“The defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.”
How later courts described this case
- “The defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
FINAL EXPENSE DIRECT,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2093-WFJ-AAS
PYTHON LEADS, LLC, JACQUELYN
LEAH LEVIN, DAVID LEVIN, AND
ALI RAZA,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Final Expense Direct moves for entry of a default judgment
against Defendant Ali Raza. (Doc. 70). Generally, a court may enter a default
judgment when the factual allegations of the complaint, which are assumed to
be true, provide a sufficient legal basis for such entry. Nishimatsu Constr. Co.
v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The defendant is
not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of
law.”). Therefore, in considering a motion for default judgment, a court must
“examine the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to determine
whether the plaintiff is entitled to” a default judgment. Fid. & Deposit Co. v.
Williams, 699 F. Supp. 897, 899 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) provides that where, as here, a
clerk’s default has been entered, a plaintiff may apply to either the clerk or the
court for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). A default judgment may
then be awarded if “there is ‘a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment
entered.’” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir.
2015) (per curiam) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l
Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Rule 54(b) states, however, that in a lawsuit involving multiple parties,
“the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer
than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). The “preferred
practice” in multi-defendant actions where only some defendants are in default
is to withhold granting a default judgment against those defendants until there
is an adjudication on the merits as to the non-defaulted defendants. N. Pointe
Ins. Co. v. Glob. Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., No. 6:12-cv-476-Orl-31TBS, 2012
WL 5378826, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Courts that have taken this approach have done so, at least
in part, to avoid inconsistent judgments. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v.
Bailey, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1221 (M.D. Ga. 2019) (citing Gulf Coast Fans,
Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Imps., Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984));
Northfield Ins. Co. v. Browning Timber & Saw Mill, LLC, No. 4:17-cv-01236-
ACA, 2018 WL 3135970, at *2 (N.D. Ala. June 27, 2018); Zurich Am. Ins. Co.
v. Ednic Trading Corp., No. 13-62229-CIV, 2014 WL 869216, at *1 (6.D. Fla.
Mar. 5, 2014) (citations omitted).
Thus, for the reasons above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that
First Response Direct’s motion for entry of default judgment against Ali Raza
(Doc. 70) be DENIED without prejudice.
ENTERED in Tampa, Florida, on May 8, 2025.
Atranda. Agneth. Saree
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES
The parties have fourteen days from the date they are served a copy of
this report to file written objections to this report’s proposed findings and
recommendations or to seek an extension of the fourteen-day deadline to file
written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. A party’s failure to
object timely under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives that party’s right to challenge
on appeal the district court’s order adopting this report’s unobjected-to factual
findings and legal conclusions. 11th Cir. R. 38-1.