The opinion
ROY RASPANTI * NO. 2019-CA-0523
VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
E. JOHN LITCHFIELD AND *
BERRIGAN LITCHFIELD, FOURTH CIRCUIT
SCHONEKAS, MANN, TRAINA *
AND THOMPSON, L.L.C. STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2002-02350, DIVISION “M”
Honorable Paulette R. Irons, Judge
******
Judge Paula A. Brown
******
(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge
Paula A. Brown)
BELSOME, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT.
Roy A. Raspanti
ATTORNEY AT LAW
110 Veterans Memorial Boulevard
Suite 360
Metairie, LA 70005-4930
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
George F. Kelly, III
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2917 Magazine Street
Suite 201
New Orleans, LA 70115-3197
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN
PART; REVERSED IN
PART
FEBRUARY 12, 2020
This matter arises out of a fee dispute between attorneys—Plaintiff, Roy
Raspanti (“Mr. Raspanti”) and Defendants, Berrigan, Litchfield, Schonekas, Mann,
Trainor and Thompson, LLC, Berrigan, Litchfield, Schonekas, Mann, Trainor and
Thompson, a partnership including professional law corporations, Joseph E.
Berrigan, Jr., Arthur S. Mann, III, Frederick F. Olsen, Jr. and Allen H. Danielson
(collectively, “Berrigan Litchfield”). Mr. Raspanti filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking to have an oral attorney fee agreement (the “Fee Agreement’)
judicially dissolved on the basis that it was an “illicit” contract in violation of Rule
1.5(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In turn, Berrigan Litchfield filed an
exception of no right of action premised on the unclean hands doctrine. Mr.
Raspanti seeks review of the district court’s judgment, granting Berrigan
Litchfield’s exception of no right of action and denying Mr. Raspanti’s motion for
partial summary judgment.
For the reasons discussed, infra, we find the Fee Agreement is not in
violation of Rule 1.5(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct; as such, the unclean
hands doctrine does not bar Mr. Raspanti’s right of action to bring this suit. We
further find genuine issues of material fact remain which preclude Mr. Raspanti’s
1
entitlement to summary judgment. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case, having been before this Court on two prior occasions, has a
storied history.1 E. John Litchfield (“Mr. Litchfield”), an attorney with the
Berrigan Litchfield law firm, engaged in fee sharing in the referral of cases to Mr.
Raspanti. In March 1988, Mr. Litchfield referred Connie and Greg Byrd’s (the
“Byrds”) personal injury case to Mr. Raspanti. After successfully concluding the
Byrds’ litigation, Mr. Raspanti received $596,606.31 in attorney’s fees.
In November 1991, the Byrds’ former attorneys, Robert Keaty and Thomas
Keaty (the “Keatys”), sued Mr. Raspanti for the attorney’s fees he recovered in the
Byrds’ litigation. The Keatys alleged Mr. Respanti engaged in tortious
interference of the Keatys’ contract with the Byrds and claimed unjust enrichment.2
In April 1992, Mr. Raspanti paid Berrigan Litchfield $292,303.15, half of
the attorney’s fee award. Later that month, Berrigan Litchfield and Mr. Raspanti
orally agreed each would share one-half of the costs and attorney fees to defend the
Keatys’ lawsuit against Mr. Raspanti.3 During the course of the Keatys’ litigation,
Berrigan Litchfield paid Joseph Raspanti, Mr. Raspanti’s brother, $8,286.00—one-
half of his attorney’s fee bill. Mr. Raspanti, however, claims Berrigan Litchfield
1
The facts and procedural history are hereby adopted from Raspanti v. Litchfield, 2005-1512,
2006-0331 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/06), 946 So.2d 234 (“Raspanti I”) and Raspanti v. Litchfield,
2011-0993 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/12), 89 So.3d 1262 (“Raspanti II”).
2
The Keatys filed a second suit in February 1992, seeking to recover attorney’s fees on a
quantum meruit basis.
3
As will be discussed infra, the parties dispute the scope of the agreement.
2
failed to pay costs in the amount of $5,200.00; half of William Cherbonnier’s4
$9,887.12 attorney’s fee bill; and one-half of Mr. Raspanti’s $59,350.00 attorney’s
fee bill he incurred as a result of representing himself.
Mr. Raspanti notified Berrigan Litchfield in August 2001 that he considered
the Fee Agreement dissolved based on Berrigan Litchfield’s failure to pay its one-
half share of the Keatys’ defense costs, including attorney’s fees of lawyers
retained by Mr. Raspanti and Mr. Raspanti’s attorney fee bill. Almost 10 years
later, on February 13, 2002, Mr. Raspanti filed a Petition for Judicial Dissolution
of a Contract, or in the Alternative, for Annulment of an Absolutely Null Contract
(the “Petition”) against Berrigan Litchfield and Mr. Litchfield, personally, seeking
the return of the $292,303.15 legal fee tendered to Berrigan Litchfield. Mr.
Raspanti’s Petition asserted, in part, the following:
Paragraph VI.
In April 1992, plaintiff Roy Raspanti received the $596,606.31 fee. In
that same April, 1992, defendant Litchfield personally, and on behalf
of defendant Berrigan, Litchfield, agreed to pay one-half of the cost of
defending the Keaty v. Raspanti matter, including attorneys’ fees and
that he and defendant Berrigan Litchfield would be responsible for
one-half of any amounts that Roy Raspanti had to pay in the event of a
judgment or settlement of said matter. In consideration of those two
obligations on the part of defendant Litchfield and defendant Berrigan
Litchfileld, and the limited assistance defendant Litchfield rendered to
Roy Raspanti in the representation of Greg and Connie Byrd in Byrd
v. Bossier, Roy Raspanti agreed to give and gave defendant Litchfield
and defendant Berrigan Litchfield $292,305.15 out of the fee he, Roy
Raspanti, realized from his representation of the Byrds. This oral
agreement was confected in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Based on Berrigan Litchfield’s alleged failure to fulfill its obligations under the
Fee Agreement, Mr. Raspanti requested the Fee Agreement be judicially dissolved
4
In addition to Joseph Raspanti, Mr. Raspanti also retained William Cherbonnier to defend him
against the Keatys’ lawsuit.
3
in accordance with La. C.C. Art. 20135 and for judgment declaring the Fee
Agreement an absolute nullity pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2030.6
In its answer, Berrigan Litchfield admitted that the parties orally agreed for
each to bear one-half of reasonable and necessary costs, such as court costs and
deposition costs, in defense of the Keatys’ lawsuit, and to pay one-half of any sums
paid or awarded to the Keatys. Berrigan Litchfield denied that it agreed to pay
some of the attorney’s fees and costs claimed by Mr. Raspanti. Berrigan Litchfield
asserted it acted in accord with the spirit of the Fee Agreement, and maintained the
$292,303.15 fee it received was reasonable. A peremptory exception of no cause
of action was also filed on behalf of Mr. Litchfield, maintaining that Mr. Raspanti
had no cause of action against Mr. Litchfield in his personal capacity.
In April 2005, in Raspanti I, Berrigan Litchfield filed a motion to compel,
alleging that Mr. Raspanti had failed to comply with any of their discovery
demands. In response, Mr. Raspanti denied the allegations and filed a motion for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion to compel and ordered
Mr. Raspanti to provide responses by June 6, 2005. Mr. Raspanti failed to comply.
Following, Berrigan Litchfield filed a motion for contempt and sanctions. A short
time later, Berrigan Litchfield filed a second motion for sanctions against Mr.
Raspanti after he failed to attend a scheduled deposition.
On June 30, 2005, Berrigan Litchfield filed a second peremptory exception
of no right of action based on the “unclean hands” doctrine. Pursuant to the
5
La. C.C. art. 2013 states, in relevant part, that “[w]hen the obligor fails to perform, the obligee
has a right to the judicial dissolution of the contract, or according to the circumstances, to regard
the contract as dissolved.”
6
La. C.C. art. 2030 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] contract is absolutely null when it
violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral. A contract
that is absolutely null may not be confirmed.”
4
unclean hands doctrine “[a] person cannot maintain a cause of action, if, in order to
establish his cause of action, he must rely in whole or in part, on any illegal or
immoral act or transaction to which he is a part.”7 Although Berrigan Litchfield
did not contest the validity of the Fee Agreement, Berrigan Litchfield maintained
that Mr. Raspanti judicially confessed8 in his pleadings that the Fee Agreement
was illicit, and that it violated Rule 1.5 (e) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct.9 As such, Berrigan Litchfiled asserted that, if the Fee Agreement was a
nullity, as claimed by Mr. Raspanti, the unclean hands doctrine precluded Mr.
Raspanti from a right of action based on his role in confecting the Fee Agreement.
The district court conducted a hearing on Berrigan Litchfield’s two motions
for contempt, exception of no cause of action, exception of no right of action and
Mr. Raspanti’s motion for summary judgment. After the hearing, the district court
dismissed, with prejudice, Mr. Raspanti’s lawsuit against Berrigan Litchfield and
granted Mr. Litchfield’s exception of no cause of action. The district court cited
Mr. Raspanti’s failure to comply with the court-ordered discovery demands as the
reason for the dismissal. The district court also determined Berrigan Litchfield’s
exception of no right of action regarding its unclean hands defense and Mr.
Raspanti’s motion for summary judgment were moot in light of its dismissal with
prejudice of Mr. Raspanti’s underlying lawsuit.
7
See Allvend, Inc. v. Payphone Commissions Co. Inc., 2000-0661, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/01),
804 So. 2d 27, 30.
8
La. C.C. art. 1853 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] judicial confession is a declaration made
by a party in a judicial proceeding. That confession constitutes full proof against the party who
made it.”
9
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 (e), which will be discussed in more detailed
infra, outlines the requirements for the division of fees between lawyers not of the same firm.
5
On appeal, this Court found the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing Mr. Raspanti’s case, with prejudice, against Berrigan Litchfield and
ordered the district court to consider Mr. Raspanti’s motion for summary judgment
and Berrigan Litchfield’s exception of no [right] of action.10 Raspanti I. The
Raspanti I Court also determined the district court properly dismissed the cause of
action against Mr. Litchfield in his personal capacity. Id.
Mr. Raspanti was granted leave, on January 20, 2010, to file a second
supplemental and amending petition (the “supplemental petition”).11 The
supplemental petition named additional parties associated with Berrigan Litchfield
as defendants12 and reiterated Mr. Raspanti’s demand that the Fee Agreement be
judicially dissolved and declared an absolute nullity. In response, Berrigan
Litchfield filed exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action seeking to
strike Mr. Raspanti’s supplemental petition from the record and/or alternatively, a
motion to annul the order granting Mr. Raspanti leave to file the supplemental
petition, citing Mr. Raspanti’s alleged failure to file the supplemental petition
within the time delays outlined in the district court’s case management order.
Berrigan Litchfield also requested that the district court re-set for hearing its June
2005 peremptory exception of no right of action based on the unclean hands
doctrine.
10
The Raspanti I Court mistakenly referred to Berrigan Litchfield’s mooted exception of no right
of action as an exception of no cause of action in its opinion.
11
Judge James Williams, who had been appointed ad hoc to replace the Division’s retiring
judge, granted Mr. Raspanti leave to file the supplemental petition.
12
The additional defendants included Berrigan, Danielson, Litchfield, Olsen, Schonekas, and
Mann, a partnership including professional law corporations (‘the “partnership”), and Joe E.
Berrigan, Jr., Allen H. Danielson, Jr., Frederick F. Olsen, Jr., E. John Litchfield, and Arthur s.
Mann, who were at all times pertinent, partners in the partnership.
6
The district court granted Berrigan Litchfield’s exceptions of no right of
action and no cause of action, and annulled the order which granted Mr. Raspanti
leave of court to file the supplemental petition outside of the case management
order time delays. The district court denied Berrigan Litchfield’s exception of no
right of action based on the unclean hands defense, noting that Berrigan Litchfield
had failed to plead the unclean hands doctrine as an affirmative defense in its
answer. The district court explained that it would not permit Berrigan to amend its
answer, considering it had denied Mr. Raspanti’s motion for leave to amend his
supplemental petition.
On appeal, this Court reversed the district court’s judgment granting
Berrigan Litchfield’s exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action, and
motion to annul and remanded the matter. See Raspanti II. The Raspanti II Court
determined that Mr. Raspanti’s noncompliance with a case management order was
not a proper basis to strike Mr. Raspanti’s supplemental petition and dismiss his
lawsuit. Id. The denial of Berrigan Litchfield’s exception of no right of action
based on the unclean hands doctrine was not considered on appeal.
Thereafter, on May 23, 2012, Berrigan Litchfield filed its answer to Mr.
Raspanti’s supplemental petition and specially pled the unclean hands doctrine as
an affirmative defense.
On January 26, 2018, Berrigan Litchfield filed a second peremptory
exception of no right of action, re-urging its unclean hands defense. Mr. Raspanti
filed, on July 30, 2018, a motion for partial summary judgment. He asserted that
the uncontested facts showed that Berrigan Litchfield’s “admissions”—that it had
agreed to pay half of the Keatys’ defense costs as part of the consideration for its
receipt of the $292,303.15 and had failed to pay said costs—demonstrated that the
7
Fee Agreement should be judicially dissolved pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2013,
and/or alternatively, that the district court should declare the Fee Agreement a
nullity and restore possession to Mr. Raspanti of the $292,305.12 fee he had
tendered to Berrigan Litchfield.
The district court, on November 20, 2018, conducted a hearing on Berrigan
Litchfield’s exception of no right of action based on its unclean hands defense and
Mr. Raspanti’s motion for partial summary judgment. The district court
maintained Berrigan Litchfield’s exception of no right of action, dismissing Mr.
Raspanti’s lawsuit in its entirety, at his costs, and denied Mr. Raspanti’s motion for
partial summary judgment.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Raspanti raises two assignments of error: (1) the district court erred in
granting Berrigan’s exception of no right of action, and (2) the district court erred
in denying Mr. Raspanti’s motion for partial summary judgment. We will address
each assigned error in turn.
Exception of No Right of Action
Mr. Raspanti asserts the district court erred in granting Berrigan
Litchfield’s exception of no right of action based on three grounds: (i) this Court,
in Raspanti II, conclusively disposed of any no right of action exceptions when it
found Mr. Raspanti’s Petition asserted a right of action; (ii) Berrigan Litchfield
failed to timely plead the unclean hands doctrine as an affirmative defense; and
(iii) Mr. Raspanti did not participate in an “illicit” agreement.
i. Disposition of Exception of No Right of Action based on Unclean Hands
8
First, Mr. Raspanti argues that the Raspanti II Court’s holding that found
Mr. Raspanti’s Petition stated a right of action foreclosed Berrigan Litchfield’s
right to bring an exception of no right of action based on unclean hands. We
disagree.
The district court’s judgment on appeal in Raspanti II provided, in pertinent
part, the following relief:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendants’ Exception of No Cause and No Right of Action is
GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s Second Supplemental and Amended
Petition is struck from the record.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Defendants’ Exception of No Right of Action is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the Defendants’ Motion to Rescind Order, or
Alternatively to Annul Order is GRANTED IN PART as follows: the
Order granting leave of court to plaintiff to filed his Second
Supplemental and Amended Petition is annulled. Attorney’s Fees for
this Motion are DEFERRED.
Review of the record shows the district court did not consider the merits of
the exception of no right of action based on unclean hands. Rather, noting that
Berrigan Litchfield had not plead unclean hands as an affirmative defense, the
district court determined that, because it had annulled and denied Mr. Raspanti’s
request for leave to file his supplemental petition well beyond the case
management order deadlines, in like manner, it could not grant Berrigan Litchfield
leave to amend its answer to plead the unclean hands doctrine as an affirmative
defense. Thus, the district court denied Berrigan Litchfield’s motion.
Consequently, the exception of no right of action this Court considered in Raspanti
II determined only that noncompliance with the court’s case management order did
not create a basis by which to grant exceptions of no cause of action or no right of
9
action; it did not dispose of the exception of no right of action based on unclean
hands. Raspanti II.
This argument lacks merit.
ii. Unclean Hands Affirmative Defense
Next, Mr. Raspanti claims that Berrigan Litchfield did not timely plead the
unclean hands doctrine as an affirmative defense in its answer. We disagree.
This Court recognizes that La. C.C.P. art. 1005 requires affirmative defenses
to be asserted in the answer.13 The purpose behind the requirement promulgated in
La. C.C.P. art. 1005 to specially plead an affirmative defense is “to give fair notice
of the nature of the defense and thereby prevent a last minute surprise to the
plaintiff.” Allvend, 2000-0661, p. 6, 804 So.2d at 29. Thus, Berrigan Litchfield
was required to affirmatively plead the unclean hands doctrine as a defense in its
answer because if proven true, the doctrine could defeat the lawsuit on the merits.
Our review of the record shows that although not initially pled in its original
answer, Berrigan Litchfield’s answer to Mr. Raspanti’s supplemental petition
included the following language:
7.
13
La. C.C.P. art. 1005 provides the following:
The answer shall set forth affirmatively negligence, or fault of the plaintiff and
others, duress, error or mistake, estoppel, extinguishment of the obligation in any
manner, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, and
any other matter constituting an affirmative defense. If a party has mistakenly
designated an affirmative defense as a peremptory exception or as an incidental
demand, or a peremptory exception as an affirmative defense, and if justice so
requires, the court, on such terms as it may prescribe, shall treat the pleading as if
there had been a proper designation.
10
Defendants specifically plead the affirmative defense of the “clean
hands doctrine” as set forth in New Orleans vs. Board of Directors of
State Museums, 739 So.2d 748 (La. 1999) and Allvend Inc. vs. The
Pay Phone Commissions Company, Inc., et al, 804 So.2d 27 (La. App.
4th Cir. 5-23-01). Plaintiff is in pari-delicto, and as such is not entitled
to invoke the equitable powers of this honorable court.
In Danna v. Barq’s Inc., 612 So.2d 253, 255 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992), this
Court found that affirmative defenses were timely raised where the defendant was
granted leave of court to amend its answer and assert its affirmative defenses
before the district court granted summary judgment.14 In the present matter, even
though Berrigan Litchfield raised the defense in its 2005 and 2010 preemptory
exceptions of no right of action, the district court did not hear argument on the
unclean hands defense until after it was timely pled as an affirmative defense in
Berrigan Litchfield’s answer to the supplemental petition.
Accordingly, we find Mr. Raspanti had adequate notice and Berrigan
Litchfield timely pled the unclean hands as an affirmative defense in its answer to
Mr. Raspanti’s supplemental petition.
This argument is without merit.
iii. Validity of the Fee Agreement
Finally, Mr. Raspanti contends that the exception of no right of action was
improperly granted because Mr. Raspanti did not participate in an “illicit”
agreement, albeit he simultaneously argues that Berrigan Litchfield participated in
an illicit contract. Conversely, Berrigan Litchfield does not concede that the Fee
Agreement was invalid; rather, Berrigan Litchfield bases its unclean hands defense
solely on allegations made in Mr. Raspanti’s pleadings that the Fee Agreement
14
Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1005, we also note courts have discretion to consider an affirmative
defense mistakenly identified as a peremptory exception or an exception mistakenly designated
as an affirmative defense.
11
violated Rule 1.5(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. After review of the
record, we find this claim has merit.
To determine the merits of Berrigan Litchfield’s exception, this Court must
first examine whether Rule 1.5(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct is
applicable to this case. Rule 1.5(e) in effect at the time of the Fee Agreement
provided the following:15
A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may
be made only if:
(1) The division is in proportion to the services performed
by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the
client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibilities for
the representation;
(2) The client is advised of and does not object to the
participation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3)The total fee is reasonable.
In matters such as this, where an attorney associates, employs, or procures
another attorney to assist in handling the case, the agreement regarding the division
of legal fees is considered a joint venture, whereby the interest each attorney has
under such a joint venture gives the parties the right to participate in the fund
resulting in the payment of attorney’s fees from the client. Scurto v. Siegrist, 598
So.2d 507, 509 (La. 1992). The Supreme Court in Scurto considered whether the
division of a legal fee between lawyers not of the same firm violated the former
Code of Professional Responsibility.16 In Scurto, the retained attorney had entered
an oral agreement to divide legal fees with another attorney. The agreement
15
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(e), formerly contained in Disciplinary Rule 2-107 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, became effective on January 1, 1987.
16
The former Code of Professional Responsibility, now governed by the Rules of Professional
Conduct, was in effect at the time the Scurto fee agreement was entered in 1986.
12
required the retained attorney to manage the client and advance costs. Finding that
the fee agreement arose from a joint venture, the Scurto Court opined that “the suit
by an attorney to recover pursuant to [an] agreement is a suit to recover for breach
of the agreement to share in the fund resulting from payment of the fee. It is not a
suit for recovery of attorney’s fees.” Id., at 509-10 (citing Duer and Taylor v.
Blanchard, Walker, O’Quin and Roberts, 354 So.2d 192 (La. 1978).17 As such,
Scurto held that the Code of Professional Responsibility or (Rules of Professional
Conduct) did not prohibit the enforcement of such an agreement and did not
require the apportionment of fees on a quantum meruit basis; hence, the district
court erred in finding that the contract was in derogation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court reached a similar result in Wootan & Saunders v. Diaz, 2017-
0820, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/28/18), --- So.3d ---, 2018 WL 1517030, *6. In
Wootan, Glenn Diaz and the Wootan & Saunders firm (“WS”) entered a fee
agreement whereby WS was to receive its portion of the fee in consideration of the
work it had already performed and also for continuing to maintain contact with the
client. Mr. Diaz argued on appeal that the district court erred in failing to find the
17
Duer considered a dispute regarding the division of attorney’s fees between two law firms that
had agreed to associate in a case. The Supreme Court reasoned:
Where an attorney retained in a case employs or procures the employment of
another attorney to assist him, as regards the division of the fee, the agreement
constitutes a joint adventure or special partnership. McCann v. Todd, 203 La. 631,
14 So.2d 469 (1943). The interest which each attorney possesses under such an
agreement is the right to participate in the fund resulting from the payment of the
fee by the client. Therefore, a suit by an attorney against another attorney to
recover, pursuant to such an agreement, a portion of the fee collected by the latter
party from the client is not one for the recovery of attorney's fees, but rather is one
for breach of the agreement to share in the fund resulting from the payment of the
fee.
354 So.2d 192, 194-95 (La.1978).
13
fee agreement was invalid under Rule 1.5(e) because WS received fees
disproportionate to the work WS performed. Citing Scurto, the Court found the
Rules of Professional Conduct did not prohibit the enforcement of the fee-splitting
agreement between attorneys in a Duer situation. The Court opined that “Scurto
and its progeny should be applied to deter attorneys from using alleged Rules of
Professional Conduct violations to preclude attorneys with whom they have
contracted from recovering an earned fee.” Id., 2017-0820, p. 12, --- So.3d at *6.18
Likewise, we find the Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly Rule
1.5(e), do not apply to the Fee Agreement between Mr. Raspanti and Berrigan
Litchfield. The underlying suit between Mr. Raspanti and Berrigan Litchfield is a
suit for alleged breach of contract19 arising out of a joint venture. Mr. Raspanti and
Berrigan Litchfield acknowledge that Berrigan Litchfield provided some measure
of representation to the Byrds both before and after the Byrds’ case was referred to
Mr. Raspanti.20 Mr. Raspanti seeks damages resulting from Berrigan Litchfield’s
alleged breach of its obligations to pay its share of the Keatys’ defense costs. We
therefore find the Fee Agreement between Mr. Raspanti and Berrigan Litchfield
was one “confected between two professionals and we will not assume the position
18
See also Fox v. Heisler, 2003-1964, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/04), 874 So.2d 932, 939,
another Fourth Circuit case cited by Wootan & Saunders, where the Court determined that the
Rules of Professional Conduct did not prohibit the enforcement of a fee agreement entered by
two attorneys not of the same firm jointly representing a client.
19
We also note that Mr. Raspanti filed the underlying complaint ten years after the parties
confected the Fee Agreement, the liberative prescriptive period for a breach of contract action
permitted by La. C.C. art. 3499.
20
See Paragraph VI. of Mr. Raspanti’s Petition which references “the limited assistance
defendant Litchfield rendered to Roy Raspanti in the representation of Greg and Connie Byrd in
Byrd v. Bossier;” and Berrigan Litchfield’s Statement of Uncontested Facts which avers, in part,
that Mr. Litchfield rendered “extensive and exhaustive assistance” to Connie Byrd and Gregory
Byrd” in their attorney fee dispute with the Keatys and further representation in their remaining
claims against the Bossier City School Board.
14
of dictating to attorneys in a Duer situation exactly how much work they need to
perform to entitle them to a certain fee.” Scurto, 598 So.2d at 510.
The party pleading an affirmative defense has the burden of proving the
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Allvend, 2006-0661, p. 6, 804 So.2d
at 30. In the present matter, notwithstanding Mr. Raspanti’s representations, the
Fee Agreement was not illicit or a nullity in violation of Rule 1.5(e). Accordingly,
the district court erred in granting Berrigan Litchfield’s exception of no right of
action based on the unclean hands doctrine.
Summary Judgment
This Court discussed the standard of review for summary judgment in
Chanthasalo v. Deshotel, 2017-0521, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/17), 234 So.3d
1103, 1109 (citations omitted) as follows:
Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to
determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. This standard of
review requires the appellate court to look at the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, to determine if they show that no
genuine issue as to a material fact exists, and that the mover is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material when its existence or
nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under
the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially
insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or
determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as
to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons
could reach only one conclusion, no need for trial on that issue exists
and summary judgment is appropriate. To affirm a summary
judgment, we must find reasonable minds would inevitably conclude
that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of the applicable law
bon the facts before the court.
La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) establishes that the mover bears the burden of proof in a
motion for summary judgment.
15
In the case sub judice, Mr. Raspanti listed the following Statement of
Uncontested Facts in his memorandum in support of his motion for partial
summary judgment.
1. Defendants agreed to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs of the Keaty v.
Raspanti litigation “such as court costs, deposition costs and the
like.”
2. Defendants agreed to pay one-half (1/2) of said costs as part of the
consideration for their receipt of the $292,303.15 from plaintiff.
3. Defendants have failed to pay one-half (1/2) of said costs.
4. Defendants have failed to perform their part of the contract relative
to their agreement to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs of the Keaty v.
Raspanti litigation “such as court costs, deposition costs and the
like,” which agreement defendants admit existed between them
and plaintiff.
5. Plaintiff notified defendants on August 14, 2001, in accordance
with Louisiana Civil Code articles 2013 and 2016 that he
considered the contract dissolved.
In opposition, Berrigan Litchfield filed a Statement of Contested Material
Facts which averred the following:
1. E. John Litchfield of Berrigan, Litchfield, et al represented Connie
and Gregory in Byrd v. Bossier City Parish School Board for the
purpose of terminating the representation of the Keaty and Keaty
law firm and obtaining an accounting and proper disbursement of
fees and costs in this matter.
2. During the course of such representation, Mr. Litchfield concocted
a settlement agreement which resulted in the Keaty and Keaty’s
firms claim for attorney’s fees being severely curtailed and costs;
3. John Litchfield, on behalf of Berrigan Litchfield, Schonekas,
Mann, Trainor and Thompson, LLC, agreed to pay one half of the
costs of the “Keaty v. Raspanti” litigation such as court cost,
deposition cost and the like;
4. Berrigan Litchfield, et al agreed to be responsible for one half of
any amounts that Roy Raspanti had to pay to Keaty and Keaty in
the event of a judgment or settlement against Roy Raspanti in the
Keaty v. Raspanti litigation;
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5. At Roy Raspanti’s specific request, John Litchfield agreed to pay
Joseph Raspanti the full sum of $8,286.00 which represented one
half of the attorney’s fees that Joseph Raspanti had billed to Roy
Raspanti in connection with his representation of Roy Raspanti in
the Keaty vs. Raspanti matter.
6. Berrigan Litchfield never agreed to pay one half of any attorney’s
fee bill of Roy Raspanti under any circumstances;
7. Berrigan Litchfield never agreed to pay one half of any attorney’s
fee bill of William Cherbonnier under any circumstances,
particularly after Mr. Litchfield was threatened with a suit by Mr.
Cherbonnier; and
8. Mr. Litchfield rendered extensive and exhaustive assistance under
very difficult circumstances to plaintiff Connie Byrd and Gregory
Byrd in their dispute with the Keaty and Keaty firm over attorney’s
fees, costs and further representation of the Byrd’s [sic] in their
remaining claims against the Bossier Parish School Board.
Clearly, a conflict exists between Mr. Raspanti and Berrigan Litchfield
regarding the scope of their oral agreement to equally share in the Keaty defense
costs. Berrigan Litchfield specifically denies that it agreed to pay Mr. Raspanti’s
attorney’s fees or the fees of Mr. Cherbonnier, an attorney retained by Mr.
Raspanti. Mr. Raspanti has offered no supporting documentation to refute
Berrigan Litchfield’s contest of some of the Keaty defense costs. Agreement on
the Keaty defense costs assumed by Berrigan Litchfield is material to Mr.
Raspanti’s right of recovery. Hence, Berrigan Litchfield’s and Mr. Raspanti’s
dispute over the Keaty defense costs presents genuine issues of material fact that
preclude Mr. Raspanti’s right to summary judgment. Accordingly, we find the
district court did not err in denying Mr. Raspanti’s motion for partial summary
judgment.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr.
Raspanti’s motion for partial summary judgment and reverse the judgment
granting Berrigan Litchfield’s exception of no right of action.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN
PART; REVERSED IN
PART
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