State of Louisiana in the Interest of A.M..

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2024-CA-0699

THE INTEREST OF A.M.

*

COURT OF APPEAL

*

FOURTH CIRCUIT

*

STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

APPEAL FROM

JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH

NO. 2024-119-03-DQ-C, SECTION “C”

Honorable Candice Bates Anderson, Judge

******

Judge Rosemary Ledet

******

(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge

Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)

JENKINS, J., CONCURS IN RESULTS ONLY

Chad Ikerd

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT

600 Jefferson St., Ste. 903

Lafayette, LA 70502-2125

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

Jason R. Williams, DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Brad Scott, CHIEF OF APPEALS

Zachary M. Phillips, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

619 South White Street

New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE

ADJUDICATION REVERSED; DISPOSITION VACATED;

AND REMANDED FOR A NEW ADJUDICATION HEARING.

March 17, 2025

RML

JCL

This is a juvenile delinquency case. The juvenile court adjudicated the

juvenile—A.M.1—delinquent, finding he committed the offense of simple

burglary, a violation of La. R.S. 14:62. From that delinquency adjudication, A.M.

appeals. We reverse the delinquency adjudication, vacate the delinquency

disposition, and remand for a new adjudication hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter stems from a car burglary. In April 2024, A.M. was arrested and

charged with one count of simple burglary; the charge against him read as follows:

[A.M.] did, without authorization, enter a 2022 Gray Hyundai Elantra

belonging to JOHNNIE LEE LIPSCOMB [“Mr. Lipscomb”], with the

intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, on or about January 2,

2024 at or near the 3100 block of Banks St. in the Parish of Orleans.

In May 2024, A.M. pled not guilty. In June 2024, the State filed a pre-trial notice

of intent to use an expert witness—Kevin Bell, a latent print examiner. In July

2024, A.M.’s adjudication hearing was continued due to Mr. Bell’s unavailability.2

1 The juvenile, who was 17 at the time of the hearing, is referred to in this opinion by his initials.

See Rules 5-1 and 5-2 of the Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal; La. Ch.C. art. 412.

2 The district court, over defense counsel’s objection, granted the State’s request for a

continuance based on Mr. Bell’s illness. The State represented Mr. Bell was crucial to this case.

1

At the August 2024 adjudication hearing, the State called four witnesses:

(i) the victim, Mr. Lipscomb; (ii) the responding officer, Detective Darrell

Richardson (“Detective Richardson”); (iii) the “after-investigation” officer,

Detective Kerry Brown (“Detective Brown”); and (iv) the arresting officer,

Detective Landon Tillery (“Detective Tillery”). The State failed to call Mr. Bell.

According to Mr. Lipscomb, on the night of the burglary, he was in his

bedroom, located in the back of his house, when he heard the sound of breaking

glass. He went to his living room, located in the front of his house, and looked out

the window. He saw a person standing outside of his car, which was parked in the

front of his house, and a flashing light inside his car. He then saw a trio of

individuals walking away from his car. When he went outside to investigate, the

trio was gone, the rear passenger window of his car was broken, and the inside of

his car was ransacked. Immediately thereafter, at about 11:45 p.m, Mr. Lipscomb

called the police.

About fifteen minutes later, Detective Richardson arrived. Detective

Richardson observed the rear passenger window of Mr. Lipscomb’s Hyundai

Elantra was smashed out and that glass was on the ground. After talking to Mr.

Lipscomb, Detective Richardson examined the car for fingerprints. He observed a

“single handprint fingerprint” on the front passenger window. Detective

Richardson dusted the car for prints, lifted the print he spotted, and submitted the

print to Central Evidence and Property for analysis. According to Detective

Richardson, the fingerprint he lifted from the outside of the front passenger

2

window was “actually noticeable.” Detective Richardson acknowledged that he

never went inside the vehicle.3

A few weeks after the initial investigation, Detective Brown—the “after-

investigation” officer—received Mr. Bell’s handprint expert’s report containing the

results of the testing (the “Bell Report”). The results placed A.M. at the scene of

the crime. Detective Brown acknowledged that they did not receive a report

indicating the “date from when that [finger]print was placed.” Over defense

counsel’s hearsay objection, the trial court allowed the State to introduce into

evidence the Bell Report.

Detective Tillery—the arresting officer—identified A.M. in court as the

person whom he arrested based on the arrest warrant for the January 2024

burglary. As noted elsewhere in this opinion, the State failed to call its expert, Mr.

Bell, as a witness.

At the end of the adjudication hearing, the district court adjudicated A.M.

delinquent on one count of simple burglary. This appeal followed.4

3 At the time of his investigation, Detective Richardson was wearing a bodycam. At the hearing,

the State, over A.M.’s counsel’s objection, introduced the bodycam video. Short clips of the

bodycam video were played at the hearing. The video documents Detective Richardson’s

testimony that the fingerprint was noticeable on the front passenger window of the car.

4 The district court ordered a predisposition determination through the Office of Juvenile Justice

(“OJJ”); placed A.M. in the Evening Report Center (“ERC”) program; ordered continued

compliance with electronic monitoring, which A.M. had been placed on by another court; and set

September 25, 2024 as the date for A.M.’s disposition hearing. But, at the hearing, a disposition

was not imposed; rather, the OJJ conducted a case review. A.M. was found to be compliant with

the ERC requirements. Meanwhile, in September 2024, the juvenile court granted A.M.’s motion

for appeal; the record was lodged with this Court; and the matter docketed.

In December 2024, this Court issued a show cause order to supplement the record with a

final disposition. A disposition hearing was held in December 2024. At the hearing, the juvenile

court sentenced A.M.—who was then eighteen years old—to one year with the OJJ, suspended,

and one-year active probation, along with certain special conditions in the event A.M. is released

on parole. Thereafter, the appellate record was supplemented with the final disposition. This

3

Assignments of Error

Although A.M. assigns multiple errors, two are dispositive: (i) the sufficiency

of the evidence to sustain the delinquency adjudication for simple burglary; and

(ii) trial error in allowing the State to introduce hearsay evidence—the Bell Report.5

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review, an appellate court must

apply the following analysis:

• [T]he entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, is to

be considered when assessing a conviction for sufficiency of the

evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992); State v.

Brown, 2008-1434, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/18/09), 7 So.3d 1238, 1242.

• If a defendant claims on appeal that certain evidence was improperly

admitted, and the reviewing court finds that any rational trier of fact,

viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

could have found all the essential elements of the offense present

beyond a reasonable doubt, the reviewing court then reviews other

assignments of trial errors to determine whether the defendant is

entitled to a new trial. Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734; Brown, 7 So.3d at

1242.

Court resubmitted this matter for decision in February 2025.

5 A.M. assigned as error the following:

1. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to sustain the adjudication of

delinquency for the offense of simple burglary.

2. Over the strenuous objection of counsel, the trial judge considered as substantive

evidence, hearsay evidence offered to show the conduct of the investigation. The

overruling of counsel’s objections was clear error prejudicial to A.M. The error

should result in a reversal of the adjudication and a vacation of the disposition. The

use of the report authored by Kevin Bell and introduced through the testimony of

Detective Brown, as opposed to Mr. Bell’s testimony, deprived A.M. of his

constitutional right to confront his accusers. The error was more egregious as the

State had previously notified the defense of its intent to call Mr. Bell as an expert

witness. The palm print on the outside of Mr. Lipscomb’s car was the sole evidence

of guilt.

3. It was patent error for the trial judge not to impose a judgment of disposition within

the time limitations set by La. Ch.C. art. 892. A.M. was prejudiced by the ruling as

the trial judge did not award credit for time served in continued custody following his

arrest. Nor did the trial judge advise A.M. of the delays to file for post conviction

relief.

4

• If the reviewing court determines there has been a trial error (which was

not harmless) in cases in which the entirety of the evidence was

sufficient to support the conviction, the defendant must receive a new

trial. He is not entitled to an acquittal even though the admissible

evidence, considered alone, was insufficient.

• On the other hand, if the review of the entirety of the evidence,

admissible and inadmissible, reveals that the evidence is insufficient,

the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734;

Brown, 7 So.3d at 1242-43.

State v. Kenny, 11-1819, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/29/13), 116 So.3d 992, 996

(reformatted).6 When the issues on appeal include both the sufficiency of the

evidence and trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency

of the evidence by considering the entirety of the evidence—admissible and

inadmissible. Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734. Such is the case here.

The State’s burden of proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is the same

as in an adult criminal proceeding—to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every

element of the offense alleged in the petition. State in Int. of D.W., 22-01654, p. 2

(La. 10/20/23), 371 So.3d 1065, 1067 (citing La. Ch.C. art. 883 and State in the

Interest of Batiste, 367 So.2d 784, 788 (La. 1979)). Here, the alleged delinquent act

is simple burglary—the “unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle,

watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, . . . with the intent to commit

a felony or any theft therein[.]” La. R.S. 14:62(A)(1).

6 “Appellate courts have observed that a child adjudicated a delinquent in Louisiana is entitled to

a broader scope and standard of review than the minimum required by the Due Process clause,

and therefore review of a delinquency adjudication is subject not only to the “rational fact-

finder” standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), but

also the ‘clearly wrong/manifest error’ standard applied in civil proceedings.” State in Int. of

D.W., 22-01654, p. 2 n.3, 371 So.3d at 1067 (internal citation omitted).

5

The essential elements of simple burglary are two-fold: (1) an unauthorized

entry of a vehicle;7 and (2) a specific intent to commit a felony or any theft in the

vehicle.8 See State v. Simpson, 447 So.2d 98, 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). Stated

otherwise, “burglary consists of an act element and an intent element. La. R.S.

14:7, 14:8. The act element, or actus reus, is the unauthorized entry of a dwelling

or vehicle. The intent element, or mens rea, is the specific intent to commit a theft

(or other felony) in the dwelling or vehicle.” State v. Arceneaux, 12-1047, p. 2 (La.

App. 3 Cir. 4/3/13), 111 So.3d 1177, 1180. As with other offenses, the State is also

required to prove the perpetrator’s identity. State in Int. of K.D., 13-1274, p. 6 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 4/9/14), 140 So.3d 182, 186 (internal citations omitted).

Also relevant here is the rule regarding principal liability, codified in La.

R.S. 14:24. “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present

or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid

and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to

commit the crime, are principals.” State in Int. of D.W., 22-01654, pp. 4-5, 371

So.3d at 1069. Neither direct commission of the crime nor presence at the crime

scene is needed to support a conviction as a principal. Id. (citing Whitmore v.

Maggio, 742 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1984)). To find a defendant guilty as a

principal to simple burglary, the State need not prove that the defendant actually

7 “The ‘entry’ element of the crime of simple burglary is proved when there is evidence that any

part of the defendant’s person intrudes, even momentarily, into the structure.” State ex rel. J.N.,

07-1229, 07-1306, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/7/08), 984 So.2d 910, 915.

8 Specific intent is that “state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the

offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”

La. R.S. 14:10(1). Thus, specific intent need not be proven as fact; it can be inferred from the

defendant’s acts and circumstances. State v. Buhcannon, 11-1727, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir.

3/13/13), 112 So.3d 312, 319 (quoting State v. Pittman, 11-0741, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir.

2/29/12), 85 So.3d 782, 785).

6

entered the structure, rather, it need only prove that the defendant was concerned

with the commission of the crime. See State v. McCord, 11-0656, p. 9 (La. App. 4

Cir. 2/15/12), 85 So.3d 210, 215.

Here, A.M.’s adjudication rests upon the fingerprint evidence9 coupled with

the testimony of Mr. Lipscomb and the officers involved in the investigation and

arrest. Focusing on the fingerprint evidence, A.M. contends that his fingerprint that

was found on the outside of the front passenger window of the car was insufficient

to establish specific intent. A.M. further contends that his fingerprint only

establishes that he touched the car at some undetermined time. He emphasizes

Detective Brown’s testimony that there is no report as to when the fingerprint was

placed on the car. As a result, A.M. contends that it could not be established

beyond a reasonable doubt that he was one of the trio that Mr. Lipscomb saw

walking from his car. Regardless, A.M. contends that the record is devoid of any

evidence that he entered the car. Lastly, A.M. cites the rule regarding liability as a

principal and emphasizes that the rule has an important qualification—an

individual may only be convicted as a principal for those crimes for which he

personally has the requisite mental state. According to A.M., nothing in the record

establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite specific intent to

commit a burglary.

The State counters that the fingerprint evidence is sufficient to establish both

elements of simple burglary—unauthorized entry and specific intent. According to

the State, the fingerprint evidence placed A.M. at the scene of the crime on the

night of the incident. The State points out that Mr. Lipscomb testified that A.M.

9 For ease of discussion, we refer to A.M.’s palm print as the fingerprint evidence.

7

was not authorized to come into contact with Mr. Lipscomb’s car or to enter his

car. The requirement of unauthorized entry, the State contends, is met given

A.M.’s fingerprint on the car; at a minimum, the presence of his fingerprint makes

A.M. a principal, either directly or indirectly concerned with the commission of the

crime. Continuing, the State contends that the circumstantial evidence excludes

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence that A.M. did not enter the car. Finally,

the State contends that A.M. and his co-conspirators had the specific intent to

commit a simple burglary.10

The linchpin of A.M.’s sufficiency argument is that the State’s fingerprint

evidence is insufficient to establish the essential elements of simple burglary.

Simply stated, the dispositive issue is whether the fingerprint evidence, standing

alone, is sufficient to establish the elements necessary to adjudicate A.M.

delinquent. We conclude it is sufficient.

This Court has observed that “[w]hen, as in the case at bar, the sole evidence

of a defendant’s unauthorized entry at the time of the burglary is fingerprints, a

jury can reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if the

State also presents evidence which reasonably excludes the hypothesis that the

prints were impressed at a time other than that of the crime.” State v. Cornelius,

10 The requirement of specific intent, the State contends, is sufficiently established by the

circumstances. The circumstances indicate that A.M. and his co-conspirators had the requisite

specific intent to commit a burglary upon this specific vehicle as well as a theft or other felony

therein. The inside of Mr. Lipscomb’s vehicle was ransacked, according to Mr. Lipscomb’s

testimony. This indicates that the offenders were looking for something—certainly something of

value—that they could take from the vehicle. The fact that the rear passenger window, as

opposed to any other window, was broken is significant. In many vehicles, the rear windows are

less likely to trigger the vehicle’s alarm. Similarly, the fact that the burglarized car is a Hyundai

is also significant; Hyundais are common burglary and theft targets because of their particular

susceptibility to hotwiring with ordinary objects like USB cords and screwdrivers. See State v.

Pierre, 24-0470, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/6/24), ___ So.3d ___, 2024 WL 5036191 at *4

(describing the attempted theft of a Hyundai sedan with the use of a USB cord).

8

539 So.2d 919, 921 (La. App. 4th Cir.1989) (citing State v. Pryor, 306 So.2d 675

(La. 1975); State v. Davenport, 445 So.2d 1190 (La. 1984); and La. R.S. 15:438).

Fingerprint evidence, in this context, is circumstantial evidence. See La.

R.S. 15:438. In Louisiana, the circumstantial evidence rule is codified as follows:

“assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to

convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La. R.S.

15:438. The circumstantial evidence rule does not establish a stricter standard of

review than the more general rational juror’s reasonable doubt formula; rather it

serves as a helpful evidentiary guide. State v. Toups, 01-1875, p. 3 (La. 10/15/02),

833 So.2d 910, 912.

“[W]here the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s fingerprints create a

strong inference that the defendant was the perpetrator,” fingerprint evidence may

suffice to support a conviction. Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 564 (Del. 1995).

The surrounding circumstances that may be considered include, but are not limited

to, the following three factors:

• [W]hether the prints were found in a private or public structure (i.e.,

whether the object in question was generally-accessible);

• [W]hether the defendant had any special access to the object in question

which may provide an alternative explanation for the presence of the

prints; and

• [W]hether the manner of placement of the prints on the object is

supportive of the defendant having placed them there while committing

the charged offense.

Id. (reformatted). Application of those factors here establishes that the evidence is

sufficient to support the delinquency adjudication.

First, at the adjudication hearing, defense counsel argued that A.M.’s

fingerprint was found on a “public facing object on [the] public facing part of a

9

motor vehicle” and that “putting your hand on a window is not a crime.” Rejecting

that argument, the district court, in its oral reasons for judgment, observed:

[T]here is no proof that [A.M.] actually went into the vehicle, however

when a bit of glass is broken, and you have to hit that bit of glass in

order break the glass than obviously there is some entering of the

vehicle. The [victim] also testifies that his items are rummaged around.

That when he went to bed that night that his car was not in that state. In

addition to that I think there was some argument about it’s a public

vehicle it’s a public facing object it’s a public area and that anybody

could touch a vehicle but again at the time of this alleged incident your

handprint is found [sic] at the time of this alleged incident the victim

states that he did not allow anybody the opportunity to enter his vehicle

clearly if items are ransacked somebody entered his vehicle at the time

of the incident the victim further alleges that he actually sees persons at

the vehicle at the time three persons I think running from the vehicle

and he also testifies that he calls the police at about 11:43 and the police

officer testifies that I believe he got to the scene at 11:58. Your

handprint is the only one that’s found the vehicle has obviously been

ransacked and rummaged through that means that somebody went in it

your fingerprints the one that’s there based on what’s been provided.

The fact that a fingerprint is found in a public place does not trump other

considerations; it is only a factor to consider. See Kenney v. State, 908 N.E.2d 350,

353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, the district court’s reasons reflect that it considered

this factor, which defense counsel argued, and rejected the suggestion that it

dictated an inference that the fingerprints were not left at the time of the offense.

Second, A.M. had no special access to Mr. Lipscomb’s car. To the contrary,

Detective Brown testified that after receiving the match on A.M.’s fingerprints, he

met with Mr. Lipscomb and asked him if the person in the photograph should have

had any contact with his vehicle; Mr. Lipscomb responded no. Mr. Lipscomb

likewise testified that he never gave anyone permission to bust out his car window

or to go in his car.

Third, the manner of placement of the prints—on the outside, front

passenger window—is supportive of A.M. having placed them while committing

10

the offense. The entry into the vehicle was made by smashing the rear passenger

window. The proximity of the print to the point of entry—the same side of the

car—supports the inference that A.M.’s fingerprint was placed there during the

commission of the offense. Moreover, Detective Richardson described the

appearance of the fingerprint as “actually noticeable.” Given the fingerprint was on

the outside of the car window, the appearance of the fingerprint supports an

inference that it was freshly made.

Taken all the surrounding circumstances into account, we conclude that the

fingerprint evidence coupled with the testimony given at the hearing was sufficient

to support the delinquency adjudication for simple burglary.

Trial Error—Allowing Introduction of Hearsay Evidence—the Bell Report

A.M. next contends that the district court erred in allowing the State, over

defense counsel’s objection, to introduce hearsay evidence—Mr. Bell’s expert

report. The use of the Bell Report, introduced through the testimony of Detective

Brown, as opposed to Mr. Bell’s testimony, deprived A.M. of his constitutional

right to confront his accusers. The error was more egregious as the State had

previously notified the defense of its intent to call Mr. Bell as an expert witness.

The State counters that, although Detective Brown could indeed identify and

authenticate the Bell Report, the report itself presents a Confrontation Clause issue

under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374,

158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).11 The State concedes that A.M. was denied his right to

11 Under Crawford, the Bell Report is a testimonial statement covered by the Confrontation

Clause, and the analyst himself—Mr. Bell—was a witness for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.

Absent a showing that the analyst was unavailable to testify at trial and that A.M. had a prior

opportunity to cross-examine him, A.M. was entitled to confront him at the adjudication hearing.

The State acknowledges that it is unclear why Mr. Bell did not appear to testify at the

adjudication hearing, despite the State noticing its intent to call him as an expert witness as to

latent fingerprint examinations.

11

confront the expert witness with regard to the Bell Report, which connected A.M.

to the crime. The State likewise concedes that given the Bell Report was used as

substantive evidence to show A.M.’s guilt for the charged offense, it cannot be said

that its introduction into evidence was harmless error. Melendez-Diaz v.

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2542, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009)

(observing that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not

permit the State to prove its case by using ex parte out-of-court affidavits).

Accordingly, we find, as the State concedes, that a trial error was committed

that was not harmless—the admission of the Bell Report despite the expert’s

absence from trial. But, the Bell Report could be considered for the Jackson

sufficiency of evidence analysis. Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734. Based on the Jackson

analysis conducted elsewhere in this opinion, this Court concludes that the

evidence—admissible and inadmissible—is constitutionally sufficient to adjudicate

A.M. as delinquent for simple burglary. Because the adjudication is

constitutionally sufficient, this Court does not acquit A.M. of the offense charged;

rather, we order a new trial—a new adjudication hearing.

Error Patent Review

Although this Court conducts an error patent review in juvenile cases, we

pretermit addressing the errors patent in this matter. Doing so is unnecessary given

our reversal of the delinquency adjudication, vacation of the delinquency

disposition, and remand for a new trial.

DECREE

12

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the delinquency adjudication, vacate

the delinquency disposition, and remand for a new adjudication hearing.

ADJUDICATION REVERSED; DISPOSITION VACATED; AND

REMANDED FOR A NEW ADJUDICATION HEARING

13