The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re SUTTON, Minor. UNPUBLISHED
June 13, 2025
11:09 AM
Nos. 372593 and 372594
Monroe Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 23-028351-NA
Before: YATES, P.J., and YOUNG and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals,1 respondents appeal of right the trial court’s order
terminating their parental rights to their minor child, MRS. They contend that respondent-mother’s
due-process rights were violated because she was not given updated case service plans, that
insufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court’s findings that statutory grounds for
termination existed, and that termination of parental rights was not in MRS’s best interests. We
affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Respondent-mother has a history of mental-health instability resulting from schizophrenia,
depression, and anxiety. Respondent-father, who suffers from bipolar I disorder, has a long history
of abusing controlled substances, including heroin and methamphetamine. He made unsuccessful
attempts at residential and outpatient drug-rehabilitation treatment, he was imprisoned for six years
for armed robbery, and his parental rights to two other children were involuntarily terminated in
earlier proceedings.
In February 2023, when MRS was approximately three months old, she was removed from
respondents’ care and custody because of respondent-mother’s mental instability and respondent-
1
In re MRS, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 23, 2024 (Docket Nos.
372593 and 372594).
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father’s substance abuse and criminality. Respondents were homeless and indigent at that point.
An adjudication order was entered in June 2023 after a bench trial.
The trial court terminated respondents’ parental rights in September 2024 because, despite
more than 15 months of reasonable family-reunification efforts, respondents had not substantially
complied with, or benefited from, their case service plans. At the time of the termination hearing,
respondent-mother was continuing to refuse to participate in recommended individual therapy, and
respondent-father was continuing to test positive for illicit drugs and had various parole violations.
Respondents could not secure stable housing, having moved many times. Further, they could not
maintain employment, and they denied the seriousness of their mental-health issues that affected
their ability to properly parent.
On September 4, 2024, the trial court rendered its ruling from the bench, determining that
statutory grounds for termination of respondents’ parental rights existed and that termination was
in the best interests of MRS. By that time, the paternal grandparents—who were estranged from
respondents—had properly cared for MRS for more than 18 months and were willing to adopt her.
After the trial court issued a written termination order on September 6, 2024, respondents appealed
of right.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, respondents fault the trial court for violating respondent-mother’s due-process
rights, rendering unsupported findings that statutory grounds for termination existed, and deciding
that termination was in MRS’s best interests. We review for clear error the finding that a statutory
ground for termination has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(K); In re
Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). Likewise, the trial court’s finding that
termination is in a child’s best interests is reviewed for clear error. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App
35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). In order to be deemed clearly erroneous, a trial court’s finding must
be more than possibly, or even probably, wrong. “A decision qualifies as clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253,
271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A trial court’s interpretation
and application of statutes and court rules is reviewed de novo. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 14;
934 NW2d 610 (2019). “Whether child protective proceedings complied with a parent’s right to
procedural due process presents a question of constitutional law,” subject to review de novo. In
re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 403-404; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). With these standards in mind, we
shall address each of respondents’ claims in turn.
A. DUE PROCESS
Respondent-mother asserts that she was deprived of her fundamental right to the care and
custody of her child without adequate notice of what she was expected to achieve, in violation of
her constitutional right to due process. A well-established tenet of due process is that parties must
be given adequate notice of what they must do to avoid deprivation of a fundamental right. Dep’t
of State Compliance & Rules Div v Mich Ed Ass’n-NEA, 251 Mich App 110, 116-117; 650 NW2d
120 (2002). Hence, respondent-mother insists petitioner “must create a service plan outlining the
steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to
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achieve reunification.” In re MJC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket No.
365616); slip op at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be presented in the lower court.
In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). Respondent-mother did not raise this
issue in the lower court, thereby leaving this claim unpreserved. In termination cases, unpreserved
issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App
120, 135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011); In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). “To
avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have
occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial
rights.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 135. “Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it
caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at
9. The asserting party bears the burden of persuasion with regard to prejudice. In re Pederson,
331 Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 70 (2020).
According to MCL 712A.18f(1) and (2), a case service plan must be in writing, and it must
“be available to the court and all the parties to the proceeding.” The case service plan is presented
to the trial court before an order of disposition, and the trial court “may order compliance with all
or any part of the case service plan as the court considers necessary.” MCL 712A.18f(4).
The record does not support respondent-mother’s claim that her due-process rights were
violated because petitioner did not implement an updated written case service plan at each review
and permanency-planning hearing. Respondent-mother claims that, although petitioner submitted
a June 29, 2023 updated plan at the July 2023 initial disposition, plans submitted at future hearings
were mere copies of the initial March 1, 2023 case service plan. Thus, respondent-mother contends
that she was not correctly apprised of the barriers she had to overcome to achieve reunification.
Respondent-mother further asserts that petitioner accelerated the date for a review hearing from
90 days to 57 days following the March 5, 2024 hearing, even though the trial court concluded that
respondent-mother was making progress. Respondent-mother insists that all those alleged errors
affected the outcome of the proceedings because the case service plan was not regularly tailored
to her current needs to accomplish reunification, so the termination of her parental rights flowed
directly from the violation of her due-process rights.
We find that the case service plans and periodic updated court reports adequately reflected
respondent-mother’s barriers to reunification, which did not significantly change during the course
of the proceedings. Respondent-mother was repeatedly notified of the issues that had brought her
child into care and that had persisted throughout the case: mental instability; inadequate housing;
and inadequate income. At the July 7, 2023 initial disposition, respondent-mother acknowledged
that she had reviewed petitioner’s proposed case service plan that was attached to the initial court
report. Further, respondent-mother’s March 1, 2023 case service plan was attached to petitioner’s
updated court reports and e-mailed to respondent-mother’s counsel, it was admitted as an exhibit,
and it was reviewed by the court at all review and permanency-planning hearings. The caseworker
explained the rationale for shortening the time for periodic review and said that she had discussed
the possibility of a goal change with her supervisor because respondents were not making adequate
progress and MRS had been in care for more than a year.
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Also, respondent-mother attended the periodic review hearings and heard the caseworker
testify about petitioner’s reunification efforts and respondent-mother’s progress on her case service
plan. Respondent-mother testified at the permanency-planning hearing in May 2024 that she had
reviewed her case report, and respondent-mother explained her efforts to satisfy each requirement
of her case service plan. Moreover, respondent-mother has not identified additional services that
should have been included in her case service plan to assist her in overcoming her mental-health
issues, unstable housing, or inadequate income. Thus, we hold that any failure to comply with the
technical requirements of MCL 712A.18f(5) did not affect the outcome of the proceedings in the
trial court or otherwise prejudice respondent-mother.
B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Both respondents insist that the record does not support the trial court’s determination that
there were statutory grounds for termination of parental rights. The trial court decided to terminate
respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), (and (i) as to respondent-
father), which state as follows:
The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
* * *
(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so,
fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time considering the child’s age.
* * *
(i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated
due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and the parent has
failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights.
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of
the parent.
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“If the trial court did not clearly err by finding one statutory ground existed, then that one ground
is sufficient to affirm the termination of [a] respondent’s parental rights.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich
App 252, 273; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). Accordingly, we must consider whether the trial court clearly
erred in finding at least one statutory ground for terminating the parental rights of each respondent.
1. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
Respondent-mother contends that the trial court committed clear error when it decided that
termination of her parental rights was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because the record
did not reflect that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and there was no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering
MRS’s age. We reject that contention.
The caseworker said that respondent-mother’s untreated mental-health issues significantly
contributed to MRS’s removal from her care, but respondent-mother only partially complied with
measures designed to address those issues. Although respondent-mother completed a mandatory
psychological evaluation, she only partially complied with the evaluator’s recommendations. For
the evaluation, respondent-mother stated that she had been previously diagnosed with postpartum
depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and anxiety. She further reported that she had
been hospitalized in a psychiatric facility on two occasions: once for two weeks after she stopped
taking a medication for her bipolar disorder for five days, and again when she reported that she
was on “too much medication.” But respondent-mother denied suffering from psychosis.
Respondent-mother had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety
disorder, but she only acknowledged she suffered from postpartum depression and anxiety. The
psychological evaluation indicated that respondent-mother might not fully understand the gravity
of her mental-health issues. The evaluator recommended that respondent-mother participate in an
active mental-health counseling plan that was specific as to time, intensity, and duration. The
evaluator noted that respondent-mother’s inconsistency in attending individual therapy was
evident when, despite respondent-mother’s reporting that she was attending therapy, some
investigation revealed that she was not actively doing so. The evaluator concluded that it was
imperative to monitor respondent-mother’s mental health if MRS were returned to her home. The
evaluator further emphasized that medication management was necessary for respondent-mother
to maintain her mental health.
The evidence also established that respondent-mother had been repeatedly hospitalized for
psychiatric care. A doctor who treated respondent-mother through December 16, 2023, testified
that his diagnosis included disorganized schizophrenia, major depressive disorder with psychotic
features, and catatonia. He opined that respondent-mother would return to a psychotic state and,
as a result, be unable to care for another person if she stopped taking her medication or participating
in individual therapy. Another one of respondent-mother’s physicians testified that her depression,
anxiety, and schizophrenia revealed themselves in the spring of 2023. Respondent-mother testified
that a doctor had attempted to diagnose her with schizophrenia at one time, but that she had refused
to accept that diagnosis. Respondent-mother conceded at the adjudication trial that she had been
the subject of three prior mental-health petitions. But at the termination hearing, she at first denied,
but later conceded, the existence of one such petition.
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In September 2023, the approved parenting-time supervisor had such grave concerns about
respondent-mother’s declining mental health that she refused to supervise visits until respondent-
mother was examined by a doctor. The caseworker testified that respondent-mother had reported
in November 2023 that she had had enough therapy in her life, so she elected not to participate in
individual therapy. At that time, respondent-mother also reported that she no longer wanted to
take her prescribed medications, and she was hospitalized within two weeks.
We agree with the trial court that the evidence demonstrated that respondent-mother only
minimally followed recommendations and only minimally took part in individual therapy. For her
part, respondent-mother continually denied having significant mental-health issues or diagnoses.
She also claimed, contrary to the psychological evaluator’s specific requirements, that her monthly
medication reviews constituted individual therapy. However, respondent-mother’s psychological
evaluation made clear that medication alone would be insufficient to manage her mental health if
it was not accompanied by individual therapy. Therefore, the trial court reasonably concluded that
short monthly medication reviews were not a substitute for prescribed individual therapy.
The evidence also revealed that respondent-mother had only partially endeavored to obtain
and maintain suitable housing. Respondent-mother claimed that she had had only four residences
since the case began, whereas the caseworker and respondent-father testified about approximately
eight residences. Respondent-mother initially denied, but later acknowledged, that she had lived
in her car and in a hotel for short periods. She also denied, but later admitted, that she was evicted
from her residence in December 2023. Respondent-mother’s subsequent residence with a relative
appeared to be suitable, but she did not have a lease or any other evidence that that arrangement
was anything more than temporary.
Finally, although the evidence demonstrated that respondent-mother partially participated
in scheduled parenting times, the record showed that visits were cancelled from October 2023 to
January 2024 because of respondent-mother’s rapidly declining mental health and hospitalization.
Although the visits themselves appeared promising, respondent-mother never progressed beyond
supervised parenting time. She only partially complied with parenting education. She refused to
participate in two programs, and she later claimed that she had completed an online program, but
she provided no verification for that claim.
In light of the record established in the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was warranted under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Simply stated, the record demonstrated that the conditions that led to the
adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would
be rectified within a reasonable time considering MRS’s age.
2. RESPONDENT-FATHER
We also conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by terminating respondent-father’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because there was sufficient evidence that he failed
to comply with, or benefit from, his case service plan. The evidence revealed that he was not able
to achieve sobriety and a crime-free lifestyle, or to maintain stable housing or income adequate to
meet MRS’s needs.
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The caseworker testified that respondent-father partially complied with recommendations,
but had not completed a substance-abuse assessment, and had tested positive for illicit substances
while in a treatment program. Respondent-father reported a sobriety date of April 23, 2024, denied
relapsing despite numerous positive drug screens since that time, and maintained that the positive
screen results were incorrect and that he was not currently suffering from any drug addiction. He
admitted to tampering with four of his drug screens, however, even while repeatedly insisting that
his positive screens were invalid. He tested positive for cocaine in June and July 2024 and refused
to screen at the agency in late July and August 2024, insisting that the screening procedure violated
his privacy. He failed to participate in certain substance-abuse programs ostensibly because doing
so could trigger a relapse. Thus, the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that respondent-
father’s longest period of sobriety since the case began was six months.
The record also established that respondent-father failed to control his criminal tendencies.
Respondent-father and his parole officer both testified about respondent-father’s numerous parole
violations, his two arrests, and his incarceration for absconding. His date for parole discharge was
extended from August 14 to November 13, 2024, and his parole officer was unaware of a pending
misdemeanor larceny charge. Respondent-father’s criminality led to prior terminations of parental
rights, and his ongoing involvement with the criminal-justice system negatively affected his ability
to parent MRS.
Beyond that, the record revealed that respondent-father had only minimally complied with
the requirements that he obtain stable housing and maintain employment. He did not have a lease
for his current residence, and was never employed for more than six months. In addition, although
respondent-father did undergo a psychological evaluation, he did not comply with the evaluator’s
recommendations in their entirety. During a psychological evaluation in August 2023, respondent-
father reported that he had had issues relating to previous diagnoses of depression, bipolar disorder,
anxiety, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and substance-abuse withdrawal. The evaluator’s
recommendations included continued mental-health services and medication management because
the evaluator believed treating respondent-father’s mental-health and substance-abuse disorders
was necessary for maintaining a safe environment for MRS. Nevertheless, the caseworker testified
that respondent-father had been attending monthly medication reviews, but not individual therapy,
since August 2023. Finally, although respondent-father attended parent-education classes, he only
minimally attended scheduled parenting times. Starting in October 2023 and continuing into 2024,
his visits with MRS were infrequent because he had relapsed, was arrested or feared being arrested,
or was incarcerated or in residential drug treatment.
For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that
respondent-father could not rectify the conditions that led to MRS’s removal within a reasonable
time, considering the child’s age. MRS was 21 months old at the time of the termination hearing,
and she had been in relative foster care for 18 of those months. According to the caseworker, the
process of achieving family reunification would take approximately an additional year because of
both respondents’ case-service trajectories. As the trial court observed, respondents’ progress had
been riddled with backsliding, and on occasion respondents flatly denied the concerns that needed
to be addressed. Consequently, the record furnished ample support for the trial court’s finding that
the statutory ground for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) was satisfied by clear and
convincing evidence.
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C. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Both respondents assert that the trial court erred in finding that termination of their parental
rights was in MRS’s best interests. If the trial court finds that there are grounds for termination of
parental rights “and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall
order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child
with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). In the trial court, “the preponderance of the
evidence standard applies to the best-interest determination.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 83;
836 NW2d 182 (2013). On appeal, we review the trial court’s best-interest determination only for
clear error. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40. “In making its best-interest determination, the
trial court may consider ‘the whole record,’ including evidence introduced by any party.” In re
Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 237; 894 NW2d 653 (2016). The trial court may consider the child’s
need for permanency, stability, and finality, the advantages of a foster home over a parent’s home,
the parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with court-ordered treatment
plans, the parent’s history of visitation with the child, the child’s wellbeing while in care, and the
possibility of adoption. See In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). As
this Court has stated:
[O]nce a statutory ground is established, a parent’s interest in the care and custody
of his or her child yields to the state’s interest in the protection of the child. Thus,
while it is inappropriate for a court to consider the advantages of a foster home in
deciding whether a statutory ground for termination has been established, such
considerations are appropriate in a best-interests determination. [In re Foster, 285
Mich App 630, 635; 776 NW2d 415 (2009) (citations omitted).]
The record reveals that the trial court considered all of the applicable factors when making
its best-interest determination. Both the caseworker and the designated parenting-time supervisor
testified that there was a good-to-strong bond between respondents and MRS, and that respondents
interacted appropriately with her during parenting time. But the caseworker noted that respondents
were unable to properly care for MRS, as demonstrated by their inability to maintain progress with
their case service plans.
The evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the foster home offered advantages
over respondents’ home. The caseworker testified that respondent-mother’s mental instability and
respondent-father’s substance abuse and criminality would likely continue to hamper their ability
to parent. Neither respondent could maintain steady employment or suitable housing. The paternal
grandparents, in contrast, had provided a safe and stable home for MRS throughout the pendency
of the case, meeting all of the child’s needs. The caseworker opined that MRS needed permanency,
stability, and finality, which neither respondent would be able to provide in the foreseeable future.
The caseworker testified, and the child’s lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) stated, that MRS, who
had been in foster care for 18 of her 21 months, was developmentally on the proper track, having
successfully reached her developmental milestones. MRS was bonded with her caregivers, who
were willing to adopt her. As a result, the LGAL supported termination.
Respondents’ claim that the trial court did not consider MRS’s placement with relatives as
a factor weighing against termination lacks merit. To be sure, “the fact that a child is living with
relatives when the case proceeds to termination is a factor to be considered in determining whether
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termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43. The trial court
in this case explicitly addressed relative placement when considering the best-interest factors. It
acknowledged that MRS was placed with relatives, but concluded that that factor did not outweigh
the considerations favoring termination. Further, the record supported the trial court’s finding that
the relative foster parents had estranged relationships with both respondents. Throughout the case,
both respondents and the child’s paternal grandmother testified that they had a difficult and toxic
relationship and did not communicate well. The paternal grandmother further stated that she was
unwilling to supervise parenting time because respondents were disrespectful, angry, and did not
listen to requests that were in MRS’s interest. Respondent-father opined that his relationship with
the paternal grandmother was not good for his sobriety because she was a hypochondriac and her
reports of MRS’s behavioral struggles following parenting time were untrue. Respondent-mother
speculated that the paternal grandparents had slashed respondents’ car tires. The LGAL stated at
the preliminary hearing that there was an ongoing lack of cooperation and communication between
the paternal grandparents and respondents. In addition, during closing arguments, the LGAL noted
that there was no familial relationship between them.
For all these reasons, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that guardianship was
not a feasible alternative to termination of respondents’ parental rights. Respondents’ reliance on
In re L J Lombard, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367714), is misplaced.
There, the trial court erred when, rather than making individualized findings regarding whether a
guardianship with the child’s maternal grandfather with whom the child was placed would be in
the child’s best interests, it instead relied on a general policy disfavoring guardianship for children
under 10 years old. Id. at ___; slip op at 5. In this case, the relative foster parents were supportive
of family reunification, if feasible, but were not seeking a guardianship, in contrast to the situation
in In re L J Lombard. Instead, the relative foster parents offered to provide permanency for MRS
through adoption. The child’s placement with relatives was duly considered, but termination was
ordered “in lieu of placement with relatives,” as contemplated by In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App
at 43. Further, the trial court satisfied MCR 3.977(I)(1) and (3) by articulating brief, definite, and
pertinent findings and conclusions on all the contested matters, including MRS’s placement with
relatives.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
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