Sumlin v. New York Beer Co., LLC

USDC SDNY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC #:

nnn nnn nnn nnn nnn acca DATE FILED:_ 6/18/2025

DENNIS SUMLIN, on behalf of himself and all others .

similarly situated, :

Plaintiff, 24-cv-8448 (LJL)

-v- OPINION AND ORDER

NEW YORK BEER CO., LLC,

Defendant.

LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Dennis Sumlin (“Sumlin” or “Plaintiff’), on behalf of himself and all others

similarly situated, brings claims against Defendant New York Beer Co., LLC (“New York Beer”

or “Defendant”) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the New York City Human

Rights Law (““NYCHRL”), and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). Dkt. No.

1 “Complaint” or “Compl.”). Plaintiff now moves for a default judgment pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). Dkt. No. 17.

For the following reasons, the motion for default judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint and are accepted as true for

purposes of this motion.

Plaintiff is a resident of New York County, New York. Compl. § 15. He is legally blind.

Id. 4 16. Like many visually-impaired people, Plaintiff uses screen reading technology to

navigate the internet. /d. 20. A screen reader reads out a website’s information to its user. /d.

A website must have “alternative text” embedded in graphics so that the screen reader can

describe the image to its user. Id. ¶ 21.

The Defendant, New York Beer Co., LLC, controls and operates a website with the

address jacobspickles.com (the “Website”). Id. ¶¶ 24, 36. The Website is connected to Jacob’s

Pickles, a Southern-inspired restaurant which is known for its comfort food, including items like

homemade pickles, fried chicken, and biscuits. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. One of Jacob’s Pickles’ locations

is on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. Id. ¶ 37. From the Website, a patron can view menus,

order food, get information about restaurant locations, book private events, purchase “Jacob’s

Pickles” merchandise, and make reservations. Id. ¶ 26.

On October 25, 2024, Plaintiff attempted to access the Website with his screen reader.

Id. ¶ 36. He browsed the Website to explore Jacob’s Pickles’ menu and get a sense of the dishes

it offered to make a reservation. Id. As he did so, he noticed that the Website offered branded

merchandise. Id. He attempted to add a branded T-shirt to his cart. Id. However, he

encountered accessibility issues, “such as external links opening in new windows without

notification, elements that could not be focused on using the Tab key, and ambiguous links that

did not clearly indicate their destination or function.” Id. These accessibility issues kept

Plaintiff from exploring and shopping on the Website. Id. Plaintiff is still interested in

Defendant’s services and hopes to visit Jacobs Pickles’ physical locations in the future,

specifically the location on the Upper West Side. Id. He will also visit the Website again as

soon as Defendants ameliorate the accessibility issues. Id. ¶ 37.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 6, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action on behalf of himself and all

others similarly situated. Dkt. No. 1. The Complaint and Summons were served on Defendant

through the New York Secretary of State on November 25, 2025, and proof of service was filed

on December 1, 2024. Dkt. No. 6. Defendant has not appeared.

On April 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proposed Clerk’s Certificate of Default pursuant to

Local Civil Rule 55.1. Dkt. No. 13. On April 16, 2025, the Clerk’s Certificate of Default was

entered. Dkt. No. 15. On April 18, 2025, Plaintiff moved for a default judgment. Dkt. Nos. 16–

17. Plaintiff served the motion for default judgment on the Defendant the same day through the

Secretary of State. Dkt. No. 18. Defendant has not appeared and has not filed a response to the

motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a two-step process for

obtaining a default judgment.” Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011).

First, when a party against whom relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and

such failure is demonstrated by affidavit, the clerk must enter the default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

This simply “formalizes a judicial recognition that a defendant has, through its failure to defend

the action, admitted liability to the plaintiff.” Mintable PTE Ltd. v. Mintology, Inc., 2024 WL

3454825, at *4 (S.D.N.Y July 18, 2024) (citing City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC,

645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011)). The second step, entry of default, “converts the defendant’s

admission of liability into a final judgment that terminates the litigation and awards the plaintiff

any relief to which the court decides it is entitled, to the extent permitted by Rule 54(c).” Id.

Entry of default depends on whether Plaintiff’s allegations establish liability under law. See id.

In evaluating a motion for default judgment, the court accepts the plaintiff’s well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, except those relating to damages. Maldonado v. Loxton, Inc., 2023

WL 8663464, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2023) (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L.

Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)). “The Court must draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the movant.” Esquivel v. Lima Rest. Corp., 2023 WL 6338666, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (citing Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009)).

However, the movant’s factual allegations must be sufficient to state a claim; the Court need not

accept legal conclusions couched as facts. See Priestley, 647 F.3d at 506 (citing Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). When liability is established, the movant must “substantiate

its claim for damages with evidence to prove the extent of those damages.” Kelly Toys Holdings,

LLC v. Airpods Pro Store, 2022 WL 2801077, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2022).

DISCUSSION

I. ADA Claim

To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege “(1) [that] he or she is disabled

within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that the defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public

accommodation; and (3) that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff within the

meaning of the ADA.” Brown v. Good Friend Deli & Tobacco Corp., 2021 WL 2021 WL

5822232, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2021) (citing Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 368

(2d Cir. 2008)).

The first and third elements of an ADA claim are clearly met. Blindness is a disability

covered by the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). In addition, Defendant has denied Plaintiff

the opportunity to benefit from the Website on account of his disability, in violation of the ADA.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). Defendant failed to provide access necessary for Plaintiff, as

a blind person, to navigate the Website and purchase the same merchandise on the Website that a

seeing person can purchase. Compl. ¶ 36. Taken as true, these facts plausibly show that

Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on account of his disability. See Thorne v. Formula 1

Motorsports, 2019 WL 6916098, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2019); Wu v. Jensen-Lewis Co., 345

F. Supp. 3d 438, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

The second element of an ADA claim concerns whether Defendant’s website is a place of

public accommodation. It is a matter of judicial controversy, including in this District, whether a

stand-alone website unconnected to a brick-and-mortar location qualifies as a place of public

accommodation. See Chalas v. Pork King Good, 673 F. Supp. 3d 339, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

(“Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit have addressed whether a stand-alone

website is a place of public accommodation and other circuit courts are divided on the

question.”); Fernandez v. Vanilla Chip, 2025 WL 1151475, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2025).1

However, the Website here is connected to a brick-and-mortar location, specifically, the

restaurant Jacob’s Pickles. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 37. The Court follows the judicial consensus in this

District, derived from Second Circuit precedent, that such a website qualifies as a place of public

accommodation.

In Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co., the Second Circuit held that “an entity covered

by Title III is not only obligated by the statute to provide disabled persons with physical access,

but is also prohibited from refusing to sell them its merchandise by reason of discrimination

against their disability.” 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999). Pallozzi concerned the underwriting

practices of insurance companies. See id. at 31. An insurance office is a place of “public

accommodation” under Title III, and the Circuit reasoned that “Title III’s mandate that the

1 The First and Seventh Circuits have held for the purposes of the ADA, a public accommodation

does not require a physical space. See Guerrero v. Ellusionist.com, Inc., 2023 WL 3847402, at

*3 (S.D.N.Y June 6, 2023) (citing Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of

New Eng., Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994); Doe v. Mut. Of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557,

559 (7th Cir. 1999)). The Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that websites are not places of

public accommodation, even with a nexus to a brick-and-mortar location. See Gil v. Winn-Dixie

Stores, Inc., 993 F.3d 1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2021). The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have

taken an intermediate approach, which requires that there be a nexus between the discriminatory

conduct and a physical location. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–13 (3d

Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997); Robles v.

Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2019).

disabled be accorded full and equal enjoyment of the goods, [and] services . . . of any place of

public accommodation, suggests . . . that the statute was meant to guarantee [plaintiffs] more

than mere physical access” to insurance offices. Id. at 32 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs were also entitled to have access to the goods and services offered at such offices. See

id. The Circuit rejected the defendant’s reading of § 12182(a), which would have limited Title

III’s scope to prohibit discrimination only in those cases where those goods or services are

consumed on-site. See Del-Orden v. Bonobos, 2017 WL 657902, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20,

2017) (citing Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33).

Pallozzi did not hold that websites are places of public accommodation. See Sookul v.

Fresh Clean Threads, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 3d. 395, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting that Pallozzi is

“not a case about the antecedent question of whether a place of accommodation can be a business

without physical premises”). Instead, Pallozzi rested on the fact that insurance offices are public

accommodations, and it held therefore that Title III regulates “the sale of insurance policies in

insurance offices.” Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33; see Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199

F.3d 99, 107 n.8 (2d Cir. 1999) (leaving open the issue of whether a claim under Title III may be

based on an insurance policy with no nexus to a physical office). The question whether a

business is a public accommodation in the first instance is different from the question whether,

assuming a business is a public accommodation, the goods and services offered at that location

must be accessible.

However, “many district courts in this Circuit have looked to Pallozzi for guidance” on

the issue whether Title III applies to websites. Fernandez, 2025 WL 1151475, at *5; see, e.g.

Del-Orden, 2017 WL 657902, at *8; Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381,

394 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). These courts reason that because Pallozzi held that the ADA guarantees

more than mere physical access, its holding “could be extended to a company’s refusal to sell a

disabled person its merchandise on the Internet and, by extension, imposing barriers that have

essentially the same effect. Otherwise, a company could freely refuse to sell its goods or

services to a disabled person as long as it did so online rather than within the confines of a

physical office or store.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 571 (D. Vt.

2015). This reasoning especially makes sense as applied to a website with a nexus to a physical

store or location. If a business would need to sell an accessible insurance policy to a customer

who walks into a store, it makes no sense for a business to be able to avoid the ADA by selling

the exact same customer an inaccessible policy online. Thus, courts in this Circuit have

consistently held that a website should be considered a public accommodation under the ADA

“when the [web]site in question serves as an adjunct to a brick-and-mortar business.” Martinez

v. MyLife.com, Inc., 2021 WL 5052745, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2021) (quoting Winegard, 554

F. Supp. 3d at 174); see Fernandez, 2025 WL 1151475, at *5; Del-Orden, 2017 WL 657902, at

*8; Andrews, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 394; Thorne, 2019 WL 6916098, at *2.2

Such a conclusion also follows independently from principles of statutory interpretation.

“When interpreting a statutory provision, we begin with the language of the statute.” Zepeda-

Lopez v. Garland, 38 F.4th 315, 210 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing Nwozuzu v. Holder, 726 F.3d 323,

327 (2d Cir. 2013)). The plain meaning of “place” is ambiguous as to whether a website should

be considered part of a place of public accommodation. The list of public accommodations in

2 Some courts in this Circuit have held that even standalone websites—those without ties to a

physical store location—are public accommodations for the purposes of Title III. See, e.g.,

Romero v. 88 Acre Foods, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 3d 9, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Tavarez v. Moo Organic

Chocolates, LLC, 623 F. Supp. 3d 365, 386 (S.D.N.Y 2022). Others have come to the opposite

conclusion. See Winegard v. Newsday LLC, 554 F. Supp. 3d 173, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); Mejia v.

High Brew Coffee Inc., 2024 WL 4350912, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024).

42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) includes mostly entities, such as inns, restaurants, bars, stores, schools,

parks, gyms, and spas, that are generally thought of as physical locations. But the list also

includes “travel services,” which do not require the existence of a physical structure. See Del-

Orden, 2017 WL 657902, at *8 (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19). And the text does not clarify

whether an online aspect of a restaurant, school, or store should be considered part of the entity

or separate from it. “The statutory text . . . of the [ADA] does not cleanly resolve whether Title

III applies to commercial websites.” Id.

If the text of a statute is ambiguous, courts must consider the statute as a whole and

interpret it in a way that effectuates its purpose. See Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dept.

of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2000). The ADA’s purpose is to “to provide a clear and

comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with

disabilities” and “invoke the sweep of congressional authority” to address discrimination.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). As a remedial statute, the ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate

that purpose. Cruz v. JKS Ventures, Inc., 2024 WL 814563, at *6 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2024)

(citing Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Loc. Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 160 (2d Cir. 2013)). Even

though the ADA became law in 1990—long before the advent of the internet—Congress

intended that the ADA would keep pace with rapidly changing technology. See Tavarez, 623 F.

Supp. 3d. at 369. “Today, few areas are more integral to the economic and social mainstream of

American life than the Internet’s websites.” Fernandez, 2025 WL 1151475, at *8 (quoting Del-

Orden, 2017 WL 6547902, at *9) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, limiting the

definition of public accommodation to physical places, especially as the world has significantly

moved online, would frustrate Congress’ intent. See Tavarez, 623 F. Supp. 3d. at 369. As

physical businesses move features like their reservation systems, menus, or payment processes

online, the protections of the ADA would slip away.

Here, the Website, jacobspickles.com, is clearly tied to a place of public

accommodation—a restaurant. The ADA is implicated when a website operates “in sufficiently

close tandem with a conventional place of public accommodation . . . that access barriers to the

website serve as access barriers to that place of public accommodation.” Del-Orden, 2017 WL

6547902, at *7. Patrons can get information about Jacob’s Pickles on the Website, order food,

make reservations, and order merchandise. Compl. ¶ 26. The Website is sufficiently linked to

the restaurant that the barriers on the Website also serve as barriers to the restaurant. See Del-

Orden, 2017 WL 6547902, at *11 (holding that a retailer’s website was sufficiently linked to its

physical locations when the website included a store locator, store phone numbers, hours of

operation, and offers of in-person services).

Because (1) Plaintiff’s blindness qualifies as a disability under the ADA, (2) the Website

is a place of public accommodation, and (3), Defendant denied Plaintiff full and equal enjoyment

of the Website on account of his disability, Plaintiff has stated a claim under the ADA.

II. NYSHRL

“A claim of disability discrimination under the [NYSHRL] is governed by the same legal

standards as govern federal ADA claims.” Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457 F.3d 181,

184 n.3 (2d. Cir. 2006) (citing Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 332 n.1 (2d

Cir.2000). As Plaintiff states a claim under the ADA, he also states a claim under NYSHRL and

is entitled to the damages enumerated in Section 40.

III. NYCHRL

In New York City, it is an “unlawful discriminatory practice for any person who is the

owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or

employee of any place or provider of public accommodation . . . because of . . . disability . . .

directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person the full and equal

enjoyment, on equal terms and conditions, of any of the accommodations, advantages, services,

facilities, or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code

§ 8-107. The word “provider” clearly covers a website; “even if one could quibble with whether

the website is a ‘place,’ it undoubtedly ‘provides’ to the public “accommodations, advantages,

services, facilities or privileges.” Andrews, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 400. “Given the court’s ruling

that the plaintiff has stated a claim under the ADA and the NYSHRL—the ‘floor’ of protection

provided by the NYCHRL—he has also stated a claim under the NYCHRL.” Id. at 401.

IV. Relief

1. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff requests a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring Defendant to make

the website accessible. Dkt. No. 1 at 28. On a motion for default judgment, a court may issue an

injunction if the moving party demonstrates that (1) it is entitled to injunctive relief under the

applicable statute and (2) it meets the prerequisites for the issuance of an injunction. Gucci Am.,

Inc. v. Tyrrell-Miller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).3 The ADA creates a private

right of action for injunctive relief, so the first prong is satisfied. See 42 U.S.C § 12188(a)(2).

To meet the second prong, in order “[t]o obtain a permanent injunction, [the requesting party]

3 The party must also have constitutional standing to seek an injunction, that is, the plaintiff must

establish that “she is likely to be harmed again in the future in a similar way.” Calcano v.

Swarovski N. Am. Ltd., 36 F.4th 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834

F.3d 220, 239 (2d Cir. 2016)). The Court finds this requirement to be satisfied here because

Plaintiff alleges that he lives in the same county as the physical restaurant, Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 15, 37,

that he enjoys visiting restaurants and appreciated specific aspects of Defendants’ offerings, id.

¶¶ 36–37, and that he sought to make a reservation and would like to visit a particular physical

location, id.; see Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding

that intention to return was plausibly shown when the plaintiff pled that he frequented diners in

his neighborhood often, lived nearby, and would frequent the diner if he was able to access it).

must demonstrate (1) actual success on the merits and (2) irreparable harm.” Id. (citing Gucci

Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, 286 F. Supp. 2d 284, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). The above

discussion establishes Plaintiff’s success on the merits. Duty Free Apparel, 286 F. Supp at 290.

In addition, Plaintiff continues to suffer irreparable harm because his continued inability to use

the website cannot be remedied by monetary damages. See Dunbar v. Buddha Bodai Two

Kosher Vegan Rest., 2020 WL 12863802, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020).

Injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C § 12188(a)(2) is intended to “make [defendant’s]

facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent required by

this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C § 12188(a)(2). When a plaintiff’s submissions do not specify what

changes are needed to make a facility readily accessible or fail to adequately support the

injunctive relief the plaintiff seeks, a court may decline to issue a “broad, imprecise” injunction

that simply demands the facility comply with the law. Dunbar, 2020 WL 12863802, at *7; see

id. (expressing concern that such an order “may not be capable of being enforced”); Sarwar v.

Zillion Mgmt., Inc., 2022 WL 1238456, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2022) (declining to issue

injunction ordering hotel to come “into compliance” with the ADA, which “could not be

meaningfully enforced,” and requiring plaintiff to “provide a specific basis for the relief he

seeks”); Pompey v. 23 Morgan II, LLC, 2017 WL 1102772, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2017)

(declining to issue an injunction when plaintiff failed to provide “basic facts to support” that

injunctive relief was appropriate, and submitted no evidence or affidavits).

Here, Plaintiff requests an injunction “requiring Defendant to take all the steps necessary

to make its website . . . into full compliance with the requirements set forth in the ADA, and its

implementing regulations.” Compl. at 28. Although this request is vague, Plaintiff has also

submitted the report of an expert consultant who audited Defendant’s website for ADA

compliance. Dkt. No. 4. The report contains an exhibit listing forty specific issues that must be

fixed for the Website to come into compliance with WCAG 2.0, a standard guideline for

accessibility. Dkt. No. 4 at 14–20; see Compl. ¶ 23; Andrews, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 386 (E.D.N.Y.

2017) (“[T]he guidelines that the parties have chosen to adopt, the WCAG 2.0 Level AA, appear

to be nearly universally accepted.”). The issues fall into general categories such as lack of

alternate text, improper headings that make it difficult for assistive technologies to interpret the

website, and failure to permit navigation through the keyboard alone, which are also identified in

Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dkt. No. 4 at 2–3. The report supports the need for an injunction and

allows an injunction to be issued with specificity.

The Court will issue an injunction requiring Defendant to resolve each of the accessibility

issues identified in the expert report submitted by Plaintiff.

2. Damages

Damages are also available to plaintiffs under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, but even

when default judgment is based on a party’s failure to defend, plaintiff still has the burden to

prove damages with a reasonable certainty. See Thorne, 2019 WL 6916098, at *3 (citing Credit

Lyonnais Secs. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations

omitted)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish any damages besides the “bare fact” of

discrimination. Id. In such cases, an award of $1,000 is generally deemed sufficient to

compensate plaintiffs under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL together. Id. (citing Kreisler v. Second

Ave. Diner Corp., 2012 WL 3961304, at *14 (S.D.N.Y 2011); see also Brown v. 3700 Deli &

Grocery Inc., 2021 WL 289349, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2021). The Court awards Plaintiff

damages of $1,000.

3. Attorney’s Fees

The ADA and NYCHRL allow for awards of attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205;

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(g). Plaintiff must file any motion for fees within thirty days of this

order.

CONCLUSION

The motion for default judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff may file a motion for fees

within thirty days of this order.

Defendant is ordered to resolve each of the accessibility issues identified in the expert

report submitted by Plaintiff as soon as reasonably practicable. This injunction shall not be

interpreted to require any actions that constitute an undue burden as defined in Title II of the

ADA.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close Dkt. No. 17.

SO ORDERED. a

Dated: June 18, 2025 tle WC iene

New York, New York LEWIS J. LIMAN

United States District Judge

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