The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2023-KA-0780
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL
ALEC J. BILLOT * FOURTH CIRCUIT
* STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 549-711, SECTION “L”
Judge Angel Harris
******
Judge Rachael D. Johnson
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)
LEDET, J., CONCURS
JASON ROGERS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
BRAD SCOTT
ZACHARY PHILLIPS
ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY
619 SOUTH WHITE STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR STATE/APPELLEE
Sherry Watters
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P. O. Box 58769
New Orleans, LA 70158
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
REMANDED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
MAY 16, 2025
RDJ Defendant, Alec J. Billiot, appeals his convictions and sentences for a
JCL
responsive verdict of manslaughter, conspiracy to commit armed robbery,
obstruction of justice, and possession of a firearm by a felon. For the reasons
discussed below, we remand this matter to the district court to impose a mandatory
fine upon Defendant for his conviction of illegal possession of a firearm by a felon.
Additionally, we vacate Defendant’s five-year sentencing enhancement imposed for
his conviction of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Further, we vacate
Defendant’s conviction and sentence for obstruction of justice. In all other respects,
Defendant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed.
Procedural History
This appeal involves Defendant’s convictions and sentences for his alleged
participation in the attempted armed robbery and murder of Lee Long, Jr. On August
20, 2020, an Orleans Parish Grand Jury indicted Defendant and co-defendants Arec
Billiot, Caiden Fruge, and Tyrin Barrazza (“Tank”) on 31 counts. Defendant was
indicted on 10 of the 31 counts as follows: second-degree murder, a felony in
violation of La. Rev. Stat. 14:30.1, Count 1; attempted second degree murder with a
firearm upon a known victim, a felony in violation of La. Rev. Stat. 14:(27)30.1,
1
Counts 5-10; obstruction of justice, a felony in violation of La. Rev. Stat. 14:130.1,
Count 25; possession of a firearm as a felon, a felony in violation of La. Rev. Stat.
14:95.1, Count 26; and conspiracy to commit armed robbery with a firearm, a felony
in violation of La. Rev. Stat. 14:(26) 64.3, Count 28.
In September 2020, the State filed an indictment charging Defendant with
nine counts. He was charged with one count each of second degree murder,
obstruction of justice, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, possession of a firearm
by a felon, and five counts of attempted second degree murder, violations of La. R.S.
14:30.1, 14:130.1, 14:(26)64, 14:95.1, and 14:(27)30.1, respectively. Defendant’s
brother, Arec, as well as Caiden and Tank were also charged by the same indictment.
At his arraignment, Defendant pleaded not guilty to all counts. The State later
entered a nolle prosequi for Defendant’s six counts of attempted second degree
murder with a firearm upon a known victim.
On December 9, 2021, Tank filed a motion to sever from the three co-
defendants, which the trial court granted. Subsequently, Arec and Caiden jointly
moved to sever from Defendant, but their motion was denied. Defendant later filed
a motion to sever, which was also denied.
The joint trial of Defendant, Arec, and Caiden began on October 18, 2022,
and concluded on October 25, 2022. A jury unanimously found Defendant guilty of
the lesser included offense of manslaughter, obstruction of justice, possession of a
firearm as a felon, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.1
1 Caiden appealed his convictions of manslaughter and conspiracy to commit armed robbery and
his respective sentences. See State v. Fruge, 23-0552 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/25), 2025 WL 1088089.
Arec, who was found guilty of negligent homicide and first degree robbery, appealed his
convictions and sentences therefor in 2023-KA-0529.
2
On December 9, 2022, the district court sentenced Defendant to 40 years at
hard labor for manslaughter, 40 years at hard labor for obstruction of justice, 15
years at hard labor for possession of a firearm as a felon, and 35 years at hard labor
plus a five-year firearm enhancement for conspiracy to commit armed robbery to be
served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. His sentences
were ordered to run concurrently, with the exception of the five-year firearm
enhancement.
Following sentencing, Defendant timely filed the instant appeal2 and assigns
two errors for this Court’s review: (1) the State failed to prove Defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, possession of a
firearm as a felon, and obstruction of justice; and (2) the district court erred in
imposing constitutionally excessive, maximum, or near maximum sentences, and in
illegally enhancing his sentence on the charge of conspiracy to commit armed
robbery.
Statement of Facts and Relevant Trial Testimony
Thirteen witnesses testified at trial on behalf of the State: 1.) New Orleans
Police Department (“NOPD”) homicide Detective Jaamane Roy, who served as the
lead detective on this case; 2.) Sergeant Djuana Adams of the Tulane University
Police Department, who was the first law enforcement officer to respond to the
scene; 3.) Dr. Aireal Sullivan, an Orleans Parish Coroner’s office forensic
pathologist who was qualified by the district court as an expert in forensic pathology
2 On November 7, 2024, this Court, finding the record to be incomplete, issued an order staying
this matter pending the supplementation of the record with State Exhibit 13. The district court
later complied with the order. Thus, on November 26, 2024, this Court lifted the stay and deemed
the matter submitted.
3
and testified to performing of Lee’s autopsy and authored the forensic report; 4.)
Officer Brett Champagne, a Jefferson Parish probation and parole officer who had
been supervising Defendant on active probation since 2018; 5.) John Mai, a
Louisiana State Police Crime Lab DNA technician, who examined evidence in this
case for the presence of biological substances; 6.) Justin Manuel, Louisiana State
Police Crime Lab forensic and DNA analyst, who was qualified by the district court
as a forensic DNA analysis expert, who analyzed case samples taken from a Kool
cigarette butt, a Luger nine-millimeter cartridge casing and the exterior front door
driver’s door handle of Lee’s vehicle; 7.) Andrew Held, an acquaintance of Lee; 8.)
Jack Gordy, an acquaintance of Lee and Defendant; 9-12.) Samantha Del Corral,
Emily Whelan, Vivian Nguy and Madeline Cristenberry, who were Lee’s friends
and back-seat passengers in his car on the night of his murder; and 13.) Aislinn
Finnegan-Wilson, Lee’s girlfriend and front-seat passenger in his car the night of his
murder. Defendant did not present any witnesses.
At trial, the State introduced the following evidence: the 911 call that Aislinn
and her friends made during the attack; residential surveillance footage showing the
intersection of Hillary and Burthe Streets at the time of the attack; Real Time Crime
Center camera footage depicting the location of Bruno’s and TJ Quills at the
intersection of Maple and Hillary Streets around the time of the incident; an audio
and video recorded interview of Caiden; and still photographs, or confirmation
photographs, of the suspects taken from the crime scene which were shown to Jack
during his interview with the NOPD. The following is a summary of the facts based
upon the testimony of the foregoing witnesses and the State’s evidence introduced
at trial. Adnoid
4
On the evening of January 9, 2020, twenty-year-old Lee and his girlfriend,
Aislinn, went out drinking at various bars, namely Bruno’s Tavern (“Bruno’s”), near
Tulane University’s campus in New Orleans, with a group of friends, Samantha,
Madeline, Vivian, and Emily. In the early morning hours of January 10, 2020, Lee,
Aislinn and Emily returned to Lee’s pickup truck, which was parked on the corner
of Hillary and Burthe Streets. After returning to the truck, Lee left Aislinn and Emily
in his truck in search of marijuana.
Jack, Lee’s acquaintance, informed Lee that Tank had marijuana. Lee found
Tank, who was seated with Defendant, Arec, and Caiden, at Bruno’s. Lee bought
what he believed to be one gram of marijuana from Tank. However, after walking
to his truck and weighing the marijuana, he discovered Tank shorted him by 0.3
grams. He left Aislinn and Emily in his truck again and returned to Bruno’s to
retrieve the missing marijuana from Tank, who was still seated with Defendant,
Arec, and Caiden.
After engaging in a brief conversation, Tank gave Lee the missing quantity of
marijuana. Lee hurriedly gathered Samantha, Madeline and Vivian to walk back to
his truck with the missing marijuana, to join Aislinn and Emily.
Four men followed Lee, Samantha, Madeline and Vivian to Lee’s truck,
eventually surrounding the vehicle. Lee was seated in the driver’s seat, Aislinn in
the passenger seat, with Emily, Samantha, Madeline and Vivian seated in the
backseat. Two of the men stood in front of Lee’s truck while one man stood by Lee’s
driver’s side door and a fourth man stood near the passenger door on the driver’s
side. One of the men standing in front of the truck was armed with a firearm that was
pointed at the windshield of Lee’s truck, and another armed man was positioned at
Lee’s door. One of the men opened Lee’s door, demanding that he empty his pockets.
5
The man argued and fought with Lee. At some point during the altercation, Lee
directed Aislinn to hand him a gun that was affixed to the center console. Before
Aislinn could hand him the weapon, Lee was shot multiple times, including in his
chest, by one of the assailants.3 The four perpetrators fled the scene, and Lee
succumbed to his wounds shortly thereafter.
Lee’s girlfriend, Aislinn, recounted that she observed Lee fighting with the
perpetrators and tried to retrieve Lee’s firearm from its position near the steering
wheel; however, she was unable to remove it from its holster. Following Lee’s
murder, she conducted her own investigation— assisted by her friends and Lee’s
mother—which resulted in her developing Defendant’s name as a possible person of
interest in Lee’s murder. She discovered Defendant’s picture, but could not
“independently identify” him as one of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, after figuring
out who Defendant’s friends were and who he was out with on the night of Lee’s
murder, she provided that information to the NOPD.
At trial, after watching residential surveillance footage of the intersection of
Hillary and Burthe Street, Aislinn identified her voice in the footage screaming and
noted that she heard a male voice shouting “open your pockets ‘n-word’” that was
not Lee’s voice. She further observed three persons dressed in black approaching
Lee’s truck that night, but did not see any of their faces. However, she did recall
seeing the person standing in front of the truck pointing a firearm at the windshield
of Lee’s car, who wore a black hoodie with “white print going across everything.”
She described the perpetrators to police as “tall, white, and brunette,” but clarified
3 Dr. Sullivan testified that Lee suffered six gunshot wounds including two to his chest, which
likely caused his death, and the rest to his left arm and left leg.
6
that her recollection of the perpetrators’ appearances was unclear and distorted as
this intense event occurred quickly, and she was focused on Lee’s safety.
Emily testified that she saw the perpetrators surround the car and witnessed a
person pointing a black firearm at Lee’s windshield the night of the murder.
Vivian testified that on the night of Lee’s murder she walked with Lee towards
the Bruno’s exit, but Lee then turned towards the patio where she observed him
speaking with a group of guys and holding his hand out. She believed the exchange
pertained to weed, as she thought Lee had weed in his outstretched hand. She
testified that the only person she could identify in the group Lee spoke with was
Ross Gonzales.
Vivian then returned to Lee’s truck with Samantha, Madeline, and Lee, where
Aislinn and Emily were waiting. Vivian testified that once everyone was seated in
Lee’s truck, Lee’s driver’s side door was “ripped open” and the perpetrators were
pulling Lee out of the truck. She saw a “brunette, white male” armed perpetrator
raising a gun at the windshield pointed at everyone in truck, but could not recall his
clothing. After ducking behind Lee’s seat, she closed her eyes and heard three gun
shots. Vivian testified that she could not identify the perpetrators.
Samantha stated that before leaving the bar that night, Lee hurriedly escorted
her and her friends to his truck as if “he knew something was about to go down.”
She recalled what two of the perpetrators who attacked Lee at his car door were
wearing: one assailant wore a “black and white ‘Champion’ T-shirt” covered with
Champion logos; and the second assailant wore a black and white hoodie with the
hood on. She could see one perpetrator through Lee’s windshield “because the lights
were on.” This perpetrator later relocated to Lee’s door because she recalled there
were two people standing there when he was shot.
7
Samantha further testified that it was Defendant she witnessed fighting Lee
and pulling him out of his vehicle with the assistance of another perpetrator who
wore a hoodie. She explained that although she saw Alec with a gun, she saw another
perpetrator shoot Lee. Alec was the only perpetrator whose face she could identify.
She also testified, however, that she saw co-defendant Arec with the “same group of
guys” as Alec inside Bruno’s earlier that night. Following Lee’s murder, Samantha
noticed that Alec was following her Instagram account and his profile picture
appeared to depict one of the assailants. She later identified Alec in an NOPD
photographic lineup, writing on his photograph “Boy who shot Lee at door with
black and white shirt/hoodie.”
Madeline testified that while she was with Samantha, Vivian and Lee
approached informing them that the group was ready to leave. The four walked to
Lee’s vehicle, where Emily and Aislinn were waiting. After everyone was seated in
the vehicle, Lee’s door swung open and she witnessed someone attacking Lee. The
truck was surrounded by several people, all of whom appeared to be white males.
She could see two people through the windshield, one of whom was pointing a gun
at them. Another perpetrator fought with Lee at his car door, while another assailant
stood behind that perpetrator at the rear door on the driver’s side of the vehicle. She
testified that when she tried to exit the vehicle, the perpetrators shut her door to
prevent her from leaving.
Madeline recalled that the assailant who fought and shot Lee wore a hoodie
with a distinctive black and white pattern, which was the same that she remembered
seeing someone wearing earlier in the night seated on Bruno’s patio. She recalled
that her friends Ross and Jack interacted with the group of men seated on the patio
8
with the man wearing the hoodie earlier that evening. After the shooting, the
perpetrators fled towards Bruno’s.
Madeline also testified that after conducting her own independent research
into the identities of the perpetrators, she discovered Defendant’s name and that his
face matched that of the person who wore the sweatshirt on the night of Lee’s
murder. She informed the police that aside from the assailant wearing a patterned
hoodie, the other assailants wore dark clothing. She identified Defendant as the
shooter in an NOPD photographic lineup. Defendant was the only assailant she
could identify.
Det. Roy, serving as the lead detective in this matter, testified that he arrived
at the scene on January 10, 2020.4 While at the scene, Det. Roy, discovered the
following items: three Hornady nine-millimeter casings on the ground as well as an
additional Hornady nine-millimeter casing near Lee’s arm with two bullet fragments
under Lee’s body; a Kool brand cigarette butt near Lee’s body; and a Goodies cigar
wrap. Inside of Lee’s truck, the NOPD retrieved a loaded firearm as well as
marijuana.5 He further testified that NOPD detectives located residential
surveillance footage from a home near the crime scene and the surveillance footage
of Kindred Restaurant and Redd’s Tavern.
4 The first law enforcement officer to respond to the scene was retired Sgt. Adams with the Tulane
University Police Department, who was patrolling the area near the crime scene on January 9,
2020, when she heard rapid-fire gunshots. Sgt. Adams testified that she radioed in to the dispatcher
to request assistance and to notify the NOPD. While attempting to follow the sound of the
gunshots, she turned onto Burthe St. where a group of young women flagged her down and
informed her that their friend had been shot. She testified at trial that the group of women informed
her that the assailants were three to four young white males. Her involvement ended when NOPD
homicide detectives arrived on the scene.
5 Mr. Mai, a DNA technician, explained that he collected and prepared the evidence samples—
including a sample from “a partially burnt Kool cigarette butt”— for further analysis, results, and
conclusions by DNA analyst Justin Manuel.
9
During his investigation, Det. Roy interviewed Aislinn, Samantha, Vivian,
and Madeline, as well as two other patrons of Bruno’s on the night of the murder,
Jack and Andrew. Det. Roy’s investigation led him to develop Defendant as a
suspect and arrange a “six-pack” photographic lineup.6 An NOPD officer, who was
unaffiliated with the investigation, conducted the “six-pack” photographic lineup
with Samantha and Madeline, who identified Defendant as one of the perpetrators.
Jack, an acquaintance of Lee as well as of Defendant, Arec and Tank, testified
that he saw Defendant, Arec, Tank and Caiden, who was unknown to him, seated
together on Bruno’s patio the night of Lee’s murder. Jack stated that he and
Defendant spoke that evening when they exchanged compliments on each other’s
clothing. Jack complimented Defendant on his “black hoodie with a Champion logo
on the front of it.”
Jack recounted that Lee became upset with Tank that evening, believing Tank
gave him less than the gram of marijuana he purchased. Jack testified that he and
Lee parted ways at Bruno’s, with each of them walking in a different direction from
the bar. Jack was assisting with jumpstarting a friend’s car nearby when he witnessed
a group of people arguing near where his vehicle was parked. A few minutes later,
he heard multiple gunshots ring out near the location of the altercation. Jack decided
to move his vehicle, but as he drove back to TJ Quills, he witnessed Defendant and
Arec looking “awfully shook up,” and crossing the street with Tank and walking “in
the opposite direction of the scene.” When Jack inquired whether the group was
alright and had heard the gunshots, Tank replied, “Why wouldn’t we be?” and,
6 Det. Roy testified that a single “confirmation” photograph is shown to a witness who “actually
knows the person that they’re talking about,” whereas a “blind” six-pack photographic lineup is
used to identify an unknown suspect.
10
“What gunshots?”, respectively. After watching surveillance footage showing Lee
being followed to his vehicle, Jack identified Defendant and Tank, but could not
recognize if the third person with the pair was Arec or Caiden. He testified that he
provided a statement to NOPD wherein he identified Defendant and Arec in a
photographic identification procedure. He also assisted Aislinn and her friends with
their investigation.
During his interview of Jack, Det. Roy showed him still photographs of the
suspects sourced from surveillance footage. Jack identified Defendant, Tank and
Arec.
Andrew testified that he was at Bruno’s the night of Lee’s murder and that he
was an acquaintance of Lee and Jack, but not Defendant and his cohorts. During the
course of the night, he witnessed Lee purchase marijuana from Tank on the patio at
Bruno’s. Andrew testified that Lee was upset about receiving less than the “full gram
of weed” he had purchased, but Lee “left it alone.” He described Tank as wearing a
red sweatshirt, and was sitting at a table with other guys, including one male who
wore a “Champion Hoodie.” Later that night, as Andrew assisted a friend with
jumpstarting a vehicle nearby, Andrew heard “screaming and yelling down the
street,” followed by several gunshots. Soon thereafter, Andrew saw Tank walking
down the street alone in his direction.
Det. Roy ultimately developed three persons of interest who he believed may
have been with Defendant on the night of Lee’s murder: Tank, Arec and Caiden.
Det. Roy testified that he interviewed Caiden and executed a search warrant of his
residence, but discovered nothing of evidentiary value. Caiden, however, placed
himself, Defendant, Arec, and Tank at the scene of the crime, but denied being
involved in Lee’s murder.
11
Regarding the surveillance videos the NOPD obtained, Det. Roy reviewed
residential, business and real-time camera footage. The real-time camera
surveillance footage showed Lee walking to his truck with Aislinn and Emily, before
he returned to Bruno’s alone. Later the footage showed Lee walking to his truck with
Aislinn’s friends while being followed by a group of people. Additionally, real-time
camera footage and surveillance footage from establishments in the immediate area
of the crime scene showed Defendant, Arec, Caiden, and Tank walking towards
Lee’s truck at 1:50 a.m., around the time Lee was shot, and fleeing shortly
afterwards. Lastly, business surveillance footage showed Lee and Aislinn’s friends
being followed by a group of people, including one person who was smoking a
cigarette, and later the group of perpetrators were seen fleeing the scene.
Det. Roy obtained a warrant for Defendant’s arrest as well as search warrants
for his residence and to collect a buccal swab of his DNA. Incident to a search of
Defendant’s residence, the NOPD discovered a firearm inside a vehicle belonging
to Defendant’s mother. Det. Roy explained that no clothing was retrieved from
Defendant’s home that matched what witnesses had described.
Forensic and DNA analyst, Justin Manuel, testified that he analyzed case
samples taken from a Kool cigarette butt, a Luger nine-millimeter cartridge casing,
and the “exterior front driver door handle” of Lee’s vehicle, and compared them to
reference samples of DNA taken from Lee and Defendant. Only the sample taken
from the Kool cigarette butt yielded a result, showing that Defendant’s DNA sample
corresponded to the DNA profile obtained from the cigarette butt.
Det. Roy stated the murder weapon was not recovered by the NOPD, but his
review of the Firearm Examination Report revealed that all of the recovered shell
casings were fired from the same weapon. However, none of the casings were fired
12
from the gun recovered from Lee’s vehicle or from Defendant’s vehicle. The
ballistics report further showed that the bullet fragments recovered from the scene
and Lee’s autopsy were consistent with nine-millimeter ammunition.
Off. Champagne testified that he supervised Defendant while he was on active
probation since October 26, 2018, following Defendant’s conviction and sentence to
five years of probation for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He
explained that Defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm or any dangerous
weapons as a condition of his probation.
Errors Patent
Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 920, appellate courts have a duty to review all
appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. Our review of the record reveals
three errors patent. First, the district court erred in imposing a sentence for the charge
of illegal possession of a firearm by a felon without also imposing the statutorily
mandated fine, pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 14:95.1(B)(1). The district court also failed
to require that Defendant’s sentence for illegal possession of a firearm by a felon be
served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Further,
the district court erred when it included in Defendant’s sentence, for conspiracy to
commit armed robbery, a five-year sentence enhancement for the use of a firearm
during the perpetration of the offense to be served consecutively to the sentence
imposed on him under the provisions of La. Rev. Stat. 14:64. See La. Rev. Stat.
14:64.3.
Regarding Defendant’s sentence for illegal possession of a firearm by a felon,
La. Rev. Stat. 14:95.1(B)(1) provides that for defendants who are found guilty of
said offense they “shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more
than twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence
13
and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.”
[Emphasis added].
The district court failed to impose the statutorily mandated sentence without
benefits and without the requisite fine in the instant matter. Nevertheless, where a
district court fails to impose a sentence without benefits, “[t]he failure of a
sentencing court to specifically state that all or a portion of the sentence is to be
served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence shall not in
any way affect the statutory requirement that all or a portion of the sentence be
served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.” La. Rev.
Stat. 15:301.1. Thus, the district court’s omission of the denial of benefits of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence does not require a remand. See State v.
Brown, 09-0884, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/10), 36 So.3d 974, 982.
Contrarily, this Court has held that when defendants convicted of illegal
possession of a firearm by a felon are not ordered by a district court to pay the
mandatory fine reviewing courts “must remand cases for the imposition of a
mandatory fine where the trial court failed to do so.” State v. Williams, 24-0105, p.
8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/9/24), 400 So.3d 1194, 1199 (citing State v. Williams, 03-0302,
p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/6/03), 859 So.2d 751, 753). Accordingly, we remand this
matter to the district court for the imposition of the statutorily mandated fine.
The third error patent involves the district court’s inclusion of a consecutive
five-year sentence enhancement in Defendant’s sentence for his conspiracy to
commit armed robbery conviction, under La. Rev. Stat. 14:64.3. This error is also
raised by Defendant in the latter portion of his second assignment of error. He asserts
that the firearm sentencing enhancement of five years without the benefit of parole
probation or suspension of sentence was illegally imposed because it is inapplicable
14
to the offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The State concedes that the
five-year sentencing enhancement was illegally imposed.
The firearm sentencing enhancement is applicable only when a firearm is used
in the commission of armed robbery or attempted armed robbery. However, “[a]
criminal conspiracy to commit crime is an inchoate crime separate and distinct from
the completed criminal act.” State v. Richards, 426 So.2d 1314, 1316 (La. 1982).
The offense of “conspiracy to commit armed robbery” is excluded from those
offenses statutorily eligible for the sentencing enhancement. Thus, we vacate the
five-year sentencing enhancement imposed on Defendant pursuant to La. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 882.7
Insufficient Evidence
Defendant’s first assignment of error is that the State presented insufficient
evidence to establish that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to
commit armed robbery, illegal possession of a firearm by a felon, and obstruction of
justice.
Regarding Defendant’s obstruction of justice conviction, however, the State
acknowledges that it lacked evidence of Defendant’s specific intent to distort an
investigation, which is essential to proving that a defendant tampered with the
evidence to obstruct justice pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 14:130.1 (A)(1), and conceded
that the record is absent of such evidence. In its brief, the State admitted the record
does not support the conclusion that Defendant had the specific intent necessary to
establish obstruction of justice where there was a lack of evidence that Defendant
7 “An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by
an appellate court on review.” La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 882.
15
removed the firearm he had at the scene with the intent to distort a potential criminal
investigation. Despite being able to infer specific intent from a defendant’s actions,
a defendant’s removal of a firearm from a crime scene, without more, is insufficient
“to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] possessed the specific
intent to distort the police investigation.” State v. Scott, 23-0022, p. 16 (La. App. 4
Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 55, writ denied, 23-01317 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707,
and writ denied, 23-01318 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707. Thus, considering the
State’s concession and the applicable law, we vacate Defendant’s conviction and
sentence for obstruction of justice.
Below we review Defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit armed
robbery and illegal possession of a firearm by a felon.
Applicable Law
In reviewing a claim for insufficiency of the evidence, the United States
Supreme Court has held:
…the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This
familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the
trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh
the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found
guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as
weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal
conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is
to be considered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. (Emphasis in original).
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979).
16
Moreover, this Court has further held that “[c]onflicting statements as to
factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency” for “the trier
of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness.”
State v. Wells, 10-1338, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So.3d 303, 306 (internal
citations omitted). “The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact,
is sufficient to support a conviction.” Id.
“Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979), this court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, ‘was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that
all the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v.
Francis, 18-0482, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/28/18), 318 So.3d 823, 826 (quoting State
v. Neal, 00-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657). The Francis Court further
explained the requirements for using circumstantial evidence to prove the
commission of a crime:
When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the
commission of an offense, “assuming every fact proved
that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La.
Rev. Stat. 15:438. This statutory test (of La. Rev. Stat.
15:438) “works with the Jackson constitutional
sufficiency test to evaluate whether all the evidence, direct
and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt to a rational jury.” Neal, 00-0674, p. 9,
796 So.2d at 657 (citation omitted). It is not a separate test
from the Jackson reasonable doubt standard but, rather, it
is an evidentiary guideline to facilitate appellate review of
whether a rational juror could have found a defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wright, 445
So.2d 1198, 1201 (La.1984).
A fact finder’s decision concerning the credibility
of a witness will not be disturbed unless it is clearly
contrary to the evidence. State v. James, 2009-1188, p. 4
(La. App. 4 Cir. 2/24/10), 32 So.3d 993, 996.
17
Id., 18-0482, pp. 3-4, 318 So.3d at 826-27.
“Stated differently, ‘the reviewer as a matter of law, can affirm the conviction
only if the reasonable hypothesis is the one favorable to the state and there is no
extant reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” State v. Mealancon, 21-0119, p. 7 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 12/22/21), 334 So.3d 792, 798 (quoting State v. Green, 449 So.2d 141,
144 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). “If a rational trier of fact reasonably
rejects the defendant’s hypothesis of innocence, that hypothesis falls; and, unless
another one creates reasonable doubt, the defendant is guilty.” Id. (citing State v.
Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984)).
Conspiracy to Commit Armed Robbery
Defendant asserts that the State failed to present “evidence of a single
conversation, text, or phone call” and therefore, failed to establish that he entered
into an agreement “to commit any crime, particularly a robbery, or that any criminal
plans were discussed or made.” We disagree.
Armed robbery is defined as “taking anything of value belonging to another
from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of
force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” La. Rev. Stat. 14:64.
Criminal conspiracy is “the agreement or combination of two or more persons
for the specific purpose of committing any crime; provided that … one or more of
such parties does an act in furtherance of the object of the agreement or
combination.” La. Rev. Stat. 14:26. “The word ‘combination’ does not obviate the
necessity for at least two parties to possess malefic intent for a conspiracy to exist.”
State v. Joles, 485 So.2d 212, 214 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986). In fact, the “pertinent
statute requires criminal intent in the mind of at least two persons, and, of course, an
overt act in furtherance of the enterprise, for a conspiracy to exist.” Id. “This Court
18
has found that direct or circumstantial evidence may be used to prove criminal
conspiracy.” State v. Robinson, 23-0058, p. 28 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/4/24), 401 So.3d
809, 828, writ not considered, 24-01306 (La. 12/27/24), 397 So.3d 1220, and writ
denied, 24-01198 (La. 2/25/25), 401 So.3d 658 (citing State v. Hickerson, 19-1077,
p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/30/20), 312 So.3d 1124, 1136)).
Additionally, “[s]pecific intent is an essential element of criminal
conspiracy”. State v. Toby, 23-00722, p. 3 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 831, 834, reh’g
denied, 23-00722 (La. 12/12/24), 397 So.3d 424. Specific intent is the “state of mind
which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. Rev. Stat.
14:10(1).
Louisiana courts have held that circumstantial evidence that the perpetrators
intended to commit the underlying offense together is sufficient to show that they
agreed. See Toby, supra, 23-00722, p. 5, 395 So.3d 831, 835 [wherein the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that jurors were not foreclosed from inferring from the
circumstantial evidence that two brothers conspired to commit murder “[s]imply
because there was no direct evidence, such as the precise content of a text message
to show an agreement.”].
In the instant matter, the testimony and evidence presented at trial reveals that
Lee and Tank participated in a botched drug deal that initially prompted Lee to
confront Tank— as he was with Defendant, Arec, and Caiden at Bruno’s— over the
missing quantity of marijuana. However, the situation ultimately escalated when
Tank and his cohorts confronted and murdered Lee.
As noted above, following the confrontation with Tank, Lee hurriedly
departed Bruno’s, quickly gathering his remaining friends to leave with him.
19
According to Aislinn, Lee returned to his truck with an additional quantity of
marijuana. Shortly thereafter, as Lee was seated in his vehicle with Aislinn, Emily,
Samantha and Madeline, Lee’s truck was surrounded by Defendant, who was armed,
along with Tank, Arec and Caiden, one of whom who was also armed. Trial
testimony from Aislinn, Samantha, Emily, Vivian and Madeline reveals that at least
two of the assailants brandished firearms, one of whom being Defendant who was
identified by the distinctive white and black patterned shirt or hoodie that he wore
the night of Lee’s murder. Furthermore, in an audio recording of the attack that the
jurors heard, one of these assailants can be heard demanding Lee to open his pockets.
The testimony and circumstantial evidence supports the rational inference that
after a botched drug deal inside Bruno’s, Defendant and his associates acted in
concert to take something of value located inside of Lee’s pockets on Lee’s person,
when they left the bar as a group, trailed Lee and his friends to Lee’s truck, and
surrounded the truck armed with at least two firearms to either intimidate or exert
force against Lee with the firearms. Defendant’s actions as well as those of his
cohorts evidence that they collectively acted with malefic intent to rob Lee at
gunpoint. This circumstantial evidence is sufficient to constitute an overt act in
pursuit of the shared goal of committing the armed robbery of Lee. Accordingly,
Defendant’s claim that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he
conspired to commit armed robbery is without merit.
Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon
Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that he illegally possessed a
firearm due to insufficient evidence. He acknowledges that he is a felon and that
several witnesses identified him as one of the assailants at the scene who possessed
a firearm. Off. Champagne further testified that Defendant is a felon who is
20
prohibited from possessing a firearm as a condition of his probation. Defendant,
however, asserts that the testimony adduced at trial was unreliable and insufficient
to support his conviction because the witnesses’ testimony conflicted as to whether
he was the actual shooter. Defendant further contends the district court should have
also rejected the witnesses’ testimony identifying the objects the assailants
brandished as guns or firearms because that testimony is also unreliable. We
disagree.
All five surviving occupants in Lee’s vehicle, Aislinn, Samantha, Emily,
Vivian, and Madeline, testified unequivocally that they observed one of the
perpetrators standing in front of the truck pointing a gun at them through the
windshield. The majority of these witnesses further related that this armed
perpetrator was a white male who wore a black shirt or hoodie with white Champion
logos and that he relocated to Lee’s door, attacked and killed him. At trial, Aislinn,
Samantha, and Madeline identified Defendant as being armed while wearing a black
and white hoodie with “Champion” logos. Samantha and Madeline identified
Defendant in the photographic lineup as the shooter. However, when Samantha
testified at trial, she stated that someone else actually shot Lee, but that she saw
Defendant pointing a gun at the windshield as he wore black and white shirt with
“Champion” logos “all over.” While Aislinn testified that the person pointing the
gun at the windshield was wearing a black hoodie with “white print going across
everything,” Emily similarly described the same assailant as wearing a “patterned
black and white shirt,” noting he later relocated to Lee’s car door.
Additionally, the State replayed all of the surveillance footage during closing
argument, noting each perpetrator’s clothing. The State noted that the identity of
each assailant depicted in the footage was confirmed by Jack and codefendant,
21
Caiden, during their police interviews. The State argued that Defendant was depicted
as wearing a black and white patterned shirt “with Champion writing all over it,”
whereas Caiden was described as wearing a “black hoodie with the emblem on the
chest,” and Arec as wearing “a black buttoned-up shirt.” Jack testified at trial that he
was familiar with Defendant and identified him as wearing “a black hoodie with a
Champion logo on the front of it.” The State further noted that Defendant was
depicted in surveillance footage smoking a cigarette as his group crept toward Lee’s
vehicle. Defendant’s DNA was determined to be consistent with the DNA recovered
from the Kool cigarette butt recovered from the scene.
As noted above, it is the jury’s province to determine the credibility of
witnesses, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and to weigh all evidence. A reviewing
court should not disturb a rational fact-finder’s determination unless is incompatible
with the physical evidence. Here, the jury concluded that the witnesses’ testimony
that the assailant—wearing the Champion logo-patterned shirt standing in front of
the windshield— pointed a firearm at them was credible. Accordingly, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational fact-
finder could have determined that the evidence presented excluded every reasonable
hypothesis of Defendant’s innocence. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to
prove that Defendant illegally possessed a firearm. This assignment of error is
without merit.
Excessive Sentences
Defendant asserts in his final assignment of error that the district court
imposed excessive sentences on each of his convictions and failed to consider the
sentencing criteria. As discussed above, Defendant was sentenced to 40 years at hard
labor for the responsive verdict of manslaughter; 40 years imprisonment at hard
22
labor for obstruction of justice; 35 years at hard labor for conspiracy to commit
armed robbery with a five year sentencing enhancement without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence; and 15 years at hard labor without the benefit
of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for illegal possession of a firearm by
a felon.
This Court has already addressed portions of Defendant’s claims and errors
patent regarding his sentences. In the errors patent discussion above, we determined
that Defendant’s sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery erroneously
included a five-year firearm sentencing enhancement pursuant to La. Rev. Stat.
14:64.3 as the statutory sentencing enhancement is applicable to defendants
convicted of armed robbery, not conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Therefore, in
addressing Defendant’s current assignment of error, only Defendants’ sentence of
35 years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence will be reviewed.
Additionally, we have already discussed the error patent that the district court
failed to impose upon Defendant the statutorily mandated fine for the conviction of
illegal possession of a firearm by a felon. Accordingly, this Court is remanding to
the district court for the imposition of the fine.
Further, as previously discussed, because the State concedes that it produced
insufficient evidence of Defendant’s specific intent to sustain his conviction for
obstruction of justice, this Court vacates his conviction and sentence on this count.
Therefore, any discussion of Defendant’s potentially excessive sentence for his
obstruction of justice conviction is now moot. We focus our review below on
Defendant’s sentences for manslaughter, conspiracy to commit armed robbery and
illegal possession of a firearm by a felon.
23
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the
record supports the sentence imposed. La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 881.4(D). However,
the imposition of a sentence within the statutory range may still violate a defendant’s
constitutional right against excessive punishment. State v. Mangrum, 23-01609, p. 4
(La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 765, 768 (citation omitted). When a sentence makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, it is nothing more than
the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering, and is grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime sentence, it is unconstitutionally excessive. State v. Ambeau,
08-1191, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/11/09), 6 So.3d 215, 221. Thus, “[t]he relevant
question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether
another sentence might have been more appropriate.” State v. Mathieu, 18-964, p. 4
(La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/19), 283 So.3d 1041, 1045 (citing State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957).
“In reviewing a sentence[,] the appellate court may consider the record of the
case which shall include any evidence or relevant information introduced at
preliminary hearings, hearings on motions, arraignments, or sentencing proceedings,
and any relevant information included in a presentence investigation report filed into
the record at sentencing.” La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 881.3. “In considering the nature
of the offense, both the trial court and reviewing court may assess whether the crime
for which defendant has been convicted adequately describes his conduct when the
conviction is for a lesser included responsive offense to the crime charged[,]” while
“accord[ing] paramount importance to the nature of the conduct proved at trial.”
State v. Lewis, 09-1404, pp. 7-8 (La. 10/22/10), 48 So.3d 1073, 1077-78.
24
In the instant case, Defendant asserts “insubstantial” evidence was presented
against him at trial; thus, he argues the imposition of the maximum sentence for
manslaughter as well as his sentences imposed for his convictions of conspiracy to
commit armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a felon are disproportionate
to his conduct. We disagree and, for reasons that follow, we find no abuse of the
district court’s discretion.
Manslaughter
Defendant was convicted of manslaughter as a responsive verdict to the
charge of second degree murder and received the maximum sentence of 40 years at
hard labor for that charge. See La. Rev. Stat. 14:31(B). Second degree murder is
defined in pertinent part as “the killing of a human…when the offender is engaged
in the perpetration of or attempted perpetration of…armed robbery…even though he
has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La. Rev. Stat 14:30.1. “Whoever
commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment
at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La.
Stat. 14:30.1(B).
Manslaughter is defined in pertinent part as:
(1) A homicide which would be murder under either
Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second
degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden
passion or heat of blood immediately caused by
provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his
self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not
reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the
offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average
person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense
was committed.
La. Rev. Stat. 14:31.
25
In the instant matter, notwithstanding the jury’s responsive verdict of
manslaughter, no extenuating evidence was presented that the offense was
committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation
sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection
pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 14:31(3). As discussed above, the record supported
Defendant’s possible conviction for second degree murder due to his participation
in hunting Lee down with a firearm to rob him, but then killing Lee when he would
not surrender the contents of his pockets to Defendant and his cohorts. However, the
district court—as a result of the jury’s responsive verdict— was permitted to
consider the significant reduction in the statutorily allowable punishment. See State
v. White, 48,788, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/14), 136 So.3d 280, 282 [where the
Second Circuit determined that evidence presented at trial supported a second degree
murder verdict and further held that the sentencing court may take into consideration
the great benefit the defendant derived from the jury’s return of the lesser verdict of
manslaughter]. Defendant greatly benefited here by being convicted of manslaughter
instead of second degree murder and, therefore, being sentenced to 40 years at hard
labor rather than of life imprisonment. This assignment of error is without merit.
Illegal Possession of a Firearm by a Felon and Conspiracy to Commit
Armed Robbery
The district court sentenced Defendant to 15 years at hard labor without the
benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for illegal possession of a
firearm by a felon and 35 years at hard labor for conspiracy to commit armed
robbery. Pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 14:95.1(B)(1), the maximum sentence for a
defendant found guilty of illegal possession of a firearm by a felon faces is “twenty
26
years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and be fined
not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.”8
Moreover, a defendant found guilty of conspiracy to commit any crime not
punishable by death or life imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest
fine, or one-half the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense
contemplated, or both. La. Rev. Stat. 14:26(D). Therefore, the maximum sentence
allowable for conspiracy to commit armed robbery would be forty-nine-and-a-half
years as armed robbery carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment of “not more
than ninety-nine years” pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 14:64(B).
Here, the district court imposed a sentence of 35 years imprisonment at hard
labor, which is in the upper range of sentences for conspiracy to commit armed
robbery. Similarly, Defendant’s sentence of 15 years imprisonment at hard labor for
illegal possession of a firearm by a felon is near the upper range of the maximum
allowable sentence of not more than twenty years. Maximum or near maximum
sentences are generally reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State
v. Quebedeaux, 424 So.2d 1009, 1014 (La. 1982). Considering that it was established
at trial that Defendant and his co-defendants, acting in concert, stalked Lee as he
walked to his vehicle before ambushing him, holding him and his friends at gunpoint
before shooting and killing Lee over 0.3 grams of marijuana, we find no abuse of
the district court’s vast discretion in sentencing Defendant on these two counts.
8 As explained above, this Court is remanding this matter in part because the district court failed
to impose a mandatory fine against Defendant for the charge of illegal possession of a firearm by
a felon without also imposing the statutorily mandated fine, pursuant to La. Rev. Stat.
14:95.1(B)(1).
27
Sentencing Criteria
Lastly, Defendant asserts that the district court erred in failing to consider
the sentencing guidelines provided in La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 894.1, which
provides in pertinent part:
A. When a defendant has been convicted of a felony
or misdemeanor, the court should impose a sentence
of imprisonment if any of the following occurs:
(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of
a suspended sentence or probation the defendant
will commit another crime.
(2) The defendant is in need of correctional
treatment or a custodial environment that can be
provided most effectively by his commitment to an
institution.
(3) A lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness
of the defendant’s crime.
B. The following grounds, while not controlling the
discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in
its determination of suspension of sentence or
probation:
(1) The offender’s conduct during the
commission of the offense manifested deliberate
cruelty to the victim.
...
(5) The offender knowingly created a risk of
death or great bodily harm to more than one
person.
(6) The offender used threats of or actual
violence in the commission of the offense.
...
(10) The offender used a dangerous weapon in
the commission of the offense.
...
(13) The offender was a leader or his violation
was in concert with one or more other persons
28
with respect to whom the offender occupied a
position of organizer, a supervisory position, or
any other position of management.
...
(18) The offender foreseeably endangered
human life by discharging a firearm during the
commission of an offense which has, as an
element, the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or
property of another, and which, by its very
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force may be used in the course of committing
the offense.
(19) The offender used a firearm or other
dangerous weapon while committing or
attempting to commit an offense which has, as
an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or
property of another, and which by its very
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force may be used in the course of committing
the offense.
...
(21) Any other relevant aggravating
circumstances.
“The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that although Article 894.1
provides useful guidelines for the determination of the nature and length of a
sentence, compliance with its provisions is not an end in itself.” State v.
Dauzart, 11-0688, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/21/12), 89 So.3d 1214, 1222-23
(citing State v. Wimberly, 414 So.2d 666, 671-72 (La. 1982)). The Dauzart
Court further explained that La. Crim. Code Proc. art. 894.1’s guidelines are
not to be strictly construed where the content of a record is sufficiently detailed
to provide an adequate factual basis for the district court’s sentencing:
29
Article 894.1 is intended to provide an impartial set of
guidelines within which the trial judge’s sentencing
discretion may be exercised. State v. Price, 403 So.2d
660 (La. 1981); State v. Douglas, 389 So.2d 1263 (La.
1980). Compliance with Article 894.1 further provides
a record which is detailed enough to allow for a
reasoned review of allegedly excessive sentences. The
articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the
goal of Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical
compliance with its provisions. A remand is
unnecessary where the record clearly shows an
adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, even
where there has not been full compliance with Article
894.1. State v. Boatright, 406 So.2d 163 (La. 1981).
Id., 11-0688, p. 13, 89 So.3d at 1223.
In the matter sub judice, the district court did not recite into the record
what factors it considered in determining Defendant’s sentence; rather, the
court declared its intent for Lee’s family to receive “some type of closure” after
enduring such an emotional process. The record evidences that the district
court had ample evidence to consider when applying article 894.1, such as
victim impact statements and court-ordered pre-sentencing investigations
reports for Defendant and his co-defendants.
Here, several of the eyewitnesses and members of Lee’s family provided
victim-impact statements in a series of letters to the district court, expressing
their disappointment in the jury’s verdicts, and imploring the sentencing court
to impose the maximum allowable sentences on all charges.
Several of the aggravating factors provided in La. Code Crim. Proc. art.
894.1 are applicable to Defendant’s conduct in this case as Defendant was
armed with a firearm and created a risk of death or harm to everyone inside
30
Lee’s vehicle when he pointed a gun at the windshield, before moving to Lee’s
open car door to physically attack Lee and threatened Lee while armed.
Defendant used force or threatened to use force while demanding the contents
of Lee’s pockets, which resulted in Lee’s death.
Additionally, the imposition of a lesser sentence against Defendant
“would deprecate the seriousness” of Defendant’s crime of murdering Lee
during an armed robbery, especially considering he was already a convicted
felon when this crime occurred. La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 894.1(A)(1) and
(A)(3). Defendant is deserving of lengthy imprisonment sentences for his
convictions in this matter as a recidivist with a demonstrated predisposition for
committing crime.9 Accordingly, because the record in this case shows
adequate factual support for the sentences imposed for manslaughter,
possession of a firearm by a felon and conspiracy to commit armed robbery,
we find Defendant’s assignment of error is without merit.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter for the district court to
impose a mandatory fine upon Defendant for his conviction of illegal possession of
a firearm by a felon. Additionally, we vacate Defendant’s five-year sentencing
enhancement imposed for his conviction of conspiracy to commit armed robbery.
Further, we vacate Defendant’s conviction and sentence for obstruction of justice.
In all other respects, Defendant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed.
9 As noted above, Off. Champagne testified that Defendant was sentenced to five years of
probation for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and that he had been supervising
Defendant on active probation for over a year prior to Lee’s murder.
31
REMANDED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
32