The Estate of Lord Treyshun Gardner v. Google, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

LOUISVILLE DIVISION

THE ESTATE OF LORD TREYSHUN Plaintiff

GARDNER

v. Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-129-RGJ

GOOGLE, INC. Defendant

* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Estate of Lord Treyshun Gardner (“Gardner”)1 originally sued Google Inc.

in state court [DE 1-1]. Summons was served by the Secretary of State on Google Inc. at the

address provided, 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043. [DE 1-1 at 19].

Google, LLC (“Google”) removed this case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1332, 1441, and 1446, on March 4, 2025. [DE 1].2 In its removal, Google asserts that it was

“improperly named in this action as Google, Inc.” [Id. at 1]. Google also asserts it “is a Delaware

limited liability company with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway,

Mountain View, California 94043. Google LLC’s sole member is XXVI Holdings, Inc., a

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway,

1 In Defendant’s removal, it is asserted that “[b]ased on information available, Plaintiff is a living individual,

and not the representative of an estate for a deceased individual.” [DE 1 at 1]. After review of the overall

pleadings and matching the address of the Plaintiff to various public records in Jefferson District Court, it

appears that the Plaintiff is a living individual who ascribes to certain sovereign citizen beliefs and has

chosen to use the estate language to avoid any appearance as a “federal citizen.” See

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_citizen_movement. Specifically, in the Complaint, Plaintiff states,

“Plaintiff Lord Treyshun The Estate Holder & Grantor of Gardner Sir Name,” and refers to himself in all

capital letters, such as “Unjust Enrichments on behalf of the falsified Information and deals made on behalf

without permission of any subject from the natural Person of TREYSHUN GARDNER.” [DE 1-1 at 10].

Moreover, Gardner appears to allege strawman and natural person theories commonly asserted by followers

of the sovereign citizen movement. [Id. at 10-11].

2 Google alleges that Gardner is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and it is a citizen of Delaware

and California. [DE 1 at 2-3].

Mountain View, California 94043.” [Id. at 2, ¶9]. Google attaches its Statement of Information

filed with the California Secretary of State. [DE 1-2].

On March 11, 2025, Google timely pleaded, moving for dismissal with prejudice of

Gardner’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). [DE 7]. Gardner failed to respond

to Google’s motion and the time for doing so has passed. Over a month after the response deadline,

Gardner moved for “Defaulted Judgement” [sic]. [DE 8]. Google timely responded, [DE 9], and

Gardner did not reply and the time for doing so has passed. These matters are ripe. For the reasons

below, Google’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 7] is GRANTED and Gardner’s Motion for Defaulted

Judgment [DE 8] is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND3

Originally filed in Jefferson Circuit Court on January 17, 2025, Gardner’s complaint is

difficult, at best, to understand. It appears to the Court that Gardner generally asserts that he has

“been Gang Stalked by shareholders looking to Collect my strawman with Illegal Bribery practices

trying to convince TREYSHUN GARDNER to allow my signature for a 3rd Party. Illegal

Malpractices and Misuse of medical information and medication Drugs to sodomize and to also

compromise my wellbeing to not recognize my intelligence.” [DE 1-1 at 10]. In essence, much

of the complaint appears to generally assert misuse or exposure of “Sensitive data.” [DE 1-1 at

12]. In addition, he alleges that Google “Dealing with Pfizer & Other NanoTech to Steal

Intelligence Property From TREYSHUN GARDNER Estate A American Indian” and that Google

has “us[ed] Nanos & Smartdust To Farm Body Heat To Create Currency.” [Id.]. As a result,

Gardner “Demands Full Compensation, Investment, Profit, Interest, Return of Information

3 The factual allegations in the Complaint [DE 1-2] are considered true for purposes of this motion. See

Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551

F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)).

Property, Intelligence Property, Voice Notes & Music Property. Etc.,” as well as 10 billion in

damages with the “Court” to “receive 10%.” [DE 1-1 at 13]. Google interprets the complaint as

accusing it of “harvesting Plaintiff’s body heat for power and also ‘gang stalking’ him.” [DE 7 at

35].

II. DISCUSSION

Because Gardner’s motion for default [DE 8] addresses the entity which has pled by

moving to dismiss [DE 7], the Court first addresses the motion for default.

1. Motion for Defaulted Judgement [sic] [DE 8]

Gardner asserts that default judgment should be entered because the entity he specifically

sued has not made an appearance. [DE 8 at 46]. As an initial matter, while the Summons served

“Google, Inc,” this motion names the Defendant as “Alphabet INC (Google INC),” but the Court

notes no summons have issued to Alphabet, Inc. (Google’s parent company). [Id.]. Specifically,

Gardner states:

It is stated that “Google LLC” has Appeared In place for “Alphabet Inc” Formerly

Known As “Google Inc” In which “Google LLC” is a different entity than the

corporation I’ve Summoned. The Corporation google changed its name to Alphabet

Inc while Operating in Continuation as Google Inc still holds the same

Responsibilities as its former Corporate Name. It has been Over 80 Days after the

February 10th 2025 Serving of Papers March, 4, 2025 motion to removal from Civil

Court To Federal Court In which Court was Attended on March, 10 2025.

Id. As a result, Gardner requests default judgment and states “I would like to be rewarded 10Billion

and donate 1 billion to Courts for fair Judgment.” [Id.].

Google responded in opposition that the motion was “frivolous,” that “Google timely

responded to the complaint by filing its Motion to Dismiss within 7 days following removal,” and

that “[w]hile Plaintiff seems to argue Google’s parent company, Alphabet, Inc., did not respond,

Plaintiff identified “Google, Inc.” in the Complaint and Summons.” [DE 9 at 49].

A. Standard

Rule 55 governs Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment “[w]hen a party against whom a

judgment of affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend and that failure is

shown by affidavit or otherwise . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(a). Where, as here, a case does not

involve a sum certain, Rule 55 sets out a two-step process. First, the Clerk of Court must issue an

entry of default under Rule 55(a). Second, upon entry of default, if the plaintiff’s claim is not for

a sum certain, he or she “must apply to the court for a default judgment” by filing a motion for a

default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)-(2); I Love Juice Bar Franchising,

LLC v. ILJB Charlotte Juice, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-00981, 2020 WL 4735031, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.

Aug. 14, 2020).

After the Clerk’s entry of default and the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, the Court

considers whether a default judgment is proper. Methe v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 2019 WL

3082329, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 2019). When doing so, the Court takes all factual allegations

in the complaint as true. In re Family Resorts of Am., Inc., 1992 WL 174539, at *4 (6th Cir. July

24, 1992). An entry of default, however, does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a default

judgment. See F.C. Franchising Sys., Inc. v. Schweizer, 2012 WL 1945068, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May

30, 2012). The plaintiff must still show that, when all factual allegations in the complaint are taken

as true, the defendant is liable for the claim(s) asserted. Said v. SBS Elecs., Inc., 2010 WL 1265186,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010) (It “remains the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that” the

complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, “establish the defendant’s liability.”), adopted as

modified, 2010 WL 1287080 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010).

When considering whether default judgment is proper, courts:

[T]ake into account: (1) possible prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the

claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the amount of money at stake; (5)

possible disputed material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable

neglect; and (7) the preference for decisions on the merits.

Russell v. City of Farmington Hills, 34 F. App’x 196, 198 (6th Cir. 2002).

Additionally, a default is not considered an admission of damages. Vesligaj v. Peterson,

331 F. App’x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where damages are unliquidated a default admits only

[the defaulting party’s] liability and the amount of damages must be proved.”).

B. Analysis

Several reasons compel denial of a default judgment against Google. First, as a procedural

matter, Gardner has failed to follow the requirements of Rule 55 and seek a clerk’s entry of default.

See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(a). As such, the motion must be denied on procedural grounds.

Second, even if a clerk’s entry were properly sought, the clerk could not enter such default

as Google has entered its appearance, noted the improper service on a non-existent entity, and pled

timely by moving to dismiss. In its removal, Google asserts that it was “improperly named in this

action as Google, Inc.” [DE 1 at 1]. Google also asserts it “is a Delaware limited liability company

with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California

94043.” [Id. at 2, ¶9]. Google attaches its Statement of Information filed with the California

Secretary of State as well as documents of formation. [DE 1-2]. It is clear from the formation

documents and publicly available corporate information that in 2015 Google reorganized its

corporate structure and became a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc. Google Inc. was

converted to a Delaware limited liability company in September 2017 as part of that

reorganization. As Google, Inc. no longer exists in that corporate structure, the existing entity,

Google, LLC, has responded, and no default should issue.

Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(a)(1) requires a defendant to serve an answer within a

specified time. Under Rule 12(a)(4), if a party serves a Rule 12(b) motion, then the time to serve

an answer is tolled until after the Court resolves the motion. Compton v. City of Harrodsburg, Ky.,

287 F.R.D. 401, 402 (E.D. Ky. 2012); see also, Yao v. Oakland Univ., No. 2:21-CV-10523, 2022

WL 1598619, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2022); B.H.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:20-

CV-0732, 2020 WL 12630642, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2020) (“Rule 12(a)(4) plainly tolls the

time within which a defendant must answer during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).”). There is no question that Google has timely filed a 12(b) motion [DE 7]

and that the time to answer is tolled during the pendency of the motion.

For these reasons, the motion for default judgment must be DENIED.

2. Motion to Dismiss [DE 7]

Google asserts that Gardner’s complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) as the

complaint is so devoid of merit it fails to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. [DE 7 at

37]. Google also asserts dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

[Id. at 40].

A. Standard

Rule 12(b)(1) allows dismissal for “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter” of claims

asserted in the Complaint. Generally, Rule 12(b)(1) motions fall into two categories: facial attacks

and factual attacks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); United States v. Richie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.

1994). In a facial attack, the defendant asserts that the allegations in a complaint are insufficient

on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. By contrast, in a factual attack, the defendant

disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal

jurisdiction and the Court is free to weigh the evidence. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of proving

subject matter jurisdiction to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Madison-Hughes v.

Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1130 (6th Cir. 1996). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable,

fatal defect. Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1074 (6th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) instructs that a court must dismiss a complaint if

the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To state a claim, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When considering a motion to dismiss,

courts must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and make all reasonable

inferences for the non-moving party. Total Benefits Plan. Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross &

Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “But the district court need not

accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions.” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (citation omitted). “A

pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further

factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim

is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A complaint will be dismissed . . . if no law supports the claims

made, if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if the face of the complaint presents

an insurmountable bar to relief.” Southfield Educ. Ass’n v. Southfield Bd. of Educ., 570 F. App’x

485, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–64).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by

attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 519 (1972). Yet “the lenient treatment generally

accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).

For example, “the less stringent standard for pro se plaintiffs does not compel courts to conjure up

unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations.” Leisure v. Hogan, 21 F. App’x 277, 278 (6th

Cir. 2001). Additionally, the Court cannot “create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out

in his pleading.” Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). The

Court cannot supply missing facts or un-pled allegations, create a claim for the pro se plaintiff, or

otherwise act as an advocate for them. Brown v. Cracker Barrel Rest., 22 F. App’x 577, 578 (6th

Cir. 2001); Bond v. Verdecia, 2023 WL 5807026, *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 7, 2023). A pro se

complainant must still contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material

elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. See Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy

Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). Ultimately, “[t]he Court’s duty to construe a pro

se complaint liberally does not absolve a plaintiff of the duty to comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure by providing each defendant with fair notice of the basis of the claim.” Jones v.

Cabinet for Families & Child., No. 3:07-cv-11-S, 2007 WL 2462184, at *4 (W.D. Ky, Aug. 29,

2007) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).

B. Analysis

i. Failure to respond.

As an initial matter Local Rule 7.1 provides that “[f]ailure to timely respond to a motion

may be grounds for granting the motion.” LR 7.1(c). Moreover, a party may to waive opposition

to a motion to dismiss by “virtue of his failure to oppose [it].” Humphrey v. U.S. Att’y Gen.’s Off.,

279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Williams v. PBI Bank, No. 3:13-cv-1166-DJH-

CHL, 2017 WL 6940699, at *1, (W.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 2017) (“Failure to respond to a dispositive

motion will be grounds for granting the motion.”) (citations omitted). It is well settled law that a

plaintiff waives a claim by failing to respond to or refute arguments made by the defendant in a

motion to dismiss and “the Court assumes he concedes this point and abandons the claim.” Mekani

v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, 752 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797 (E.D. Mich. 2010); see also Notredan, LLC

v. Old Republic Exch. Facilitator Co., 531 F. App’x. 567 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the

plaintiff had waived claim by failing to respond to or refute arguments made by the defendants in

the district court); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Global Med. Billing, Inc., 520 F. App’x. 409, 412 (6th

Cir.2013) (same); Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1007–08 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district

court’s conclusion that the plaintiff abandoned certain claims by failing to raise them in his brief

opposing the government’s motion to dismiss); Degolia v. Kenton Cty., 381 F. Supp. 3d 740, 759–

60 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (“[I]t is well understood . . . that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a

dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat

those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” (quoting Rouse v. Caruso, No. 6-

cv-10961-DT, 2011 WL 918327, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2011)) (internal quotation marks

omitted); ARJN #3 v. Cooper, 517 F. Supp. 3d 732, 750 (M.D. Tenn. 2021); PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n

v. Goyette Mech. Co., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 775, 785 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (dismissing claims that the

plaintiffs failed to respond to in opposition to motion to dismiss, noting that “[a] plaintiff abandons

undefended claims.”).

Here, Gardner has failed to file a response to Google’s motion. Gardner’s own default

motion acknowledges that Google has appeared in the case, [DE 8 at 46], yet he has not filed a

response to the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in Google’s response to Gardner’s motion for

default, Google asserted Gardner’s failure to respond to its’ motion to dismiss as grounds for

granting its’ motion. [DE 9 at 48 (“The deadline for Plaintiff to respond to the Motion to Dismiss

was more than a month ago, April 1, 2025. Plaintiff’s failure to respond is grounds to grant

Google’s Motion to Dismiss.” (citing Rule 7.1(c))]. Gardner did not reply in opposition to this

assertion or attempt to file a response to the motion to dismiss. As a result, the Court may consider

any opposition to the motion to dismiss waived and grant Google’s motion to dismiss.

ii. Frivolous and patently insubstantial or conclusory claims.

Even if Gardner had responded, dismissal here is warranted. A district court has authority

to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) “when the allegations of a complaint are totally

implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.”

Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999) (per curiam). “[M]ost complaints will not be so

clearly insufficient as to warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), but instead should be handled

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 480. “When a district court is faced with a complaint that

appears to be frivolous or unsubstantial in nature, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) (as opposed to

Rule 12(b)(6)) is appropriate in only the rarest of circumstances where . . . the complaint is deemed

totally implausible.” Faller v. Att’y Gen. of Kentucky, No. CIV A 1:08-CV-86-R, 2009 WL

530646, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2009) (citing Apple, 183 F.3d at 480).

Frivolous or patently insubstantial complaints are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Watkins v. F.B.I., No. 3:14-CV-656-CRS, 2015 WL 339584,

at *1 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 23, 2015) (citing Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n. 6 (1989) and

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (federal courts lack power to entertain claims that

are “so attenuated and insubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.”)). Examples of clearly

baseless factual contentions include “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios . . .”

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. As stated in White v. State of Michigan Ctr. for Forensic Psychiatry, 66

Fed. App’x 626, 627, 2003 WL 21397866 (6th Cir. 2003), “[a] totally unsubstantiated complaint

such as the one in this case fails to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court.” Citing

Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536–37. Garner’s complaint lacks credible allegations. It contains bizarre,

fantastic, delusional, and disjointed thoughts which the Court strains to interpret or decipher. As

such, the action must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) as patently insubstantial and frivolous such

that it conveys no subject matter jurisdiction to this Court.

Further, to survive a motion to dismiss grounded on a failure to state a claim, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, taken as true to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Not only

are Gardner’s allegations bizarre and incredible, but they fail to allege any claim. As stated in

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions, or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Here the complaint lacks plausible legal

claims and any well-pled facts. Moreover, any well potentially decipherable allegations are

speculative and conclusory such that they cannot survive a motion to dismiss. For this reason, the

action must also be dismissed for Gardner’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, under Rule 12(b)(6).

iii. Sovereign citizen claims.

Although Google does not directly address this matter, the Court notes that Gardner’s

complaint appears to raise a number of so-called “sovereign citizen” beliefs or arguments or, at a

minimum uses language associated with these theories. Noles v. United States Internal Revenue

Serv., No. 3:23-CV-150-TAV-JEM, 2024 WL 4899990, at *1–2 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 26, 2024)

(citing United States v. Cook, No. 3:18-cr-19, 2019 WL 2721305, at *1–2 (E.D. Tenn. June 28,

2019)). As described by other courts in this Circuit, sovereign citizen pleadings are “dense,

complex, and virtually unreadable,” and a branch of sovereign citizen case law has grown to

address the voluminous and often frivolous workload. See Francis X. Sullivan, The “Usurping

Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority”: The Legal Theories of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 199

Wis. L. Rev. 85, 796 (1999) (“Faced with mountains of paperwork, courts must choose between

spending hours deciphering Sovereign Citizen arguments or dismissing them out of hand”). Thus,

“Courts have repeatedly rejected, as frivolous, arguments based on the theory of sovereign

citizenship” recognizing that such arguments are “a waste of court resources.” Powell v. Michigan,

No. 22-10816, 2023 WL 2154954, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2023) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

As a result, courts in this district and others frequently sua sponte dismiss sovereign citizen

complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or dismiss sovereign citizen complaints on this

ground without extended argument. Primero v. Barum, No. 3:24-cv-200, 2024 WL 1543782, at *2

(W.D. Ky. Apr. 9, 2024) (dismissing sovereign citizen complaint, at screening stage, for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction because “the legal theories espoused in this action are frivolous”);

Adkins v. Kentucky, No. 3:18-mc-26, 2018 WL 6528462, at *1–2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 2018) (sua

sponte dismissing sovereign citizen complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without

further discussion); Maddox El v. Scharf, No. 23-10990, 2023 WL 3587538, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich.

May 22, 2023) (dismissing sovereign citizen complaint at screening stage for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction without further discussion). To the extent certain of Gardner’s claims assert these

theories, the Court finds it appropriate to follow this course of action here.

I. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT

IS ORDERED as follows:

1. Google’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) [DE 7] is

GRANTED;

2. Gardner’s motion for default judgment [DE 8] is DENIED;

3. A separate judgment will be entered accordingly.

United States District Court

June 10, 2025

CC: Plaintiff, pro se

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