The opinion
Cite as 2021 Ark. App. 98
Elizabeth Perry ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document DIVISION II
2023.06.22 14:56:53 -05'00' No. CR-20-333
2023.001.20174
Opinion Delivered March 3, 2021
MERCEDES LOREN TAYLOR
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 04CR-18-2655]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBIN F. GREEN,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge
Mercedes Loren Taylor appeals the finding of the Benton County Circuit Court
holding her in contempt for appearing in court under the influence of marijuana. On
appeal, Taylor argues that the contempt finding should be reversed both because it is
supported by insufficient evidence and because it was made without adequate notice and
opportunity to defend. We affirm.
Taylor was initially charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a
Class D felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. She appeared
in the Benton County Circuit Court on December 16, 2019, to plead guilty to the drug-
paraphernalia charge and the reduced charge of possession of marijuana, also a Class A
misdemeanor. Taylor answered yes to four questions from the court regarding waiving her
rights and pleading guilty. The following colloquy then occurred:
THE COURT: Are – have you taken any drugs or anything before coming to
court?
TAYLOR: No.
THE COURT: Would you pass a drug test right now?
TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT: I’m not so sure. Ms. Taylor, take a seat. We’ll get you back up
here.
When Taylor’s case was recalled, the court noted that Taylor was in handcuffs; the
court then requested testimony from the probation officer who had administered the drug
screen. The probation officer testified that Taylor tested positive for THC and had
presented a picture of a “Michigan state marijuana card” but did not have the actual card.
The court asked Taylor’s attorney if she had any challenge to the testimony. Taylor’s
attorney stated that Taylor “has a prescription for medical marijuana in the state of Michigan
where she lives; and after speaking with her, I think the last time she used was night before
last before she came to Arkansas.” The court found Taylor in contempt for appearing in
court under the influence of THC, and it sentenced her to ten days in jail. Taylor’s attorney
objected to the finding and asked the court to reconsider based on Taylor’s proof that she
has a legitimate, valid prescription card for marijuana. The court stated that it ordered the
drug test on the basis of Taylor’s “demeanor” in court and that, whether it was alcohol or
marijuana, her demeanor prevented her plea from being entered. The court further noted
that Taylor did not have a prescription card from the state of Arkansas and that she only had
a photograph of her Michigan card. The plea hearing was continued until January 21, 2020.
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After the hearing, Taylor filed a motion to reconsider arguing that she has a valid
medical-marijuana card issued by Michigan, her state of residence; that there was no
evidence she had used marijuana in the state of Arkansas; and that there was no evidence of
any contemptuous behavior. Three days later, she filed a motion to stay the county-jail
order or, alternatively, grant an emergency hearing alleging that she had been denied all due
process to which she was entitled. On December 20, the court ordered Taylor “cite
released” from jail and ordered her to appear on January 21.
At the January hearing, the court recounted that Taylor had obstructed the court
proceedings because it was not able to proceed with her plea due to her being under the
influence. The court stated that it had cited Taylor out of jail after communicating with
her attorneys but that it had ordered she would have to finish her contempt sentence if she
could not produce the receipt or record of her recent acquisition of medical-grade THC.
Taylor’s attorney argued that the transcript of the December hearing revealed no basis to
order the drug test and that her due-process rights had been violated due to the failure to
provide her notice of the contempt charge and the right to counsel. 1 The court stated that
at the December hearing, its suspicions were based on Taylor’s being “unsteady on her feet,
the look on her face, her personal affect” and the fact that she was appearing to plead guilty
to drug charges. The court stated that it protected her constitutional rights by preventing
her from entering a guilty plea without sufficient cognitive abilities. Taylor’s attorney
presented a receipt of marijuana purchases in Michigan but objected to the court’s requiring
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Taylor’s attorney stated that her attorney on the drug charges would likely have
become a witness due to her interactions with Taylor prior to the plea hearing; thus, he
claimed that Taylor was entitled to new counsel in the contempt matter.
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Taylor to prove her innocence. The court found the receipt insufficient and stated that
Taylor could either present more documentation or appeal. Taylor chose to appeal, and
the court stayed the remaining contempt sentence pending the appeal.
We turn first to Taylor’s sufficiency argument that the record does not support a
conclusion that either her demeanor or positive drug test obstructed the court’s plea
proceedings. She argues that the record is silent as to her demeanor because she gave only
one-word answers to the court’s questions, and the court stated only that it was “not so
sure” she would pass a drug test. Taylor argues that the positive drug test is insufficient
proof of criminal contempt because the court made no further inquiry regarding whether
the positive result was due to the prescription use of marijuana or the extent to which her
ability to enter a plea might actually be impaired.
On appeal from an order of contempt, we view the record in the light most favorable
to the circuit court’s decision, and we affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018
Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847. An act is contemptuous if it interferes with the order of the
court’s business or proceedings or reflects upon the court’s integrity. Etoch v. State, 332 Ark.
83, 964 S.W.2d 798 (1998). A court’s contempt power may be wielded to preserve the
court’s power and dignity, to punish disobedience of the court’s orders, and to preserve and
enforce the parties’ rights. Id. The appropriateness of a contempt finding does not turn on
whether the contemnor subjectively intended to engage in conduct that would be
considered contemptuous. Dowdy, supra.
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Both the Arkansas Constitution and the governing state statute distinguish between
direct and indirect contempt. See Ark. Const. art. 7, § 26; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108
(Repl. 2010). Direct contempt is a contemptuous act committed within the immediate
presence of the court. Dowdy, supra. Indirect contempt is contemptuous behavior
committed outside the presence of the court. Id. An obvious example of direct contempt,
apart from open misconduct in the courtroom, is when a party comes to court drunk. Id.
Summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent
power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Id.
The State contends that this case is controlled by Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931
S.W.2d 100 (1996). Burradell appeared in municipal court to plead guilty to DWI. Before
entering the courtroom, Burradell was “screened” by a representative of the Ozark
Guidance Center who noticed that he smelled of alcohol. A police officer then administered
a portable breathalyzer test, and Burradell registered a .13 blood alcohol level. After
Burradell’s attorney informed the judge, the judge summarily found Burradell in contempt.
On appeal to the circuit court, Burradell argued that he could not be held in contempt for
simply appearing in court under the influence of alcohol absent any disruptive behavior on
his part. The State conceded that, other than smelling of alcohol and registering a .13
percent on the breath test, Burradell displayed no outward signs of intoxication. After a
hearing, the circuit court found that Burradell’s condition displayed a lack of regard for the
court, eroded the solemnity of the proceedings, potentially impaired the proceedings, and
demonstrated disrespect.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the contempt finding, stating as follows:
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The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. Its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings. James v. James, 237 Ark.
764, 375 S.W.2d 793 (1964). It is inevitable that, if a defendant is allowed to appear
at a court proceeding in a state of intoxication, the authority and dignity of the court
will suffer. Such behavior is, standing alone, a mark of disrespect to the court and the
legal process. An act is contemptuous if it interferes with the order of the court’s
business or proceedings or reflects upon the court’s integrity. Witherspoon v. State,
322 Ark. 376, 909 S.W.2d 314 (1995). The power of contempt is available to uphold
public confidence in the majesty of the law, Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845
S.W.2d 7 (1993), and to preserve the power and dignity of the court. Edwards v.
Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984). These interests are offended by a
defendant who shows up for a plea hearing under the influence of alcohol. Public
confidence in the majesty of the law would be sorely tried were a court to turn a
blind eye to a defendant who appeared in court smelling of alcohol and intoxicated
to the extent we have in this case. Further, the validity of the proceedings themselves
could be called into question by the participation of an intoxicated defendant. Finally,
we have recognized that one of the values of a court’s exercise of its criminal
contempt power is its deterrent effect on others. Ward v. Ward, 273 Ark. 198, 617
S.W.2d 364 (1981). A contempt citation such as the one issued against Burradell lets
others know that such behavior will not be tolerated by the court.
Burradell, 326 Ark. at 185, 931 S.W.2d at 102.
Despite the distinctions Taylor notes between her case and Burradell, we agree with
the State that its principles apply here. The fact that Taylor’s positive drug test may have
been the result of legally obtained medical marijuana does not excuse her appearing visibly
impaired in court. The drug test was ordered as a result of the circuit court’s personal
observation of Taylor’s demeanor. The court further found that her demeanor, whether
caused by alcohol or marijuana, prevented her plea from being entered. When the court’s
finding was challenged at the January hearing, it expounded on its observations and recalled
that its suspicions were based on Taylor’s being unsteady on her feet, the look on her face,
and her personal affect. Taylor’s objection at the time of the contempt finding focused only
on her possession of a medical-marijuana card from Michigan; she did not object to the
court’s statements about her demeanor or request further findings from the court.
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In Burradell, the contempt finding was affirmed despite the fact that the court had not
observed the defendant to be impaired. We hold that the court’s observation of Taylor
combined with the positive drug test supported its finding that she was under the influence
of THC and was sufficient evidence of contempt. An act is contemptuous if it interferes
with the order of the court’s business or proceedings or reflects upon the court’s integrity.
Burradell, supra. As the court noted at the January hearing, defendants appearing under the
influence impair the ability of the court to perform its business by requiring that their cases
be reset. Furthermore, it is inevitable that if a defendant is allowed to appear at a court
proceeding in a state of intoxication, the authority and dignity of the court will suffer. Id.
We now turn to Taylor’s due-process arguments. She argues that no definite order
put her on notice that she would be drug tested at her plea proceedings and that a positive
result could lead to a criminal sentence. She claims that if perceived impairment might be
investigated by a court-ordered drug test of a person claiming prescription drug use, she is
entitled to know as much beforehand so that she might be prepared to explain a real or
imagined perception of impairment by the court and defend a criminal charge of
contemptuous obstruction arising from it. Taylor asserts that the circuit court’s process
failed any due-process scrutiny.
As stated above, summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of
the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by
legislation. Dowdy, supra; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108(c) (“Contempts committed
in the immediate view and presence of the court may be punished summarily. In other
cases, the party charged shall be notified of the accusation and shall have a reasonable time
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to make his or her defense.”). Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-10-108(c) is entirely
consistent with the inherent power of the court to summarily punish contumacious conduct
occurring in its presence. James v. Pulaski Cnty. Cir. Ct., 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19.
This power is necessary to enforce the authority of the court and to protect the dignity of
the proceedings before it. Id.
Taylor concedes that she is not entitled to notice that she should not obstruct court
proceedings by being too impaired to enter a plea. But that is what the court found, stating
“we couldn’t enter this with her demeanor before this Court whether it was alcohol or
marijuana.” Due to her appearance before the court, Taylor was summarily held in
contempt, and in a summary-contempt proceeding, a contemnor is not entitled to notice
and an opportunity to be heard. See James, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.
David R. Raupp and Gregg Parrish, Arkansas Public Defender Comm’n, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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