Micolta-Sinisterra v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

SILVIO SEGUNDO MICOLTA-SINISTERRA,

v. Case No. 8:13-cr-609-VMC-CPT

8:22-cv-1630-VMC-CPT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

_______________________________/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Silvio Segundo

Micolta-Sinisterra’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. #

295), filed on July 11, 2022. The United States of America

responded on July 14, 2023. (Civ. Doc. # 8). Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra replied on August 13, 2023. (Civ. Doc. # 12). For

the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied.

I. Background

On December 18, 2013, a grand jury indicted Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra on two counts: conspiracy to distribute five

kilograms or more of cocaine, knowing and intending that such

substance would be unlawfully imported into the United States

(Count One); and conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board

a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States

(Count Two). (Crim. Doc. # 1). On January 2, 2019, Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra pled guilty to Count Two of the

indictment. (Crim. Doc. # 158).

At the change of plea hearing, Magistrate Judge

Christopher P. Tuite asked Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra, who was

under oath, a number of questions regarding his guilty plea.

Judge Tuite first assured that Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra had

sufficient education to read the documents in his case and

was not under the influence of any intoxicating substances.

(Crim. Doc. # 275 at 6:3-7:13). He next confirmed that Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra had reviewed the charges, the evidence,

and his option to go to trial with his attorney, Ms. Angela

B. Wright. (Id. at 8:8-9:21). He asked Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra

if he was “fully satisfied with the advice and representation”

of Ms. Wright, to which he responded “[y]es, Your Honor.”

(Id. at 8:21-8:24). He also confirmed that he had read each

page of the plea agreement and discussed the terms with Ms.

Wright. (Id. at 9:17). Judge Tuite next read the most

significant terms of the plea agreement with the government

and ensured that Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra understood those

terms. (Id. at 10-16).

Judge Tuite next asked Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra whether he

had been “threatened,” “coerced,” or “forced” to plead

guilty, to which he responded “[n]o one at all, Your Honor.”

(Id. at 17:15). Judge Tuite asked him if he was “pleading

guilty freely and voluntarily?” (Id. at 17:16-17:17). Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra responded “[y]es, Your Honor.” (Id. at

17:18). Judge Tuite also confirmed that Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra understood that his sentence contained a mandatory

minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years. (Id. at 18-

19).

The factual basis in the plea agreement included several

relevant facts. “From approximately 2006 until December 2013,

the defendant was part of a Colombia-based cocaine

transportation organization that transported cocaine by self-

propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels and go-fast vessels

(GFVs) through the international waters of the Pacific Ocean,

from Colombia to Central America and Mexico.” (Crim. Doc. #

158 at 20). “During the course of the charged conspiracy, two

SPSSs belonging to this cocaine transportation organization

were interdicted by the United States Coast Guard (USCG).”

(Id.). The interdictions involved 2,300 and 1,572 kilograms

of cocaine, respectively. (Id. at 20-21). For the first

interdiction, which occurred in 2008, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra

“installed the engine on this SPSS. [He] was present when

this SPSS launched.” (Id.). For the second interdiction,

which occurred in 2010, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra “was present

when this SPSS launched and instructed a crewmember and the

onboard mechanic on how to properly handle the SPSS’s motor.”

(Id.). In a post-Miranda interview, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra

“admitted to installing engines on SPSSs for [a leader of the

organization] from 2007 until 2010, knowing the SPSSs were

going to be transporting multi-ton quantities of cocaine.”

(Id. at 21-22). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra was extradited from

Colombia to the Middle District of Florida on April 27, 2017.

(Id.).

On January 2, 2019, Judge Tuite entered his Report and

Recommendation, recommending that the plea agreement and plea

of guilty be accepted. (Crim. Doc. # 163). Neither party filed

any objections. This Court accepted the guilty plea. (Crim.

Doc. # 248).

Prior to sentencing, a Presentence Report (“PSR”) was

prepared. (Crim. Doc. # 173). The PSR scored Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra’s offense level as follows: his base offense level

was 38; a two-level enhancement was added because a semi-

submersible vessel was used; a two-level enhancement was

added because the defendant’s role in the offense involved a

special skill – diesel mechanics – and he taught crews how to

operate the vessels; and a three-level reduction was factored

in for acceptance of responsibility. (Id. at 9). As a result,

his total offense level was 39. (Id.). The PSR then identified

that Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra had a prior conviction from 1999

for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute

on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States. (Id. at 10-11). Thus, his criminal history category

was III. (Id.).

On March 18, 2019, this Court held the sentencing

hearing. (Crim. Doc. # 191). There are a few events from the

hearing worth noting. The Court considered the sentence

pronounced for Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s co-defendant, Damaso

Vente-Bonilla, noting that Mr. Micolta-Sinsterra “deserved a

more significant sentence [than Mr. Vente-Bonilla] because of

his prior offenses.” (Crim. Doc. # 273 at 30-33). In further

comparing the sentences, the Court noted that Mr. Vente-

Bonilla was not involved in the 2010 interdiction, while Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra was involved in the 2010 interdiction.

(Id. at 32). The probation officer explained that “[i]n this

case, we used the 2009 manual which has the enhancement for

the SPSS and that was because of the [vessel] that was

[interdicted] in 2010.” (Id.). Thus, the Court found that the

two-level enhancement for the use of a semi-submersible

vessel should apply to Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s sentence

because that enhancement was added by the 2009 guidelines.

(Id.).

During sentencing, Ms. Wright objected on Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra’s behalf to the enhancements for his role in the

offense and the use of the semi-submersible vessel, as well

as for the failure to credit him with a minor role reduction.

(Id. at 6). The Court overruled each objection. (Id. at 14).

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s guidelines range was 324 to 405

months, but the Court varied downward to 240 months’

imprisonment. (Id. at 34-35).

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra filed his notice of appeal on

August 12, 2020. (Crim. Doc. # 283). His appointed counsel

found that the appeal was without merit and filed an Anders

brief. (Crim. Doc. # 287). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed:

“Because independent examination of the entire record reveals

no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is

GRANTED, and Micolta-Sinisterra-Sinisterra’s conviction and

sentence are AFFIRMED.” (Id.).

Now, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra seeks to vacate his

conviction, citing numerous claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel. (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 295). The government

responded in opposition (Civ. Doc. # 8), and Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra filed a reply. (Civ. Doc. # 12). The Motion is

ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra bears the burden of proving that

he is entitled to relief under Section 2255. See LeCroy v.

United States, 739 F.3d 1297, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[O]n a

§ 2255 petition, [the burden of proof] belongs to the

petitioner.”).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his counsel’s

performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra must demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence “that particular and identified acts or omissions of

counsel were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d

1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). In other words, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra

must show that “no competent counsel would have taken the

action that [his] counsel did take.” Id. at 1315. In deciding

whether an attorney’s performance was deficient, courts are

“highly deferential” and “indulge [the] strong presumption

that counsel’s performance was reasonable and that counsel

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

To satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice — Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra must show that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. “To establish prejudice in the context of a

guilty plea, [Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra] must show that there is

a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors,’ he would not have entered a guilty

plea and would have insisted on going to trial.” Solomon v.

United States, No. 1:10-cr-376-RWS-CCH, 2012 WL 1900138, at

*2 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2012) (citation omitted), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:10-cr-0376-RWS, 2012 WL 1900136

(N.D. Ga. May 24, 2012). “[I]f a claim fails to satisfy the

prejudice component, the Court need not make a ruling on the

performance component.” Ortiz v. United States, No 8:15-cr-

409-VMC-JSS, 2017 WL 6021645, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2017).

“[C]ounsel need not always investigate before pursuing

or not pursuing a line of defense. Investigation (even a

nonexhaustive, preliminary investigation) is not required for

counsel reasonably to decline to investigate a line of defense

thoroughly.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1060 (11th

Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “The decision whether to

present a line of defense, or even to investigate it, is a

matter of strategy and is not ineffective unless the

petitioner can prove that the chosen course, in itself, was

unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted);

see also Stephens v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1331

(N.D. Ga. 1998) (“A decision not to investigate a potential

defense, like other litigation decisions, need only be

reasonable to fall within the range of professionally

competent assistance.” (citation omitted)).

Additionally, “[i]n cases where the files and records

make manifest the lack of merit of a Section 2255 claim, the

trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”

United States v. Lagrone, 727 F.2d 1037, 1038 (11th Cir.

1984).

III. Analysis

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra raises three ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. (Civ. Doc. # 2). First, he

claims counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the

validity of the indictment because his conduct was entirely

extraterritorial, and this statute cannot apply

extraterritorially (Ground One). (Id. at 6-18). Second, he

argues that his plea was procedurally invalid because there

was insufficient evidence to support the factual basis for

his plea, which he did not understand at the time due to his

counsel’s ineffective advice (Ground Two). (Id. at 19-25).

Third, he argues that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance at sentencing (Ground Three). (Id. at 26-33). The

Court evaluates each Ground in turn.

A. Ground One

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues first that counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise a challenge that the statutes

which he violated - 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a), 70506(a) and (b) –

cannot be applied extraterritorially. (Id. at 6-11). This

argument is contradicted by the statutory language. Section

70503(a)(1) makes it a crime to “manufacture or distribute,

or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a

controlled substance,” and Section 70503(b) clarifies that

“[s]ubsection (a) applies even though the act is committed

outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”

See United States v. Sinisterra, No. 23-13640, 2025 WL

1157239, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025) (“The MDLEA applies

even though the act is committed outside the territorial

jurisdiction of the United States.” (internal citations and

quotations omitted)). Because the argument that the statute

cannot apply extraterritorially is foreclosed by both the

statutory language and precedent, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s

counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this

meritless argument. See Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1520

(11th Cir. 1990) (“Counsel cannot be labeled ineffective for

failing to raise issues which have no merit.”).

Relatedly, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra next argues that his

counsel should have argued that the Court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over the crime because it did not occur

within the United States. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 11-18). But this

argument is also without merit. At the change of plea hearing,

Judge Tuite sought clarification on what renders the two

vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(Crim. Doc. # 275 at 2:23-24). The prosecutor responded that

the vessels are “stateless” because “[t]here either was no

claim of registry by the - by any of the crewmembers or, if

there was, that was refuted by the country they designated.”

(Id. at 3:1-6). The factual basis in the plea agreement

explained that the trafficking organization’s scheme was to

transport cocaine “through the international waters of the

Pacific Ocean,” and that “two SPSSs belonging to this cocaine

transportation organization were interdicted by the [USCG] in

international waters of the Eastern Pacific Ocean.” (Crim

Doc. # 158 at 20). When these facts were presented at the

change of plea hearing and Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra was asked

if he disagreed with any of these facts, he responded that he

disagreed with “none” of the facts. (Crim. Doc. # 275 at

28:1).

These facts — to which Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra agreed

under oath — are sufficient to establish subject matter

jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit has “long upheld the

authority of Congress to extend the criminal jurisdiction of

this country to any stateless vessel in international waters

engaged in the distribution of controlled substances.” United

States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2014)

(internal quotations omitted); see also United States v.

Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 826 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[W]e have

always upheld extraterritorial convictions under our drug

trafficking laws as an exercise of power under the Felonies

Clause” (internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, No. 24-

6177, 2025 WL 1426696 (May 19, 2025). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra

admitted to participating in a conspiracy involving the

trafficking of cocaine in stateless vessels that were

interdicted on international waters. See (Crim. Doc. # 275 at

2:23-3:6; 28:1); see also United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d

1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Parties may . . . stipulate

to facts that bear on our jurisdictional inquiry.” (internal

quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the Court had subject

matter jurisdiction over the charged conduct, and any

argument otherwise would have been meritless. Thus, Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra’s counsel was not ineffective for failing

to raise this argument. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694

(holding that petitioners must show that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different”); see also Card, 911 F.2d at 1520 (“Counsel cannot

be labeled ineffective for failing to raise issues which have

no merit.”).

The Motion is denied as to this Ground.

B. Ground Two

Next, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra claims that his plea was

involuntary because his counsel failed to advise him that the

government lacked sufficient evidence to support the alleged

conspiracy. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 19-25). Specifically, he asserts

that “[t]he factual basis failed to establish the existence

of any agreement between him and another person, which was a

necessary element of conspiracy.” (Id. at 23). But, as stated

in the plea agreement, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra admitted in his

post-Miranda interview to “installing engines on SPSSs for [a

leader of the drug trafficking organization] from 2007 until

2010, knowing the SPSSs were going to be transporting multi-

ton quantities of cocaine.” (Crim. Doc. # 158 at 21-22). He

also admitted to instructing crewmembers on how to handle the

vessels’ motors. (Crim. Doc. # 275 at 27).

To obtain a conviction, the government needed to “prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy existed, that

the defendant knew about it and that he voluntarily agreed to

join it.” United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 806 (11th

Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). The factual basis for Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra’s plea included the existence of the drug

trafficking conspiracy, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s knowledge of

the conspiracy, and his admission that he joined it

voluntarily. (Crim. Doc. # 158 at 21-22). Therefore, Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra’s plea to the conspiracy charge contained

a sufficient factual basis, and he did not suffer any

prejudice because of counsel’s alleged failure to advise him

of this meritless argument. See United States v. Winfield,

960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[A] lawyer’s failure to

preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a

client.”). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra has not shown that he would

have proceeded to trial in the face of overwhelming evidence

if his counsel had raised doubts about the sufficiency of the

plea agreement’s factual basis. See Solomon, 2012 WL 1900138,

at *2 (requiring plaintiffs claiming ineffective assistance

of counsel in the plea process to demonstrate prejudice by

“show[ing] that there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors,’ he would not have

entered a guilty plea and would have insisted on going to

trial”). This ineffective assistance of counsel argument

fails. See Ortiz, 2017 WL 6021645, at *2 (“[I]f a claim fails

to satisfy the prejudice component, the Court need not make

a ruling on the performance component.”).

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra also argues that his counsel

failed to advise him that the statute of limitations had

passed. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 21-22). However, the statute of

limitations had not passed. The statute of limitations was

five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282. The two vessels were interdicted

on December 31, 2008, and May 2, 2010. (Crim. Doc. # 173 at

7-8). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra was indicted on December 18,

2013. (Crim. Doc. # 1). Thus, the indictment was filed within

five years of each interdiction. Accordingly, Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra’s prosecution was not barred by the statute of

limitations, and it would have been fruitless for his counsel

to argue as such. This argument fails to establish ineffective

assistance of counsel. See Winfield, 960 F.2d at 974 (“[A]

lawyer’s failure to preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot

prejudice a client.”).

The Motion is denied as to Ground Two.

C. Ground Three

Finally, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues that his counsel

provided ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

(Civ. Doc. # 2 at 26-33). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra raises three

supposed errors of his counsel, which the Court analyzes in

turn.

i. Mandatory Minimum

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues that his counsel should

have argued that he was eligible for the statutory safety-

valve, such that the mandatory minimum did not apply. (Id. at

26-29). But he was ineligible for the statutory safety-valve.

He had a prior conviction from 1999 for conspiracy to possess

cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel subject

to the jurisdiction of the United States, which is a three-

point offense. (Crim. Doc. # 173 at 10-11). As Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra has a prior three-point offense, he is ineligible

for safety-valve relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)(B). Thus, Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra cannot establish any prejudice from his

counsel’s failure to raise a meritless argument. See

Winfield, 960 F.2d at 974 (“[A] lawyer’s failure to preserve

a meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a client.”).

ii. Sentencing enhancements

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues that no sentencing

enhancements should have applied to his sentence so his

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to each

enhancement. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 29-30). A two-level enhancement

was added because a semi-submersible vessel was used, and a

two-level enhancement was added because the defendant’s role

in the offense involved a special skill – diesel mechanics –

and he taught crews how to operate the vessels. (Crim. Doc.

# 173 at 9). Notably, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s counsel

objected to each enhancement at sentencing, so she was not

ineffective. (Crim. Doc. # 191 at 6). Even if Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra had adequately identified a specific argument that

his counsel failed to raise, he still could not establish

prejudice because both enhancements were properly applied.

First, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra admitted to being “part of

a Colombia-based cocaine transportation organization that

transported cocaine by . . . semi-submersible . . . vessels.”

(Crim. Doc. # 158 at 20). Thus, the two-level enhancement for

semi-submersible vessel use was properly applied. See USSG

§2D1.1(b)(3)(B) (directing courts to apply two-level

enhancement “[i]f the defendant unlawfully imported or

exported a controlled substance under circumstances in which

. . . a submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel . . .

was used”).

Second, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra admitted to installing

engines on each interdicted vessel and instructing

crewmembers on using the vessels. (Crim. Doc. # 158 at 21).

The PSR also noted that he had “studied diesel mechanics for

six years” and “had training in hydraulics.” (Crim. Doc. #

173 at 9). Therefore, the two-level enhancement for use of a

special skill was properly applied. See USSG §3B1.3

(directing courts to apply two-level enhancement when the

defendant “used a special skill, in a manner that

significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of

the offense”); see also United States v. Mateu, No. 24-10500,

2024 WL 4707423, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2024) (“If an

‘average person off the street’ does not possess the skill,

then the skill is considered special for purposes of applying

the enhancement.”). Having failed to establish both deficient

performance and prejudice, the Court finds that this argument

fails. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

iii. Reference to 2009 Sentencing Guidelines

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues that his counsel erred by

failing to object to the Court’s reference to the 2009

sentencing guidelines in calculating his sentence. (Civ. Doc.

# 2 at 31-33). But Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra misconstrues the

Court’s limited reference to the 2009 sentencing guidelines

at his sentencing hearing. The Court did not calculate his

sentence based off the 2009 guidelines as Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra asserts. (Id.).

Rather, the Court noted that it could apply the

enhancement for the usage of a semi-submersible vessel

because the enhancement was first added by the 2009 guidelines

and the second interdiction occurred in 2010. (Crim. Doc. #

273 at 32). Thus, the Court assured that applying the

enhancement would not violate the ex post facto clause of the

Constitution. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.11(b)(1) (“If the court

determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the

date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex

post facto clause of the United States Constitution, the

court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date

that the offense of conviction was committed.” (emphasis in

original)). Therefore, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra was not

prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to raise this meritless

argument. See Winfield, 960 F.2d at 974 (“[A] lawyer’s failure

to preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a

client.”).

In short, the Motion is denied as to Ground Three.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

As the Court has readily concluded that the Motion lacks

merit, the Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing on

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s Section 2255 Motion. See Lagrone,

727 F.2d at 1038 (holding that courts need not hold

evidentiary hearings in § 2255 actions when the lack of merit

is “manifest”).

V. Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In

Forma Pauperis Denied

The Court declines to issue a certificate of

appealability because Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra has failed to

make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor will the

Court authorize Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra to proceed on appeal

in forma pauperis because such an appeal would not be taken

in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Mr. Micolta-

Sinisterra shall be required to pay the full amount of the

appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b) (1) and (2).

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Silvio Micolta-Sinisterra’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ.

Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 295) is DENIED.

(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the United

States of America and to close this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 6th

day of June, 2025.

Eigen Maca ee

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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