.”
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With respect to Petitioner’s claim that she was coerced into pleading guilty as a
result of the reverse proffer, the court found that argument to be without merit. The court
noted that at the plea hearing, Petitioner informed the court that Counsel allowed the
prosecutor to present the convicting evidence to her and assert that she would be convicted
of some offense. However, when the court asked Petitioner whether “anything about that
changed her mind to plead guilty,” she responded in the negative. Based on this exchange,
the court concluded that Petitioner made the decision to plead guilty voluntarily, after
“weigh[ing] her options and deciding that pleading guilty was in her best interest.”
The court next addressed Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
regarding her guilty plea. It concluded that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving
that Counsel “scared and threatened” her into pleading guilty. The court determined that
no such threats were made. Rather, based on Petitioner’s own testimony, the court found
that she chose to accept the twenty-one-year plea offer because she feared receiving a life
sentence if convicted of first degree murder at trial. The court reiterated that Counsel fully
explained Petitioner’s rights and options and the risks associated with proceeding to trial.
The court then considered Petitioner’s claim that Counsel was ineffective for
advising her that she would likely be convicted at a subsequent trial, despite the initial trial
resulting in a hung jury. The court noted Counsel’s testimony that the hung jury on the
first degree murder count was due to one juror’s refusal to deliberate. Given that the
evidence supported a theory of criminal responsibility, the court found that Counsel acted
reasonably in seeking to negotiate a plea agreement in order to avoid the risks associated
with a second trial. In any event, the court emphasized that the decision to plead guilty
was ultimately made by Petitioner. As such, the court concluded Petitioner failed to
demonstrate prejudice resulting from Counsel’s advice.
Regarding Petitioner’s claim that Counsel was rude and used profanity, the court
found the issue was without merit. The court stated that “[a]lthough Petitioner was
unsatisfied with how and what [Counsel] told her about her case, it appears [Counsel] told
her the truth.” The court credited the testimony of Counsel and found that Petitioner “just
simply did not want to hear the truth about her case.” Moreover, Petitioner provided no
evidence that Counsel’s cursing affected her decision to plead guilty.
Regarding Petitioner’s claim that Counsel inappropriately attacked the character of
Ms. Myles, the court concluded that Counsel was not ineffective and that Petitioner
suffered no resulting prejudice from Counsel’s actions. The court determined that it was
reasonable for Counsel to challenge the victim’s credibility by presenting evidence that she
was engaged in illicit activity for financial gain.
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With respect to Petitioner’s claim that Counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the Facebook post, the court determined that Counsel’s performance was not deficient.
The court credited Counsel’s testimony that he did not believe there was a valid basis to
object to the post. Accordingly, the court concluded that it was reasonable for Counsel to
refrain from raising an objection.
Finally, with respect to Petitioner’s claim that Counsel failed to inform her that she
could wear street clothes at trial, the court determined that Petitioner failed to meet her
burden of proof. The court credited Counsel’s testimony that he informed both Petitioner
and her family of her right to wear street clothes during trial. When her family did not
provide other clothing, Counsel brought clothes himself; however, they did not fit.
Accordingly, the court concluded that this claim lacked merit.
Having determined that Petitioner failed to meet her burden on any of her claims,
the court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner’s timely appeal follows.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in denying her
petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Petitioner argues that: (1) Counsel
exhibited inappropriate behavior toward her after she declined the State’s initial plea offer;
(2) Counsel improperly attacked a witness’s character during trial; (3) Counsel failed to
inform her of her right to appeal her jury conviction; (4) the trial court denied her request
to appoint new trial counsel after she expressed feeling coerced by Counsel; (5) Counsel
arranged a meeting between her and a prosecutor, during which the prosecutor explained
the State’s evidence against her; (6) Counsel failed to object to the introduction of the
Facebook post at trial; and (7) Counsel did not inform her that she had the option to wear
street clothes at trial. The State argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and has waived
review of her claims by failing to adequately brief the issues and to provide a complete
record on appeal.
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) provides that a brief shall contain
an argument setting forth “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require
appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record . .
. relied on.” Our court’s rules say the same: “Issues which are not supported by argument,
citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in
this court.” Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b).
Here, Petitioner’s brief fails to support the issues raised with argument or citations
to the record. In the argument section, Petitioner states: “[Petitioner] alleges that her plea
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was not knowing and voluntary. The following discusses the facts, court’s decision and
argument of [Petitioner] on her contentions[.]” Immediately thereafter, she merely restates
the issues presented for review, followed by the sentence fragment: “In support of her
contentions[.]” The brief includes no further argument or legal analysis. Accordingly,
Petitioner has waived review of all claims by failing to adequately brief the issues. See
Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b).
Waiver notwithstanding, Petitioner is not entitled to relief due to her failure to
provide an adequate record on appeal. She included only transcripts from the latter portion
of the trial, the post-conviction hearing, and a bond hearing. Although the State noted this
deficiency in its responsive brief, Petitioner neither filed a reply brief nor sought to
supplement the record.
As the appellant, Petitioner bears the burden of preparing a record that conveys “a
fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are
the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). “Where . . . the record is incomplete, and
does not contain a transcript of the proceedings relevant to an issue presented for review,
or portions of the record upon which a party relies, this Court is precluded from considering
the issue.” State v. Roberts, 755 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citing State v.
Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tenn. 1981); State v. Jones, 623 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1981)). Importantly, “[i]n the absence of an adequate record on appeal, we
must presume that the trial court’s ruling was supported by the evidence.” State v. Bibbs,
806 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Smith v. State, 584 S.W.2d 811, 812
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Vermilye v. State, 584 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1979)).
Notably, Petitioner failed to include transcripts from the plea hearing in the appellate
record.3 These transcripts are directly relevant to her claim that her guilty plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily made. The post-conviction court relied heavily on them in
concluding that Petitioner’s plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and found that
“each of her rights were explained to her” during the second guilty plea hearing. The court
further observed that Petitioner affirmed to the trial court that she was pleading guilty freely
and voluntarily. Additionally, the court found that while Petitioner raised concerns about
Counsel during the plea hearing, she expressly stated that those concerns did not affect her
decision to plead guilty. The plea hearing transcripts are necessary for appellate review
and in their absence, we must presume the findings of the post-conviction court are correct.
Bibbs, 806 S.W.2d at 790. Likewise, Petitioner is not entitled to relief regarding her
3
We recognize our supreme court’s holding in State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012),
that, when a guilty plea hearing transcript is absent, appellate courts must determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the record permits meaningful review under State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn.2012).
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ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As the State correctly notes, Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance claims are largely based on Counsel’s actions regarding her guilty
plea and his trial performance. However, in the absence of the full trial record and the plea
hearing transcripts, this court is unable to provide meaningful review of these issues. As
such, we again must presume that the post-conviction court’s rulings are correct. Id.
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on these issues.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
s/ Matthew J. Wilson
MATTHEW WILSON, JUDGE
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