The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
DAVID J. WILSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No.
v. ) 25-11153-BEM
)
EXPERIAN INFORMATION )
SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
MURPHY, J.
Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Dkt. 18, is ALLOWED in part. This case is hereby
REMANDED to the Small Claims Division of Wrentham District Court, Massachusetts.
I. Background
On or around January 23, 2025, Plaintiff David J. Wilson filed this action in the Small
Claims Division of Wrentham District Court, Massachusetts. Dkt. 1-1 at 6. In his original
complaint, Wilson made the following full statement of his claim:
Plaintiff files this Complaint against Defendants & its related entities, officers, and agents
for violations of state and federal laws. Plaintiff seeks Monetary damages of $100,000,
including: $7,000 for base claims & $93,000 in statutory damages, administrative fees.
Plaintiff alleges on or around 02/19/24 Defendants Willfully failed to conduct reasonable
investigations into disputed credit report inaccuracies, violating federal and state consumer
protection laws, Mishandled Plaintiff’s personal and identifying data for financial gain, in
breach of good faith and fair dealing principles under the UCC, Engaged in deceptive,
coercive, and discriminatory business practices that denied Plaintiff fair and equal
treatment. Defendants’ actions resulted in substantial financial, reputational, and
emotional harm to Plaintiff. Their negligent, willful, and discriminatory conduct demands
judicial intervention to rectify the violations, enforce statutory protections, and compensate
Plaintiff for the damages incurred. Defendants do not adhere to any laws and have, ignored
the Massachusetts State Attorney General and CFPB.
Id.
On April 28, 2025, Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) removed
to federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dkt. 1 at 1–2.
Experian argues that Wilson’s claims are brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., providing for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 2.
On May 21, 2025, Wilson moved to remand. Dkt. 18. Wilson argues that his claims are
not brought under the FCRA but rather “under [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (“93A”)] and related
Massachusetts statutes, presenting no federal question.” Id. at 3.1
II. Legal Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. In the absence of jurisdiction, a court is
powerless to act.” Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 362 F.3d 136, 138
(1st Cir. 2004). In a removal action, the removing party bears the burden of showing that
jurisdiction is proper. Lopez-Munoz v. Triple-S Salud, Inc., 754 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2014).
For jurisdictional purposes, whether a claim arises under federal law is determined by
looking at the “four corners” of the complaint. Rossello-Gonzalez v. Calderon-Serra, 398 F.3d
1, 10 (1st Cir. 2004). “[I]t is well-settled that ‘the plaintiff [is] the master of the claim; he or she
may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.’” Id. at 11 (alteration in
Rossello-Gonzalez) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). “[A]ny
ambiguity as to the source of law relied upon by [the plaintiff] ought to be resolved against
removal.” Id. (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941)).
1 Wilson also argues that removal was procedurally deficient. Dkt. 18 at 2–3. Because the Court remands
on other grounds, it need not reach that issue.
III. Discussion
This case presents an interesting puzzle but admits of only one conclusion. Wilson’s
complaint alleges “violations of state and federal laws” and references the CFPB (presumably, the
federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). Dkt. 1-1 at 6. In the first instance, these seem
like strong indicators of some claim under federal law. Cf. Rossello-Gonzalez, 398 F.3d at 11.
However, Wilson demurs that these were intended only as elements of a claim under 93A “and
related Massachusetts statutes.” Dkt. 18 at 3. Indeed, violations of federal statutes can constitute
the basis for a claim under 93A.2 In essence, notwithstanding the complaint’s initial appearance,
Wilson surfaces a colorable latent ambiguity that makes a finding of no jurisdiction, and therefore
remand, appropriate. See Rossello-Gonzalez, 398 F.3d at 11.3
Experian calls this a “bad-faith argument” and likely sees it as a bait-and-switch move by
Wilson following removal. Dkt. 19 at 3–4. But even if Wilson did originally intend to state a
claim under the FCRA, his present renunciation of that claim—and of all claims arising under
federal law—defeats this Court’s jurisdiction:
When a plaintiff amends [his] complaint following [his] suit’s removal, a federal
court’s jurisdiction depends on what the new complaint says. If . . . the plaintiff
eliminates the federal-law claims that enabled removal, leaving only state-law
claims behind, the court’s power to decide the dispute dissolves. With the loss of
2 See, e.g., 940 Mass. Code Regs. 3.16(4) (making certain violations of federal consumer protection statutes
per se violations of 93A). Experian argues that any state-law claim Wilson might make is preempted by the FCRA.
Dkt. 19 at 2 (citing Leet v. Cellco P’ship, 480 F. Supp. 2d 422, 431 (D. Mass. 2007)). Maybe so. But see Hopkinson
v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 2021 WL 664040, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2021), adhered to on reconsideration, 2021
WL 1536171 (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 2021). Either way, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear that argument. See Kasparian
v. Transunion, 2016 WL 4967688, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2016) (holding FCRA preemption defense cannot support
removal) (“[T]he complete preemption doctrine does not apply to the FCRA and therefore removal is not permitted.”).
3 The Court is further guided by the maxim that, “[t]o safeguard the rights of pro se litigants, courts should
‘construe liberally a pro se complaint.’” Falk v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 600 F. Supp. 3d 115, 118 (D. Mass. 2022)
(quoting Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997)). Wilson rightly points out that, as plaintiff, it is his
right to determine the nature of his complaint. Dkt. 18 at 3; see also Rossello-Gonzalez, 398 F.3d at 10. Accordingly,
the Court reads the complaint liberally in favor of preserving that right.
federal-question jurisdiction, the court loses as well its supplemental jurisdiction
over the state claims.
Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 30 (2025) (abrogating Ching v. Mitre
Corp., 921 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, whether the Court construes the complaint
ab origine in Wilson’s favor (excluding federal claims) or instead treats Wilson’s motion for
remand as an effective amendment or clarification, the result is the same.4
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Dkt. 18, is ALLOWED in part.
This action is hereby remanded to the Small Claims Division of Wrentham District Court,
Massachusetts.5
So Ordered.
/s/ Brian E. Murphy
Brian E. Murphy
Dated: June 5, 2025 Judge, United States District Court
4 Since the Court relies upon and adopts Wilson’s characterization of the complaint, he will presumably be
estopped from arguing otherwise down the line. See Brown v. Quinn, 406 Mass. 641, 646 (1990). Thus, Wilson’s
motion, and this Court’s allowance of it, effectively limits the scope of the current complaint.
5 Wilson asks the Court to send the case directly to Norfolk Superior Court, arguing that his alleged damages
exceed the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims Division, where Wilson originally filed. Dkt. 18 at 1–3. The Court
believes that this would be improper. The remand statute contemplates that a district court’s remand order will be
issued “to the State court from which [the case] was removed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (emphasis added). The statute’s
broader use of the definite article further supports the conclusion that the district court lacks discretion in this regard.
See, e.g., id. § 1447(c) (referring to “the State court” to which a district court may remand and that thereupon proceeds
with the case (emphasis added)).