The opinion
Cite as 2021 Ark. 96
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-20-232
Opinion Delivered: April 29, 2021
MONTRELL DASHONE VENTRY
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SALINE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 63CR-07-669]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice
Montrell Dashone Ventry appeals from the life sentence imposed by a Saline County
jury at a resentencing hearing after his original sentence of life imprisonment without parole
was vacated due to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). For reversal, Ventry argues that
the trial court should have (1) permitted the introduction of the sentences imposed on his
codefendants; (2) excluded testimony about an alleged escape attempt while Ventry was
awaiting his original trial; and (3) granted a directed verdict and prohibited the jury from
imposing a life sentence. Ventry also asks this court to clarify our rulings regarding parole
eligibility under the Fair Sentencing for Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA). We affirm.
I. Background
In 2008, Montrell Ventry was found guilty of capital murder and aggravated robbery
in the shooting death of Nicholas Jones and sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole. We affirmed. Ventry v. State, 2009 Ark. 300, 318 S.W.3d 576. Ventry was seventeen
years old when he committed the offenses. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a sentencing scheme that mandates life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Miller, 567 U.S. at
479. Ventry’s sentence was vacated, and a three-day resentencing hearing was held in August
2019.
At the resentencing hearing, the State offered testimony from surviving victim Eddie
Dixon, family members of Jones and Dixon, law enforcement officials, the medical examiner,
officials from the Arkansas Department of Correction and the Arkansas Parole Board, and
two witnesses to Ventry’s attempted escape from custody. Ventry and his mother testified
for the defense. At the close of the State’s case, and again at the close of all the evidence,
Ventry moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had failed to prove that he was
irretrievably depraved and therefore could not be sentenced to life. The trial court denied
the motion. The jury was instructed that capital murder, when committed by a juvenile, was
punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and not more than forty
years, or life, and that Ventry would be eligible for parole after thirty years if he received a
life sentence. The jury imposed a life sentence. This appeal followed.
II. Points on Appeal
Ventry first argues that the trial court should have permitted the introduction of the
sentences imposed on his codefendants. Before the sentencing hearing, the State moved to
exclude the sentences of codefendants Terrance Rhodes, Mohammad Siddiq, and Sultannah
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Siddiq, which the trial court granted. Ventry cites Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577
U.S. 190 (2016), for the proposition that proportionality is a concern in juvenile sentencing
under the Eighth Amendment. He contends that he should have been able to present his
codefendants’ sentences to argue that his sentence should be proportionate to those received
by his codefendants. Ventry argues that this issue raises a constitutional claim and that he is
entitled to relief under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
This court reviews the admission of evidence by the trial court using an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Barefield v. State, 2019 Ark. 149, at 4, 574 S.W.3d 142, 145. The decision
to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will
not reverse a court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence absent a manifest abuse
of discretion. Id. Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error
in the trial court’s decision, but also requires that the trial court act improvidently,
thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Collins v. State, 2019 Ark. 110, at 5, 571 S.W.3d
469, 472.
We have repeatedly held that the sentence received by a codefendant is not relevant
to a defendant’s guilt, innocence, or punishment. See Baxter v. State, 324 Ark. 440, 446, 922
S.W.2d 682, 685 (1996); Robinson v. State, 278 Ark. 516, 517, 648 S.W.2d 444, 444 (1983).
Nothing in Miller or Montgomery suggests that this rule should not apply to juvenile
defendants. Those cases examined whether mandatory sentences of life without parole
imposed on juveniles were proportionate given that “children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206. “The ‘foundation
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stone’ for Miller’s analysis was this Court’s line of precedent holding certain punishments
disproportionate when applied to juveniles.” Id. at 206. But the differences between juveniles
and adults for sentencing purposes have no bearing on the relevance of sentences imposed
on juveniles’ codefendants. Because the sentences received by Ventry’s codefendants are not
relevant to Ventry’s sentence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
evidence of those sentences.
Next, Ventry argues that the trial court should have excluded testimony about an
alleged escape attempt—while Ventry was awaiting his initial trial—for which he was never
convicted. In October 2007, Ventry attempted to escape from custody by fleeing from a
police vehicle. The State nolle prossed the escape attempt and did not introduce evidence of
the attempt at the initial trial, although the State did introduce evidence of a separate
attempt: Ventry’s flight from officers at the time of his arrest. The trial court heard arguments
on the admissibility of this evidence. After noting that it “was inclined to believe that would
be more prejudicial than plain error [sic],” the trial court ruled that evidence of the attempt
was admissible because it would have been admissible in the guilt phase. At the sentencing
hearing, two witnesses testified about the escape attempt.
Ventry contends that the trial court ruled that the evidence of the escape attempt was
admissible without properly conducting an analysis under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403.
Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ventry argues that in admitting
the evidence, the trial court determined that “admissibility automatically trumps any
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prejudice.”
This court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence in the penalty phase of a
trial for an abuse of discretion. Brown v. State, 2010 Ark. 420, at 12, 378 S.W.3d 66, 73.
Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-97-103 (Repl. 2016), evidence relevant to
sentencing includes but is not limited to relevant character evidence and evidence of
aggravating circumstances. We have stated that “once the jury has determined that the
defendant is guilty, additional evidence, even evidence regarding attempted crimes, may be
admissible if it gives the jury as much information as possible when it makes its sentencing
decisions.” Buckley v. State, 341 Ark. 864, 874, 20 S.W.3d 331, 338 (2000). We have held
that evidence of attempted escape is admissible during the sentencing phase of the trial,
concluding that “[a] criminal defendant’s proclivity for escape is a pertinent factor in a jury’s
sentencing decision.” Skiver v. State, 336 Ark. 86, 99, 983 S.W.2d 931, 938 (1999).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting testimony about Ventry’s
escape attempt. The trial court did not, as Ventry suggests, automatically assume that
admissibility trumps prejudice. Rather, the trial court heard arguments on the issue and
considered prejudice before concluding that the evidence was admissible. Evidence of
Ventry’s attempted escape was relevant to his character. Ventry’s “proclivity for escape” was
pertinent to the jury’s sentencing decision. Skiver, supra. And this evidence gave the jury “as
much information as possible” in making its sentencing decision. Buckley, supra. We cannot
say that the trial court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration in
admitting this evidence. Therefore, we affirm on this point.
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Ventry next argues that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict and
prohibited the jury from imposing a life sentence. Ventry contends that Miller and
Montgomery required the State to prove permanent incorrigibility or irretrievable depravity
before he could be sentenced to life imprisonment. He points to language in Montgomery
explaining that “Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive
for all but the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” and is thus
unconstitutional for “juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth.” 577 U.S. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ventry argues that the State
failed to prove that he was permanently incorrigible, showing evidence of the numerous
programs he completed in prison. He also argues that he is not old enough to show
permanent incorrigibility.
The State was not required to prove that Ventry was permanently incorrigible before
he could be sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. The United States Supreme Court
recently held that Miller and Montgomery do not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility
before a juvenile can be sentenced to life without parole. Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___
(2021). Ventry did not face a possible sentence of life without parole; he faced a possible
sentence of ten to forty years in prison, or life, with parole eligibility after thirty years. If the
Constitution does not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility before a juvenile can be
sentenced to life without parole, it follows that the Constitution requires no such finding
before a juvenile can be sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Because the State was
not required to prove that Ventry was permanently incorrigible before the jury could impose
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a sentence of life with the possibility of parole, the trial court did not err in denying the
motion for directed verdict.
Finally, Ventry urges this court to clarify our rulings regarding parole eligibility under
the FSMA. He claims that this court’s language regarding the retroactivity of the parole-
eligibility provisions of the FSMA in recent cases, including Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179,
547 S.W.3d 64, and Scherrer v. State, 2019 Ark. 264, 584 S.W.3d 243, is overly broad.
Specifically, he asks us to clarify how the FSMA’s parole-eligibility provisions apply to Miller
defendants whose sentences were vacated before the FSMA’s enactment.
This case does not present a dispute regarding the parole-eligibility provisions of the
FSMA for us to resolve. Both Ventry and the State agreed at the sentencing hearing that
Ventry would be eligible for parole after serving thirty years if he received a life sentence.
The jury was instructed accordingly. The sentencing order states that Ventry is subject to the
provisions of the FSMA and is eligible for parole after serving thirty years. The parties
currently agree that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-621(a)(2)(A) applies to Ventry
and that he will be eligible for parole after serving thirty years. We do not answer academic
questions or issue advisory opinions. See Hampton v. State, 2014 Ark. 303, at 7, 437 S.W.3d
689, 693. Therefore, we decline to address this point.
III. Rule 4-3(a) Review
Because Ventry was sentenced to life imprisonment, the record has been examined
for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to
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Ventry in compliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a). No prejudicial error has
been found.
Affirmed.
Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Pamela Rumpz, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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