The opinion
Cite as 2021 Ark. 161
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-21-43
Opinion Delivered: September 16, 2021
ARKANSAS PAROLE BOARD; APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
JOHN FELTS, JOHN BELKIN, ANDY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO.
SHOCK, ABRAHAM CARPENTER, 60CV-20-3958]
JR., DAWN BENAFIELD, JERRY
RILEY, AND LONA MCCASTLAIN, HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER
IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES CHARLES PIAZZA, JUDGE
AS MEMBERS OF THE ARKANSAS
PAROLE BOARD; ARKANSAS
DIVISION OF CORRECTION; AND
DEXTER PAYNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE
ARKANSAS DIVISION OF
CORRECTION
APPELLANTS
V. APPEAL DISMISSED AS MOOT.
TERRANCE PROCTOR
APPELLEE
BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice
The Arkansas Parole Board and its members in their official capacities, the Arkansas
Division of Correction, and Dexter Payne as the director of the Division of Correction
(hereinafter “the Parole Board”) appeal from a November 18, 2020 order of the Pulaski
County Circuit Court declaring that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-621(a)(1)
(Supp. 2021), the parole provision of the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA)
applicable to juvenile nonhomicide offenders, is retroactive. The circuit court also found
that Terrance Proctor’s parole-eligibility date was 2003, which made him immediately
eligible for parole. The Parole Board argues that the circuit court erred in its construction
of the statute.
However, while this appeal was pending, on April 29, 2021, the General Assembly
passed Act 1034 of 2021. Act 1034 inserted a new retroactivity clause that reads as follows:
(B) Subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section applies retroactively to a minor whose
offense was committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age,
including a minor serving a sentence of life, regardless of the original sentences
that were imposed.
Accordingly, if there was ever ambiguity in the FSMA with regard to its retroactive effect
on the parole eligibility of nonhomicide offenders, the General Assembly has acted decisively
to eliminate this ambiguity.
On May 4, 2021, Proctor moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. The Parole Board
opposed the motion, arguing that Act 1034 lacked an emergency clause, which meant that
it had not taken effect. We deferred the dismissal motion, opting to take it with the case.
We do so now and grant Proctor’s motion to dismiss.
As a general rule, the appellate courts of this state will not review issues that are moot.
Dickinson v. State, 372 Ark. 62, 270 S.W.3d 863 (2008). A case becomes moot when any
judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal
controversy. Id. Given that the relevant portion of the FSMA clearly applies to Proctor’s
eligibility for parole, an opinion on the merits would have no practical legal effect. We
therefore dismiss this appeal as moot.
Appeal dismissed as moot.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellants.
Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellee.
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