reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment because “a reasonable jury could conclude that Raytheon knowingly waived its right to enforce” certain insurance requirements after it “accepted premiums from Mr. Rhorer for several months”
How later courts described this case
- reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment because “a reasonable jury could conclude that Raytheon knowingly waived its right to enforce” certain insurance requirements after it “accepted premiums from Mr. Rhorer for several months”
- describing standard as requiring merely “evidence . . . that clearly supports the basis for its denial” (quotation omitted)
- explaining that whether a participating business has employees speaks to “the determination of the existence of an employee welfare benefit plan” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-60381 Document: 72-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/20/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 24-60381 June 20, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
James R. Edwards,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Guardian Life Insurance of America,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:22-CV-145
______________________________
Before King, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:
After Pamela Edwards died of cancer, her widower sought payment
on her life insurance policy. Guardian Life Insurance denied his claim. Jimmy
Edwards then sued the insurer in federal court. The district court granted
Guardian’s motion for partial summary judgment. We reverse and render
judgment for Edwards.
I
Pam Edwards owned and operated a beauty salon in Starkville,
Mississippi called Allure Salon. She was diagnosed with cancer in 2019 and
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No. 24-60381
underwent radiation, chemotherapy, and surgery thereafter. Tragically,
Pam’s cancer never went into remission, and she died on May 27, 2022.
Upon Pam’s death, insurance agent Debbie Jaudon informed her
husband, Jimmy, that Pam had a life insurance policy from Guardian. She had
purchased the policy in 2007, as she “wanted to be sure that she had
something to leave to her husband.” ROA.160. Pam dealt exclusively with
Allure’s finances, so Jimmy was unaware of the policy until Jaudon informed
him of its existence.
Jaudon then requested a life claim form from Guardian. But Guardian
claimed the policy had been cancelled before Pam’s death. The insurer
argued that Pam bought a group policy to cover multiple Allure employees.
But in November 2019, Allure’s coverage dropped to one (Pam)—thus
triggering Guardian’s contractual right to cancel it.
That was news to Jaudon, Pam’s insurance agent, because she never
received a notice of cancellation. How so? Guardian says that in September
2020, it “temporarily suspended its practice of terminating plans that had
dropped to one participant due to the COVID 19 pandemic that was
impacting the entire globe.” Red Br. at 6. Guardian later renewed its normal
cancellation practices and terminated Pam’s coverage on January 15, 2022. It
nevertheless remains a mystery why Guardian never notified Jaudon of the
cancellation.
Jimmy Edwards sued Guardian in the Northern District of
Mississippi. 1 He brought various claims under Mississippi common law, and
argued that in the alternative, ERISA entitled him to recover benefits under
_____________________
1
Jimmy Edwards passed away during the pendency of this case. Accordingly, the
court granted a motion on June 20, 2025 to substitute his son and the executor of his estate,
James R. Edwards, as appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(a)(1).
2
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No. 24-60381
the plan. Guardian moved for partial summary judgment, arguing ERISA
governed the plan and preempted Edwards’ common-law claims. The
district court granted Guardian’s motion. Jimmy timely appealed.
II
As a threshold matter, we find that ERISA applies to the Allure
policy. ERISA governs “any employee benefit plan if it is established or
maintained by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or
activity affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1). The mere purchase of
an insurance policy does not immediately establish that ERISA applies. See,
e.g., Shearer v. Sw. Serv. Life Ins. Co., 516 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2008).
Instead, to decide whether a policy qualifies as an employee benefit plan, “we
ask whether a plan: (1) exists; (2) falls within the safe-harbor provision
established by the Department of Labor; and (3) satisfies the primary
elements” of such a plan: “establishment or maintenance by an employer
intending to benefit employees.” Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352, 355
(5th Cir. 1993). Failure to satisfy any of these elements means ERISA does
not apply. Ibid.
The parties mainly dispute whether Allure had employees—a
question that implicates the first and third Meredith prongs. See House v. Am.
United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443, 450 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
whether a participating business has employees speaks to “the determination
of the existence of an employee welfare benefit plan” (emphasis added));
Meredith, 980 F.2d at 355–56 (locating it in “step three” while
acknowledging the “circ[ularity]” of the inquiry). Employee benefit plans
under ERISA do not include those “[p]lans that cover only sole owners or
partners and their spouses.” Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing
Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 21 (2004). So ERISA would not apply if Allure
never had employees, making Pam the only covered member. Independent
3
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No. 24-60381
contractor status is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Penn v.
Howe-Baker Eng’rs, Inc., 898 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1990).
Because ERISA does not define “employee,” federal courts apply
federal common law to determine whether an individual qualifies. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24, 323 n.3 (1992). This multi-
faceted inquiry “incorporate[s] traditional agency law principles.” Id. at 323.
No single factor is dispositive, but the test places “special emphasis on the
issue of control.” Penn, 898 F.2d at 1102. Additional factors include:
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship
between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the
hired party.
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)).
On the limited record below, the Darden factors indicate Allure’s
salon technicians were employees. Pam owned the salon building and
equipment, so she controlled where the technicians worked and their means
of doing so. See id. at 323. She also controlled when and how long they worked
by setting salon hours. Ibid. Allure paid their insurance premiums, which
entitled it to favorable tax treatment. Ibid. Clients paid gross receipts to
Allure, and Pam subsequently paid her employees from the Allure business
account. Finally, Allure was in business and the technicians’ work
constituted its normal business. See id. at 324. Considering “all of the
incidents of the relationship,” Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quotation omitted),
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we find that Allure’s workers were employees, so a plan exists and ERISA
applies.
III
Satisfied that ERISA applies, we turn to Guardian’s policy and
Jimmy’s claim for benefits. Under the terms of its policy, Guardian
maintained its “right to cancel . . . any coverage hereunder” when “less than
two employees are insured.” ROA.303. That right vested when Pam
Edwards became the sole participating employee effective November 1, 2019.
Because Guardian could cancel the plan at any time and for any reason, its
discretionary authority would normally permit the cancellation here under
the generous abuse of discretion standard. See Corry v. Liberty Life Assur. Co.
of Bos., 499 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2007); Holland v. Int’l Paper Co. Ret. Plan,
576 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2009) (describing standard as requiring merely
“evidence . . . that clearly supports the basis for its denial” (quotation
omitted)); ROA.111–113 (showing Allure’s plan with only one member).
But insurers can waive their discretionary cancellation rights under
ERISA. The waiver inquiry “focus[es] on the unilateral action of the insurer
in failing to raise at the outset a known” right. Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Am. Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 1991). We have held that an insurer that
accepted premiums for five months “after learning beyond all doubt that
[Plaintiff] was the only employee remaining on the policy” waived its right to
cancel. Ibid.
We hold that Guardian waived its right to cancel Pam Edwards’s plan
by continuing to accept premium payments from Allure for 26 months after
its cancellation right vested. Guardian’s cancellation right vested on
November 1, 2019. There is a conspicuous 10-month gap between that date
and when Guardian started “temporarily suspending” plan cancellation in
September 2020 due to COVID. See Red Br. at 6. Between the plan becoming
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No. 24-60381
eligible for termination and its cancellation, Guardian accepted 26 months’
worth of premiums. And Guardian’s delay in cancellation prejudiced Pam
because she was unable to conduct business over the last ten months of her
life due to her mental and physical deterioration. Guardian cannot now avoid
its obligation to Jimmy Edwards after accepting Allure’s premiums for 26
months. Cf. Rhorer v. Raytheon Eng’rs and Constructors, Inc., 181 F.3d 634,
645 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment
because “a reasonable jury could conclude that Raytheon knowingly waived
its right to enforce” certain insurance requirements after it “accepted
premiums from Mr. Rhorer for several months”).
* * *
According to Guardian, most of its delay in canceling Allure’s ERISA
plan was caused by the insurer’s non-cancellation policy during the COVID
pandemic. Guardian asks us to recognize this “generous accommodation” as
“laudatory.” Red Br. at 48 & 6 n.1. But we disagree that requiring Guardian
to pay Jimmy’s claim “epitomizes the adage that ‘no good deed goes
unpunished.’” Id. at 48. To the contrary: Requiring Guardian to pay Jimmy’s
claim after it pocketed 26 months of Allure’s premiums epitomizes a
different adage: “You get what you pay for.”
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s
judgment and RENDER judgment for James Edwards.
6