Ratliff v. Louisiana State

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KENTDRICK D RATLIFF CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 24-2757

LOUISIANA STATE, ET AL. SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Kentdrick D. Ratliff’s (“plaintiff”) motion for

reconsideration.1 Plaintiff asks the Court to consider or amend its judgment granting

defendant Hammond City’s (“Hammond”) motion2 to dismiss. For the reasons that

follow, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an alleged incident in which plaintiff was stopped and

detained by Hammond police and, subsequently, was kicked, punched, tased,

stomped in the face, and put in a choke hold while in the booking room.3 Plaintiff was

then allegedly falsely charged because of the incident.4 Plaintiff also alleged that

Hammond police concealed video evidence corroborating the incident until 2022.5

On May 13, 2025, Hammond filed a motion to dismiss6 plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The

1 R. Doc. No. 41.

2 R. Doc. No. 28.

3 Id.; see also R. Doc. No. 41, at 1-3.

4 R. Doc. No. 41, at 2.

5 Id. at 3-4.

6 R. Doc. No. 28.

Court granted the motion, having found plaintiff’s claims were prescribed, and it

issued a corresponding order and reasons.7 The Court therein also denied plaintiff’s

request for leave to file an amended complaint, finding that it would be futile to allow

amendment.8 A judgment was issued dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.9

On June 11, 2025, plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration. He argues that

reconsideration of this Court’s dismissal is proper, because “new evidence surfaced in

2022 concerning the reconstruction of video footage that supports the misconduct

allegations against the City of Hammond police officers.” He also raises a new cause

of action for violation of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), § 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize motions for

reconsideration. Bass v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2000).

However, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that parties may challenge a

judgement or order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b). Reyes

v. Julia Place Condo. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 12-2043, 2016 WL 4272943, at *2

(E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2016) (Barbier, J.) (collecting cases). “Rules 59 and 60, however,

apply only to final judgments.” Id. (citing S. Snow Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Snowizard

Holdings, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 548, 563-64 (E.D. La. 2013) (Brown, J.)). If a party

seeks reconsideration of an order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims among

7 R. Doc. No. 39.

8 Id.

9 R. Doc. No. 40.

all the parties prior to entry of final judgment, then Rule 54(b) controls. Specifically,

Rule 54(b) provides that

any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates

fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than

all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or

parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a

judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and

liabilities.

Rule 54 recognizes that a district court “possesses the inherent procedural

power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to

be sufficient.” Melancon v. Texaco, 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981). Accordingly,

under Rule 54(b) the court “is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason

it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in

or clarification of the substantive law.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336

(5th Cir. 2017).

Between Rules 59(e) and 54(b), the former “sets a high threshold for parties to

raise a new argument for the first time after judgment has already been entered”

while the latter can be “more flexible, reflecting the ‘inherent power of the rendering

district court to afford such relief from interlocutory judgments as justice requires.’”

Id. at 336–37 (quoting Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25–26 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (internal

citations omitted). In short, reconsideration of an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b)

is less stringent than reconsideration of judgments under Rule 59(e).10 Austin, 864

F.3d at 336. Nonetheless, while “a less exacting standard applies, courts look to

similar considerations as those it considers when evaluating Rule 59(e) motions.”

Edwards v. Take Fo’ Records, Inc., No. 19-12130, 2020 WL 3832606, at *11 & n.12

(E.D. La. July 8, 2020) (Feldman, J.); see also Pierce v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,

No. 15-6585, 2017 WL 2082947, at *1 (E.D. La. May 15, 2017) (Vance, J.). To be sure,

“rulings should only be reconsidered where the moving party has presented

substantial reasons for reconsideration.’” Adams v. United Ass’n of Journeymen &

Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the United States & Canada, AFL-

CIO, Loc. 198, 495 F. Supp. 3d 392, 396 (M.D. La. 2020) (deGravelles, J.) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) Applies

The Court’s order granting Hammond’s motion to dismiss and dismissing

plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice is an interlocutory order, because at the time

10 When ruling on Rule 59(e) motions, courts in this district consider: “(1) whether the

movant demonstrates the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact

upon which the judgment is based; (2) whether the movant presents new evidence;

(3) whether the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; and (4)

whether the motion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law.”

United States v. Cytogel Pharma, LLC, No. 16-13987, 2017 WL 3849317, at *2 (E.D.

La. Mar. 28, 2017) (Vance, J.). Rule 59 motions should not be used to relitigate old

matters, raise new arguments, or submit evidence that could have been presented

earlier in the proceedings. Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir.

2004); Rosenblatt v. United Way of Greater Houston, 607 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2010).

plaintiff filed his motion,11 the Court had not yet dismissed defendant Louisiana

State (“Louisiana”) from this action. See Green v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., No. 23-111,

2023 WL 3453937, at *1 (E.D. La. May 15, 2023) (finding the plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration constituted one addressing an interlocutory order because one

defendant still remained in the action) (“After all, [the defendant-company] is also a

defendant in this action, and none of [the plaintiff’s] claims against it have been

dismissed. [The plaintiff’s] motion, then, is properly treated as a motion to reconsider

an interlocutory order.”); Mayfield v. DeSoto Par. Police Jury, No. 15-2374, 2017 WL

2295908, at *1 (W.D. La. May 25, 2017) (evaluating the motion for reconsideration

under Rule 54(b) because “[a] case [that] seeks reconsideration of the grant of a

motion to dismiss as to only one defendant, . . . is considered an interlocutory order

and not a final judgment.”). Thus, the more lenient Rule 54(b) standard applies.

b. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

Having reviewed plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds plaintiff has not provided

sufficient justification for the Court to reverse its dismissal. Plaintiff’s motion merely

rehashes the same facts and legal theories that were before the Court when it ruled

on the motion to dismiss.12 Mere disagreement with the Court’s order is not sufficient

grounds for reconsideration. Mayfield, 2017 WL 2295908, at *1 (denying the

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration because the plaintiff reiterated the same legal

11 Although the Court on this date dismissed Louisiana, see R. Doc. No. 44, it will

evaluate plaintiff’s motion under the standard applicable at the time plaintiff filed

his motion.

12 See R. Doc. No. 39, at 1-3, 5 (considering the 2022 video footage, but nonetheless

dismissing the claims as prescribed).

and factual arguments the court had already considered and rejected) (“A motion for

reconsideration should not be used to advance arguments already presented or

relitigate matters that have been resolved, albeit to the moving party’s

dissatisfaction.”). Moreover, plaintiff fails to identify any facts to refute the Court’s

finding that his claims are prescribed by the one-year prescription period.13 Plaintiff

admits that the “new evidence” on which he relies for his motion “surfaced in 2022.”14

Consequently, even if the Court had not yet considered the 2022 evidence, plaintiff

essentially admits his claims “prescribed long before [he] filed his complaint in June

2024.”15 Cf. Green 2023 WL 3453937, at *2 (denying the plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration where she provided “no justification whatsoever for her request that

the Court reexamine its decision to dismiss her claims . . . as prescribed.”).

Plaintiff’s new FCA claim fares no better. Although Rule 54(b) permits

consideration of arguments that could have been, but were not, raised previously, the

Court may “use its discretion to prevent parties from, without justification, raising

new arguments for the first time.” Domain Prot., LLC v. Sea Wasp, LLC, No. 18-792,

2019 WL 3933614, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2019) (internal alterations and quotations

omitted); Mitchell v. Cenlar Cap. Corp., No. 16-814, 2020 WL 13577558, at *2 (S.D.

Miss. Feb. 19, 2020) (“While the Rule 54(b) standard is more permissive, it appears

that district courts have discretion to reject arguments that should have been made

13 See id.

14 R. Doc. No. 41, at 6.

15 Cf. R. Doc. No. 39, at 5-6 (“[T]he prescriptive period began to run at some point in

2022 . . . . Plaintiff’s . . . claims therefore . . . must be dismissed.”).

earlier in the case.”); see also Green, 2023 WL 3453937, at *2 (“[T]he district court

must exercise [its] broad discretion [under Rule 54(b)] sparingly to forestall the

perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting burdens and delays.”). Plaintiff

has provided no justification for the Court to grant reconsideration where he had

ample opportunity to bring the FCA claim and did not.16

Further, plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint to add the FCA

claim.17 And even if he had, plaintiff has alleged no facts to support his conclusory

allegation that defendants “submitted [claims] to local and state authorities that were

false in nature.”18 Slyce Acquisition Inc. v. Syte - Visual Conception Ltd., 422 F. Supp.

3d 1191, 1198 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (“Mere conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”) (internal quotations

omitted); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (“[Courts] are not bound

to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). The Court would

therefore not grant a request for leave to amend, because an FCA claim would be

futile. Pogo Res., LLC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 19-2682, 2021 WL

1923301, at *9 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2021) (“Leave to amend does not need to be granted

when the amended complaint would not defeat a motion to dismiss.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

16 See R. Doc. Nos. 1, 4, 24, 26.

17 See generally R. Doc. No. 41.

18 Id.

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, June 16, 2025.

shes M. AFRICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE