Brown v. Phelps

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

PADUCAH DIVISION

JONATHON S. BROWN PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-P76-JHM

JODIE PHELPS al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil-rights action. This matter is before the

Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss this action without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint.

I.

Plaintiff Jonathon S. Brown is incarcerated as a convicted prisoner at Christian County Jail

(CCJ). Plaintiff sues 3C Healthcare; 3C Healthcare Nurse Jodie Phelps in her official and

individual capacities; and CCJ Jailer Adam Smith in his official and individual capacities.

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the complaint:

On March 29 at or around 6 P.M. in cell 992 I was assaulted by 2 inmates. My jaw

was broken and I was stabbed in my neck with a weapon. I notified staff and asked

them to take me to the E.R. I was given 2 tylenol and ice pack and escorted to cell

901. I could not open my mouth and my neck was swollen from puncture wound.

Again, I asked staff to take me to the hospital. For the next 8 days I told staff

everyday that I needed to go to the hospital. Finally I was given an x-ray at CCJ. I

flied grievance on 3-31-25 and 4-7-25. Still no relief. 12 days later I was taken to

oral doctor. She ordered a cat-scan. CCJ missed my appointment. 20 days later I

had cat-scan on the 17 day of April. I filed another grievance. 28 days after cat

scan more than 6 wks later I was finally transported to oral doctor. Doctor Lauren

Braden informed me that my jaw was indeed broke and I that I still have a piece of

graphite in my neck. [She] informs me that in order to have that object removed, I

would have to have surgery. [She] also stated to me that the way I was treated was

inhumane and unprofessional. The fact that the CCJ staff had a total disregard for

my well-being and safety. Also due to [this incident], the entire nursing staff was

written up by their supervisor. . . .

As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages.

II.

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or

employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A,

the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In order to survive dismissal

for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,

561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)

(citations omitted)). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, while liberal, this standard

of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Columbia Natural

Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court’s duty “does not require [it] to

conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a

claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).

To command otherwise would require the court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a

pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to

the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful

strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

III.

“Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations

of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351

(6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446

U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and

laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Absent either element,

a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).

Here, the Court construes the complaint as asserting Eighth Amendment claims for

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

A. Christian County/Official-Capacity Claim

Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against CCJ Jailer Adam Smith is actually against his

employer Christian County. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“Official-

capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of

which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Neither a municipality nor a county can be held responsible for a

constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a policy or custom of the

municipality or county and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton

v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). The policy or custom “must be

‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability” of the

municipality or county under § 1983. Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)

(quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that he suffered any constitutional injury due to a

policy or custom of Christian County. Instead, Plaintiff alleges circumstances that affected him

only. Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Defendant

Smith/Christian County for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. 3C Medical Care/Official-Capacity Claim

For the reason explained above, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Nurse Jodie

Phelps is actually against her employer, 3C Medical Care. 3C Medical Care is ostensibly the entity

that contracts with Christian County to provide medical care to inmates at CCJ. The same analysis

that applies to a § 1983 claim against a municipality or county applies to a § 1983 claim against a

privately contracted entity such as 3C Medical Care. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d

810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, the liability of a contracted private entity must be based on a policy

or custom of the entity. Id.; see also Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465

(6th Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that he suffered any constitutional injury due to a

policy or custom of 3C Medical Care. As stated above, the circumstances affected only him.

Moreover, his allegation that a 3C Medical Care supervisor disciplined the nurses involved in

Plaintiff’s medical care at CCJ cuts against any argument that a 3C Medical Care custom or policy

caused him to suffer a constitutional injury. Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against

3C Medical Care and his official-capacity against Nurse Phelps for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

C. Individual-Capacity Claims

The complaint contains no allegations against Defendant Smith or Phelps. The Sixth

Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged

violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each

defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648, 661

(6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (italics in original).

Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the claim against

the defendant is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se

complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal

of plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where the

complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were

personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights).

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Smith liable in his individual

capacity based on his role as the CCJ Jailer, supervisory liability “must be based on active

unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon ‘a mere failure to act.’” Shehee v. Luttrell,

199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th

Cir. 1998)). The doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply

in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell, 436 U.S at 691; Taylor v. Mich.

Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.

1984).

Thus, because the complaint contains no allegations that either Defendant Smith or

Defendant Phelps was personally involved in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, Plaintiff's mdividual-capacity claims against them must also be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

D. Amended Complaint

Although the Court is dismissing this action for the above-stated reasons, the dismissal will

be without prejudice and with leave to Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff decides

to file an amended complaint, he should identify the specific CCJ officers and/or 3C Medical Care

nurses who he alleges violated his constitutional rights, name those individuals as Defendants, sue

those Defendants in their individual capacities, and state specifically how each allegedly violated

his constitutional rights. See Rashada v. Fiegel, No. 23-1674, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7883, at

*12 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024) (approving dismissal of pro se complaint without prejudice and with

leave to amend).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enter a separate Order dismissing this action

without prejudice and with leave to amend the complaint.

IT IS ORDERED that any amended complaint must be filed no later than July 24, 2025.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place this case number and the word “Amended”

on a § 1983 complaint form and send it to Plaintiff, along with three summons forms, should

Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint.

Date: June 24, 2025

Sr

Joseph H. Mckinley Jr., Senior Judge

United States District Court

ce: Plaintiff, pro se

4414.011