The opinion
WATSON MEMORIAL * NO. 2023-CA-0293
SPIRITUAL TEMPLE OF
CHRIST D/B/A WATSON *
MEMORIAL TEACHING COURT OF APPEAL
MINISTRIES, CHARLOTTE *
BRANCAFORTE, ELIO FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRANCAFORTE, BENITO *
BRANCAFORTE, JOSEPHINE STATE OF LOUISIANA
BROWN, ROBERT PARKE, *******
NANCY ELLIS, MARK
HAMRICK, ROBERT LINK,
CHARLOTTE LINK, ROSS
MCDIARMID, LAUREL
MCDIARMID, JERRY
OSBORNE, JACK STOLIER,
AND WILLIAM TAYLOR
VERSUS
GHASSAN KORBAN, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE
SEWERAGE AND WATER
BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS
APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2022-10955, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M. Medley
******
Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano
******
(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge
Karen K. Herman)
Randall A. Smith
Sarah A. Lowman
L. Tiffany Hawkins
Andre M. Stolier
SMITH & FAWER, L.L.C.
201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3702
New Orleans, LA 70170
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Michael E. Botnick
Alex B. Rothenberg
GORDON ARATA MONTOGMERY BARNETT MCCOLLAM DUPLANTIS &
EAGAN, LLC
201 St. Charles Avenue, 40th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70170-4000
Craig B. Mitchell
Christopher D. Wilson
MITCHELL & ASSOCIATES, APLC
615 Baronne Street, Suite 300
New Orleans, LA 70113
Darryl Harrison
SEWERAGE & WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS
625 St. Joseph Street, Room 201
New Orleans, LA 70165
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
DECEMBER 13, 2023
JCL This is a mandamus proceeding, wherein the prevailing parties in an inverse
DLD condemnation claim seek to compel payment of damages awarded at trial.
KKH Plaintiffs/appellants (collectively, the “Neighbors”)1 appeal the February 8, 2023
judgment of the district court, which granted the exception of no cause of action
filed by defendant/appellee, Ghassan Korban (“Korban”), in his official capacity as
Executive Director of the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (“SWB”).
For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Neighbors claim that SWB damaged and interfered with the Neighbors’
use and enjoyment of their private homes and church during the Southeast
Louisiana Urban Drainage Project (the “SELA Project”), which took place
between 2013 and 2016. Multiple groups of residents, including the Neighbors,
filed lawsuits to recover damages sustained in connection with the SELA Project.
1 The Neighbors are listed as Watson Memorial Spiritual Temple of Christ d/b/a Watson
Memorial Teaching Ministries; Charlotte, Elio, and Benito Brancaforte; Josephine Brown;
Robert Parke and Nancy Ellis; Mark Hamrick; Robert and Charlotte Link; Ross and Laurel
McDiarmid; Jerry Osborne; Jack Stolier; and Dr. William Taylor.
1
The facts of these claims are discussed in detail in this Court’s opinion in
Lowenburg v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 19-0524 (La. App. 4 Cir.
7/29/20), --- So.3d ----, 2020 WL 4364345 (“Lowenburg”). Following a trial on the
merits, the Neighbors were awarded $998,872.47 in cumulative damages for
inverse condemnation, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs, which ultimately
totaled $517,231.03. The district court’s finding, that SWB was liable to the
Neighbors for inverse condemnation, was upheld by this Court on appeal. See
Lowenburg, 19-0524, p. 14, --- So.3d at ----, 2020 WL 4364345 at *7.
Thereafter, SWB did not appropriate funds to satisfy the judgment rendered
in the Lowenburg suit. In response, the Neighbors filed a separate lawsuit in
federal district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other things,
that SWB’s failure to pay the inverse condemnation judgment to the Neighbors
constitutes a secondary taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 543
F.Supp.3d 373, 375 (E.D. La. 2021), aff’d, 29 F.4th 226 (5th Cir. 2022), cert.
denied, --- U.S. ---, 143 S.Ct. 353, 214 L.Ed.2d 170 (2022) (“Ariyan”). SWB and
Korban filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the district
court granted, and the U.S. Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal, “applying long-
standing precedent that there is no [federal constitutional] property right to timely
payment on a judgment.” Ariyan, 29 F.4th at 228.
On December 1, 2022, the Neighbors filed the current action in the district
court by filing a “Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Fieri Facias.” The
2
Neighbors argued that the damages awarded at trial for inverse condemnation were
a just compensation award, pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but the SWB had failed to appropriate funds
to satisfy the underlying judgments. According to the Neighbors, the constitutional
duty to pay just compensation for the taking or damaging of property is a
ministerial duty required by law, and the district court has the power and authority
to issue a writ of mandamus directing the immediate payment of the just
compensation award.
On December 27, 2022, Korban filed exceptions of res judicata and no
cause of action. In the exception of no cause of action, Korban argued that the
Louisiana Constitution prohibits seizure of State assets to satisfy money
judgments, and such judgments may only be paid from funds appropriated by the
legislature or the political subdivision against which the judgment was rendered.
Under Korban’s argument, courts may not order appropriation of funds through
mandamus, as that power is reserved to the legislature.
A hearing on the exceptions went forward on January 27, 2023. The district
court subsequently rendered judgment on February 8, 2023, which denied the
exception of res judicata, granted the exception of no cause of action, and
dismissed the Neighbors’ claims against Korban with prejudice. This appeal
follows.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, the Neighbors set forth the following assignments of error:
3
I. The District Court erred by granting Appellees’
peremptory exception of no cause of action and
dismissing Appellants’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus
and Writ of Fieri Facias.
II. The District Court erred in granting Appellees’ exception
of no cause of action on Appellants’ petition for writ of
mandamus, because just compensation is constitutionally
required under both the state and federal constitutions;
therefore, the duty to pay a just compensation award is a
mandatory duty that is not subject to discretion, and thus
properly subject to mandamus.
III. The District Court erred in granting Appellees’ exception
of no cause of action on Appellants’ petition for writ of
fieri facias, because the constitutional requirement that
just compensation be paid in LA. CONST., art. I, § 4(B) is
more specific than, and therefore supersedes, the
requirement that judgments only be paid from voluntary
appropriations under LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(C).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Exception of No Cause of Action
The exception of no cause of action raises a question of law, and appellate
courts review a district court’s ruling on an exception of no cause of action de
novo. Herman v. Tracage Dev., L.L.C., 16-0082, 16-0083, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir.
9/21/16), 201 So.3d 935, 939. “The function of the peremptory exception of no
cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition, which is done by
determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading.”
State, Div. of Admin., Off. of Facility Plan. & Control v. Infinity Sur. Agency,
L.L.C., 10-2264, p. 8 (La. 5/10/11), 63 So.3d 940, 945-46 (citing Ramey v.
DeCaire, 03-1299, p. 7 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118). The mover bears the
burden of showing that the petition states no cause of action. Id., 10-2264, p. 9, 63
So.3d at 946. Under La. C.C.P. art. 931, no evidence may be introduced to support
4
or controvert the exception of no cause of action; thus, the trial court reviews the
petition and accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact. Id., 10-2264, pp. 8-
9, 63 So.3d at 946 (citing Ramey, 03-1299, p. 7, 869 So.2d at 118)(other citations
omitted).
Inverse Condemnation
Pursuant to Article I, Section 4(B) of the Louisiana Constitution, “[p]roperty
shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for
public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his
benefit.” An inverse condemnation action provides a procedural remedy to a
property owner seeking compensation for land already taken or damaged, against a
governmental or private entity having powers of eminent domain, where no
expropriation proceedings have commenced. Faulk v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 14-
1598, p. 9 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So.3d 1034, 1043-44 (citing Avenal v. State, 03-3521,
p. 26 (La. 10/19/04), 886 So.2d 1085, 1103-04)(other citations omitted). “Inverse
condemnation claims derive from the Taking Clauses contained in both the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana
Constitution.” Id., 14-1598, p. 9, 172 So.3d at 1044. “Under the Louisiana
Constitution, the action for inverse condemnation is available in all cases where
there has been a taking or damaging of property when just compensation has not
been paid, without regard to whether the property is corporeal or incorporeal.” Id.,
14-1598, pp. 9-10, 172 So.3d at 1044 (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original).
5
The Louisiana Supreme Court pronounced a three-factor analysis to
determine whether a property owner is entitled to “eminent domain compensation,”
wherein the court must:
(1) determine if a recognized species of property right has
been affected;
(2) if it is determined that property is involved, decide
whether the property has been taken or damaged in a
constitutional sense; and
(3) determine whether the taking or damaging is for a public
purpose under Article I, Section 4.
Id., 14-1598, p. 10, 172 So.3d at 1044 (citing State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v.
Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So.2d 598, 603 (La. 1992); Avenal, 03-3521, pp. 26-27,
886 So.2d at 1104).
In Lowenburg, supra, this Court examined these factors and upheld the
district court’s finding that the Neighbors were entitled to damages pursuant to
inverse condemnation.
Mandamus
“Mandamus is a writ directing a public officer … to perform” “a ministerial
duty required by law.” La. C.C.P. arts. 3861 and 3863. “A ministerial duty is one
in which no element of discretion is left to the public officer, in other words, a
simple definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and
imposed by law.” Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 20-01231, p. 3 (La. 5/13/21), 320
So.3d 369, 371 (internal quotations omitted). “If a public officer is vested with any
element of discretion, mandamus will not lie.” Id.
6
Importantly, the Louisiana Constitution enables the legislature to “limit or
provide for the extent of liability of the state, a state agency, or a political
subdivision.” Id. (quoting La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C)). Specifically, under Article
XII, Section 10(C), “[n]o judgment against the state, a state agency, or a political
subdivision shall be exigible, payable, or paid except from funds appropriated
therefor by the legislature or by the political subdivision against which the
judgment is rendered.” Id. Moreover, under La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2),2 a judgment
against the state or its political subdivision is only payable by funds appropriated
for the purpose of satisfying that judgment. As a general matter, “[t]he very act of
appropriating funds is, by its nature, discretionary and specifically granted to the
legislature by the constitution.” Hoag v. State, 04-0857, p. 7 (La. 12/1/04), 889
So.2d 1019, 1024.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[m]andamus may lie
against a political subdivision when the duty to be compelled is ministerial and not
discretionary.” Lowther, 20-01231, p. 5, 320 So.3d at 372. “[T]he relevant
consideration is ‘whether the act of appropriating funds to pay the judgment … is a
purely ministerial duty for which mandamus would be appropriate.’” Id. (quoting
Hoag, 04-0857, p. 6, 889 So.2d at 1023). The Supreme Court acknowledged there
are “specific limited exceptions wherein the duty to pay a judgment is
2 “Any judgment rendered in any suit filed against the state, a state agency, or a political
subdivision, or any compromise reached in favor of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit
shall be exigible, payable, and paid only out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the
legislature, if the suit was filed against the state or a state agency, or out of funds appropriated
for that purpose by the named political subdivision, if the suit was filed against a political
subdivision.” La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2).
7
constitutionally and statutorily mandated and therefore ministerial in nature.”
Crooks v. State Through Dep’t of Nat. Res., 22-00625, p. 4 (La. 1/1/23), 359 So.3d
448, 451, reh’g denied, 22-00625 (La. 3/16/23), 362 So.3d 424. As the Court
explained:
These constitutional and statutory provisions operate as
de facto appropriations by the legislature irrespective of
the general limitations set forth in La. Const. art. XII, §
10(C) and La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2). See Lowther, 20-1231,
p. 6, 320 So.3d at 372-73 (citing Perschall v. State, 96-
0322, p. 22 (La. 7/1/97), 697 So.2d 240, 255). Where
such provisions exist, courts are merely enforcing the
positive law and not encroaching on functions
constitutionally dedicated to the legislative branch.
Lowther, 20-1231, p. 5, 320 So.3d at 372; Hoag, 04-
0857, p. 4, 889 So.2d at 1022.
Id.
This case presents a res nova issue of law: whether payment of an inverse
condemnation judgment against a political subdivision is a ministerial duty. We
find that it is.
The Neighbors rely on Parish of St. Charles v. R.H. Creager, Inc., 10-180,
p. 13 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/10), 55 So.3d 884, 893, writ denied, 11-0118 (La.
4/1/11), 60 So.3d 1250 (“Creager”), which held that “payment of final judgments
of damages in expropriation cases is a ministerial duty and not a discretionary one”
such that “a mandamus may be properly issued for payment of the judgment in this
case.” The Creager court recognized that the specific levee district statute, La. R.S.
38:513(B), and the mandamus power consistent with that law, were not directly
applicable where the parish was not a levee district. Creager, 10-180, p. 8, 55
So.3d at 889. Even so, the court found “the legislative intent of those statutes can
8
be instructive.” Id. When a levee district expropriates land, La. R.S. 38:390(A)
requires:
If the amount finally awarded exceeds the amount
so deposited, the court shall enter judgment against the
levee district or levee and drainage district and in favor
of the persons entitled thereto for the amount of the
deficiency. The final judgment together with legal
interest thereon shall be paid within sixty days after
becoming final. Thereafter upon application by the owner
or owners, the trial court shall issue a writ of mandamus
to enforce payment.
Looking to this authority, the court further reasoned:
By incorporating the mandamus power to compel
payment of fair and just compensation into the
proceedings for expropriation of land by levee boards, we
believe the legislature intended that this be an exception
to the general mandamus law. Furthermore, we note that
the issuance of a mandamus by the trial court in that case
is actually mandated by the legislature.
Creager, 10-180, p. 8, 55 So.3d at 890. The court was also persuaded that the
judgment against the parish was not obtained in a contract or tort action; “the fact
that this matter results from an action taken pursuant to the Parish’s power of
eminent domain requires a different analysis and outcome.” Id., 10-180, pp. 8-9, 55
So.3d at 890. Moreover, under the Takings Clause of the Louisiana Constitution,
“the same law that affords the right of the Parish to exercise its police power
compels the Parish to pay just and fair compensation, and to afford constitutional
due process rights to citizens affected.” Id., 10-180, p. 10, 55 So.3d at 891.
According to the Neighbors, inverse condemnation – like expropriation – is
a taking or damaging of a private property because of a public purpose as provided
in Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, and the aggrieved property
9
owners must be subject to the same constitutional protections and benefit from the
same ability to collect a judgment for a taking or damaging. This Court determined
that “in cases where inverse condemnation rather than formal expropriation of
property has taken place[,] … [t]here is no basis in Louisiana law for the different
treatment of property owners in these two situations.” Avenal v. State, 99-0127
(La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99), 757 So.2d 1, 12, on reh’g (3/15/00), writ denied, 00-1077
(La. 6/23/00), 767 So.2d 41. “The same substantive constitutional right (the right,
secured by Art. I, § 4 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, to receive full
compensation for the governmental taking of private property) is triggered by
both.” Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court compared the “mandatory nature” of a hotel
tax overpayment refund, pursuant to statutory and constitutional authority,3 to the
“compensation that is required in expropriation cases” finding mandamus the
appropriate remedy to compel these ministerial duties. Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C. v.
Bridges, 16-1663, pp. 10-11 (La. 5/3/17), 223 So.3d 488, 496 (“Jazz”)(citing
Creager, 10-180, p. 11, 55 So.3d at 891)(footnotes omitted). In doing so, the Court
distinguished the overpayment refund proceeding “from cases requiring a
legislative appropriation for payment of a judgment, i.e., matters arising out of
contract or tort.” Id., 16-1663, p. 11, 223 So.3d at 496 (footnote omitted). The
Court further reasoned that a refund proceeding, “like an expropriation proceeding,
implicates constitutional concerns involving the deprivation of property” and that
3 See generally La. Const. art. VII, § 3(A) and La. R.S. 47:1621 et seq. (setting out the
circumstances and procedure providing refund to the taxpayer for the overpayment of taxes).
10
“the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary [of the Department of
Revenue] to use those funds does not violate the constitutional prohibition of
seizing public funds.” Id., 16-1663, p. 12, 223 So.3d at 497.
Similarly, the Supreme Court compared the mandatory, ministerial duty to
pay firefighters back wages4 to the “appropriation of funds to pay judgment of
damages in expropriation case … because the expropriation statutes and La. Const.
art. I, § 4(B) make payment of fair and just compensation mandatory and not
discretionary.” Lowther, 20-01231, p. 5, 320 So.3d at 372 (citing Creager, 10-180,
p. 13, 55 So.3d at 892-93). The Court again “distinguished the mandatory nature of
paying judgments for tax overpayment refunds and expropriation compensation
from the discretionary nature of paying judgments arising from matters of contract
or tort.” Id. (citing Jazz, 16-1663, pp. 10-11, 223 So.3d at 495-96).
SWB relies on Newman Marchive Partnership v. City of Shreveport, 07-
1890 (La. 4/08/08), 979 So.2d 1262, for the general premise that the separation of
powers doctrine prohibits issuing mandamus ordering seizure of public assets in
satisfaction of money judgments. Nevertheless, Newman Machive Partnership was
a breach of contract claim, which the Supreme Court acknowledged as distinct
from a constitutional takings claim involving the mandatory duty to pay just
compensation for deprivation of property rights. See Lowther, 20-01231, p. 5, 320
So.3d at 372; Jazz, 16-1663, pp. 10-11, 223 So.3d at 495-96.
4 See La. Const. art. VI, § 14(A)(2)(e); La. R.S. 33:1992(A); La. R.S. 33:1992(B); and La. R.S.
33:1969 (governing firefighter compensation).
11
SWB further cites the recent Supreme Court case of Mellor v. Parish of
Jefferson, 22-01713 (La. 9/1/23), 370 So.3d 388, rejecting a claim seeking
mandamus for return of funds collected through the enforcement of an ordinance
later found unconstitutional. Mellor declined to follow Creager, finding “no
specific constitutional or statutory provision permits the trial court to order the
defendants to remit [the disputed sum] into its registry[.]” Id., 22-01713, p. 14, 370
So.3d at 397. Instead, the Court adhered to the general pronouncements of La.
Const. art. XII, § 10 and La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2) in determining that the Court
lacked specific authority to issue mandamus ordering seizure of public funds to
satisfy payment of a money judgment. Id.
We find Mellor dissimilar from the appeal before us, because, in Mellor,
there was no holding that the funds collected under the ordinance resulted in a
taking under La. Const. art. I, § 4, and neither the constitution nor statute permitted
mandamus. Instead, we find this matter analogous to the expropriation issues
resolved in Creager and followed in Jazz. We find it instructive that in Creager,
the Takings Clause of the Louisiana Constitution governed and mandamus was
proper, even though the expropriation statute was not directly applicable.
Moreover, we are bound by this Court’s pronouncement in Avenal, 99-0127, 757
So.2d at 12, that no reason exists to treat expropriation and inverse condemnation
differently, as the same constitutional protections arise in both.
Under this reasoning, we find that payment of a judgment awarding just
compensation for inverse condemnation, like a judgment awarding just
12
compensation for expropriation, is a ministerial duty, and we find that the
Neighbors have stated a cause of action. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the
district court.
Res Judicata
Lastly, we find no merit in Korban’s argument that the district court’s
judgment should be upheld on the basis of res judicata.5 Korban has failed to
demonstrate with law or record evidence that the federal court judgment in Ariyan
bars the instant state law claim for mandamus.
When filing suit in federal court, the Neighbors “invoked federal question
jurisdiction, relying on their Fifth Amendment claim.” Ariyan, 29 F.4th at 232. A
state court must apply the federal law of res judicata when determining “the
preclusive effects of a judgment rendered by a federal court exercising federal
question jurisdiction.” St. Charles Surgical Hosp., LLC v. Louisiana Health Serv.
& Indem. Co., 18-0052, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/21/18), 317 So.3d 854, 856
(quoting Reeder v. Succession of Palmer, 623 So.2d 1268, 1271 (La. 1993)). The
res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law, which is reviewed de
novo. Id., 18-0052, p. 3, 317 So.3d at 856-57 (quoting Test Masters Educ. Servs.,
Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005)).
5 Korban did not file an answer to the appeal, but seeks affirmation of the district court’s
judgment of dismissal on alternative grounds: res judicata. In the judgment currently before us
on appeal, the district court granted Korban’s exception of no cause of action, but it denied the
exception of res judicata. Korban contends that, even if this Court were to reverse its ruling on
the exception of no cause of action, this litigation should still be dismissed as barred by res
judicata. “A party who does not seek modification, revision, or reversal of a judgment in an
appellate court, including the supreme court, may assert, in support of the judgment, any
argument supported by the record, although he has not appealed, answered the appeal, or applied
for supervisory writs.” La. C.C.P. art. 2133(B). See also Slaughter v. Louisiana State Employees’
Ret. Sys., 15-0324, pp. 3-4 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So.3d 279, 281-82.
13
Res judicata encompasses the doctrine of “claim preclusion,” which “bars
the litigation of claims that either have been litigated or should have been raised in
an earlier suit.” Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc., 428 F.3d at 571. The test for res
judicata has four requirements:
(1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment
in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final
judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause
of action was involved in both actions.
Id.
Korban argues the general premise that the Neighbors’ state law claim
seeking mandamus arises from the same underlying facts as the federal suit: that
the Neighbors seek to compel payment of the unpaid judgment against SWB.
While this may be true, we cannot find it sufficient, without more, under the
jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court explained in Reeder, 623 So.2d at 1272-73:
if a set of facts gives rise to a claim based on both state
and federal law, and the plaintiff brings the action in a
federal court which had “pendent” jurisdiction to hear the
state cause of action, but the plaintiff fails or refuses to
assert his state law claim, res judicata prevents him from
subsequently asserting the state claim in a state court
action, unless the federal court clearly would not have
had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted state claim, or,
having jurisdiction, clearly would have declined to
exercise it as a matter of discretion.
Ariyan dismissed the federal Fifth Amendment takings claim, wherein the
Neighbors asserted that nonpayment of the underlying judgment was a “second
taking.” Ariyan, 29 F.4th at 229. The federal district court and Fifth Circuit
14
concluded under a line of federal jurisprudence6 that a government’s failure to
timely pay a judgment did not constitute a violation of a federal constitutional
right. Id. at 230-32. “Without an underlying federal claim, or any other basis for
jurisdiction asserted by the Plaintiffs, the district court properly declined to hear
Plaintiffs’ standalone claim to declaratory relief.” Id. at 232.
Other Louisiana courts, following Reeder, have recognized that state law
claims in a state action are not precluded by res judicata, where “although
plaintiffs did not assert all of their state law claims in the federal proceeding, the
federal court clearly would have declined to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over
the omitted state law claims.” Morales v. Parish of Jefferson, 10-273, pp. 7-8 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 11/9/10), 54 So.3d 669, 673. Korban has failed to demonstrate that the
federal court could have exercised jurisdiction over the state law mandamus claim,
and we find no error in the district court’s denial of his exception of res judicata.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the
district court, which granted the exception of no cause of action and dismissed the
Neighbors’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Fieri Facias, is reversed,
and this matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
6 See Folsom v. City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 3 S.Ct. 211, 27 L.Ed. 936 (1883); Minton v.
St. Bernard Par. Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1986); Freeman Decorating Co. v. Encuentro
Las Americas Trade Corp., 352 F. App’x 921 (5th Cir. 2009).
15