Pdt Holdings, Inc., and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc. D/B/A Phillip Thompson Custom Homes v. City of Dallas and the Board of Adjustment of the City of Dallas

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 23-0842

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PDT Holdings, Inc., and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc. d/b/a

Phillip Thompson Custom Homes,

Petitioners,

v.

City of Dallas and the Board of Adjustment of the City of Dallas,

Respondents

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On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas

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Argued January 15, 2025

JUSTICE BUSBY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mistaken actions by city officials generally will not equitably

estop the city from performing its governmental functions. But we have

long recognized that estoppel may be necessary to prevent manifest

injustice in exceptional cases where a citizen relies on affirmatively

misleading government statements and suffers substantial loss as a

result. We agree with the trial court that this is such an exceptional

case.

Following a bench trial, the court rendered judgment estopping

the City of Dallas from enforcing its residential-proximity-slope

ordinance against a builder’s completed over-height residential duplex.

The court of appeals reversed, concluding this was not an exceptional

case because the City simply erred in issuing a building permit for a

noncompliant structure.

We agree that a mere mistake in issuing a permit is not sufficient

for estoppel, but that is not what happened here. Instead, city officials

affirmatively told the builder that 36 feet was the applicable height

limit, issued an amended permit for that height after inspecting the

construction, and stated that the duplex was “OK TO FINISH” even

after they identified the ordinance violation. Accordingly, we hold that

legally sufficient evidence supports the disputed elements of estoppel,

and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding estoppel is

necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

BACKGROUND

PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc.

(collectively, “the Builder”) develop property and construct residential

homes and other structures across the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex.

One of the Builder’s projects was to build a duplex townhome at

5230 Alcott Street in Dallas—an irregularly-shaped, 6000-square-foot

residential lot with an existing single-family structure destined for

demolition. To the north of the lot is a retail-use development; to its

east, south, and west are other residential properties with existing

structures.

2

Before preparing its construction plan, the Builder and its various

agents met with city officials several times to verify any applicable

restrictions, and the Builder’s agent also conducted his own internet

searches for restrictions. In response, city officials identified only a 36-

foot maximum-building-height limit, and the Builder’s internet searches

revealed no other height-related restrictions.

With this information in mind, the Builder prepared and

submitted a detailed construction plan to the City’s planning and zoning

department, seeking a permit to construct a three-story duplex with an

overall height of around 36 feet. The City approved the Builder’s plan

and issued a permit shortly thereafter, authorizing the construction of

the duplex exactly as shown on the plan. Construction began in October

2017, and the Builder signed a contract to sell a unit in the duplex one

month later.

In January 2018, with construction in progress, the City sent an

inspector to assess the structure’s compliance with the City’s

Development Code. The inspector measured the structure’s height and

determined that the top of the parapet wall1 on the roof slightly exceeded

the 36-foot maximum-height limit. The City issued a stop-work order,

1 Visually, a parapet wall is a vertical barrier atop and along the edge

of a structure’s roof. “The earliest known representation of a parapet wall

comes from Mesopotamia,” where its main use was as cover from bows, arrows,

and other missiles during battle. M. S. Mate, Parapet Crestings in

Architectural Ornamentation, 19 BULL. DECCAN COLL. POST-GRADUATE &

RSCH. INST. 280, 280-81 (1959). Today, a parapet wall is used, among other

things, to conceal equipment on a structure’s rooftop, prevent falls, or reduce

wind loads. Rose Peterson, Parapet Roof Design (Explained), BETTER THAT

HOME (Apr. 20, 2025), https://betterthathome.com/parapet-roof-design/.

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citing the parapet wall’s height and halting construction until the

Builder amended its construction plan.

Although the Builder disagreed with the City’s citation, it

nevertheless amended its existing plan, incurring reconstruction and

compliance costs of about $7,500. The amended plan changed only the

parapet height; everything else, including the structure’s overall height

of 36 feet, remained the same. The City promptly approved the

amended plan, issued another permit, and lifted its stop-work order. In

turn, the Builder quickly resumed construction.

Six months into construction and with the duplex 90 percent

complete, the City issued another stop-work order in April 2018. As

before, the City’s citation concerned the structure’s overall 36-foot

height. But this time, the structure’s noncompliance was measured

against a height restriction that city officials did not originally mention

and the Builder’s searches did not reveal: the residential-proximity-

slope (RPS) ordinance. See DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 51A-4.412. This

ordinance restricts a structure’s maximum height based on, among

other things, the property’s zoning category and its proximity to

residential properties.2 The City asserted that under the RPS

ordinance, a structure on this property could not exceed a height of

2 A “residential proximity slope,” as contemplated in the City’s

Development Code, “is a plane projected upward and outward” at a specified

angle depending on the applicable zoning category. See DALLAS, TEX., CODE

§ 51A-4.412(b). The plane begins at the property line of a nearby residential

lot and prevents any portion of a planned structure over 26 feet in height from

being located above the plane.

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26 feet3—10 feet lower than the height shown on the Builder’s approved

plans and issued permits.

After receiving the stop-work order, the Builder, confused about

the RPS ordinance’s features, contacted city officials to discuss how the

structure was noncompliant. Without offering an explanation, city

officials advised the Builder to apply for a variance from the Board of

Adjustment (BOA).4 The Builder filed an application for a ten-foot

height variance, arguing that extreme waste would otherwise result

from the destruction of a near-complete residential structure.

The BOA set a hearing on the Builder’s variance request for May

2018. Before the scheduled hearing date, the City voluntarily lifted its

stop-work order, informing the Builder that it was “OK TO FINISH”

constructing the duplex. Yet the hearing still occurred as scheduled.

The Builder’s representative testified, as did several neighboring

homeowners who protested the structure’s height and blamed the City

for permitting a noncompliant structure. The City recommended that

3 Because the area is zoned as MF-2(A), the RPS plane is projected

upward at a 45° angle from the property line and terminates at a distance of

50 feet. See DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 51A-4.412(c). Given the location of the

property line and the position of the Builder’s structure on the lot, the City

took the position that the plane intersected the structure, thereby limiting its

height to 26 feet.

4 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 211.009(a) (“The board of adjustment may . . .

authorize in specific cases a variance from the terms of a zoning ordinance if

the variance is not contrary to the public interest and, due to special conditions,

a literal enforcement of the ordinance would result in unnecessary hardship,

and so that the spirit of the ordinance is observed and substantial justice is

done . . . .”).

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the Builder’s variance request be denied, and the BOA denied it without

prejudice.

One week later, the Builder filed a second variance request that

received the City’s support. The BOA denied that request too, this time

with prejudice. Without the variance, the Builder’s duplex—now

95 percent complete at a cost of over $1 million—was unusable: a

certificate of occupancy would not issue until a final inspection of the

structure occurred, which could not be passed absent compliance with

the RPS ordinance.

The Builder sued,5 seeking to estop the City from enforcing the

RPS ordinance under various equitable theories including estoppel,

laches, and waiver.6 Following a bench trial, the trial court signed the

Builder’s proposed judgment, which provided, among other things, that

the City was estopped “from enforcing . . . [the RPS ordinance] or any

ordinance related to the height of the structure . . . in existence at the

time the plans were approved and permits were issued in 2017 and

which the City did not raise prior to January 2018.” Without requesting

findings of fact or conclusions of law, the City appealed.

The court of appeals reversed. 703 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2023). Applying our decision in City of White Settlement v. Super Wash,

5 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 211.011(a)(1) (allowing “a person aggrieved

by a decision of the board” to “present to a district court . . . a verified petition

stating that the decision of the [BOA] is illegal in whole or in part”).

6 While the case was pending, the trial court granted the parties’ joint

motion to abate and remand to the BOA. A third hearing was held in May 2020

on the Builder’s same variance request, again with the City’s support. But the

BOA again denied the request, leading the Builder to file its live (third

amended) petition.

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Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. 2006), the court held that justice did not

require equitable estoppel against the City. 703 S.W.3d at 419. Even

after “imply[ing] all findings necessary to support the judgment” in the

Builder’s favor, id. at 413 n.3, the court of appeals concluded nothing in

the record showed an affirmative misrepresentation by the City or a

benefit to the City from the Builder’s reliance on the City’s mistakes, see

id. at 417, 418. It also found the Builder’s argument that it reasonably

relied on the City’s actions “unpersuasive” because the RPS ordinance

was a matter of public record. Id. Thus, the court concluded this case

was not among those “exceptional cases where the circumstances clearly

demand [estoppel’s] application to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. at

419 (quoting Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 774). This petition followed.

ANALYSIS

The Builder’s petition presents two issues: one concerning the

standard of review and the other regarding whether the law and the

record support the trial court’s judgment estopping the City from

enforcing its RPS ordinance against the Builder. We conclude that

under the correct standards of review, the trial court’s judgment must

be reinstated and the court of appeals’ judgment reversed.

I. Standard of review and applicable law

“The purpose of estoppel[] is to prevent inconsistency and fraud

resulting in injustice.” Kuehne v. Denson, 219 S.W.2d 1006, 1009 (Tex.

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1949) (quoting 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 1).7 Equitable estoppel requires

proof of five elements:

(1) a false representation or concealment of material facts;

(2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those

facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to

a party without knowledge or means of obtaining

knowledge of the facts; (5) who detrimentally relies on the

representations.

Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 486 (Tex. 2017)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gulbenkian v. Penn, 252

S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1952). In addition, when equitable estoppel is

invoked against a municipality, the case must be an exceptional one in

which “justice requires” estoppel and its application would not

“interfere[] with the exercise of . . . governmental functions.” Super

Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 774 (quoting City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450

S.W.2d 829, 836 (Tex. 1970)).

Whether equitable estoppel applies is a question for a court to

decide. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 245 (Tex. 1999). Different parts

of that question are governed by different standards of review.

If there is a dispute of material fact regarding one or more of the

five elements of equitable estoppel, that dispute must be resolved by the

finder of fact. See Huynh v. Blanchard, 694 S.W.3d 648, 673, 675 (Tex.

7 American courts sitting in both law and equity historically rooted

estoppel in the principle “that no man may take advantage of his own wrong.”

Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 & n.6 (1959) (collecting

cases). Similarly, Texas courts have long recognized that estoppel “is for the

protection of those who have been misled by that which upon its face was fair,

and whose character as represented parties to the deception will not, in the

interest of justice, be heard to deny.” Davis v. Allison, 211 S.W. 980, 984 (Tex.

1919).

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2024); State v. Tex. Pet Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. 1979). In

this appeal from a judgment following a bench trial where no factual

findings were requested, all necessary findings supported by the

evidence are implied, and the legal and factual sufficiency standards of

review govern appellate challenges to those findings. See BMC Software

Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); Roberson v.

Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989).

In contrast, “[t]he [trial] court, not the [factfinder], determines

whether” the case is an exceptional one requiring estoppel against a

municipality. Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 774. Because this part of the

question concerns the expediency, necessity, and propriety of equitable

relief, id., an appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision for abuse

of discretion. See Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 673-74. A court abuses its

discretion when it errs in determining what the law is or applying the

law to the facts, or when it could reasonably have reached only one

decision on the record yet fails to do so. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d

833, 840 (Tex. 1992).

In Part II of this opinion, we address whether legally sufficient

evidence supports the trial court’s implied findings on the challenged

elements of equitable estoppel. We then consider in Part III whether

the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that this is an

exceptional case requiring estoppel against the City.

II. There is legally sufficient evidence of the challenged

elements of equitable estoppel.

The City contends that there is legally insufficient evidence of the

following elements of equitable estoppel: (1) that the City falsely

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represented material facts; (2) that the Builder lacked knowledge or

means of obtaining knowledge of those facts falsely represented; and

(3) that the Builder detrimentally relied on the false representation. We

address each element in turn. The evidence is legally sufficient if there

is more than a scintilla of evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact

could find the element to be true. See 4Front Engineered Sols., Inc. v.

Rosales, 505 S.W.3d 905, 908-09 (Tex. 2016).

A. False representation

First, the City argues that its approval of construction plans

exceeding the maximum height permitted under the RPS ordinance was

not “a false representation or concealment of material facts”; rather, it

was an unintentional oversight. But the intent of a misrepresentation

is not material to this element: what matters in determining whether

the City made a false representation is whether its representation was

in fact untrue.8 There is more than a scintilla of evidence that the City

made false representations to the Builder and its agents.

When the Builder asked city officials about applicable

restrictions, they identified only a 36-foot maximum-height limit, not

the 26-foot limit imposed under the RPS ordinance. After the Builder

amended its construction plan to address the City’s first height-related

stop-work order, the City conducted its own inspection and issued a

8 City of Houston v. McDonald, 946 S.W.2d 419, 421-22 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); False Representation, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (directing reader to definition of

misrepresentation, which is “a materially incorrect, unfair, or false statement;

an assertion that does not accord with the facts”; and it “need not be fraudulent

to amount to a misrepresentation”).

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second permit, again approving the construction of a 36-foot-high

structure. And although the City did eventually issue a stop-work order

based on the RPS ordinance, it later lifted that order, stating “OK TO

FINISH.”

As the Builder later found out, these representations were false.

The applicable height restriction under city ordinances was not in fact

36 feet; it was 26 feet. The Builder was not entitled to an amended

permit for the 36-foot-high structure the City inspected. And that

structure was not OK to finish under the RPS ordinance.

B. Lack of means to obtain knowledge

Second, the City argues that the RPS ordinance was a matter of

public record and therefore easily discoverable through due diligence.

“A party claiming an estoppel must have used due diligence to ascertain

the truth of the matters upon which he relies in acting to his detriment.”

Barfield v. Howard M. Smith Co. of Amarillo, 426 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tex.

1968). If the facts “were known to a person or were open for his

convenient ascertainment,” that person cannot “rely[] on [the]

representation pertaining thereto and . . . cannot effectively say that he

was misled or deceived by [the] representation[].” Id.

Here, there is more than a scintilla of evidence that the Builder

used due diligence yet did not discover the RPS ordinance. The Builder’s

representative testified that his internet searches did not reveal the

ordinance.

Moreover, as we explain in more detail later, our cases recognize

that a party’s failure to discover a government restriction will not

prevent estoppel when that failure is attributable to affirmative

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government misdirection. See Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75,

80 (Tex. 1976) (holding deemed notice of city charter provision did not

prevent estoppel where plaintiff’s “ignorance of the charter provision

was primarily attributable to the actions of the city officials”); see also

Mosley v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 263,

267-68 (Tex. 2019) (rejecting argument that plaintiff had obligation to

discover and comply with government requirement that was contrary to

instructions government provided). Here, the record includes evidence

that the City affirmatively told the Builder that the applicable building-

height limit was 36 feet—not the 26 feet imposed by the RPS

ordinance—and that construction was OK to finish.

C. Detrimental reliance

Third, the City argues that the Builder’s reliance on its issued

permits was not reasonable because those permits contained language

cautioning that they did not authorize a violation of city ordinances. But

as explained above, the City did more than just issue the permits: the

evidence shows that the City falsely represented the applicable building

height to the Builder, and that the Builder was unaware the City’s

guidance was (or even could be) erroneous. See Mosley, 593 S.W.3d at

263-64, 268 (holding government misdirection violates due process

where plaintiff is “not aware of any problem at all with simply following

the instructions given”). In addition, there is evidence that the Builder

spent over $1 million to build the duplex in reliance not only on the

original and amended permits but also on the City’s inspection and

decisions to lift the stop-work orders.

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For these reasons, we conclude there is sufficient evidence of the

elements of equitable estoppel challenged by the City.

III. This is an exceptional case requiring estoppel against the

City.

In addition to proving each element of equitable estoppel, a party

seeking estoppel against the government must also show that its case is

among the “exceptional cases where the circumstances clearly demand

[estoppel’s] application to prevent manifest injustice.” Super Wash, 198

S.W.3d at 773 (quoting Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d at 836). Super Wash

reiterated our long-held general rule “that a city cannot be estopped

from exercising its governmental functions.” Id.9 In City of San Angelo

v. Deutsch, for example, we refused to estop the city from enforcing its

tax lien, reasoning that “a municipality is not estopped by the

unauthorized acts of its officer or agent, or by his wrongful act.” 91

S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. 1936).10 Applying the general rule, we have held

9 This general rule barring estoppel against cities, as set forth in Super

Wash, is derived from our general rule barring estoppel against the State. See

Marsalis v. Garrison, 27 S.W. 929, 932 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1894, no writ).

Although cities “represent no sovereignty distinct from the [S]tate,” Payne v.

Massey, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1946), no party argues that this distinction

counsels overruling Super Wash and its progeny. The general bar on estoppel

against the State and the limited exception to that general rule in the state-

specific estoppel context have long been recognized under Texas law. See

Saunders v. Hart, 57 Tex. 8, 10 (1882).

10 See also City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking of Tex., Inc., 311

S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. 1958) (no estoppel against city exercising governmental

authority); Tex. Co. v. State, 281 S.W.2d 83, 88 (Tex. 1955) (no estoppel against

state recovering lands and minerals); Rolison v. Puckett, 198 S.W.2d 74, 77

(Tex. 1946) (no estoppel against city asserting tax foreclosure); Republic Ins.

Co. v. Highland Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 171 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. [Comm’n

Op.] 1943) (no estoppel against city collecting tax assessment).

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that a landowner could not estop a city from enforcing its zoning

ordinance based on a later city resolution changing the property’s zoning

classification that proved to be ineffective. See Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d at

834-36. We have also held that a purchaser of property could not estop

the government from enforcing a judgment favorable to its title based

on a later judgment favorable to the purchaser’s title that was

eventually declared void. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe &

Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Tex. 2013).

Our cases have also recognized a limited exception to this general

rule: “a municipality may be estopped in those cases where justice

requires its application, and there is no interference with the exercise of

its governmental functions.” Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 774 (quoting

Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d at 836). Although “this exception is available only

in exceptional cases where the circumstances clearly demand its

application to prevent manifest injustice,” id. (internal quotation marks

omitted), we have applied the exception in cases where city officials led

the plaintiff to believe that certain legal requirements had been met or

waived, see City of San Antonio v. Schautteet, 706 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.

1986); Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 78-79.

Whether the exception applies is a two-part inquiry: (1) whether

“justice requires [the] application” of estoppel in these circumstances;

and (2) whether estoppel will “interfere” with the “future performance

of [a] governmental function.” Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 774, 776. We

consider each part in turn to determine whether the trial court abused

its discretion in concluding that the exception applies here.

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A. Justice requires estoppel against the City.

We observed in Super Wash that our cases discussing when

“justice requires estoppel” have involved “evidence that [(1)] city officials

may have affirmatively misled the part[y] seeking to estop the city,” and

(2) the party “would [be] completely denied relief” absent estoppel

because no “other remedies [are] available . . . that it has yet to pursue.”

Id. at 775.11 We also noted the relevance of evidence regarding whether

(3) “the misleading statements resulted in . . . permanent loss” or

estoppel is “necessary for [the party’s] continued operation,” (4) the

ordinance “was a matter of public record and discoverable by [the party]

before it purchased the [property],” and (5) “the City acted quickly—

within days of learning of its error—to notify [the party] of the

[o]rdinance.” Id.

These considerations support the trial court’s application of

equitable estoppel here. First, this is not a case involving a city official’s

mere mistaken issuance of a building permit or mistaken acquiescence

in an ordinance violation. Instead, there is evidence that city officials

affirmatively misled the Builder regarding the overall height limit of the

structure and whether it could be completed as permitted. Three

months after granting a permit for a 36-foot-high structure, the City

issued a stop-work order, citing the violation of a height-related

11 See also Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 78-80; Krause v. City of El Paso, 106

S.W. 121, 123 (Tex. 1907) (“Why should a municipal corporation, which has led

a citizen into error and caused him to expend large sums of money in the

erection of permanent improvements . . . , be permitted to destroy the

improvements . . . simply to assert a legal right? A sense of justice common to

all civilized people revolts at such a rule of legalized wrong.”).

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restriction concerning the structure’s parapet wall. It later conducted a

height inspection and approved the Builder’s amended plan, which

included the same overall height of 36 feet. Then, six months into

construction and with the project about 90 percent complete, the City

finally issued a stop-work order identifying the overall height violation

of the RPS ordinance. Just a few days later, it rescinded that order as

well—stating “OK TO FINISH”—and allowed the Builder to fully

complete construction. Considered together, this evidence shows that

the City’s actions affirmatively misled the Builder into constructing a

noncompliant structure.

Second, there is evidence that the Builder would be completely

denied relief absent estoppel. The Builder unsuccessfully sought a

variance three times; no other remedies were available that it had yet

to pursue. The City argues that the Builder could also have challenged

the variance denials in court. But variances involve significant

discretion,12 and there is no indication that the variance denials were

faulty for any reason other than the same estoppel-based considerations

at issue here.

Third, there is evidence that the City’s affirmative

misrepresentation will result in permanent loss. The Builder’s

representative testified that the most feasible way to comply with the

RPS ordinance at this point would be to raze the structure—which cost

over $1 million to build—and construct a new, shorter one.

12 See 2 AM. LAW ZONING § 13:26 (5th ed.) (“[T]he board retains

significant discretion to evaluate variance applications on a case to case basis

. . . .”).

16

Fourth, although the RPS ordinance was a matter of public

record, our cases have recognized that affirmative misdirection can

overcome constructive notice. We have applied estoppel against a city

“demand[ing] strict compliance with [its] charter provisions,” for

example, where city officials “so conducted themselves as to lull the

claimant into a sense of security, causing him to think they were waiving

said charter provision.” Cawthorn v. City of Houston, 231 S.W. 701, 706

(Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, holding approved, judgm’t adopted).13 And

more recently in Mosley, we explained that although “parties have an

obligation to discover and satisfy” applicable government regulations,

that obligation “is in tension with” the government’s obligation not to

“publish[] an erroneous regulation” misdirecting a party “and then

blam[e] the [party for] fail[ing] to discover the regulation was wrong all

along.” 593 S.W.3d at 263-64. Where the party has “no independent

knowledge” of a government requirement and is “not aware of any

problem at all with simply following the [misleading] instructions given

her by the [government],” the government may not hold her to that

requirement. Id. at 268. As explained above, that is what happened

here.14

13 See also Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 78 (“While it is settled law that

ignorance of a charter provision does not excuse compliance therewith, this

court in exercising its equitable powers under the doctrine of estoppel cannot

ignore the practical effect of the conduct of the city officials” that “led [the

plaintiff] to believe that the [provision] was waived.”).

14 The situation would be materially different if there were evidence

that a city purposefully or collusively violated the law in order to trigger

equitable estoppel. Our precedent does not support the notion that a city can

invite estoppel by granting authorization for something it wants but knows to

be improper.

17

Fifth, the City did not act quickly in notifying the Builder of the

RPS ordinance. The first time it mentioned the ordinance to the Builder

was over six months after issuing the original permit—when the

structure was 90 percent complete. And even after notifying the Builder

of its noncompliance, the City lifted its stop-work order, allowing

construction to continue to completion.

For its part, the City argues that it cannot be estopped absent

“[e]vidence that city officials acted deliberately to induce a party to act

in a way that benefitted the city but prejudiced the party.” Super Wash,

198 S.W.3d at 775. According to the City, it received no benefit from

approving a structure that did not comply with the RPS ordinance, so

the exception to the general rule barring estoppel should not apply.

We disagree. Super Wash said that evidence of a city receiving a

benefit “weighs in favor of applying the exception,” not that such

evidence is required. Id. (emphasis added). We similarly noted in a later

case that “we have applied estoppel to prevent manifest injustice” in

cases of government benefit—concluding, there, that “no evidence

suggests . . . that [the city] benefitted.” A.P.I. Pipe, 397 S.W.3d at 170.

But our decision did not suggest that evidence of the government

receiving a benefit was required.

Instead, we went on to explain why that case was different from

Roberts and Schautteet. See A.P.I. Pipe, 397 S.W.3d at 170 & n.36. As

already explained, those cases applied estoppel against the government

in circumstances similar to those here. On this record, the trial court

could reasonably have reached only one decision: justice requires

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estoppel against the City. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not

abuse its discretion.

B. Estoppel would not interfere with future

performance of governmental functions.

Turning to the second part of the inquiry, we took the opportunity

in Super Wash “to clarify what it means to ‘interfere’ with a

governmental function.” 198 S.W.3d at 776. “[T]he relevant inquiry is

whether estopping the city in a single instance will bar the future

performance of that governmental function or impede the city’s ability

to perform its other governmental functions” or “affect public safety.”

Id. at 776, 777.

Everyone agrees that the functions of municipal government

implicated here are zoning and planning.15 The City contends that

applying estoppel here would leave it unable to answer the concerns of

neighbors regarding the Builder’s over-height structure, impairing its

ability to perform these governmental functions.16 But “precluding a

city from performing a specific governmental function in a single

instance is not per se interference with its governmental functions.” Id.

15 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.0215(a)(29) (including

“zoning, planning, and plat approval” among “governmental functions” for

which a municipality can be held liable); Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 776-77

(consulting the Tort Claims Act’s “nonexclusive list of specific, municipal

functions” to assess whether certain functions are governmental).

16 Nothing in this opinion should be construed to affect any remedies

that the neighbors may have against either party. Whether a court, in deciding

whether justice requires estoppel, should take into consideration the severity

of any injustice neighbors will likely face from its application is a question we

leave open for a future case where it is raised by the evidence.

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at 776. Nothing in the record indicates that allowing this single

over-height structure to remain would bar future enforcement of the

RPS ordinance in other instances or hinder the City’s ability to ensure

public safety. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that estoppel would not interfere with a governmental

function.

CONCLUSION

Having concluded that the trial court’s implied factual findings

were supported by legally sufficient evidence and that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by concluding that this is an exceptional case

requiring estoppel against the City, we hold that the court of appeals

erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment. We therefore reverse the

court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment that

the City is estopped from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the

Builder. See TEX. R. APP. P. 60.2(c).

J. Brett Busby

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 2, 2025

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