(SS) Adams v. Commissioner of Social Security

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 STARR A. ADAMS, No. 2:24-cv-01530-EFB (SS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 CAROLYN COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

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Defendant.

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18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

19 denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social

20 Security Act. ECF No. 1. Pending before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary

21 judgment. ECF Nos. 15 & 191. For the reasons provided below, plaintiff’s motion for summary

22 judgment is denied, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

23 I. Background

24 In December 2018, plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits under

25 Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning April 17, 2018. Administrative

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27 1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings in this action, including judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1). ECF No. 9.

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1 Record (AR) 23, 81-82.2 Plaintiff alleged disability due to major depression and generalized

2 anxiety. AR 81-82, 105. Plaintiff’s application was denied on June 25, 2019, AR 105-109, and

3 her request for reconsideration was denied on September 20, 2019. AR 112-117. She requested a

4 hearing, which was held by telephone on August 29, 2022. AR 37-68. On September 13, 2022,

5 the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. AR 20-36. Plaintiff sought review,

6 which was denied on August 21, 2023, AR 9-13, and, on May 30, 2024, she initiated the instant

7 action. ECF No. 1.

8 II. Legal Standard

9 A. The Disability Standard

10 To qualify for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must

11 show he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

12 determinable physical or mental impairment3 which can be expected to result in death or which

13 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

14 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential evaluation

15 process to be used in determining if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Batson v.

16 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). The five steps in the sequential

17 evaluation in assessing whether the claimant is disabled are:

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Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so,

19 the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

20 Step two: Is the claimant’s alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit his or

her ability to work? If so, proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not

21 disabled.

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Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment, or combination of impairments, meet

23 or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1? If so, the

claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

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Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

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2 Defendant lodged the administrative record on October 7, 2024. ECF No. 12.

3 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or

27 psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

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1 perform his or her past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not,

proceed to step five.

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3 Step five: Does the claimant’s RFC, when considered with the claimant’s age,

education, and work experience, allow him or her to adjust to other work that

4 exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

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6 Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). At each of these five

7 steps, “the ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

8 testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2020).

9 (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). In steps one through four, the

10 burden of proof is on the claimant. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148. A claimant establishes a prima facie

11 case of qualifying disability once he has carried the burden of proof from step one through step

12 four. Ibid.

13 Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s

14 RFC. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1194; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most [one] can still

15 do despite [his] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.”

16 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal

17 decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC

18 is not a medical opinion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for

19 determining RFC); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the

20 responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional

21 capacity.”).

22 At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show that there are a

23 significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given his RFC,

24 age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1194. If the

25 claimant can perform other work in the national economy, then the claimant may not be found to

26 be disabled. Ibid.

27 ////

28 ////

1 B. Standard of Review

2 Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision

3 of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In

4 determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the court reviews only those issues raised by

5 the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

6 The court must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial

7 evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 99 (2019). “Substantial evidence

8 is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept

9 as adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart (Thomas), 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir.

10 2002) (quoting Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995));

11 see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence

12 standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary

13 sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. Rather, “[s]ubstantial evidence means more

14 than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is an extremely deferential standard.” Thomas v.

15 CalPortland Co. (CalPortland), 993 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and

16 citations omitted); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if the

17 ALJ has erred, the Court may not reverse the ALJ’s decision where the error is harmless, Stout,

18 454 F.3d at 1055-56, and the burden of showing that an error is not harmless “normally falls upon

19 the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009).

20 In conducting its analysis, the “reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole

21 and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill v.

22 Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

23 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). The court may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which she did not rely;

24 rather, the court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in her decision. Orn v. Astrue,

25 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.

26 2003). Further, if the evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the

27 ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400

28 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)).

1 III. The ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

2 In his September 13, 2022 decision, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled and made the

3 following findings:

4 1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

5 through December 31, 2023.

6 2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 17,

7 2018, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

8 3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: depressive disorder; anxiety

9 disorder; obsessive compulsive personality disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

10 4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

11 meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR

12 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).

13 5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the

14 residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels

15 but with the following nonexertional limitations: Work with simple tasks. Only

16 occasional interaction with the public, in the work setting. Only occasional

17 interaction with coworkers and supervisors. No tandem tasks involved. Work with

18 end of the day production requirements and no other periodic or hourly quotas.

19 6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).

20 7. The claimant was born on August 30, 1977 and was 40 years old, which is

21 defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20

22 CFR 404.1563).

23 8. The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 404.1564).

24 9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

25 because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding

26 that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job

27 skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

28 10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

1 functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

2 economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569a).

3 11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

4 Act, from April 17, 2018, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).

5 AR 25-31.

6 Relative to the ALJ’s fifth finding, concerning the scope of plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ

7 explained the basis of his conclusions:

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In making this finding, I have considered all symptoms and the extent to

9 which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the

objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20

10 CFR 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p. I also considered the medical opinion(s) and prior

administrative medical finding(s) in accordance with the requirements of 20 CFR

11 404.1520c.

In considering the claimant’s symptoms, I must follow a two-step process

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in which it must first be determined whether there is an underlying medically

13 determinable physical or mental impairment(s)--i.e., an impairment(s) that can be

shown by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques--that

14 could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms.

Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could

15 reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms has

been shown, I must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the

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claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s

17 work-related activities. For this purpose, whenever statements about the intensity,

persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not

18 substantiated by objective medical evidence, I must consider other evidence in the

record to determine if the claimant’s symptoms limit the ability to do work-related

19 activities. The claimant also reported that she has trauma responses to stressful

situations affecting her ability to work.

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The claimant reported that she is unable to work because she is limited in

21 her time and needs to spend all of her time of basic activities of daily living. The

claimant reported that it takes her longer to do things than other people and she

22 believes it is related to a diagnosis of obsessive compulsive personality disorder

(OCPD). The claimant reported that she was treated in therapy for her OCPD as

23 well as PTSD. The claimant also reported that she was treated with Prozac which

helps to regulate her mood, nut made her lethargic. However, she stated that the

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medication did not affect her OCPD or her need to spend time on daily living

25 activities. The claimant reported that depression affects her ability to interact with

others. She estimated that she has 15 to 25 bad days per month. She stated that

26 unexpected things or plans cause her anxiety. The claimant reported that she

drives to the dentist, stores, and doctor. The claimant reported that she tries to go

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to places that do curbside shopping. The claimant reported that she cooks for

28 herself, attends to her personal care, cleans up after herself, does yoga and

1 meditation, exercises, and does laundry. The claimant reported that she enjoys

knitting, but does not have time to do so. The claimant stated that it generally

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takes her 7 hours to get out of the house. (Testimony).

3 After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the

4 alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with

5 the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in

this decision.

6

The claimant has a diagnoses of major depressive disorder, generalized

7 anxiety disorder, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. (Exhibit 2F/3).

The claimant engaged in mental health treatment following a major depressive

8 episode triggered by the death of her boyfriend. (Exhibit 2F/1). The claimant then

moved in with her mother and stepfather, and the transition was stressful, and

9 reportedly increased her depression. (Exhibit 2F/2). The claimant also reportedly

maintains rigid control of her external environment and becomes very anxious,

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agitated and irritated with whomever has disturbed her sense of order. (Exhibit

11 2F/2; 7F/5, 43). The claimant reported symptoms of restlessness, poor

concentration, fatigue, irritability, intrusive thoughts, and depressed mood.

12 (Exhibit 3F/2; 6F/36; 7f/5). She also reported compulsiveness, occasional panic,

and social anxiety. (Exhibit 6F/20). The claimant treated with Zoloft and noted

13 some fatigue and concentration issues while on the medication. (Exhibit 4F/19).

The record indicates that after a year of engaging in psychotherapy, the

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claimant had some progress, with a decrease in depressed affect and feelings of

15 grief. (Exhibit 2F/3). Improvement with anxiety issues was also noted. (Exhibit

2F/3). At times, the claimant exhibited low mood, tearfulness, or was irritable.

16 (Exhibit 6F/34; 7F/37). However, overall, the claimant generally presented as

cooperative, with appropriate dress and grooming, normal memory, intact

17 judgment, average intellect, normal attention and concentration, normal thought

process, normal speech, and good insight. (Exhibit 3F/5; 6F/21, 24, 26, 28, 31;

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7F/7, 19, 22, 24, 26, 41). In January 2020, the claimant denied obsessive

19 compulsive habits, depressed mood, excessive anxiety, and issues with memory

and concentration. (Exhibit 4F/23). Records indicate that the claimant

20 experienced good results with Zoloft. (Exhibit 4F/16, 19, 21; 5F/10; 6F/27;

7F/25). The claimant reported that episodes of irritability significantly decreased

21 when taking sertraline. (Exhibit 6F/20). March 2021 relate that the claimant

reported normal situational anxiety with which she is able to cope. (Exhibit

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6F/27). Records from November 20211 relate that the claimant was self-tapering

23 off of Zoloft. (Exhibit 7F/47). Despite discontinuing treatment with Zoloft, the

claimant reported that she was feeling stable. (Exhibit 7F/55, 60). Additionally,

24 on examination, the claimant was alert and oriented, cooperative, with normal

speech, good mood, goal-directed thought process, and no suicidal or homicidal

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ideation. (Exhibit 7F/55, 60).

26 The claimant has been limited to simple tasks in order to accommodate

limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information. The

27 claimant’s requirement to interact with others has also been limited due to

moderate limitations in the category of interacting with others. She is limited to

28 occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors and the general public. With

1 respect to concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, both pace and

persistence are addressed by requiring that work have no periodic or hourly

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quotas and no tandem tasks. Finally, the prohibition on production requirements

3 in combination with the limitations on interaction with others serves to create a

work environment that is lower in stress than that which would require fast-paced

4 work and greater interaction with others, and therefore accommodates limitations

in adapting and managing.

5 In addition to the above-referenced findings, the record shows that the

claimant retained ability which further undermine the claimant’s allegations of

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severity. The claimant is able to attend to her own personal care, drive a car,

7 exercise, do yoga, do laundry, prepare meals, shop in stores, manage finances.

(Exhibit 3E; 7F/19; Testimony). These retained abilities further support the

8 residual functional capacity and suggest the claimant could sustain work with

restrictions outlined in the above residual functional capacity.

9 Under the current rules for evaluating medical evidence in claims filed

after March 27, 2017, I did not provide articulation about evidence that is neither

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inherently valuable nor persuasive. This includes issues reserved to the

11 Commissioner, such as whether or not a claimant is disabled or able to work or

whether or not the claimant meets or equals a listing, and decisions by other

12 governmental or non-governmental entities (20 CFR 416.920b(c)(1) and (3)). (See

Exhibit 2F/3; 7F/28, 63). Nor did I provide articulation for statements that are not

13 provided by medical sources or that do not state what the claimant could do

despite her impairments. (20 CFR 416.913(a)(2)).

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As for the opinion evidence regarding the claimant’s mental functioning, I

15 have considered the psychiatric review technique set forth by R. Warren, M.D.

and Barney Greenspan, Ph.D. (Exhibit 1A; 3A). Dr. Warren and Dr. Greenspan

16 opined moderate limitations in the area of concentrate, persist, or maintain pace

and no limitations in the remaining paragraph B criteria. They further

17 opined that the claimant is capable performing semi-complex tasks. They

supported their opinions with evidence of progress in psychotherapy, decrease in

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depressed affect, and improvement in anxiety issues. (Exhibit 3A/4). I find that

19 the evidence available at the hearing level, showing cooperative behavior with

normal memory, intact judgment, average intellect, normal attention and

20 concentration, normal thought process, normal speech, and good insight. (Exhibit

6F/21, 24, 26, 28, 31; 7F/7, 19, 22, 24, 26, 41). Accordingly, I find these opinions

21 generally persuasive. However, based on the claimant’s complaints regarding

interaction as well as reported concentration issues, I have included additional

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social limitations to occasional contact with the public, co-workers and

23 supervisors as well as restrictions on production requirements.

I have considered the opinion provided by Jeff Rose, Ph.D. (Exhibit 1F).

24 Dr. Rose opined that the claimant has mostly unlimited to good ability to

understand, remember, and carry out instructions; interact with others; and

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respond appropriately to changes in a work setting. He opined fair ability to

26 complete a normal workday or workweek. Dr. Rose supported his opinion with a

mental status examination showing normal speech, cooperative behavior, intact

27 concentration, normal memory, above average intelligence, anxious/depressed

mood, intact judgment, and goal directed thought process. I find this opinion

28 mostly persuasive as it is consistent with the State Agency opinion at Exhibit 1A;

1 3A. However, as stated above, based on the claimant’s testimony and later

treatment records showing issues forming and maintaining social connections,

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reports of poor concentration and low motivation, I have found the claimant more

3 limited and included appropriate accommodations as outlined in the above

residual functional capacity. (Exhibit 7F/2, 10, 32).

4 In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by

the objective medical evidence and the record as a whole. Even though the record

5 indicates that the claimant did have some limitations due to her impairments, the

record also shows that the claimant’s impairments were not as limiting as she has

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alleged, and she maintained the ability to perform work related activities within

7 the residual functional capacity assigned.

AR 27-30.

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IV. Analysis

9

Plaintiff raises a single issue on review, asserting that the ALJ’s decision was not

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supported by substantial evidence because, in determining plaintiff’s residual functioning

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capacity, the ALJ erroneously discounted the medical opinions of Dr. Rose with evidence that

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post-dated his report, without developing the record by obtaining an additional psychological

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consultative examination that could have assessed the newer evidence. ECF No. 15 at 10-14

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(citing AR 29-30). In so doing, plaintiff argues, the ALJ improperly acted as a de facto medical

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expert, and this was not harmless. Ibid. Plaintiff requests the agency’s decision be vacated and

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the matter remanded. The court concludes plaintiff has not met her burden to demonstrate relief

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is merited.

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The record does not support plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ “implicitly rejected” the

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opinion of Dr. Rose. See ECF No. 15 at 11. Rather, the record indicates that the ALJ considered

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Dr. Rose’s opinion and gave it weight, while also endeavoring to reconcile it with the additional

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information supplied by plaintiff’s testimony and later treatment records. AR 29-30. This was

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not error, but rather reflected the ALJ undertaking the very analysis the regulations require of

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him. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1520c(a), 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1545(a), 404.1546(c);

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416.945(a); see Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ALJ is the

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final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence.”); Lingenfelter v.

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Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (“When evaluating the medical opinions of treating

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and examining physicians, the ALJ has discretion to weigh the value of each of the various

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1 reports, to resolve conflicts in the reports, and to determine which reports to credit and which to

2 reject.”); Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (where “the record contains

3 conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ is charged with determining credibility and resolving the

4 conflict”); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding

5 that ALJ was “responsible for resolving conflicts” and “internal inconsistencies” within doctor’s

6 reports); see generally Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the

7 ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”).

8 Plaintiff has also not shown that the language of the ALJ’s decision indicates that the ALJ

9 should have initiated additional fact-finding prior to rendering a decision. To be sure, in a social

10 security case the ALJ “has an independent ‘duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to

11 assure that the claimant’s interests are considered.’” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150

12 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288, and Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th

13 Cir.1983)). This duty is heightened where, as here, the claimant was unrepresented. Tonapetyan,

14 242 F.3d at 1150; Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978). Ambiguous evidence, or

15 the ALJ’s own finding that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the

16 evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty to “conduct an appropriate inquiry,” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288,

17 which may be discharged in several ways, including subpoenaing the claimant’s physicians,

18 submitting questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record

19 open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150;

20 Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998); Armstrong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

21 160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir.1998); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288.

22 Here, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Rose’s report indicates ambiguity in

23 the factual record that triggered the duty for additional fact-finding, insofar as the ALJ reported

24 that Dr. Rose’s report did not fully accord with reports of plaintiff’s functioning described in later

25 treatment records, nor with plaintiff’s own testimony. ECF No. 15 at 13. Plaintiff likens the

26 ALJ’s analysis to cases where the ALJ has erroneously endeavored to interpret raw clinical data

27 rather than develop the record with the opinion of a medical professional who has assessed the

28 raw data. ECF No. 15 at 10-11. For example, in Rivera v. Berryhill, No. ED CV 16-791-SP,

1 2017 WL 5054656, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2017), the court held the ALJ erred in his RFC

2 determination because it was based on no opinions from any medical professional who had

3 assessed the claimant or reviewed his records, but rather was based solely on the ALJ’s own

4 interpretation of the claimant’s MRIs and medical treatment notes. For this reason, the record

5 before the ALJ “did not provide sufficient indications of plaintiff’s functional limitations[,] [a]nd

6 the few findings that could translate to function limitations were ambiguous,” such that the RFC

7 was not based on substantial evidence. Id. at *5.

8 The record does not support plaintiff’s interpretation that the ALJ similarly supplanted

9 medical opinions with his own or that he failed to resolve an ambiguity that arose that was critical

10 to his RFC determination. The ALJ did not disregard Dr. Rose’s opinions and instead “acted as

11 his own medical expert,” see Miller v. Astrue, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2010), by

12 considering the raw data and notes contained in Dr. Rose’s records. Rather, the ALJ

13 appropriately and properly considered and gave weight to Dr. Rose’s medical opinion, while also

14 considering the basis of his opinion when deciding how much weight to give it. See AR 29-30.

15 This not only was proper, but was required of the ALJ in synthesizing the medical evidence

16 before him. See, e.g., Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041-42; Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1042; Benton,

17 331 F.3d at 1040. The fact that the ALJ observed that more recent evidence indicated plaintiff

18 suffered from greater limitations than even Dr. Rose had found, see AR 29-30, did not alone

19 create an ambiguity requiring further factual development. There was no ambiguity intrinsic to

20 Dr. Rose’s opinion. See, e.g., Padilla v. Astrue, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2008)

21 (finding ambiguity requiring further evidentiary development where one doctor’s clinical opinion

22 appeared to contradict his own clinical findings). That additional evidence was generated after

23 Dr. Rose’s report does not, in itself, create an ambiguity in the record triggering the ALJ’s duty to

24 develop the record further. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); see,

25 e.g., Stivers v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-01110-BAM, 2021 WL 1193794, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30,

26 2021); Lamas v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-00852-BAM, 2020 WL 6561306, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9,

27 2020); Charney v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1152961, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014), aff'd, 647 F.

28 App’x 762 (9th Cir. 2016). Simply, the ALJ’s approach was entirely consistent with his

1 obligation to consider “all the relevant evidence” when determining plaintiff’s RFC. See 20

2 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

3 Finally, plaintiff fails to show that any error by the ALJ harmed her. See Shinseki, 556

4 U.S. at 409; Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055-56. In the portion of the ALJ’s findings at issue, the ALJ

5 largely credited Dr. Rose’s clinical opinion, only deviating from Dr. Rose by finding plaintiff

6 “more limited” in her functioning than Dr. Rose had found. AR 30. As such, it is unclear how

7 the ALJ’s error, if any, was not harmless to the RFC determination nor, more generally, to the

8 ALJ’s decision that plaintiff was not disabled. See Gonzalez v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-01676-

9 SKO, 2023 WL 6164086, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2023) (“plaintiff can hardly fault the ALJ for

10 giving him the benefit of the doubt and assessing an RFC that is more favorable to plaintiff than

11 most of the medical opinions in the record”); Mills v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-CV-0899-

12 KJN, 2014 WL 4195012, at *4 n.8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2014) (same). Plaintiff makes no

13 argument to explain how, had the ALJ hewn strictly to only those limitations identified by Dr.

14 Rose or had he ordered further evidentiary development, the ALJ’s determinations would have

15 been different and more favorable to plaintiff. See Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409; Stout, 454 F.3d at

16 1055-56; see generally Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009).

17 On this additional ground, therefore, plaintiff fails to show that the ALJ’s decision should be

18 vacated and the matter remanded.

19 In sum, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence at each of the five steps

20 of its required analysis. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1052; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff has not shown that

21 the ALJ erred in determining her RFC by failing to give due weight to the opinions of Dr. Rose or

22 failing to require further evidentiary development relative to his opinions. The totality of the

23 ALJ’s determination of plaintiff’s RFC indicates that he aptly considered all medical evidence

24 before him and properly relied on objective medical data, synthesizing and weighing it in light of

25 the entire record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir.

26 2012). As such, plaintiff has provided no basis to reverse the agency’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. §

27 405(g).

28 ////

1 V. Conclusion

2 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

3 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) is denied;

4 2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is granted;

5 3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for defendant and close this case.

° fo

7 | Dated: June 13, 2025 biti MDMA

EDMUND F. BRENNAN

8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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