JONES v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHIHEAN JONES, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-1650

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

SÁNCHEZ, J. JUNE 12, 2025

Plaintiff Chihean Jones, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Federal Detention Center

in Philadelphia, brings this civil action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971),1 alleging various constitutional claims

and a statutory claim arising from his ongoing criminal prosecution for federal crimes. (See ECF

No. 1 (“Compl.”)). Jones also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following

reasons, the Court will grant Jones’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and dismiss his

Complaint with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

1 “[A]ctions brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials have become

known as ‘Bivens actions.’” Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2017).

2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the Complaint

(ECF No. 1). The Court adopts the sequential pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing

system to the entire submission. Punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors in the Complaint

will be cleaned up where appropriate. The Court may consider matters of public record when

conducting a screening under § 1915. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260

(3d Cir. 2006)).

Jones alleges that his civil rights were violated in several ways by his ongoing criminal

prosecution for federal crimes.3 First, he asserts that the Defendants “conspired against [him] in

order to bring about charges they knew or likely knew to be false. They were able to do this by

utilizing the secrecy of the grand jury process, claiming the charges fell under the process by

default.” (Compl. at 1.) Next, he alleges that Defendants violated his Sixth Amendment rights

and the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (28 U.S.C. § 1861, et seq.) in various ways,

including by “cover[ing] up the . . . systematic exclusion of the disproportionate number of

students, blacks, and people with Spanish and Chinos [sic] surnames from the master list from

which [Jones’s] grand jury would be selected”; summoning a grand jury with fewer than 16

members; failing to bring Jones out of custody for selection of the grand jury; not permitting

Jones to inspect and copy the master jury list; and “attempting to persuade and manipulate the

judge into disregarding a pro se filing under the pretenses of plagiarism.”4 (Id. at 1-2.)

He also asserts that “[t]he indictment itself is invalid due to the fact that it does not have

the proper signatures, nor is the signature that was signed by the person acting as the U.S.

Attorney even legible.” (Id. at 2.) Jones “believes that there was no grand jury because the ‘true

bill’ wasn’t signed by the clerk on the return of the indictment, in accordance with the rule

governing grand jury proceedings.” (Id.) Jones seeks $12 million in punitive damages and a

trial by jury. (Id. at 1.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

3 Jones was charged in a second superseding indictment with: (1) robbery which

interferes with interstate commerce; (2) use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence;

and (3) murder in the course of using and carrying a firearm. See USA v. Brown, et al., No. 23-

215 (E.D. Pa.) (ECF No. 94).

4 Jones does not provide any further context for this cryptic allegation.

The Court grants Jones leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether

a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher

v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether

the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v.

Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will

accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, contains facts

sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021)

abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir.

2024)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Jones is proceeding

pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir.

2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against the United States and its Agencies

The Court understands Jones to raise constitutional claims arising from his criminal

prosecution, primarily based on alleged irregularities in the grand jury and indictment process.

(See generally Compl.) As an initial matter, Jones’s claims against Defendant United States of

America fail because suits against the federal government are “barred by sovereign immunity,

absent an explicit waiver.” Lewal v. Ali, 289 F. App’x 515, 516 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see

also F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields

the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”). Since Congress has not waived sovereign

immunity for the asserted claims against the United States, Jones’s claims against the United

States are barred by sovereign immunity.

Jones’s claims against the United States Department of Justice are likewise barred

because federal agencies are not subject to suit under Bivens. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486-87

(refusing to extend Bivens claim to federal agency defendant); see also Keys v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just., 285 F. App’x 841, 842 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of claims against DOJ under

Meyer); Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1998) (federal governmental entities

are not “persons” subject to suit in a federal civil rights matter). Accordingly, Jones’s claims

against the United States and DOJ are dismissed with prejudice.

B. Claims Against Federal Prosecutor(s)

Jones also states he is “suing the Government’s Attorney” which the Court understands to

be a reference to the Assistant United States Attorney(s) prosecuting his criminal case. (Compl.

at 1.) Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for acts that are “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and

. . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976).5 Absolute

immunity extends to the decision to initiate a prosecution, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, including

“soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause

hearings,” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state’s case at

trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, and appearing before a judge to present evidence, Fogle v. Sokol,

5 Although Imbler was a suit against a state prosecutor filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that public policy mandates a

similar immunity be extended to federal prosecutors in Bivens actions. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535

F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976).

957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020). Absolute immunity can extend to “the duties of the prosecutor

. . . involv[ing] actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the

courtroom.” Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 994 n.6 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S.

at 431 n.33). This means prosecutors have absolute immunity from suits challenging their

preliminary “strategic decisions,” including their decision to prosecute a case. Harris v.

Krasner, No. 23-2068, 2024 WL 2861848, at *2 (3d Cir. June 6, 2024), publication ordered, No.

23-2068, 2024 WL 3493020 (3d Cir. July 22, 2024). To the extent discernible, Jones’s claims

against the unnamed prosecutor(s) in his case arise from the handling of grand jury proceedings

including failing to bring Jones out of custody to participate, the decision to charge him with

federal crimes, and allegedly “manipulat[ing]” the presiding judge to rule against Jones on an

unspecified motion. (Compl. at 1-2.) These are all acts that are “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process” to which prosecutorial immunity applies. See Imbler, 424

U.S. at 430-31. Accordingly, Jones’s claims against the unnamed “Government Attorney” are

barred by prosecutorial immunity.

C. Claims Against Unnamed Federal Agents

Jones lists as Defendants in the caption of his Complaint “Unknown Named defendants”

and brings his “lawsuit against 12 unnamed federal agents.” (Compl. at 1.) While naming Doe

defendants at the pleading stage is permissible, see Blakeslee v. Clinton Cnty., 336 F. App’x 248,

250 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Use of John Doe defendants is permissible in certain situations until

reasonable discovery permits the true defendants to be identified.”), Jones does not describe

these individuals in any meaningful way in the body of his Complaint, nor assert any allegations

as to how each of these unidentified individuals were involved in the violation of his civil rights.

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also

Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each Government official,

his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”) (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 677) (emphasis in original); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676

(explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution”). Because Jones does not allege any facts to support his claims against

the 12 unnamed federal agents those claims are not plausible and will be dismissed.6 See

Concepcion v. Russell, No. 21-0274, 2021 WL 826301, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2021) (dismissing

claims against Doe defendants where the “allegations against these additional John or Jane Doe

Defendants are vague and generalized, and thus insufficiently specific to state a claim against

them.”).

D. Jury Selection and Service Act Claims

6 At most, Jones refers to “Defendants” as a group, failing to distinguish between the 12

Doe defendants, identify which individuals or entities were involved in each violation of his

rights, or specify what each of them did and when. (See e.g., Compl. at 1-2.) As noted above,

the Complaint must contain sufficient facts for the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that

[every named] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

Lawal v. McDonald, 546 F. App’ x 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2014) (agreeing with the district court that

the repeated and collective use of the word “Defendants” “fail[ed] to name which specific

Defendant engaged in the specific conduct alleged’”). Further, if these Defendants are

prosecutors participating in the prosecution of the federal charges against Jones, they will be

subject to immunity as noted above.

Jones asserts that unspecified Defendants violated the Jury Selection and Service Act

(“JSSA” or “the Act”) by, inter alia, excluding minorities and students from the grand jury

master list, summoning a grand jury with fewer than 16 members, failing to bring Jones out of

custody for selection of the grand jury, and preventing Jones from reviewing the grand jury

master list. (Compl. at 1-2.) The JSSA “governs the selection of grand and petit juries in federal

court, and ‘seeks to ensure that potential grand and petit jurors are selected at random from a

representative cross section of the community and that all qualified citizens have the opportunity

to be considered for service.’” United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218, 220 (3d Cir. 1991),

(quoting United States v. Bearden, 659 F.2d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1861),

cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936 (1982)). The JSSA prohibits discrimination “on account of race,

color, religion, sex, national, origin, or economic status.” 28 U.S.C. § 1862. To achieve these

goals, the JSSA provides that each United States District Court shall create a jury selection plan

that complies with the Act’s requirements. Calabrese, 942 F.2d at 220. “Challenges to

compliance with the Act’s selection procedures must be raised before voir dire begins, or within

seven days after the party raising the challenge discovers, or could have discovered, the grounds

for the challenge.” Id. at 221 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1867). Notably, nothing in the Act suggests

that it provides a separate basis for a cause of action for damages.

On February 7, 2025 Jones filed a motion in his criminal raising the same grounds

asserted in his Complaint, challenging the grand jury process under the JSSA. (See United States

v. Jones, 23-215-03 (ECF No. 266)). On May 5, 2025, the judge in Jones’s criminal case denied

the motion, thoroughly rejecting his arguments in a lengthy footnote, as follows:

Defendant moves to quash the indictment for several reasons. First, he believes

he had a right to be present at the selection of the grand jury. (See ECF No. 266.)

Second, he believes he has a right to challenge the grand jury and believes he was

not given the opportunity to do so. (Id.) Third, Defendant believes that the

indictment does not contain proper signatures. (Id.) Fourth, Defendant believes

that the grand jury was not selected in accordance with the proper policies and

procedures. (Id.) . . . Addressing the Defendant’s first point, “[w]hile the grand

jury is in session, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 provides that the only

people who may be present are ‘attorneys for the government, the witness being

questioned, interpreters when needed, and a court reporter or an operator of a

recording device.’” United States v. Bailey, 2024 WL 4656206, at *6 (E.D. Pa.

Oct. 31, 2024) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 6). Notably, this list does not include the

defendant. Id. Furthermore, Defendant’s reliance on Test is misplaced as it does

not make any mention of a defendant’s presence at grand jury proceedings. Test

v. United States, 420 U.S. 28 (1975). In conclusion, the Defendant did not have a

right to be present during the Grand Jury proceedings and any Motion based upon

that alleged right is denied. In addressing Defendant’s second point, it is true that

a defendant “may challenge the grand jury on the ground that it was not lawfully

drawn, summoned, or selected.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(b)(1). The Defendant bears

the burden of demonstrating that an abuse has occurred, as a “presumption of

regularity attaches to a grand jury’s proceedings. . . .” United States v. Woods, 544

F.2d 242, 250 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977); See also United

States v. Kelley, 2013 WL 12436245, at * 2 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2013) (“With

respect to the grand jury, ‘the law presumes, absent a strong showing to the

contrary, that a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority.’”)

(citing United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1991)). To

challenge the composition of a grand jury, a party must provide a sworn statement

of facts which, if true, would constitute a substantial failure to comply with the

provisions of the Jury Selection and Service Act (“JSSA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d).

Failing to provide such an affidavit or sworn testimony is fatal to a defendant’s

challenge. See e.g. United States v. Jones, 480 F.2d 1135, 1139 (2d. Cir. 1973).

Defendant has not provided any sworn testimony or statement of facts which

would meet defendant’s burden of showing that an abuse has occurred. This is

also fatal to Defendant’s Fourth point, that the grand jury was not selected in

accordance with the proper policies and procedures. Defendant has not provided

any evidence or sworn testimony that the policies and procedures of the selection

of the Grand Jury were not followed. Furthermore, the Court finds no evidence on

the record that Defendant has been prevented from challenging the grand jury

proceedings. The Court has allowed the Defendant to challenge the grand jury

proceedings, which he has done. The Court, through this Order, on the record,

and in previous orders has evaluated these challenges. To the extent that

Defendant believes his right to challenge the grand jury proceedings has been

abridged due to him not being present, there is no legal grounds for such a

challenge. Defendant also claims that the proper signatures were not affixed to

the Second Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 94). “[I]ndictments are to be

signed by both the foreperson of the grand jury and by an attorney for the

government.” United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 360 (3d Cir. 2006)

(citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c), 7(c)(1)). The Court, reviewing the Second

Superseding Indictment, finds that the signature of the foreman and the U.S.

Attorney and/or her delegate is properly present, satisfying the Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Furthermore, while there is no signature above the line titled “Clerk”,

the Court finds that the lack of this signature, to the extent a signature is even

required, is a mere technical irregularity that is not necessarily fatal to the

indictment, similar to if a foreman didn’t sign an indictment. Hobby v. United

States, 468 U.S. 339, 345 (1984). . . . For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s

Motions to Quash (ECF Nos. 266, 279) are denied.

Id. (ECF No. 319 at 1-2, n. 1). For the same reasons articulated by Judge Hodge in Jones’s

criminal case, Jones fails to state a claim under the JSSA here, assuming he could bring any such

claim in the first place. Accordingly, his claims asserting failure to comply with the jury

selection provisions of the JSSA fail.

E. No Bivens Remedy is Available for Jones’s Constitutional Claims

Even assuming Jones had named an eligible Defendant, his case must be dismissed

because, for reasons discussed below, his constitutional claims are not cognizable under Bivens.

Bivens provides a judicially recognized damages remedy for constitutional violations committed

by federal actors in highly limited circumstances. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 486 (2022);

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130-31 (2017). Since Bivens was decided in 1971, the Supreme

Court “has repeatedly refused to extend Bivens actions beyond the specific clauses of the specific

amendments [of the Constitution] for which a cause of action has already been implied, or even

to other classes of defendants facing liability under those same clauses.” Vanderklok, 868 F.3d

at 200; see Egbert, 596 U.S. at 501. The Supreme Court has recognized an implied private

action against federal officials in only three cases: (1) Bivens itself, which recognized an implied

cause of action for violation of the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable searches and

seizures; (2) Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), which recognized a claim for gender

discrimination in the employment context under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; and

(3) Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), which recognized a claim against prison officials for

inadequate medical care in the prison context under the Eighth Amendment. See Dongarra v.

Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2022); see also Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 131 (“These three cases -

Bivens, Davis, and Carlson - represent the only instances in which the [Supreme] Court has

approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.”). “To preserve the

separation of powers, the Court has ‘consistently rebuffed’ efforts to extend Bivens further . . .

[because] [t]he Constitution entrusts Congress, not the courts, with the power to create new

federal causes of action and remedies.” Dongarra, 27 F.4th at 180 (citing Hernandez v. Mesa,

589 U.S. 93, 101 (2020)); see also Xi v. Haugen, 68 F.4th 824, 832 (3d Cir. 2023) (“In the fifty-

two years since Bivens was decided, . . . the Supreme Court has pulled back the reins to what

appears to be a full stop and no farther.”).

“Reflecting these concerns, the Supreme Court has set forth a two-step inquiry to

determine the availability of Bivens remedies in a particular case.” Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th

311, 326 (3d Cir. 2024). “First, [courts] ask whether the ‘case presents a new Bivens context’—

i.e., whether the ‘case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by’

the Supreme Court”—using only Bivens, Davis, and Carlson as a benchmark as well as a

“broad” understanding of what constitutes a new context. Id. (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 139).

The non-exclusive list of factors to consider here includes:

the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or

specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an

officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the

statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of

disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the

presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.

Id. (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 139-40). “Whether a context is new is an ‘easily satisfied’ test

because ‘a modest extension of the Bivens action is still an extension[,]’” meaning “[e]ven

‘significant parallels to one of the Supreme Court’s previous Bivens cases’ may not be enough.”

Henry v. Essex Cnty., 113 F.4th 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up) (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S.

at 147-49); Fisher, 115 F.4th at 206 (“[A] case can differ meaningfully from Bivens, Davis, and

Carlson even when it involves the same constitutional right as one of those cases.”).

If the context is new, courts proceed to the second step of the inquiry, which “ask[s]

whether there are ‘special factors counselling hesitation’ in extending Bivens” with a focus “‘on

whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and

weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Kalu, 113 F.4th at 326

(quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136); see also Fisher, 115 F.4th at 205 (“Egbert now requires us to

ask whether ‘the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress’ to weigh the costs

and benefits of a damages action.” (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492)). Special attention is given

to the existence of an alternative remedial structure and separation-of-powers concerns. Kalu,

113 F.4th at 326. If there is any reason to think Congress might be better situated to weigh the

costs and benefits of a damages action, courts may not do so. Id. at *5. That uncertainty alone

forecloses Bivens relief. Id. at *4. “To sum up, . . . : unless a case is indistinguishable from

Bivens, Davis, or Carlson, a damages remedy may be created by Congress, but not by the

courts.” Id. at *5.

1. Sixth Amendment right to fair trial

The Court understands Jones to allege a Sixth Amendment right to fair trial claim based

on the same grounds asserted under the JSSA, i.e. various alleged irregularities in the grand jury

and indictment process. (Compl. at 1-2.) However, a Sixth Amendment right to fair trial claim

“is not a plausible extension of Bivens liability.” Gedeon v. Att’y Gen., No. 22-3595, 2022 WL

7570749, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2022). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has held that a Sixth Amendment claim for denial of the right to a fair trial does not fall

within any of the existing contexts for which the Supreme Court has implied a Bivens remedy.

See Sharratt v. Murtha, 437 F. App'x 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We doubt that a purported

violation of Sixth Amendment rights could be remedied under Bivens.”). Other appellate courts

have likewise held that this is not a proper extension of Bivens. See, e.g., Montgomery v.

Ferentino, No. 20-3114, 2021 WL 3204843, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2021) (“Montgomery has

not provided this court with any authority supporting an extension of the Bivens remedy here,

and other courts have expressed doubt over whether an alleged violation of the Sixth

Amendment is cognizable under Bivens.”). For the reasons set forth above, Jones’s Sixth

Amendment claim is not cognizable under Bivens and will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claims

The Court understands Jones to also assert claims under the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment regarding the grand jury process. 7 In determining whether a Bivens remedy is

available for Jones’s claims, the Court looks first to whether the Supreme Court has previously

recognized such a cause of action under Bivens. While the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens

cause of action under the Fifth Amendment due process clause in Davis, the Court finds few

parallels between that case and Jones’s claims in the instant suit.

7 While Jones references the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, (see

Compl. at 1), a “‘passing reference’ to jurisprudential precepts without more does not bring that

issue before the Court in that it provides no basis for a ruling one way or the other.” Campbell v.

LVNV Finding, LLC and Resurgent Capital Servs., No. 21-5388, 2022 WL 6172286, at *7 (E.D.

Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (citing Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy

Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)). Here, Jones does not assert facts that plausibly allege

claims under anything but the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In any event, it is worth noting that

courts have been reluctant to imply a Bivens remedy for Fourth Amendment (and other)

challenges to a federal prosecution. Xi, 68 F.4th at 834 (rejecting the existence of a Bivens

remedy where “evaluating Xi’s claims would invite a wide-ranging inquiry into the agent’s state

of mind and the evidence available to investigators, prosecutors, and the grand jury” (internal

quotations omitted)); see also Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996 F.3d 120, 137 (4th Cir. 2021)

(“Also counseling hesitation is the risk that a Bivens action for these Fourth Amendment claims

would require courts to interfere in the executive branch’s investigative and prosecutorial

functions.”).

In Davis, a former congressional staffer sued her former employer, Louisiana

Congressman Otto E. Passman, for gender discrimination under the Fifth Amendment. After

firing her as his deputy administrative assistant, Passman stated that, “although [Davis] was

‘able, energetic and a very hard worker,’ he had concluded ‘that it was essential that the

understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man.’” Davis, 442 U.S. at 230. Noting its

“numerous decisions” holding that “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the

Federal Government to deny equal protection of the laws” the Supreme Court held that Davis’s

Fifth Amendment gender discrimination claim was cognizable under Bivens. Id. at 248-49.

Other than asserting a claim under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Jones’s suit

bears little similarity to Davis. Perhaps the prominent distinction is that Jones’s claim arises in

the context of a criminal prosecution, rather than the employment discrimination context of

Davis. It involves both a new category of litigant, i.e. a federal inmate, and new category of

defendants, i.e. federal prosecutors. Indeed, one prominent policy concern presented by Jones’s

claims—the risk of judicial interference with the law enforcement functions of the executive

branch—were not remotely considered by the Supreme Court in Davis. See generally Davis, 442

U.S. 228. This alone is sufficient to establish that Jones’s due process claims represent a “new

context” under Bivens, requiring a special factors analysis.

Turning to that analysis, the Court finds that multiple factors counsel against recognizing

a new Fifth Amendment cause of action under Bivens. Doing so would potentially subject

federal prosecutors to a flood of Fifth Amendment damages claims from criminal defendants,

forcing them to engage in collateral—potentially duplicative—litigation while attempting to

enforce the nation’s criminal laws. It would also burden the federal courts with potentially a

parallel civil case for every criminal prosecution, a prospect that could overwhelm the judicial

branch. Moreover, Jones already has a venue in which to raise concerns about jury selection, the

grand jury process, and misconduct by prosecutors: his pending criminal case. He can, and has

filed motions challenging various aspects of the criminal process (indeed the very same alleged

violations asserted here), and file an appeal if he believes the district court has erred.8 Given the

important separation of powers concerns and potential burden on federal resources at stake, it

would be unwise for this Court to recognize a cause of action where Congress has declined to do

so. Accordingly, the Court finds that Jones cannot assert a Fifth Amendment due process claim

under Bivens and will dismiss these claims with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court will dismiss Jones’s Complaint for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court concludes that amendment would be

futile because Jones cannot cure the noted deficiencies in his Complaint.9 Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that leave to amend claims dismissed

on screening should generally be granted “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”)

An appropriate Order follows, dismissing the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).

8 While Jones may not, as he does in this civil suit, seek damages in the context of his

criminal case, he may nevertheless obtain other forms of relief. Xi, 68 F.4th at 837 (explaining

that “Egbert instructs that an alternative remedy need not provide complete relief or be as

effective as an individual damages remedy to foreclose Bivens relief” (internal quotations

omitted)).

9 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court has also considered the assorted “amendments”

and “attachments” filed by Jones in the course of this case and has concluded that none of them

suggest any plausible basis for a proper legal claim. (See ECF Nos. 4, 7, 8.)

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Juan R. Sánchez

JUAN R. SÁNCHEZ, J.