Ulshafer v. Kijakazi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KORI LYNN ULSHAFER, : Civil No. 4:23-CV-1181

:

Plaintiff :

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

FRANK BISIGNANO,1 :

Commissioner of Social Security, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Social Security appeals are governed by a familiar five-step paradigm. At Step

3 of this process an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) must determine whether the

claimant’s impairments are so severe that they meet or equal a regulatory listing

which defines a person as presumptively disabled. In order to satisfy this burden of

proof at Step 3, the claimant must show that her impairments meet all of the pertinent

listing requirements. This is an exacting burden of proof and persuasion.

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025.

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano

should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to

continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

1

Once the ALJ makes this determination, we are enjoined to apply a deferential

standard of review to this Step 3 analysis, a standard of review which simply asks

whether there is “substantial evidence” supporting the Administrative Law Judge’s

(ALJ) determination. With respect to this legal guidepost, as the Supreme Court has

explained:

The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout

administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency

factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––,

135 S. Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-

evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record

and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the

agency’s factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,

305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis

deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts,

the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial

evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,

e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks

omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206. See Dickinson v.

Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)

(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-

erroneous standard).

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

In the instant case, the plaintiff, Kori Ulshafer, argues that the Administrative

Law Judge erred in failing to recognize that his emotional impairments were per se

disabling. According to Ulshafer this legal error was a product of another error in

that the ALJ discounted her own subjective complaints. However, after a review of

2

the record, and mindful of the fact that substantial evidence “means only—‘such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion,’” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, we conclude that substantial evidence

supported the ALJ’s findings in this case. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below,

we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

A. Introduction

On April 14, 2020, Kori Ulshafer filed a Title II application disability benefits.

(Tr. 15). In this application Ulshafer alleged, in part, that she was disabled due to an

array of emotional impairments. (Tr. 18).2 Ulshafer was born on July 3, 1982 and

was 37 years old at the time of the alleged onset of her disability, making her a

younger worker under the Commissioner’s regulations. (Tr. 29). She had at least a

high school education and prior employment in the corrections field. (Tr. 28-29.

B. Ulshafer’s Emotional Impairments—The Clinical Record and

Opinion Evidence.

As the ALJ observed, with respect to Ulshafer’s emotional impairments:

The record reflects ongoing mental health treatment on an outpatient

basis through September 2021 (7F, 12F, 13F, 14F, 16F, 17F). She

2 While Ulshafer’s application also mentioned some physical impairments, her

appeal focuses solely upon the ALJ’s consideration of her psychological limitations.

Therefore, we will confine our discussion to the emotional conditions at issue in this

appeal.

3

reported that she has been out of work as a corrections officer due to an

incident that happened with her coworkers, which was unpleasant and

caused her to have panic attacks (7F/6). Treatment records generally

note that Xanax helps with panic attacks and Effexor was helping in

daily life (7F, 14F, 17F). Additionally, depression screenings were

either positive for only minimal or no depression (7F, 17F). Treatment

records from October 2019 note that the claimant’s anxiety and

depression were controlled with medication (7F/2). Her depression was

again reportedly controlled with medication in July 2020 (7F/10). The

records also reflect that the claimant had a friend with whom she sees

regularly went to Georgia with her friend during the period at issue (6F,

14F/36). While the treatment record reflects reports that she had a panic

attack when she found out that her best friend was moving to Georgia,

it notes that it only lasted approximately fifteen minutes and that the

claimant was able to calm down and breathe through it (14F/16, 18).

Mental status examinations during the period at issue reflect variations

in mood at times, but were otherwise generally within normal limits

(7F, 13F, 14F, 16F, 17F). However, a new patient examination in July

2021 was positive for psychomotor agitation of fidgeting and picking

fingers; dysthymic, anxious, and irritable mood; labile, but mood

congruent and redirectable affect; and a short attention span, but was

otherwise generally within normal limits (12F). A new patient visit to

establish care with a primary care physician in January 2021 notes that

the claimant’s PTSD, anxiety, and depression were clinically stable and

that the claimant was doing well (9F/35).

(Tr. 24).

Given this fairly unremarkable treatment history, no medical source clearly

opined that Ulshafer’s emotional impairments met a listing requirement which

would have defined her as per se disabled. Instead, with respect to this issue, three

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medical opinions that were deemed persuasive by the ALJ3 indicated that the

plaintiff’s psychological impairments did not reach listing level severity. As the ALJ

explained when analyzing these medical opinions:

The State agency psychological consultant on initial review, Valorie

Rings, Psy.D., opined that the claimant has moderate limitation in

interacting with others and adapting or managing oneself, but no

limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information and

concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace and that she could

understand, remember, and follow simple instructions, in that she could

perform/follow one and two-step tasks/instructions (1A). The

undersigned finds this opinion partially persuasive. The undersigned

finds it persuasive to the extent it is consistent with the evidence of

record, such as the finding that the claimant could perform simple and

routine work, but is inconsistent with the finding that the claimant has

no limitation in concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace, yet is

limited to one to two-step tasks. As it pertains to Dr. Rings’ indication

that the claimant is capable of performing one to two-step tasks, if that

is an example and not a limitation, it is consistent with the longitudinal

evidence of record. However, if it is meant to be a limitation, it is

inconsistent with the longitudinal evidence, including the claimant’s

reported daily activities, which show that the claimant engages in multi-

step tasks, including personal care and hygiene, mowing the lawn and

other household chores, making and attending doctor’s appointments,

weeding the garden, driving a motor vehicle when needed, shopping in

stores and online, playing video games, and listening to the radio.

Additionally, considering the claimant ongoing reported complaints of

interaction difficulties and testimony that she experiences panic attacks

while in public, the undersigned added additional interaction

limitations. As for adapting and managing oneself, the undersigned

finds this portion of the opinion not persuasive, as it is inconsistent with

the evidence of record, including the relatively benign clinical findings

3 The ALJ’s decision found two other medical opinions unpersuasive. (Tr. 27-28).

However, Ulshafer does not appear to challenge the assessment of these medical

opinions on appeal.

5

on mental status examinations and ability to perform a variety of daily

activities, described in detail herein, does not support more than mild

limitation in that functional domain.

(Tr. 26).

On reconsideration, a second state agency expert reached similar conclusions

according to the ALJ:

The State agency psychological consultant on reconsideration, Dante

Emmanuel Mancini, Ph.D., opined that the claimant has moderate

limitation in interacting with others; mild limitation in adapting or

managing oneself and concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace;

and no limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying

information and that she could meet the demands to complete one to

two-step tasks on a sustained basis (3A). The undersigned finds this

opinion partially persuasive. The undersigned finds it persuasive to the

extent it is consistent with the evidence of record, such as the finding

that the claimant could perform simple and routine work, but is

inconsistent with the finding that the claimant has mild limitation in

concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace, yet is limited to one to

two-step tasks. As it pertains to Dr. Mancini’s indication that the

claimant is capable of performing one to two-step tasks, if that is an

example and not a limitation, it is consistent with the longitudinal

evidence of record. However, if it is meant to be a limitation, it is

inconsistent with the longitudinal evidence, including the claimant’s

reported daily activities, which show that the claimant engages in multi-

step tasks, including personal care and hygiene, mowing the lawn and

other household chores, making and attending doctor’s appointments,

weeding the garden, driving a motor vehicle when needed, shopping in

stores and online, playing video games, and listening to the radio.

Additionally, considering the claimant ongoing reported complaints of

interaction difficulties and testimony that she experiences panic attacks

while in public, the undersigned added additional interaction

limitations.

6

(Tr. 26-27).

Finally, a consulting examining source also opined that Ulshafer’s emotional

impairments, while severe, were not per se disabling. With respect to this opinion,

the ALJ concluded as follows:

The consultative psychological examiner, Jennifer Betts, Psy.D.,

opined that the claimant has no limitation in understanding,

remembering, or applying information and moderate limitation in

interacting with coworkers, supervisors, coworkers, and the public, but

marked limitation in responding appropriately to work situations and

changes in routine (6F). The undersigned finds this opinion partially

persuasive. The undersigned finds it persuasive to the extent it is

consistent with and supported by the evidence of record, such as the

finding that the claimant can perform simple work and limitations

regarding interacting with supervisors and coworkers. However, while

some concentration, persistence, or pace limitations are warranted and

the undersigned afforded additional limitations related to interacting

with the public. However, the evidence does not support marked

limitation in adapting or managing oneself. More specifically, as for

supportability, the consultative examination itself describes depressed

mood and affect and was positive for tearfulness at times, but was

otherwise generally within normal limits. As for consistency, treatment

records also reflect variations in mood and affect, but were otherwise

generally within normal limits. Additionally, this opinion is based on a

one-time self-reported snapshot of the claimant’s alleged mental

limitations; however, even the claimant’s reported daily activities and

allegations do not support marked limitation in adapting or managing

oneself.

(Tr. 27).

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C. The ALJ Hearing and Decision

It was against this equivocal medical backdrop that Ulshafer’s disability claim

came to be heard by the ALJ on September 8, 2021. (Tr. 37-69). Following this

hearing, on April 18, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision denying Ulshafer’s application

for benefits. (Tr. 12-30). In that decision, the ALJ first concluded that Ulshafer met

the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2025 and

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 5, 2019, her amended

alleged onset date. (Tr. 17-18). At Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs

Social Security cases, the ALJ found that Ulshafer had the following severe

impairments: anxiety disorder/generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress

disorder (PTSD), major depressive disorder/persistent depressive disorder, panic

disorder with agoraphobia, dysthymia, nightmares, obesity, asthma, and vertigo. (Tr.

18).

At Step 3, the ALJ determined that Ulshafer’s impairments did not meet or

medically equal the severity of any listed impairments. (Id.) In particular, with

respect to Ulshafer’s emotional impairments, the ALJ found that:

The severity of the claimant’s mental impairments, considered singly

and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of

listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15. In making this finding, the undersigned

has considered whether the “paragraph B” criteria are satisfied. To

satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria, the mental impairments must result

in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad area of

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functioning. An extreme limitation is the inability to function

independently, appropriately, or effectively, and on a sustained basis.

A marked limitation is a seriously limited ability to function

independently, appropriately, or effectively, and on a sustained basis.

In understanding, remembering, or applying information, the claimant

has a mild limitation. The claimant alleges difficulty following

instructions and memory deficits, she reported no difficulties with

understanding (4E). The claimant reported that she needs reminders to

go places, but that they are not needed for caring for her personal

hygiene or taking medication (4E). She also reported that she must re-

read written instructions several times (4E). However, she reported that

she helps her children with their homework, prepares basic meals,

drives a motor vehicle when needed, and manages money (4E,

Testimony). Treatment records generally describe full orientation,

intact short and long-term memory skills, grossly intact cognitive skills,

and coherent, organized, and goal directed thought processes (11F, 12F,

13F, 14F, 16F, 17F). Additionally, the consultative examination

describes coherent and goal directed thought process, clear sensorium,

full orientation, intact recent and remote memory skills, average

cognitive functioning, and appropriate general fund of information

(6F). No treating, examining, or reviewing source opined that the

claimant has greater limitation in this functional domain (1A, 3A, 2F,

6F). Thus, the evidence of record wholly supports the finding that the

claimant’s mental impairments cause mild limitation in understanding,

remembering, or applying information.

In interacting with others, the claimant has a moderate limitation. The

claimant alleges difficulty getting along with others, including

authority figures (4E). She reported that she does not want to be around

other people most of the time, that she stays home a lot, that she does

not visit friends or family as much, and that she is unable to be around

crowds (4E). However, she reported that she has never been fired from

a job for problems getting along with others (4E). Additionally, the

record reflects that the claimant took a weekend trip to Georgia to see

her friend’s new home, at which time she stayed in a hotel, went to eat

at restaurants, walked around the area to see some sights, and went on

a small trolley tour of the area (14F/36, Testimony). Moreover,

9

although she and her husband had balcony seats, she testified that she

attended a concert in January 2020, in which there were a lot of people

in attendance. She also testified that she has been to a park with her

friend and daughter twice since moving to Pennsylvania and reported

that she shops in stores and visits with family (4E). Treatment records

during the period at issue generally describe cooperative, calm, and

friendly attitude; normal speech; normal behavior; normal appearance;

good eye contact; and normal thought content without reported

hallucinations, delusions, paranoia, or homicidal ideations (1F, 7F, 8F,

9F, 11F, 12F, 13F, 14F, 16F, 17F). Additionally, the consultative

examination describes cooperative demeanor, fair manner of relating

and social skills, satisfactory grooming and hygiene, appropriate eye

contact, fluent and clear speech, and no evidence of hallucinations,

delusions, paranoia, or homicidal ideations (6F). The State agency

psychological consultants opined that the claimant has moderate

limitation in this functional domain (1A, 3A). While the consultative

psychological examiner, Jennifer Betts, Psy.D., opined that the

claimant has marked limitation in responding appropriately to

workplace situations and changes in routine, she opined that the

claimant otherwise has moderate limitation in interacting with

coworkers, supervisors, and the public (6F). Thus, the evidence of

record wholly supports the finding that the claimant’s mental

impairments cause moderate limitation in interacting with others.

With regard to concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the

claimant has a moderate limitation. The claimant alleges difficulties

with concentration and completing tasks (4E). She further reported that

she must re-read written instructions several times and that she does not

follow spoken instructions very well due to her lack of focus and

concentration (4E). However, she reported that she helps her children

with their homework, prepares basic meals, drives a motor vehicle

when needed, and manages money (4E, Testimony). The consultative

examination also notes that the claimant enjoys music and television

(6F). The consultative examination notes only mildly impaired

attention and concentration skills, but coherent and goal directed

thought process (6F). Treatment records generally describe normal

attention span and concentration skills and logical, relevant, and goal

directed thought processes (11F, 13F, 14F, 17F). However, at a new

10

client appointment in July 2021, the record was positive for obsessions

with skin picking and short attention span, but also reflects coherent,

organized, and goal directed thought process (12F). No treating,

examining, or reviewing source opined that the claimant has greater

limitation in this functional domain (1A, 3A, 2F, 6F). Thus, the

evidence of record wholly supports the finding that the claimant’s

mental impairments cause moderate limitation in concentration,

persistence, or maintaining pace.

As for adapting or managing oneself, the claimant has experienced a

mild limitation. The claimant alleges that she is “terrible” at handling

stress and changes in routine (4E). However, the record is devoid of

inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations or participation in a

hospitalization program during the period at issue. Additionally, the

record is generally devoid of reported hallucinations, delusions,

paranoia, obsessions, or suicidal or homicidal ideations or apparent

difficulties with impulse control. The claimant reported that she cares

for her children and pets; relatively independently cares for her personal

hygiene; prepares basic meals; performs indoor and outdoor household

chores, including washing laundry and dishes, vacuuming, dusting, and

mowing the lawn with a push mower; shopping in stores and online;

generally manages her personal finances; drives a motor vehicle; and

leaves her residence unaccompanied (4E). The consultative

examination also reflects that the claimant dresses, bathes, and grooms

herself on a daily basis despite negative moods 6F). Treatment records

generally reflect variations in mood and affect, but were otherwise

generally within normal limits (1F, 7F, 11F, 12F, 13F, 14F, 16F, 17F).

Additionally, the consultative examination was positive for depressed

mood and affect with tearfulness at times but was otherwise generally

within normal limits (6F). Primary care treatment records from January

2021 note that the claimant’s PTSD, depression, and anxiety were

clinically stable and that she was doing well (9F/35). There is no

evidence of an inability to set realistic goals, make plans independent

of others, travel to unfamiliar places, avoid normal hazards, or take

appropriate precautions. No treating, examining, or reviewing source

opined that the claimant’s mental impairments cause mild limitation in

adapting or managing oneself.

11

Because the claimant’s mental impairments do not cause at least two

“marked” limitations or one “extreme” limitation, the “paragraph B”

criteria are not satisfied.

The undersigned has also considered whether the “paragraph C” criteria

are satisfied. In this case, the evidence fails to establish the presence of

the “paragraph C” criteria. The claimant is capable of self-sustainment

and the record reveals that the claimant is also capable of some

adjustment to minor changes in mental demands. The claimant has not

required psychiatric hospitalizations and mental status examinations

fail to show significant clinical abnormalities during the period at issue.

(Tr. 19-21).

Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ fashioned a residual functional capacity

(“RFC”), considering Ulshafer’s limitations from her impairments, stating that:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds

that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full

range of work at all exertional levels but with the following limitations:

the claimant is limited to occupations that require no more than

occasional postural maneuvers, such as stooping, kneeling, crouching,

crawling, and climbing on ramps and stairs, but must avoid occupations

that require climbing on ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. The claimant is

limited to occupations that require no more than frequent balancing.

The claimant must avoid concentrated prolonged exposure to fumes,

odors, dusts, gases, chemical irritants, environments with poor

ventilation, temperature extremes, vibration, or extreme dampness and

humidity. The claimant must avoid all exposure to hazards, such as

dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. The claimant is limited

to simple routine repetitive work, generally described as unskilled, with

no more than a specific vocational preparation (SVP) of two and that is

low stress, defined as only occasional decision making required and

only occasional changes in the work setting. The claimant is limited to

occupations which require no more than occasional interaction with

supervisors and coworkers and no interaction with members of the

general public.

12

(Tr. 21-22).

Specifically, in making the RFC determination, the ALJ considered the

clinical evidence, the medical opinions, and Ulshafer’s self-described activities.

Ultimately, the ALJ found based upon this evidence that the plaintiff’s “statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr.

23). As the ALJ explained with regard to her emotional impairments:

As for the claimant’s alleged mental functional limitations, the

evidence of record does not support greater limitations than those

provided herein. The record is devoid of inpatient psychiatric

hospitalizations or participation in a partial hospitalization program

during the period at issue. Additionally, the record is generally devoid

of reported hallucinations, delusions, paranoia, obsessions, or suicidal

or homicidal ideations or apparent difficulties with impulse control.

The record reflects emergency treatment for complaints of chest pain

with reports that she thought she was just having a panic attack in

September 2019 (1F). A cardiovascular work-up was negative;

however, a physical examination was positive for anxious mood and

affect (1F). Nevertheless, the record reflects that there was no concern

for acute psychological decompensation warranting either involuntary

or voluntary hospitalization (1F).

The record reflects ongoing mental health treatment on an outpatient

basis through September 2021 (7F, 12F, 13F, 14F, 16F, 17F). She

reported that she has been out of work as a corrections officer due to an

incident that happened with her coworkers, which was unpleasant and

caused her to have panic attacks (7F/6). Treatment records generally

note that Xanax helps with panic attacks and Effexor was helping in

daily life (7F, 14F, 17F). Additionally, depression screenings were

13

either positive for only minimal or no depression (7F, 17F). Treatment

records from October 2019 note that the claimant’s anxiety and

depression were controlled with medication (7F/2). Her depression was

again reportedly controlled with medication in July 2020 (7F/10). The

records also reflect that the claimant had a friend with whom she sees

regularly went to Georgia with her friend during the period at issue (6F,

14F/36). While the treatment record reflects reports that she had a panic

attack when she found out that her best friend was moving to Georgia,

it notes that it only lasted approximately fifteen minutes and that the

claimant was able to calm down and breathe through it (14F/16, 18).

Mental status examinations during the period at issue reflect variations

in mood at times, but were otherwise generally within normal limits

(7F, 13F, 14F, 16F, 17F). However, a new patient examination in July

2021 was positive for psychomotor agitation of fidgeting and picking

fingers; dysthymic, anxious, and irritable mood; labile, but mood

congruent and redirectable affect; and a short attention span, but was

otherwise generally within normal limits (12F). A new patient visit to

establish care with a primary care physician in January 2021 notes that

the claimant’s PTSD, anxiety, and depression were clinically stable and

that the claimant was doing well (9F/35).

The claimant presented for a consultative psychological examination in

August 2020, at which time she reported that depression and anxiety

were predominantly the reasons for her leaving her past work as a

corrections officer (6F). However, a mental status examination at that

time was negative for significant clinical abnormalities (6F). More

specifically, it was positive for depressed mood and affect with

tearfulness at times, mildly impaired attention and concentration skills,

and fair manner of relating and social skills, but was otherwise

generally within normal limits (6F).

Pursuant to SSR 16-3p, if we cannot make a disability determination or

decision that is fully favorable based solely on objective medical

evidence, then we carefully consider other evidence in the record in

reaching a conclusion about the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of an individual's symptoms. Other evidence that we will

consider includes statements from the individual, medical sources, and

any other sources that might have information about the individual's

14

symptoms, including agency personnel, as well as the factors set forth

in our regulations. Other non-medical sources may provide information

from which we may draw inferences and conclusions about an

individual's statements that would be helpful to us in assessing the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms. Examples of

such sources include public and private agencies, other practitioners,

educational and personnel records, non-medical sources such as family

and friends, and agency personnel.

As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of her symptoms, they do not support greater limitations

than those accounted for herein. In addition to the claimant’s limited,

routine, and conservative course of treatment, the claimant has retained

the ability to perform a wide range of daily activities, described in detail

herein. Thus, the evidence of record wholly supports the finding that

the claimant’s vertigo, asthma, and obesity, considered singly and in

combination, do not cause any exertional limitations and are adequately

accommodated by limiting her to no more than frequent balancing;

occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing

ramps and stairs; but avoids occupations that require climbing on

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and avoids all exposure to hazards. To

prevent exacerbation of symptoms, the claimant must avoid

concentrated prolonged exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases,

chemical irritants, environments with poor ventilation, temperature

extremes, vibration, and extreme dampness and humidity. As for the

claimant’s mental impairments, the evidence of record wholly supports

the finding that her symptoms are adequately accommodated by

limiting her to simple, routine, repetitive work, generally described as

unskilled, with no more than an SVP of 2 and are low stress, defined as

only occasional decision making required and occasional changes in the

work setting and is limited to no more than occasional interaction with

supervisors and coworkers, but no interaction with the public.

(Tr. 24-25).

Having arrived at this RFC assessment, the ALJ found at Step 5 that there

were jobs which existed in substantial numbers in the national economy which

15

Ulshafer could perform. (Tr. 29-30). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the

plaintiff did not meet the stringent standard for disability set by the Act and denied

this claim. (Id.)

This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, Ulshafer contends that the ALJ

erred in assessing the severity of her symptoms and failed to recognize that she was

per se disabled at Step 3 due to her emotional impairments. This case is fully briefed

and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm

the decision of the Commissioner.

III. Discussion

A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court

When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s

application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the

findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the

record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200

(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).

Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but

rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial

evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.

16

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not

substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a

conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir.

1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be

“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision]

from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n,

383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”

Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).

The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review in

this field, noting that:

The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout

administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency

factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––,

135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-

evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record

and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the

agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,

305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis

deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts,

the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial

evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,

e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks

omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

17

Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v.

Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)

(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-

erroneous standard).

Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.

The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is

disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is

supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application

of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205,

at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote

a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.

Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of

a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v.

Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal

matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review

of all legal issues . . . .”).

Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential

standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must

not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777

F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d

Cir. 2005)). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence.

18

Rather our task is to simply determine whether substantial evidence supported the

ALJ’s findings. However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets

the burden of articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial

review. Simply put, “this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his

decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).

As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score:

In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for

his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are

insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and

an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable

meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d

501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ

particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use

particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his

analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.

Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).

Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the

ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that

decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is

sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.

This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim

made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s

mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the

19

United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that

apply in this setting. In Hess, the court of appeals considered the question of whether

an RFC, which limited a claimant to simple tasks, adequately addressed moderate

limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s

argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental

limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which

would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis.

Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s

rationale, the court held that, “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a

‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’

difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931

F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, the appellate court indicated that an ALJ

offers a valid explanation a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as

“mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] could

function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do simple

work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc.

Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019).

In our view, the teachings of the Hess decision are straightforward. In

formulating a mental RFC, the ALJ does not need to rely upon any particular form

20

of words. Further, the adequacy of the mental RFC is not gauged in the abstract.

Instead, the evaluation of a claimant’s ability to undertake the mental demands of

the workplace will be viewed in the factual context of the case, and a mental RFC is

sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in the evidence.

B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ

To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a

claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); see also 20

C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe

physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous

work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42

U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of

the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the

insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on

which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).

In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a

five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). Under this process,

21

the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in

substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)

whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether

the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant

is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience

and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4).

Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual

functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able

to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.

§§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of

the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe

impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R.

§404.1545(a)(2).

There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that

determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the

physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role

and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have

followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical

22

opinion support for an RFC determination and have suggested that “[r]arely can a

decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an

assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.”

Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013)

(quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that: “There is no legal

requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts

in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11

(3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any

credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the

proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a

physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D.

Pa. 2015).

These seemingly discordant legal propositions can be reconciled by

evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize

the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in

the factual setting where a well-supported medical source has identified limitations

that would support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion

which supported a disability determination based upon a lay assessment of other

23

evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In this setting, these cases simply restate

the commonplace idea that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration

when making a disability determination, particularly when those opinions support a

finding of disability. In contrast, when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence, such

as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony regarding the claimant’s

activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have adopted a more pragmatic

view and have sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based upon all

of the facts and evidence. See Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir.

2006); Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). In either

event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment

of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if

it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d

Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at

*5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar

v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun

v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12,

2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366

(M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018).

24

At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in

engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this

burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show

that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could

perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and

RFC. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.

The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive

requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the

ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination.

Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence

standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory

explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d

Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate

which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for

rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-07. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his

decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for

his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).

25

C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of a Claimant’s

Alleged Symptoms

The interplay between the deferential substantive standard of review that

governs Social Security appeals, and the requirement that courts carefully assess

whether an ALJ has met the standards of articulation required by law, is also

illustrated by those cases which consider analysis of a claimant’s reported pain.

When evaluating lay testimony regarding a claimant’s reported degree of pain and

disability, we are reminded that:

[T]he ALJ must necessarily make certain credibility determinations,

and this Court defers to the ALJ's assessment of credibility. See Diaz v.

Comm'r, 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir.2009) (“In determining whether

there is substantial evidence to support an administrative law judge's

decision, we owe deference to his evaluation of the evidence [and]

assessment of the credibility of witnesses....”). However, the ALJ must

specifically identify and explain what evidence he found not credible

and why he found it not credible. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d

Cir.1994) (citing Stewart v. Sec'y of Health, Education and Welfare,

714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir.1983)); see also Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d

1050, 1054 (9th Cir.2006) (stating that an ALJ is required to provide

“specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony”). An ALJ cannot reject

evidence for an incorrect or unsupported reason. Ray v. Astrue, 649

F.Supp.2d 391, 402 (E.D.Pa.2009) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d

1058, 1066 (3d Cir.1993)).

Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612–13 (3d Cir. 2014).

Yet, it is also clear that:

Great weight is given to a claimant's subjective testimony only when it

is supported by competent medical evidence. Dobrowolsky v. Califano,

606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979); accord Snedeker v. Comm'r of Soc.

26

Sec., 244 Fed.Appx. 470, 474 (3d Cir. 2007). An ALJ may reject a

claimant's subjective testimony that is not found credible so long as

there is an explanation for the rejection of the testimony. Social

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–7p; Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Social

Security, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). Where an ALJ finds that

there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the

individual's pain or other symptoms, however, the severity of which is

not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a

finding on the credibility of the individual's statements based on a

consideration of the entire case record.

McKean v. Colvin, 150 F.Supp.3d 406, 415–16 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (footnotes omitted).

Thus, we are instructed to review an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s subjective

reports of pain under a standard of review which is deferential with respect to the

ALJ’s well-articulated findings but imposes a duty of clear articulation upon the ALJ

so that we may conduct meaningful review of the ALJ’s conclusions.

In the same fashion that medical opinion evidence is evaluated, the Social

Security Rulings and Regulations provide a framework under which the severity of

a claimant's reported symptoms are to be considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529,

416.929; SSR 16–3p. It is important to note that though the “statements of the

individual concerning his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is

not required to credit them.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363

(3d. Cir. 2011) (referencing 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(a) (“statements about your pain or

other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled”). It is well settled in

27

the Third Circuit that “[a]llegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be

supported by objective medical evidence.” Hantraft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d

Cir. 1999) (referring to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). When evaluating a claimant’s

symptoms, the ALJ must follow a two-step process in which the ALJ resolves

whether a medically determinable impairment could be the cause of the symptoms

alleged by the claimant, and subsequently must evaluate the alleged symptoms in

consideration of the record as a whole. SSR 16-3p.

First, symptoms, such as pain or fatigue, will only be considered to affect a

claimant's ability to perform work activities if such symptoms result from an

underlying physical or mental impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by

medical signs or laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR

16–3p. During the second step of this credibility assessment, the ALJ must determine

whether the claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally

limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated based on the ALJ's

evaluation of the entire case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16–

3p. This includes but is not limited to medical signs and laboratory findings,

diagnoses, and other medical opinions provided by treating or examining sources,

and other medical sources, as well as information concerning the claimant's

symptoms and how they affect his or her ability to work. Id. The Social Security

28

Administration has recognized that individuals may experience their symptoms

differently and may be limited by their symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than

other individuals with the same medical impairments, signs, and laboratory findings.

SSR 16–3p.

Thus, to assist in the evaluation of a claimant's subjective symptoms, the

Social Security Regulations identify seven factors which may be relevant to the

assessment of the severity or limiting effects of a claimant's impairment based on a

claimant's symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). These factors

include: activities of daily living; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of

the claimant's symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage,

effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to

alleviate his or her symptoms; treatment, other than medication that a claimant has

received for relief; any measures the claimant has used to relieve his or her

symptoms; and, any other factors concerning the claimant's functional limitations

and restrictions. Id.; see Koppenaver v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-1525, 2019 WL

1995999, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub

nom. Koppenhaver v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-1525, 2019 WL 1992130 (M.D. Pa.

May 6, 2019); Martinez v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-1090, 2015 WL 5781202, at *8–9

29

(M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015); George v. Colvin, No. 4:13–CV–2803, 2014 WL

5449706, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2014).

D. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Ulshafer’s appeal of this adverse decision faces a series of interlocking

obstacles. First, by arguing that the ALJ erred at Step 3 by failing to find that she

was per se disabled, Ulshafer faces a significant burden of proof and persuasion.

At Step 3 of this sequential analysis, the ALJ is required to determine whether,

singly or in combination, a claimant's ailments and impairments are so severe that

they are per se disabling and entitle the claimant to benefits. As part of

this step three disability evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether a

claimant's alleged impairment is equivalent to a number of listed impairments,

commonly referred to as listings, that are acknowledged as so severe as to preclude

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.

P, App. 1; Burnett, 220 F.3d 112, 119.

In making this determination, the ALJ is guided by several basic principles

set forth by the social security regulations and case law. First, if a claimant's

impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is considered

disabled per se and is awarded benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); Burnett, 220 F.3d

at 119. However, to qualify for benefits by showing that an impairment, or

30

combination of impairments, is equivalent to a listed impairment, a plaintiff bears

the burden of presenting “medical findings equivalent in severity to all the criteria

for the one most similar impairment.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990);

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). An impairment, no matter how severe, that meets or equals

only some of the criteria for a listed impairment is not sufficient. Id.

Moreover, while the ALJ's treatment of this issue must go beyond a summary

conclusion, since a bare conclusion “is beyond meaningful judicial review,” Burnett,

220 F.3d at 119, case law “does not require the ALJ to use particular language or

adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis. Rather, the function ... is to

ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings

to permit meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. This goal is met when the

ALJ's decision, “read as a whole,” id., permits a meaningful review of the

SLJ's Step 3 analysis.

In addition, this question of per se disability is judged as a general matter

under a deferential standard of review. In this setting, we are mindful that we are not

free to substitute our independent assessment of the evidence for the ALJ’s

determinations. Rather, we must simply ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence, a quantum of proof which is less than a

preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla, Richardson, 402 U.S.

31

at 401, and “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565.

Finally, when addressing the ALJ’s duty of articulation with regard to a

claimant’s emotional limitations, “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a

‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’

difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931

F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, the appellate court indicated that an ALJ

offers a valid explanation a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as

“mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] could

function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do simple

work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc.

Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019).

Judged against these deferential standards of review, we are constrained to

find that substantial evidence supported the decision by the ALJ that Ulshafer was

not disabled. Therefore, we will affirm this decision.

In reaching this result we note at the outset, that to the extent Ulshafer argues

that the ALJ failed to sufficiently explain her Step 3 findings, this argument fails in

light of the thorough analysis conducted here. The ALJ’s decision provided a careful,

32

and complete, articulation of the reasons why Ulshafer had not established a per se

disability at Step 3. Drawing upon the clinical record, the plaintiff’s activities of

daily living and the greater weight of the persuasive medical opinion evidence the

ALJ determined that Ulshafer had not proven that she met all of the pertinent listing

criteria. This conclusion was supported by substantial evidence; that is, “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. There was no error here.

Nor was the ALJ required to uncritically accept Ulshafer’s subjective reports

regarding the severity of his symptoms when engaging in this Step 3 evaluation.

Quite the contrary, the ALJ was obliged to assess those subjective reports in light of

the clinical evidence, the plaintiff’s activities of daily living, and the medical opinion

evidence. In this case, that analysis yielded a conclusion that Ulshafer’s complaints

were only partially credible and did not satisfy the exacting standards prescribed at

Step 3. Once again, substantial evidence; that is, “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Biestek v.

Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019), supported this finding which was consistent

with the greater weight of persuasive medical opinions. Thus, in the final analysis,

the ALJ’s decision in this case, was entirely consistent with settled caselaw, which

holds that we should affirm “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,” for a

33

mental RFC. Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this

score, it is well-settled that an ALJ offers a valid explanation for a simple task RFC

when the ALJ highlights factors such as “mental status examinations and reports that

revealed that [the claimant] could function effectively; opinion evidence showing

that [the claimant] could do simple work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily

living, which demonstrated that [s]he is capable of engaging in a diverse array of

‘simple tasks[.]’” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019). In

the instant case the ALJ fulfilled this duty by explaining that the plaintiff’s

allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms were not fully consistent with

clinical records, the plaintiff’s activities living, and other more persuasive medical

opinions. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions in this regard. Thus,

there was no error here.

In closing, the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence in this case complied with

the dictates of the law and was supported by substantial evidence. This is all that the

law requires, and all that a claimant can demand in a disability proceeding. Thus,

notwithstanding the argument that this evidence might have been viewed in a way

which would have also supported a different finding, we are obliged to affirm this

ruling once we find that it is “supported by substantial evidence, ‘even [where] this

court acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.’” Monsour Med.

34

Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190–91 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Hunter Douglas,

Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, under the deferential

standard of review that applies to appeals of Social Security disability

determinations, we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of

this case.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the final decision of the

Commissioner denying these claims will be AFFIRMED.

An appropriate order follows.

s/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: June 4, 2025

35