Fulton v. Rickard

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PARIS FULTON, :

Petitioner : No. 1:24-cv-01691

:

v. : (Judge Kane)

:

WARDEN RICKARD, FCI :

SCHUYLKILL, :

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court is pro se Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 13, 2022, pro se Petitioner Paris Fulton (“Fulton”), who is currently

incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution Schuylkill, pleaded guilty to one (1) count of

felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)) in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York. See United States v. Fulton, No. 1:22-cr-00049-2

(S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 12, 2022), ECF No. 69. On May 1, 2023, Fulton was sentenced to sixty (60)

months’ incarceration. See id., ECF No. 120. Fulton did not file an appeal from his judgment of

sentence. According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator

(https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/), Fulton’s release date is August 10, 2026.

Fulton commenced the instant action by filing a two (2)-page “Motion for FSA, SCA,

and RDAP under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for ‘Duration of a Sentence,’” which the Clerk of Court

docketed on October 3, 2024. See (Doc. No. 1). In this submission, which this Court construed

as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Fulton asserted that the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) violated the Second Chance Act (“SCA”), First Step Act (“FSA”),

and Residential Drug and Alcohol Program (“RDAP”), and he sought “a full review of his earned

time credits under [the] FSA and RDAP.” See (id. at 1). Fulton also claimed that “exhaustion

should not be required in this matter, because of futility” insofar as he “was [s]entenced to a

[t]erm of [i]mprisonment for 60 months, [with a p]rojected [r]elease [d]ate in 2027, so there

[wa]s not sufficient time” for him to “exhaust all [BOP] [a]dministrative [r]emedy steps in such a

short time frame.” See (id.). He further claimed that if he attempted to exhaust his BOP

administrative remedies “he could not then receive SCA and FSA for his [h]alfway [h]ouse in

time.” See (id.).

Fulton did not submit his petition on the Court’s standard form. To rectify this issue, the

Court issued an Order on October 16, 2024, directing the Clerk of Court to send Fulton the

Court’s standard form Section 2241 petition and ordering Fulton to complete and return the form

petition within thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 5.) Fulton timely complied with this Order by

completing and returning the form Section 2241 petition, which the Clerk of Court docketed on

November 7, 2024. (Doc. No. 6.) In this petition, Fulton asserts one claim, namely, that the

BOP is “not obeying under Loper,1 [f]ederal laws[,] and [s]tatutes of [sic] FSA, SCA, and RDAP

consecutive terms of [h]alfway [h]ouse [p]lacement.” See (id. at 6). Fulton’s facts supporting

this claim are:

FCI Schuylkill is issuing the highest single Halfway House term of placement, for

example: should RDAP give you 10 months, SCA rated 6 months, and FSA Time

credits totalled [sic] 7 months, you only receive the 10 months of RDAP placement,

and not the proper total of 23 months Halfway House Placement Times. This is not

per Statute or Law, and they were meant to be consecutive, not concurrent terms.

See (id.).

1 Presumably, Fulton is referencing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024),

in which the United States Supreme Court overruled Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

On November 26, 2024, the Court entered an Order which, inter alia, directed

Respondent to file a response to the habeas petition and gave Fulton a period of fourteen (14)

days after the filing of Respondent’s response to file a reply brief. (Doc. No. 8.) Respondent

timely complied with the Order by filing a response in opposition to the habeas petition on

December 16, 2024. (Doc. No. 10.) Fulton did not file a reply brief and his time to do so has

passed. Therefore, Fulton’s habeas petition is ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Section 2241

Section 2241 confers federal jurisdiction over a habeas petition that has been filed by a

federal inmate challenging “not the validity but the execution of [their] sentence.” See Cardona

v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations and footnote omitted); Woodall v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that Section 2241 “allows a federal

prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”). While “the precise meaning of

‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy[,]” the phrase has been interpreted as to “put into effect” or

“carry out.” See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 242, 243 (citation omitted). As a result, a federal inmate

may challenge conduct undertaken by the BOP that affects the duration of the inmate’s custody.

See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that a federal

inmate’s Section 2241 petition is actionable where the inmate attacks the term of their custody by

challenging the manner in which the BOP is computing their federal sentence); United States v.

Vidal, 647 F. App’x 59, 60 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“Because [the federal inmate’s] claim

challenges the BOP’s calculation of sentence credits, it is appropriately addressed in a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to [Section] 2241” (citation omitted)).

B. Analysis

In Respondent’s response to Fulton’s habeas petition, he argues that the Court should

dismiss the petition because: (1) Fulton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) the

Court lacks jurisdiction over Fulton’s claim because his request for Residential Reentry Center

(“RRC”) placement is not a cognizable habeas claim and BOP decisions concerning prerelease

custody placements and RDAP are not judicially reviewable; and (3) Fulton is not entitled to any

prerelease custody placement, is ineligible for application of his earned FSA time credits, and is

not entitled to RDAP or its benefits. (Doc. No. 10 at 1–2.) The Court agrees with Respondent

that Fulton has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.2

Although Section 2241 does not contain an explicit statutory exhaustion requirement, the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently required a federal inmate to exhaust their

administrative remedies before filing a Section 2241 petition. See Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust

their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.”

(citations omitted)). Exhaustion is required “for three reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate

agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2)

permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing

agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” See id. at

761–62 (citations omitted)). Exhaustion is not required when it would not promote these goals.

See Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The exhaustion doctrine will not

be applied . . . when none of the basic goals (of the doctrine) would be served.” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). “For example, exhaustion may be excused where it ‘would

2 Given this conclusion, the Court need not address Respondent’s other arguments.

be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or

constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to

prevent irreparable harm.’” Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App’x 296, 297 (3d Cir. 2019)

(unpublished) (quoting Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988)).

The BOP has a multi-step administrative remedy program allowing an inmate “to seek

formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of [their] confinement.” See 28 C.F.R. §

542.10(a). First, an inmate should attempt informal resolution of the issue with the appropriate

staff member. See id. § 542.13(b). If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may submit

a formal written grievance, using the BP-9 form, to the warden within twenty (20) calendar days

“following the date on which the basis for the Request occurred.” See id. § 542.14(a). The

warden is to respond to the request within twenty (20) calendar days. See id. § 542.18. An

inmate dissatisfied with the warden’s response may appeal, using the BP-10 form, “to the

appropriate Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the date the warden signed the

response.” See id. § 542.15(a). Finally, an inmate may appeal from the Regional Director’s

response, using the BP-11 form, to the BOP’s General Counsel “within 30 calendar days of the

date the Regional Director signed the response.” See id. The General Counsel’s response to this

appeal is due within twenty (20) calendar days; however, the time for a response may be

extended by twenty (20) days. See id. § 542.18.

Here, Respondent argues that Fulton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

because the BOP’s computerized records show that he did not submit any requests for

administrative remedies during his federal incarceration. See (Doc. Nos. 10 at 6; 10-2 ¶ 6; 10-4

at 2). Fulton does not appear to contest this fact, as he asserts in his original petition that

exhaustion should be excused because it is futile. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) In support of this futility

argument, Fulton contends that because he was sentenced to sixty (60) months’ incarceration and

has a projected release date in 2027, “there [i]s not sufficient time to exhaust all [BOP]

[a]dministrative [r]emedy steps in such a short time frame, and should [he] attempt to do so, he

could not then receive SCA and FSA for his [h]alfway [h]ouse in time.” See (id.). This

argument is meritless.

In his operative habeas petition, Fulton acknowledges that the issue he is complaining

about has been “ongoing since 9/2023.” See (Doc. No. 6 at 2). Based on the periods of time set

forth in the BOP’s administrative process, Fulton could have fully exhausted his claim in

approximately four (4) months. In other words, Fulton could have exhausted the claim by

January or February 2024, which was approximately eight (8) months before he filed his original

habeas petition in this case. Overall, Fulton has not shown that exhaustion is futile because he

does not have sufficient time to pursue his claims through the BOP’s administrative system. To

the contrary, he has had ample time but apparently chose not to pursue his claims with the BOP

before filing his habeas petition. Accordingly, Fulton’s futility argument is meritless, and the

Court will dismiss his habeas petition without prejudice due to his failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Fulton’s Section 2241 petition without

prejudice for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane

Yvette Kane, District Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania