discussing “under color of 15 state law”
How later courts described this case
- discussing “under color of 15 state law”
- “California 5 Civil Code § 52.1 . . . provides a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff's state or federal 6 civil rights committed by ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.’”
- “There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance 18 procedure.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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MARK W. CAPPELLO, Case No: 1:24-cv-01365-EPG
10
11 Plaintiff, F R I E N C D O IN M G M S E A N N D D IN R G E T C H O A M T M T E H N IS D A A T C I T O I N O S N
12 v. P A R G O A C IN E S E T D D O E N F P E L N A D I A N N T T IF S F T ’S O C H L L A , IM
ODONAUGHY, AND BRAGG FOR
13 DONALD STOHL, et al., VIOLATION OF THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
14 Defendants. BASED ON ALLEGEDLY PREVENTING
PLAINTIFF FROM OBTAINING HIS
15 MEALS AT THE TIMES DICTATED BY
HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, AS WELL AS
16 PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST BRAGG
FOR VIOLATION OF THE FREE
17 EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT BASED ON ALLEGEDLY
18 BLOCKING PLAINTIFF FROM
RECEIVING RELIGIOUS FOOD ITEMS
19 SENT IN FROM AN APPROVED
RELIGIOUS VENDOR FOR USE IN ROSH
20 HASHANAH SERVICES, AND THAT ALL
OTHER CLAIMS BE DISMISSED
21
(ECF No. 13)
22
OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
23 THIRTY DAYS
24 AND
25
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ASSIGN
26 DISTRICT JUDGE
27
28
1 Plaintiff Mark W. Cappello (Plaintiff) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this
2 civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second
3 amended complaint alleging that he was denied religious accommodations. (ECF No 13).
4 Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff only states a claim against Defendant Stohl,
5 ODonaughy, and Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment based
6 on allegedly preventing Plaintiff from obtaining his meals at the times dictated by his religious
7 beliefs, as well as a claim against Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
8 Amendment based on allegedly blocking Plaintiff from receiving religious food items sent in
9 from an approved religious vendor for use in Rosh Hashanah services. Thus, the Court will
10 recommend that these claims proceed and that all other claims and Defendants be dismissed
11 without further leave to amend.
12 Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of service of these findings and recommendations
13 to file any objections.
14 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
15 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking “redress from a
16 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
17 The Court must dismiss a complaint, or a portion of it, if the prisoner has raised claims that are
18 frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
19 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–
20 (2).
21 Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may also screen the
22 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which requires a court to dismiss a case if it is frivolous or
23 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C.
24 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).
25 II. PREVIOUS SCREENINGS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINTS
26 As background, Plaintiff has submitted two previous complaints, which the Court has
27 screened.
28 On November 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint, which was 39 pages long and
1 in excess of the Court’s 25-page limit for the electronic filing of prisoner litigation. (ECF Nos.
2 1 and 10). The Court issued a screening order finding that Plaintiff’s complaint did not comply
3 with the Court’s standing order or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and giving Plaintiff leave
4 to file a first a amended complaint. (ECF No. 10).
5 On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff’s
6 first amended complaint generally asserted that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by
7 not providing sufficient religious accommodations over several years but failed to include facts
8 about what accommodations Plaintiff requested, when and how Plaintiff made the request, and
9 any response Defendants provided to the request.
10 The Court screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and found Plaintiff failed to
11 comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that requires a complaint to contain
12 a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
13 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). (ECF No. 12). This Court provided the following explanation of Rule 8’s
14 requirement of a short and plain statement of the claim and why Plaintiff’s complaint did not
15 comply with that rule:
16 Instead of providing those specific facts, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint
generally refers to violations of religious accommodations over many years by
17 many defendants, such as that Defendants “all disregarded Plaintiff’s exercise of
religion and greatly interfered with, intentionally blocked religious
18 considerations/accommodations to correct known violations of federal and state
laws, CDCR Policys in Dept. of Operations Manual of Jewish Kosher Laws and
19 other prison staffs attempts to correct, by e-mails and in person multiple times by
religious staff.” These and other similar general allegations throughout Plaintiff’s
20 first amended complaint are conclusory and do not include specific facts that
satisfy Rule 8’s pleading requirements. For example, Plaintiff’s first amended
21 complaint does not allege specific facts as to any denial of religious
accommodations such as what exactly Plaintiff requested, when Plaintiff made
22 that request, in what way that request was based on a sincerely held religious
belief, which specific Defendant received or responded to that request, what
23 accommodation was or was not provided, and the reason given by any defendant
for not agreeing to Plaintiff’s request. Without this information, Plaintiff’s
24 allegations do not satisfy Rule 8 and do not give fair notice of Plaintiff’s claim.
Additionally, without those factual allegations, the Court cannot determine if the
25 underlying facts would state a cognizable constitutional claim under the relevant
legal standards.
26
27
(ECF No. 12 at p. 6).
28 The Court gave Plaintiff one further opportunity to amend his complaint, and provided
1 applicable legal standards for claims that could apply to his claim.
2 III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
3 On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (erroneously named
4 “First Amended Complaint”). (ECF No. 13). Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1)
5 Donald Stohl, Captain at SATF, (2) Denise ODonaughy, food manager at SATF, (3) Jeanett
6 Bragg, community resource manager at SATF, (4) Laura Sherwood, associate warden at SATF,
7 (5) the City of Corcoran, and (6) Jeanett Bragg, Mayor of the City of Corcoran.1
8 In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff describes in general terms how he
9 repeatedly complained to various prison officials about how he believed he was not receiving
10 certain religious accommodations. Plaintiff’s complaint refers to specific communications and
11 emails that he sent but did not receive a response to. For example, Plaintiff describes how on
12 he sent four inmate requests for interview on February 23, 2023, October 30, 2023, December
13 12, 2023, and December 27, 2023, but Plaintiff alleges he was never interviewed by staff at
14 SATF. (ECF No. 13 at pp. 6-7). However, for the most part, Plaintiff does not describe what
15 was said in this correspondence.
16 Additionally, Plaintiff at times makes generalized allegations regarding how “he went
17 without a kosher dinner for months and years for Fridays and Sabbath meals were served not
18 according to Jewish law or Kosher law.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 7). Plaintiff also generally alleges
19 that during Jewish holidays “he was denied access to Jewish services” and “deprived kosher
20 meal solely because defendants Stohl, Bragg, and ODonaughy failed to provide and submit
21 proper ‘Jewish Law complient’ [sic] memorandums describing the dates and times that services
22 were to be held, which would give Plaintiffs housing and yard officers to allow him to attend
23 said services.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 8).
24 Plaintiff alleges he submitted a grievance on December 20, 2023, and Defendant
25 Sherwood denied his grievance “without contacting Chaplain D. Townson or Plaintiff”
26 regarding “the overwhelming evidence and many emails.” He alleges Sherwood committed
27
28 1 It appears that the two defendants listed as Jeanett Bragg are the same individual with different
titles.
1 perjury and fraud by stating: “After a thorough review of all the documents and evidence
2 presented to the office of grievance it is the order of the office of grievance to DENY this
3 claim.” (ECF No. 13 at pp. 8-9).
4 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Bragg “refused to allow religious food items sent in
5 from an approved CDCR religious organization ‘Aleph Institute.’” (ECF No. 13 at pp. 10-11).
6 Plaintiff also generally alleges that on “many other documented dates and items sent from
7 ‘Aleph Institute’ has been directed by the CRM to other staff to be thrown away or kept from
8 Plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 11).
9 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bragg had “retaliatory motives” by giving him “a
10 write-up rule violation (CDC 128-B) notice” for “religious diet violation” on December 20,
11 2023, and September 11, 2024. (ECF No. 13 at p. 14). Plaintiff alleges Chaplain Townson
12 prevented the violations from being followed through by stating “it is not a violation.” (Id.)
13 Plaintiff attaches three affidavits from other inmates that describe certain lack of
14 accommodations the inmates experienced over time. Mark Eugene Weyand states,
15 “Throughout these many years, the Jewish community experienced significant hardship by
16 being denied many religious services on holy days.” Jon Robert Wilson states, “This past
17 Passover of 2024 I myself was refused participation in Passover because I was not provided
18 what/is necessary to observe Passover which is the Passover Ritualistic Elements even though I
19 was on the list.” Joseph Jones states he was denied kosher meals because the meals were
20 served at the incorrect time.
21 Plaintiff’s first claim alleges violations of “[t]he First, Fifth and Fourteenth
22 Amendments . . . along with California Civil Code ‘Tom Bane Civil Rights Act.’ Violations of
23 Freedom of Religion, due process, and equal protection of rights to exercise such religion.”
24 (ECF No. 13 at p. 3). Plaintiff’s second claim alleges “[t]he First and Eighth Amendments
25 violations of cruel and unusual punishment, retaliation of a protected class of religion . . . State
26 violations of California Civil Code, ‘Tom Bane Civil Rights Act’ by adverse actions against
27 Plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 4).
28 \\\
1 IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
2 A. Section 1983
3 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
4 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
5 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
6 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
7
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
8
“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a
9
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
10
393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
11
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under
12
color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or
13
federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
14
Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of
15
state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983,
16
if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act
17
which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
18
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “The requisite causal connection can be
19
established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by
20
setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know
21
would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Id. at 743-44. This standard of
22
causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”
23
Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City
24
of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
25
A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the
26
deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual
27
connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have
28
1 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
2 691, 695 (1978).
3 B. Due Process Claim
4 In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived him of his due process
5 rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
6 “The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against
7 deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection
8 must establish that one of these interests is at stake. A liberty interest may arise from the
9 Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ . . . or it may arise
10 from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
11 209, 221 (2005) (citations omitted); see also Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1066 (9th
12 Cir. 2022) (“‘A section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process . . . has three elements:
13 (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest
14 by the government; (3) lack of process.’”).
15 “[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance
16 procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d
17 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance
18 procedure.”).
19 Plaintiff’s due process claim appears to be based on his allegations that various prison
20 officials failed to respond to his emails or requests for interview, and generally failed to
21 adequately communicate during the grievance process. For example, Plaintiff alleges “L.
22 Sherwood, Grievance Reviewing Authority on 1/3/2024 gave “DENY” to this grievance
23 without contacting Chaplain D. Townsen or Plaintiff regarding the overwhelming evidence and
24 many e-mails sent by this Chaplain Townsen and a Rabbi, saying Plaintiff is correct.” (ECF
25 No. 13, at p. 8).
26 However, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the way that his grievances were handled do
27 not state a constitutional claim under the due process clause. A failure of a prison to abide by
28 their own grievance procedures may entitle a plaintiff to file a lawsuit without exhausting those
1 grievance procedures, but it does not state an independent constitutional claim. See Ramirez v.
2 Galaza 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Ramirez's claimed loss of a liberty interest in the
3 processing of his appeals does not satisfy this standard, because inmates lack a separate
4 constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”).
5 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his due process rights.
6 C. Free Exercise Claim
7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to exercise his
8 religion.
9 “The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by
10 the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids government from ‘prohibiting the free exercise’ of
11 religion.” Fuqua v. Raak, 120 F.4th 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 2024). “Inmates clearly retain
12 protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit
13 the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation
14 omitted). However, limitations of the inmates’ rights “arise both from the fact of incarceration
15 and from valid penological objectives– including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of
16 prisoners, and institutional security.” Id.
17 “A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government action in
18 question substantially burdens the person's practice of her religion.” Jones v. Williams, 791
19 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). “‘A substantial burden ... place[s] more than an
20 inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting
21 contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
22 behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff must allege
23 that “(1) ‘the claimant's proffered belief [is] sincerely held’; and (2) ‘the claim [is] rooted in
24 religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns.’” Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d
25 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994)); Fuqua,
26 120 F.4th at 1352 (“An inmate asserting a Free Exercise claim must first show that he or she
27 has a sincerely held religious belief that was impinged by government action.”).
28 “Inmates also have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good
1 health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198
2 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Long v. Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1335-38 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding a
3 Muslim inmate’s free exercise of religion was substantially burdened where he received his
4 meals at 3:30 p.m. even though he could not break his fast for Ramadan until 7:30 p.m. and the
5 food was “cold, unappetizing, and potentially unsafe to consume”).
6 In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff relies primarily on conclusory and vague
7 statements that “he was denied his religious freedoms and requirements of the Jewish kosher
8 laws, [and] deprived religious services.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 7). For the most part, Plaintiff does
9 not describe what religious accommodations he was denied, how he was denied access, and
10 who denied him access.
11 However, liberally construing his complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently
12 alleges that he did not receive sabbath and holiday meals at the time of day dictated by his
13 religious beliefs. He alleges that, on October 26, 2023, an email was sent to Captain D. Stohl
14 “requesting accommodations for Jewish Faith inmates assigned to kosher dietary plan, receive
15 their meals at 1600 hrs. daily . . . .” (ECF No. 13, at p. 7). Elsewhere, Plaintiff alleges “from
16 October 2022 to present 2025 these continued denials to accommodations/considerations
17 placed substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious rights to keep and exercise his faith . . . by
18 depriving Plaintiff kosher meals from Oct. 2022 threw [sic] present 2025 during the winter
19 months when the sun sets early. This defendant(s) know or should know the ‘sunset’ is the end
20 of the Jewish day to follow Jewish laws.” (ECF No. 13, at p. 9).
21 The Court next looks to whether Plaintiff has alleged that any defendant directly caused
22 Plaintiff’s meals to be served at a time inconsistent with his religious beliefs. Plaintiff’s
23 primary factual allegations consist of claims that Stohl, Bragg, and ODonaughy received
24 Chaplain Townson’s email regarding a “request for considerations/accommodations” but “did
25 nothing.” (Id. at p. 8). He also alleges that in 2023, “Jewish Religious days were deprived to
26 Plaintiff” “solely because defendants Stohl, Bragg, and ODonaughy failed to provide and
27 submit proper ‘Jewish Law complient’ (sic) memorandums describing the dates and times that
28 services were to be held.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 8). Based on these allegations, the Court will
1 permit Plaintiff to proceed on this claim against Defendants Stohl, Bragg, and O’Doonaughy.
2 The Court also recommends allowing a claim based on Plaintiff’s allegation that
3 Defendant Bragg refused to allow Plaintiff to receive religious items from an approved vendor.
4 On this issue, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
5
Defendant City of Corcoran Mayor J. Bragg was the head of her city and head of
6 her SATF Office as “CRM” at the same time escalated the deprivations of
Plaintiff’s religious beliefs without compelling justification by on Rosh
7 Hashanah 2023-24 refused to allow religious food items, sent in from an
approved CDCR religious organization, ‘Aleph Institute,’ for this religious
8
service were intentionally blocked by her alone to be used by Plaintiff. Causing
9 additional deprivation of a religious right, for on October 4, 2024, a email again
from Chaplin Townson to J. Bragg regarding this Jewish observance of Rosh
10 Hashanah was denied knowing its use in the prayer services.
11 (ECF No. 13, at p. 11).
12 Courts have held that denial of religious items required for services or religious
13 holidays can impose a substantial burden on an inmate’s free exercise of religion. See Jones v.
14 Slade, 23 F.4th 1124, 1145 (9th Cir. 2022) (reversing summary judgment and finding an issue
15 of material fact existed as to whether exclusion of religious texts a Muslim inmate wished to
16 read during Ramadan infringes on the inmate’s right to engage in his sincerely held religious
17 belief); see also Rouser v. White, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (denying summary
18 judgment for Director of CDCR and prison warden who inhibited prisoner's free exercise of
19 Wiccan religion by denying the prisoner access to chapel and various items, including incense,
20 candles, and Tarot cards, required for Wiccan religious services).
21 Thus, liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court recommends allowing a claim
22 for a violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion against
23 Defendants Stohl, Bragg, and O’Donaghy for allegedly preventing Plaintiff from receiving his
24 meals at the time of day required by his religious (Jewish) beliefs, and the Court recommends
25 allowing a free exercise claim against J. Bragg for allegedly blocking Plaintiff from receiving
26 religious food items sent in from an approved religious vendor for use in Rosh Hashanah
27 services.
28 However, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege facts regarding any other deprivation of
1 his free exercise rights.
2 D. Retaliation Claim
3 Plaintiff’s second claim alleges Defendants retaliated against him in violation of the
4 First Amendment.
5 “[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An
6 assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that
7 prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First
8 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional
9 goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). “[A]
10 plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he suffered
11 some other harm that is more than minimal.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.
12 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can plead the fifth element
13 “by alleging, in addition to a retaliatory motive, that the defendant's actions were arbitrary and
14 capricious . . . or that they were ‘unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the institution.’”
15 Id. at 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
16 Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to adverse action when Defendant Bragg “and
17 others” issued a write up for a religious diet violation on December 20, 2023, and September
18 11, 2024. Plaintiff, however, does not allege facts indicating that Defendants took the alleged
19 adverse action against him because of his constitutionally protected conduct. Plaintiff also
20 alleges that Chaplain Townson “prevented the violations” from being followed through with.
21 (ECF No. 13 at p. 14). Thus, Plaintiff has also not alleged a chilling effect or a harm that was
22 more than minimal as required to state a claim for retaliation.
23 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for retaliation in violation of the
24 First Amendment.
25 E. Equal Protection Claim
26 In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants also violated his equal protection
27 rights.
28
1 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State
2 shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is
3 essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of
4 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
5 202, 216 (1982)). To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly
6 showing that “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him]
7 based upon membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686
8 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at
9 least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d
10 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Nov. 22, 1994).
11 Plaintiff broadly alleges that he was denied equal protection rights. However, Plaintiff
12 fails to allege that he was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated individuals.
13 For example, Plaintiff does not allege that persons of other faiths received their meals at 1600
14 hours (or another set time of day), yet that defendants failed to provide similar accommodations
15 to Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges in this claim that “All Defendants conduct is
16 discriminatory because they treat Plaintiff differently than other Christians and Muslim inmates
17 without rational basis for the desparate [sic] treatment.” (ECF No. 13, at p. 11). Plaintiff’s
18 allegation is conclusory and lacks any supporting factual allegations regarding this alleged
19 differential treatment.
20 Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants failed to provide him religious
21 accommodation specifically because he was Jewish, in contrast to belonging to some other
22 religion.
23 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for violation of his equal
24 protection rights.
25 F. Tom Bane Civil Rights Act
26 In both of his claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Tom Bane Civil
27 Rights Act.
28 “The Tom Bane Civil Rights act . . . was enacted in 1987 to address hate crimes. The
1 Bane Act civilly protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are
2 secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by threats, intimidation or
3 coercion.’” Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation
4 omitted); Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“California
5 Civil Code § 52.1 . . . provides a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff's state or federal
6 civil rights committed by ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.’”)
7 “The California Bane Act creates a cause of action against a person if that person
8 ‘interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion ... with the exercise or enjoyment by any
9 individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’”
10 Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 519 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Code §
11 52.1).
12 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint contains no factual allegations stating Defendants
13 engaged in interference with his rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion. Plaintiff’s
14 allegations are based primarily on Defendants’ alleged inaction rather than any improper means
15 to interfere with his protected rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for
16 violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act.
17 IV. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
18 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 13) and finds
19 that it states a cognizable claim against Defendants Stohl, ODonaughy, and Bragg for violation
20 of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment based on allegedly preventing Plaintiff
21 from obtaining his meals at the times dictated by his religious beliefs, as well as a claim against
22 Defendant Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment based on
23 allegedly blocking Plaintiff from receiving religious items sent in from an approved religious
24 vendor for use in Rosh Hashanah services.
25 The Court will recommend that all other claims and Defendants be dismissed without
26 further leave to amend. The Court has screened Plaintiff’s previous complaints on two
27 occasions and provided him with the relevant legal standards. The Court finds that further
28 leave to amend would be futile.
1 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
2 1. The Clerk of Court shall assign a District Judge to this case.
3 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:
4 1. This case proceeds only on Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Stohl,
5 ODonaughy, and Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
6 Amendment based on allegedly preventing Plaintiff from obtaining his meals at
7 the times dictated by his religious beliefs, as well as Plaintiff's claim against
8 Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment based on
9 allegedly blocking Plaintiff from receiving religious food items sent in from an
10 approved religious vendor for use in Rosh Hashanah services.
11 2. All other claims and Defendants be dismissed without further leave to amend.
12 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district
13 || judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
14 || thirty (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file
15 || written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
16 || Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no more than
17 || fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within
18 || the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d
19 || 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
20
IT IS SO ORDERED.
221! Dated: _ June 17, 2025 [Je hey
23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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