Stubbs v. Henry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

THEO STUBBS, CASE NO. 1:24-cv-1482

Plaintiff,

vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

WARDEN HENRY, et al.,1

Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Theo Stubbs filed this civil rights action alleging that

Cuyahoga County Jail employees refused to permit him to identify as Muslim,

and thereby interfered with his free exercise of religion. Doc. 1. Defendants

have filed under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(c) a Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings. Doc. 26. They argue that Stubbs failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies and failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Id.

In response, Stubbs filed his own Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,

Doc. 28, which I construed as an opposition brief, see Order, 5/28/2025.

Defendants filed a reply. Doc. 29. For the reasons explained below, I deny

Defendants’ motion.

1 Stubbs named “Christopher Henry” as the Jail’s Warden, Doc. 1, at 1,

but Defendants state that “Michelle Henry” is the Jail’s Warden, Doc. 12, at 1

n.1.

Background facts2

Stubbs was booked in the Cuyahoga County Jail in December 2023. Doc.

1 at 3, ¶11; Doc. 26 at 9. Defendants allege that when Stubbs was booked, he

didn’t designate his religious status. Doc. 26 at 17. Stubbs concedes that he

was “not booked in as a Muslim.” Doc. 1 at 3, ¶12. But, Stubbs alleges, he has

been a Muslim since 2011, and sometime after he was booked, he sent a

grievance to the Jail Chaplin, Pastor Givens, “to be sure I was labeled as

Muslim.” Id. at ¶¶11, 12.

Nevertheless, Stubbs alleges, he was not permitted to participate in the

April 11, 2024 feast marking the end of Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr. Id. at 2, ¶9. He

“was told by Pastor Givens and Corporal Dancy that the warden said anybody

can fast during Ramadan but only Muslims can participate in the feast.” Id.

Stubbs contends that he “sent grievances to make sure I was labeled as Muslim

and for Jummah ([F]riday prayer).” Id. “And after doing all of this,” Stubbs

writes, “I’m told that I am not Muslim and therefore couldn’t be a part of the

feast.” Id. at 2–3. Stubbs alleges that “the Wardens … stated if a person was

not booked in as Muslim, th[e]n they are not Muslim,” id. at 3, ¶12, and that

Paster Givens “said [Stubbs] wasn’t Muslim when he is the Chaplain of

Cuyahoga County Jail,” id. at ¶11.

2 These facts are primarily taken from Stubbs’s Complaint. For context, I

have included additional and seemingly non-material facts taken from

Defendants’ Motion.

Stubbs filed a Verified Complaint alleging 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims

against Warden Henry, Associate Warden Kevin O’Donnell, and Pastor

Givens, in their individual and official capacities. Id. at 1–2, ¶¶4–7, at 5; Doc

12 at 1–2, ¶¶4–6. Stubbs alleges that Defendants violated his First

Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Doc. 1 at 3, ¶13. He seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

at 3–4.

Defendants filed an Answer, in which they asserted an affirmative

defense that Stubbs failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, a pre-

condition to suit established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). Doc. 12 at 4. Defendants attached two grievances that Stubbs filed

in jail—one dated March 18, 2024, Doc 12-1, and one dated April 8, 2024, Doc.

12-2.3 In these grievances, Stubbs complains about the Ramadan meals that

the Jail was serving—he twice complained that the portions were insufficient,

and once complained that a breakfast was served after sunrise and therefore

was received by Stubbs too late to eat it.4 Doc. 12-1, 12-2. Defendants allege

that Stubbs failed to appeal these grievances. Doc. 12, at 4.

3 The parties did not authenticate the exhibits they attached to their

motion papers. Neither side challenges the authenticity of the others’ exhibits.

In this Opinion, I assume that the parties’ unauthenticated submissions are

what they say they are.

4 Ramadan observers fast from sunrise to sunset. See, e.g., Sanderson v.

Louisville Metro. Gov’t, No. 3:23-cv-138, 2024 WL 3184652, at *4 (W.D. Ky.

June 26, 2024).

After they filed their Answer, Defendants filed under Rule 12(c) a

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.5 Doc. 26. In their Motion, Defendants

argue that they are entitled to judgment because Stubbs failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. Doc. 26, at 13. Defendants also assert that Stubbs

has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, id. at 16–18; that

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, id. at 18–21; and that

Defendants cannot be held liable in their individual capacities for the

compensatory and punitive damages that Stubbs seeks, id. at 21–22.

In his responsive brief, Stubbs refutes Defendants’ legal arguments

regarding whether he stated a viable claim for relief. Doc. 28 at 2–4. He

attaches to his brief the same two grievances that Defendants filed, along with

inmate request forms he had completed and other prison documents. Doc. 28-

1 at 1–18. Defendants filed a reply brief in which they re-assert the arguments

they presented in their Motion brief and raise some new ones, Doc. 29, which I

discuss below.

Rule 12(c) standard

“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a

party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court

evaluates a Rule 12(c) motion “using the same standard that applies to … a

5 Stubbs alleges that Defendants’ Motion was late. Doc. 28 at 5. But

Stubbs’s calculation is based on the old case management dates. Id. On March

25, I set April 25 as the deadline for Defendants to file their expected Rule 12(c)

motion. See Doc. 25 at 2. Defendants filed their Motion on April 25. Doc. 26.

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Moore v. Hiram Twp., Ohio, 988 F.3d

353, 357 (6th Cir. 2021). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss on the

pleadings, a district court ‘must construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as

true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.’” Barber v. Charter Twp.

of Springfield, Michigan, 31 F.4th 382, 386–87 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Engler

v. Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2017)); see United Food & Com.

Workers, Loc. 1995 v. Kroger Co., 51 F.4th 197, 202 (6th Cir. 2022) (courts “will

not blindly accept legal conclusions nor draw unwarranted factual inferences

from either the complaint or the answer.”) (citing Barber, 31 F.4th at 387).

In addition to reviewing the allegations in the complaint and attached

exhibits, a court “may consider … public records, items appearing in the record

of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as

they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained

therein.” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.

2008) (citing Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Analysis

1. Exhaustion of remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act states, in relevant part, that “[n]o

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 …

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). To exhaust all available administrative remedies, a prisoner must

follow the procedures and policies of the facility in which the incident occurred.

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 95

(2006).

A prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense that a defendant must raise, Jones, 549 U.S. at 216, and prove,

Bushong v. Delaware City Sch. Dist., 851 F. App’x 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2021)

(citing Rembisz v. Lew, 590 F. App’x 501, 503 (6th Cir. 2014)). “Because the

failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or

12(c) is appropriate only if the face of the complaint shows that the plaintiff

has not in fact exhausted her administrative remedies.” Bushong, 851 F. App’x

at 545 (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215).

Here, Defendants in their Motion assert that Stubbs “only sent [two]

grievances” about religion—his complaints about the food service during

Ramadan. Doc. 26, at 15. Stubbs did not, Defendants contend, “‘sen[d] a

grievance to the chaplain when [he] first got booked in the county jail for [his]

religious belief.’” Id. (citing Stubbs’s complaint). In other words, Defendants

allege that Stubbs failed to grieve the claim alleged in his Complaint.

It is true that to administratively exhaust a claim a party must grieve

the same allegations contained in the complaint. See, e.g., Vandiver v. Martin,

48 F. App’x 517, 519 (6th Cir. 2002). But in his verified Complaint, Stubbs

states that he did grieve to the Chaplin “to make sure I was labeled as

Muslim.” Doc. 1 at 2, ¶9. So dismissal under Rule 12(c) is inappropriate here

because the face of Stubbs’s Complaint does not show that he failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies. See Bushong, 851 F. App’x at 545. There are facts

in dispute about this issue, and at this stage the Court must view the facts in

the light most favorable to Stubbs. See Barber, 31 F.4th at 386–87; Rembisz,

590 F. App’x at 504 (“At the motion to dismiss stage, courts are bound to accept

the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint as true and to draw inferences and

resolve ambiguities in a plaintiff’s favor.”).

Defendants assert that Stubbs “has not, and cannot, provide any proof

or evidentiary quality material to support [his] claims.” Doc. 26, at 11. But at

this stage Stubbs doesn’t have to provide proof to support his claims—he only

has to allege in his Complaint facts that “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. And this he has done. Stubbs states

that he grieved the issue he complains of in his Complaint—that the Jail

refused to classify him as Muslim. So Defendants are not entitled to judgment

on the pleadings for Stubbs’s alleged failure to exhaust his claim. See Bushong,

851 F. App’x at 545 (observing that the district court erroneously “relied upon

unsubstantiated assertions6 made by the defendants in their motion” when

evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion; “it is black-letter law that, with a few . . .

exceptions, a court evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings (or a

motion to dismiss) must focus only on the allegations in the pleadings.”)

(quoting Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020)).

In their reply brief, Defendants submit that Stubbs “relies on the

submission of kites and the two grievances” and asserts that “there is no

evidence that the grievances were ever appealed, despite the clear availability

of such remedy.” Doc. 29, at 4. The problem is that Defendants do not identify

Stubbs’s “remedy,” let alone show the “clear availability of [it].” Defendants

6 The Defendants have not substantiated their allegation that Stubbs did

not grieve the claim that he alleges in the Complaint. Had they done so, I might

have decided to consider any relevant attachments as central to the claims in

the complaint, see, e.g., McIntyre v. Halen, No. 3:13-cv-1365, 2014 WL 3672118,

at *3 (M.D. Tenn. July 23, 2014) (considering the sheriff’s office’s grievance

policy, declaration of that office’s records custodian, and a list of the plaintiff’s

grievances without converting the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a

summary judgment motion because the above items were either public records

or referenced in the complaint and central to the plaintiff’s claims), or

converted the Rule 12(c) Motion to a Rule 56 motion, see, e.g., Aguirre v. Corr.

Corp. of Am., No. 4:08-cv-2365, 2009 WL 2423702, at *3–4, 6 (N.D. Ohio Aug.

3, 2009) (converting the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a summary

judgment motion when both parties attached to their motion papers

declarations, grievances, and the prison grievance policy). Or I might have

decided that neither of these options would have been prudent and denied the

Rule 12(c) Motion. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Harrison, No. 3:22CV-P364, 2024

WL 1815372, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 2024). The only route to take here, given

the factual dispute in the pleadings and the lack of presented evidence to

resolve that factual dispute, is to deny Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion.

have not submitted the Jail’s grievance policy, so I can’t determine whether

Stubbs complied with it. The grievance forms are labeled “Inmate

Grievance/Appeal Form,” so it’s not even clear from the face of these forms that

Stubbs had to separately appeal. Defendants don’t explain what Stubbs’s

“kites” are and how, if at all, they differ from a “grievance.” Simply put, all the

Defendants offer the Court are “unsubstantiated assertions,” which are

improper bases for granting judgment on the pleadings.7 See Bushong, 851 F.

App’x at 545.

2. Failure to state a claim

Defendants argue that Stubbs fails to state a First Amendment claim

against them because Stubbs hasn’t demonstrated that Defendants’ acts

impinged on his free exercise of religion. Doc. 26 at 16. Defendants submit that

that “courts have consistently found that isolated acts or omissions do not

create a substantial burden on the First Amendment free exercise of religion.”

Id. (citing cases). They state:

Plaintiff’s Complaint pertains only to an isolated

act, i.e., his allegedly being deprived of an April 11,

2024 religious feast that he was allegedly entitled to

which marked the end of Ramadan. This action is

not sufficient to state a claim for violation of the

First Amendment. Plaintiff does not specify any

CCCC policy or action taken through any County

officials that prohibited, much less “substantially

impair” the free exercise of his religion.

7 The Defendants are free to assert a failure-to-exhaust-remedies

argument in a summary judgment motion and provide relevant evidence in

support, such as the Jail’s grievance policy and declarations.

Id. at 17.

To the extent Defendants assert that depriving Stubbs of participation

in the Eid feast was only one isolated act insufficient to allege a First

Amendment violation, they are mistaken. Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d 1076 (6th Cir.

2019), is factually similar to this case. There, prison officials told Maye that he

could only participate in Eid if he ‘“change[d] [his] religion’ from Nation of

Islam to Al-Islan, a different sect of Islam.” 915 F.3d at 1081. Maye didn’t

change his religion, so he wasn’t permitted to participate in the feast. Id. The

next year, Maye was scheduled to work during Eid; requested a “call-out from

his work detail” so he could participate; but didn’t receive a work call-out and

again couldn’t participate in the feast. Tr. 1082. The Court affirmed the district

court’s partial grant of summary judgment to Maye on his First Amendment

claim, and explained:

Importantly, we have held that denying inmates the

ability to participate in a group Passover Seder—

even though the ceremony only lasts “a few hours

once a year”—violates their free exercise rights

under the First Amendment, given that “Passover is

an especially critical and very special time in the

Jewish religion.” Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068,

1073 (6th Cir. 1989). The two annual Eid feasts are

the functional equivalent for Muslims.…Thus,

Maye’s factual allegations, taken as true, would

compel the same conclusion here—denying a

Muslim inmate the opportunity to partake in Eid

would substantially burden his free exercise rights,

so Maye has alleged a deprivation of his rights under

the Free Exercise Clause.

Id. at 1083. The court rejected the officials’ argument that these were “isolated

incidents,” concluding that “this argument makes the same mistake we

highlighted in Whitney: it overlooks the significance of a religious event such

as Passover or Eid, which is plainly incomparable to the harm of missing one

weekly religious service or being denied a kosher meal on an isolated occasion.”

Id. at 1083–84.

Next, Defendants downplay the “feast,” describing it as “a treat box,

which typically consisted of a sweet item such as a date, provided by Council

on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) to inmates designated as Muslim in

celebration of Ramadan.” Doc. 26 at 17. But Defendants haven’t cited legal

authority indicating that the type or quantity of food provided for a religious

feast lessens the importance of that feast and the constitutional protections

that are attached to it.

Defendants admit that “[t]he CAIR organization provides the treat

and/or ‘feast’ only to those inmates designated ‘Muslim’ in the Jail’s booking

system” and reiterate that Stubbs didn’t designate a religious status when he

was booked into the jail. Doc. 26 at 17. But this is the whole point of Stubbs’s

claim. Stubbs alleges that Defendants don’t permit inmates to change their

religious-affiliation information after it has been entered on the booking form.8

Doc. 1 at 3. This practice, Stubbs alleges, violates his First Amendment rights,

8 Stubbs also points out that “there are individuals who will convert [in

jail] to Islam as their religion.” Doc. 1 at 4, ¶15.

see id., and these allegations are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, see Maye, 915 F.3d at 1083–84.

Defendants suggest that they have “legitimate penological security” to

maintain and assert that the Jail “provides incarcerated individual with

meaningful opportunities to engage in worship.” Doc. 29 at 9. It’s true that a

jail may show that it has a valid “penological justification” for denying an

inmate the opportunity to practice religion. See Maye, 915 F.3d at 1084. But

Defendants haven’t advanced any penological justification for the restriction

Stubbs alleges in his Complaint, even if advancing such a justification would

be appropriate to do so at the motion-for-judgment-on-the-pleadings stage.

Defendants argue that the two grievances they claim Stubbs did file—

which had to do with the portions of Ramadan meals, Docs. 12-1, 12-2—

“demonstrate that [Stubbs] was actively engaging in Ramadan,” “not

expressing that he is foreclosed from partaking in Ramadan.” Doc. 26 at 15.

But Stubbs alleges in his Complaint that “the warden said anybody can fast

during Ramadan but only Muslims can participate in the feast.” Doc. 1 at 2,

¶9. So Stubbs’s fasting during Ramadan and his receipt of Ramadan meals

does not show that the jail had classified him as Muslim, and it does not

address the Jail’s alleged refusal to let Stubbs participate in the feast.

“[E]ven if a plaintiff can prove a violation of his constitutional rights, his

§ 1983 claim must fail against a supervisory official unless ‘the supervisor

encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly

participated in it.’” Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 802–03 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2002), in turn quoting

Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)). Defendants cite this law

and argue that Stubbs’s claims against Warden Henry, Associate Warden

O’Donnell, and Pastor Givens are “improperly based on their position[s] as

supervisor[s].”9 Doc. 26 at 21.

In his Complaint, Stubbs alleges that the “Wardens … stated if a person

was not booked in as a Muslim, th[e]n they are not Muslim.” Doc. 1 at 3, ¶12.

He alleges that Pastor Givens “stated [Stubbs] wasn’t Muslim when [Givens]

is the Chaplin of Cuyahoga County Jail.” Id. at 11. These specific factual

allegations are sufficient to show that Warden Henry, Associate Warden

O’Donnell, and Pastor Givens either acted themselves or “at least implicitly

authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct

of the offending officers.” See Combs, 315 F.3d at 558 (quoting Hays v. Jefferson

County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)); cf. George v. Ballard, No. 17-

5161, 2017 WL 7550768, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2017) (“George’s complaint

contains no specific factual or legal allegations against either individual,

alleging only that each was ‘legally responsible’ for the operation of the

Northpoint Training Center.”).

9 In their reply brief, Defendants move from “supervisory” liability to

“vicarious” liability. Doc. 29 at 6. Defendants’ vicarious liability arguments fail

for the same reason as their supervisory liability argument.

3. Qualified immunity

Defendants allege that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 26

at 18. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In determining whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, a court asks whether: (1) “the

plaintiff’s version of the facts alleges the deprivation of a constitutional right”;

and (2) “that right was clearly established such that a reasonable official would

have known his actions were unconstitutional.” Maye, 915 F.3d at 1082 (citing

Morgan v. Fairfield Cty., 903 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 2018), in turn citing

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).

As explained above, Stubbs’s version of the facts alleges the deprivation

of a constitutional right. Defendants do not argue that the right was not clearly

established.10 See Doc. 26, at 20; see also Maye, 915 F.3d at 1087 (citing cases

10 Defendants sketch the legal standard for what “clearly established”

means, but they don’t apply that standard to the allegations in Stubbs’s

Complaint. They also conclude that Stubbs can’t show that the alleged conduct

is “sufficiently shocking to the conscience [to] support a Fourteenth

Amendment claim.” Doc. 26 at 26. But Defendants don’t explain why a

Fourteenth Amendment shocks-the-conscious test would apply to Stubbs’s

First Amendment free-exercise-of-religion claim. See, e.g., Bell v. Johnson, 308

F.3d 594, 610 (6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment

“‘shocks the conscience’ test would not apply to § 1983 claims based expressly

on the First Amendment.”).

showing that inmates’ rights to participate in Eid “were clearly established in

2013 and 2014.”). And after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the factually similar

Maye case, any reasonable official should have known that the actions alleged

in Stubbs’s complaint would have violated clearly established constitutional

rights.

In their reply brief, Defendants submit that even if Stubbs can meet

both prongs of the qualified immunity standard, “there is insufficient evidence

to show that Defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.” Doc. 29, at 5–

6. The case they cite in support, Cobbs v. Pramstaller, 475 F. App’x. 575, 579

(6th Cir. 2012), is a summary judgment case, not a case decided at the

pleadings stage. Stubbs has alleged in his Complaint conduct on the part of the

two Wardens and Pastor Givens which is specific enough to survive a Rule

12(c) Motion. In all, Defendants have not shown that they are entitled to

qualified immunity.

4. Damages liability

Defendants argue that Stubbs may not recover compensatory or

punitive damages on his individual-capacity claims without suffering a

physical injury. Doc. 26, at 21. And because Stubbs hasn’t suffered a physical

injury, Defendants reason, he may not recover compensatory or punitive

damages for any mental or emotional injuries, either. Id. at 22; see 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a

jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the

commission of a sexual act.”).

But a plaintiff alleging a First Amendment violation need not suffer a

physical injury to recover compensatory damages so long as the plaintiff

“alleges a constitutional injury distinct from any mental or emotional injury he

might have suffered.” King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 214 (6th Cir. 2015). Here,

Stubbs alleges that his “[F]irst [A]mendment rights of the United States[] to

practice religion” has been violated. Doc. 1 at 3, ¶13. He alleges that he “h[as]

not been able to at[t]end Friday service (Jummah).” Id. These allegations

describe an “actual injury” for which compensatory damages are available. See

King, 788 F.3d at 213–15. And Defendants have not shown that punitive

damages would be prohibited. See id., at 216–17; see also Small v. Brock, 963

F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2020).

5. Stubbs may not add new claims in a motion brief

In his brief in opposition to Defendants’ Motion, Stubbs argues for the

first time that Defendants’ conduct violated the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act. Doc. 28, at 3. As Defendants point out, Doc. 29

at 10, Stubbs didn’t allege such a claim in his Complaint. He is not permitted

to add it now, through his opposition brief. See, e.g., Thomason v. Nachtrieb,

888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989) (“It is a basic principle that the complaint

may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss”). And

to the extent that Stubbs in his opposition brief alleges facts that would

support a different claim than the one he alleged in his Complaint, see Doc. 28

at 4 (referencing Ramadan meals), this is also inappropriate. See Thomason,

888 F.2d at 1205. This case will proceed on the First Amendment claim that

Stubbs alleged in his Complaint—that Warden Henry, Associate Warden

O’Donnell, and Pastor Givens refused to let Stubbs classify himself as Muslin,

and in doing so violated Stubbs’s right to practice his religion by participating

in the Eid feast. See Doc. 1.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings, Doc. 26, is denied. The Defendants’ Motion to stay discovery

pending a ruling on their motion, Doc. 27, is denied as moot.

Dated: June 4, 2025

/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge