federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
How later courts described this case
- federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances.”
- court not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”
- district court may take judicial notice of public state records
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DEANDRE D. WALTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00585 SEP
)
JUDGE PAULA BRYANT, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff DeAndre D. Walton’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Doc. [2]. Having reviewed the motion, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee
of $1.00, and will dismiss this action without prejudice.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis
is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. District courts “shall assess and, when funds
exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee”
of 20% of the greater of the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account and the average
monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make
monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to his account. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward the monthly payments to
the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully
paid. Id.
Plaintiff has not submitted a prison account statement. The Court will therefore require
Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484
(8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison
account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever
information the court has about the prisoner’s finances.”). If Plaintiff is unable to pay the initial
partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his prison account statement in support of his claim.
LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal
conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.
Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept
as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court
should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints must
“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d
1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have
formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be
“interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” See McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff DeAndre Walton, an inmate at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and
Correctional Center (ERDCC) in Bonne Terre, Missouri, filed the instant action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff brings this action against St. Louis Circuit Court Judge Paula Bryant.
Review of public records on Missouri Case.net shows that in March of 2022, Plaintiff was
charged with two counts of First-Degree Murder, two counts of Armed Criminal Action, and one
count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the matter of State v. Walton, No. 2222-CR00369
(22nd Jud. Cir. 2022). He has since been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.1
In the instant action, Plaintiff alleges that Circuit Court Judge Paula Bryant, who
presided over his criminal action, denied his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by: (1) failing to provide him a preliminary hearing in a timely manner; (2) denying him
bail; (3) failing to allow him to present evidence of police misconduct at a suppression hearing;
(4) making him take on stand-by counsel when he wanted to represent himself pro se; (5) failing
to provide him grand jury transcripts and/or failing to quash the indictment; (6) failing to recuse
herself; and (7) failing to find that Plaintiff’s counsel was ineffective.
Plaintiff seeks five million dollars in compensatory damages.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was designed to provide a
“broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,”
and (2) “that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff alleges wrongdoing by a Circuit Court Judge in the performance of her judicial
duties. Judges are absolutely immune from civil lawsuits based on judicial misconduct, subject
to two exceptions: (1) when a judge does not act within her judicial capacity or (2) when a judge
takes judicial action in the absence of jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991).
Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that Judge Bryant acted outside her judicial capacity or
without jurisdiction. All of Judge Bryant’s allegedly unlawful actions were judicial in nature.
And Judge Bryant, acting as a judge in the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court, took judicial action
pursuant to the jurisdiction granted to that court by the Missouri Constitution. See Mo. Const. art
V, § 14. Judicial immunity applies “even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
1This Court takes judicial notice of the Missouri State Court record before it, as obtained through the public
records published on Missouri Case.net. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 2007) (district court may
take judicial notice of public state records).
corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Because Judge Bryant acted within her
judicial capacity and within her court’s jurisdiction, she is immune from Plaintiff’s claims.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
No leave to amend will be granted. Plaintiffs claims are clear, and the Court can
envision no amendment to the Complaint that would cause it to state a valid claim for relief.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion seeking leave to commence this
action without prepaying fees or costs, Doc. [2], is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 30 days of the date of this order, Plaintiff
must pay an initial filing fee of $1.00. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to
“Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) this case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an
original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A
separate Order of Dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this Order of Dismissal would not be
taken in good faith.
Dated this 12th day of June, 2025.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE