The opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0161p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
ROBERT CARBONE,
│
Plaintiff-Appellant, │
│
v. > No. 24-3795
│
│
WULF KAAL; RAPHAEL BAUMANN; MICHAEL STEUER; │
OPEN SOURCE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION; │
EMERGING TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION; JOHN and JANE │
DOES 1–35, │
Defendants-Appellees. │
┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:23-cv-03443—Algenon L. Marbley, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: June 20, 2025
Before: GILMAN, DAVIS, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Lindsey E. Sacher, Spencer E. Krebs, TUCKER ELLIS LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for
Appellant. Kevin T. Shook, Zackary L. Stillings, FROST BROWN TODD LLC, Columbus,
Ohio, for Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Robert Carbone, who lives in Connecticut, sued two Swiss
organizations and several individuals who live in California, Illinois, and Switzerland for
defamation and other tortious conduct. Carbone was a member of the two Swiss organizations.
He claims that the defendants used websites to publish defamatory statements about him and to
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 2
facilitate his removal from the organizations. He decided to file suit in Ohio. Why Ohio?
Because the Swiss organizations maintained servers in Ohio that hosted the organizations’
websites. So Carbone’s theory is that the allegedly improper statements about him would have
passed through the servers in Ohio on the way to their destination. Nothing else connected any
of the parties to Ohio.
The district court dismissed Carbone’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We
affirm.
I.
The Emerging Technology Association (“ETA”) and the Open Source Standards
Association (“OSSA”) are Swiss “decentralized autonomous organizations” (“DAOs”). DAOs
like ETA and OSSA are “used in the world of cryptocurrency by investors and other players in
that field.” R. 32-1, PageID 405. Wulf Kaal, an Illinois resident, is a co-founder and board
member of both ETA and OSSA. Michael Steuer, a California resident, is also a member of the
DAOs and holds majority voting rights for both organizations. Raphael Baumann, a resident of
Switzerland, is a member and president of ETA. And Defendants John/Jane Does 1-35 are other
unknown ETA and OSSA members.
Carbone, a Connecticut resident, was also a member of ETA and OSSA. But in October
2022, Kaal, Steuer, and Baumann allegedly accused him of engaging in sexual misconduct
against ETA’s compliance director. Not only that, Carbone claims they falsely implied to ETA
and OSSA members that three law firms investigated his misconduct. Carbone alleges that ETA
and OSSA members voted to remove him from the organizations because of these false
statements, resulting in damages.
Carbone sued Defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio for defamation, tortious interference, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent
misrepresentation, invoking the court’s diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. Carbone does not
contend that he—or any defendant—lives in or even visits Ohio. Instead, in his complaint,
Carbone alleges that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants
because they “transacted business in Ohio, engaged in business acts in Ohio and/or caused a
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 3
tortious injury through events occurring in Ohio.” R. 1, PageID 6. In particular, ETA and OSSA
maintain websites with servers located in Ohio.
ETA’s website has a portal that allows its members to discuss and vote on business
matters. Carbone contends that Defendants used the ETA website to engage in business
dealings, publish defamatory statements about him, and vote on his removal from the DAOs. He
also asserts that the defamatory statements “had to ‘hit’ or ‘pass through’” the Ohio-based server
to reach other members. R. 32-1, PageID 407. As for OSSA’s website, Carbone states that
members used it to communicate and conduct business activities. And he attests that Defendants
“would or should have had access to information regarding the location of the server[s].” Id. at
408.
Defendants moved to dismiss Carbone’s complaint for, among other reasons, lack of
personal jurisdiction. In support of their motions to dismiss, Defendants proffered evidence that
third parties selected the server locations for them. Charles Wismer stated that ETA gave him a
grant to construct the ETA website. No one directed him to use a server in Ohio, nor did he
discuss the server’s location with Defendants. Instead, Wismer chose a server in Ohio “based
upon cost and [his] experience.” R. 11-1, PageID 114. Similarly, OSSA hired a third-party
vendor to develop its website. No one at OSSA told the vendor to use an Ohio-based server, and
there was “no specific reason” the vendor chose to do so. R. 27-2, PageID 278.
The district court determined that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over
Defendants and granted the motions to dismiss. Carbone now appeals.
II.
A plaintiff filing a lawsuit in federal court bears the burden of establishing a prima facie
case that the district court can maintain personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Peters Broad.
Eng’g, Inc. v. 24 Cap., LLC, 40 F.4th 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2022). He can meet this initial burden
“merely through the complaint.” Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 504
(6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). This requires “establish[ing], with reasonable particularity,
sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state to satisfy the relevant long-arm
statute and the Due Process Clause.” Id. (citations omitted).
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 4
If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the
defendant. Peters Broad. Eng’g, 40 F.4th at 437. The defendant must support its motion to
dismiss with evidence showing that the district court lacks jurisdiction over it. Id.
If the defendant provides such evidence, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff. Id.
At that point, the plaintiff “may no longer stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit or
otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Id. at 437–38 (internal
quotation marks omitted). And the plaintiff must establish the district court’s jurisdiction “over
each defendant independently.” Beydoun v. Wataniya Rests. Holding, Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499, 504
(6th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).
When a district court grants a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure without conducting an evidentiary hearing, as the court did here, we consider
the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Anwar v. Dow Chem.
Co., 876 F.3d 841, 847 (6th Cir. 2017). Moreover, we do not weigh “the controverting
assertions of the party seeking dismissal.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We review de novo the district court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Blessing v. Chandrasekhar, 988 F.3d 889, 901 (6th Cir. 2021).
III.
By filing an action against Defendants in the district court, Carbone invoked that court’s
diversity jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). “When sitting in diversity, a
federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only if a court of
the forum state could do so.” Blessing, 988 F.3d at 901 (citation omitted). As a result,
“[a] federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in a diversity of citizenship case must be
both (1) authorized by the law of the state in which it sits, and (2) in accordance with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Beydoun, 768 F.3d at 504 (quotation omitted).
Because Carbone cannot show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants satisfies
due process, we need not consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction would also run afoul
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 5
of Ohio’s long-arm statute.1 See Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1459 (6th Cir. 1991)
(conducting the due-process analysis first).
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits “any State” from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. Relevant here, it “protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject
to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties,
or relations.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants
only where those defendants have “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Personal jurisdiction can be either “general” or “specific.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581
U.S. 402, 413 (2017). General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s relationship with the forum
state is “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home” there. Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 317). On the other hand, specific jurisdiction “arises out of or relates to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (alterations and
quotation omitted). Indeed, “specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving
from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 564 U.S.
at 919 (internal quotation marks omitted). For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a
defendant, a plaintiff must establish a “substantial connection” among “the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). Our “primary concern” under
either type of jurisdiction “is the burden on the defendant.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super.
Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 263 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1
Although the district court never considered whether exercising personal jurisdiction over ETA and OSSA
was appropriate under the Due Process Clause, we can “affirm a decision of the district court for any reason
supported by the record, including on grounds different from those on which the district court relied.” Phillips v.
UAW Int’l, 854 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 6
Carbone never argued that the district court had general jurisdiction over Defendants.
We therefore consider only whether he established specific jurisdiction.
We have long applied a three-part specific-jurisdiction test. Under that test, the district
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants would comport with due process if:
(1) Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting, or causing a
consequence, in Ohio; (2) Carbone’s claims against Defendants arise from Defendants’ activities
in Ohio; and (3) Defendants’ actions, or the consequences they caused, have a substantial enough
connection with Ohio to make it reasonable for a court in Ohio to exercise jurisdiction. See
Peters Broad. Eng’g, 40 F.4th at 441; S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381
(6th Cir. 1968).
Because the district court decided Defendants’ motions to dismiss without an evidentiary
hearing, all Carbone had to do was make a prima facie showing. See Malone, 965 F.3d at 505.
He failed to do so.
Did Defendants purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio? To
subject itself to the jurisdiction of a court in a foreign state, a defendant must “purposefully
avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within th[at] State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citation
omitted). This “requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely
as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another
party or a third person.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Simply put, “[t]he contacts must be the defendant’s own choice,” Ford Motor Co. v.
Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021), and they must “create a substantial
connection with the forum State,” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We have described the purposeful-availment component as “the constitutional
touchstone of personal jurisdiction.” AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543, 550 (6th
Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Recall that Carbone contends that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the
privilege of acting in Ohio by maintaining computer servers there—servers that Defendants used
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 7
to publish allegedly defamatory statements about Carbone. Nothing else connects Defendants to
Ohio. They do not reside there, nor do they conduct any other business there. Defendants
counter that maintaining servers in Ohio does not suffice to create a substantial connection with
Ohio because, among other reasons, they did not select Ohio as the location for the servers—
their agents made that decision. Defendants have the better argument.
Two Supreme Court decisions guide our purposeful-availment analysis.
In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), the Supreme Court “establishe[d] that the
effects of intentional torts sometimes may establish personal jurisdiction,” Johnson v. Griffin, 85
F.4th 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2023), where the “intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were
expressly aimed at [the forum state],” Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. There, the Court found that the
defendants—who published an “allegedly libelous story” in a magazine—“expressly aimed”
their actions at California. Id. at 788–89. For one, the “story concerned the California activities
of a California resident.” Id. at 788. Plus, the defendants “knew that the brunt of th[e] injury
would be felt” in California, where the plaintiff lived and the magazine was widely circulated.
Id. at 789–90. The Court thus concluded that a California court had jurisdiction over the out-of-
state defendants because California was “the focal point both of the story and of the harm
suffered.” Id. at 789.
More recently, in Walden, the Supreme Court acknowledged the limits of Calder’s
“effects” test. The Walden defendant seized cash from the plaintiffs at an airport in Georgia and
later submitted an allegedly false affidavit against them to federal prosecutors in Georgia. 571
U.S. at 288. The plaintiffs argued that a Nevada court had personal jurisdiction over the
defendant because “he knew his allegedly tortious conduct in Georgia would delay the return of
funds to plaintiffs with connections to Nevada.” Id. at 279. The Court rejected this argument,
concluding that the defendant had “no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada,” because
he “never traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or
anyone to Nevada.” Id. at 289.
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 8
We recently applied Calder and Walden in two cases considering whether allegedly
tortious tweets created personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. See Blessing, 988 F.3d
at 892; Johnson, 85 F.4th at 431.
In Blessing, the defendants, residents of California and New Jersey, tweeted about
Kentucky high school students and their conduct at a rally in Washington, D.C. 988 F.3d at
892–83. We concluded that the defendants did not direct their actions at Kentucky—where the
plaintiffs lived—via their tweets. Id. at 906. This was because the defendants had no preexisting
relationship with the plaintiffs; the tweets did not target Kentucky readers; the plaintiffs never
alleged that anyone in Kentucky read the tweets; and the defendants never sought the benefits or
protections of Kentucky’s laws. Id. Therefore, a Kentucky court could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendants.
We reached the opposite conclusion in Johnson. There, the defendant, who was also a
defendant in Blessing, sent a series of tweets asserting that a Tennessee CEO “had engaged in
homophobic conduct.” Johnson, 85 F.4th at 431. The “tweets drew [from] a Tennessee
source . . . to attack a Tennessee resident for his conduct in Tennessee.” Id. at 434. Indeed, the
tweets mentioned Tennessee directly, identified the plaintiff’s Tennessee employer, and
allegedly led to the termination of the plaintiff’s employment in Tennessee. Id. Accordingly, we
held that a Tennessee court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 435.
The facts of this case more closely resemble Walden and Blessing than Calder and
Johnson. As in Walden, Defendants never visited Ohio or contacted anyone there. See 571 U.S.
at 289. And like in Blessing, the complaint does not allege that anyone in Ohio read the
defamatory statements, and Defendants’ allegedly tortious actions never targeted anyone in
Ohio. See 988 F.3d at 906. Unlike Calder and Johnson, Carbone never asserted that the
defamatory statements concerned conduct occurring in Ohio or Ohio residents. Nor did he
contend that anyone in Ohio read the statements or that he suffered an injury in Ohio. See
Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90; Johnson, 85 F.4th at 435. In sum, Ohio was never “the focal point
. . . of the story [or] of the harm suffered.” See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. As a result, Defendants
did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio through their alleged
tortious conduct.
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 9
Carbone resists this conclusion by arguing that Defendants targeted Ohio by using Ohio-
based servers to commit the tortious acts. But mere transmission of information through a server
has little, if any, effect in Ohio. Cf. uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 432 (7th
Cir. 2010) (noting that “[w]here [the defendant] chooses to locate the servers that complete the
[allegedly tortious act] is irrelevant”); Silver v. Brown, 382 F. App’x 723, 732 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“The location of . . . the computer server . . . has little practical effect on the damage caused.”).
All in all, Carbone cannot rely on the effects of Defendants’ allegedly tortious actions to
establish personal jurisdiction in Ohio.
Carbone also argues, relying on out-of-circuit decisions, that an Ohio court can maintain
personal jurisdiction over Defendants based on Defendants choosing to locate website servers
there. Under his proposed test, personal jurisdiction exists if Defendants used a server to commit
wrongful acts and “‘something more’ than the mere use of the server [] connects the user to the
forum.” D. 19 at p.20; see MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012); Will Co. v.
Lee, 47 F.4th 917 (9th Cir. 2022), overruled in part by Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739
(9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). He claims that “something more” exists here because Defendants:
(1) “would or should have had access to information regarding the location of the server[s],” R.
32-1, PageID 408, and (2) benefited from locating them in Ohio. Carbone’s arguments fall short.
Carbone asserts that Defendants had either actual or constructive knowledge that their
agents selected Ohio as the location for the servers. Yet even assuming Defendants knew of the
servers’ location, their use of Ohio-based servers alone fails to create a “substantial connection”
between Defendants and Ohio. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 284; see also Carefirst of Md., Inc., v.
Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have described as de
minimis the level of contact created by the connection between an out-of-state defendant and a
web server located within a forum.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); GreatFence.com, Inc. v.
Bailey, 726 F. App’x 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2018) (concluding that “a web server’s location alone”
did not establish personal jurisdiction “where there is no allegation, argument, or evidence that
the defendants played any role in selecting the server’s location”).
What is more, Carbone failed to establish that Defendants themselves created any
connections with Ohio. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472,
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 10
478 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Indeed, ETA and OSSA contracted with third parties who
independently chose to locate the servers in Ohio.2 And Carbone neither alleged nor established
by affidavit that Defendants themselves chose the server location or sought a financial benefit
from locating them in Ohio. Overall, Carbone failed to show that using an Ohio-based server
was “[Defendants’] own choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous,” or that Defendants had
“fair warning” that the location of a website server “may subject [them] to” Ohio’s jurisdiction.
See Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359–60 (quotations omitted).
The cases Carbone relies on from our sister circuits do not persuade us otherwise. In
MacDermid, the defendant accessed the plaintiff’s computer servers to misappropriate
confidential information. 702 F.3d at 726–27. The plaintiff sued in Connecticut, alleging that
the defendant knew the servers were located there and used them “to send an email which itself
constituted the alleged tort.” Id. at 730. The defendant also directed her tortious activity toward
the plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation. Id. The Second Circuit thus determined that the
defendant purposefully availed herself of the privilege of acting in Connecticut. Id. But
crucially here, Defendants never directed any tortious activity toward Ohio or its residents.
Instead, they directed their allegedly tortious actions at Carbone, a Connecticut resident.
Carbone’s reliance on Will Co. fares no better. In that case, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether computer servers connected a foreign company to the United States under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). 47 F.4th at 922, 925. To begin, Rule 4(k)(2) does not apply here—it
applies only to federal claims outside of state-court jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
Plus, the minimum-contacts analysis under that rule focuses not on the defendant’s contacts with
a certain state, but with the United States generally. Lyngaas v. Curaden AG, 992 F.3d 412, 422
(6th Cir. 2021). So the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the defendant targeted the United States
by using and benefiting from a U.S.-based server carries little weight here. See Will Co.,
47 F.4th at 926.
In the end, viewing the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to Carbone,
Defendants never created a substantial connection with Ohio. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.
2
Because these facts do not conflict with those offered by Carbone, we may consider them. See Neogen
Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002).
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 11
That the alleged defamatory statements traveled through an Ohio-based server establishes only
“random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” with the State. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Do Carbone’s claims against Defendants arise from Defendants’ activities in Ohio? The
arises-from prong of the purposeful-availment test “is subject to a lenient standard.” Schneider
v. Hardesty, 669 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). It requires
only that the cause of action “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,”
Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can meet this
requirement by showing that the defendant “purposefully direct[ed] communications into the
forum, and those communications form the heart of the cause of action.” Intera Corp. v.
Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 617–18 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Although Carbone alleges that Defendants transacted business in Ohio, he failed to show
that his claims arose from any of Defendants’ business transactions. He argues instead that
Defendants committed intentional torts, like defamation, through the Ohio-based servers. Yet he
does not contend that Defendants wrote the defamatory statements in Ohio; that they directed the
statements towards Ohio; or that anyone in Ohio read the statements. Nor does he allege that
anyone in Ohio used the website to vote on Carbone’s removal from the organizations.
True enough, Carbone declares that the defamatory statements and votes on his removal
passed through the Ohio-based servers. Even so, it was not the physical transmittal of
information through a server that constituted the allegedly tortious activity. Cf. MacDermid, 702
F.3d at 727, 730 (using “servers to send an email [] itself constituted” the tortious actions of
“unauthorized access and misuse of a computer system and misappropriation of trade secrets”).
Instead, Defendants’ actions elsewhere—writing and communicating3 defamatory statements and
facilitating Carbone’s removal—“form the ‘heart’ of the cause of action.” Intera Corp., 428
F.3d at 618 (quotation omitted). Carbone thus failed to show that his claims arose from
Defendants’ connections to Ohio.
3
The act of publishing occurs when others read or hear the defamatory statements. See Hartman v. Kerch,
217 N.E.3d 881, 902 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023) (“Publication” occurs “by any act communicating the defamatory matter
to a third party.”); see also Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984) (“The tort of libel is generally
held to occur wherever the offending material is circulated.” (citation omitted)).
No. 24-3795 Carbone v. Kaal, et al. Page 12
* * *
In sum, Carbone did not “establish, with reasonable particularity, sufficient contacts
between the [Defendants] and the forum state to satisfy . . . the Due Process Clause.” See
Malone, 965 F.3d at 504 (citation omitted). He thus failed to make a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction. See Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1459 (holding that dismissal is “proper if all
of the specific facts [the plaintiff] alleged collectively failed to state a prima facie case for
jurisdiction under the appropriate standards”).4
IV.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
4
Because Carbone failed to establish that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of
acting in Ohio or that Carbone’s claims against Defendants arise from Defendants’ activities in Ohio, we need not
consider whether it would be reasonable for an Ohio court to exercise jurisdiction over Defendants.