State of Tennessee v. Rex A. Martin

06/04/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 13, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. REX A. MARTIN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County

No. F 87143 Howard W. Wilson, Chancellor

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No. M2024-00189-CCA-R3-CD

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The defendant, Rex A. Martin, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury

of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, assault,

preventing another from making an emergency call, possession of a firearm while under a

court order, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for

which he was sentenced to an effective term of fifteen years in the Department of

Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to seven

of his eight convictions - aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, assault, preventing

another from making an emergency call, and possessing a firearm during the commission

of a dangerous felony. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral

arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM GREENHOLTZ and KYLE

A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Patrick T. McNally, Nashville, Tennessee (on appeal); Gerald L. Melton, District Public

Defender; and Caleb B. McCain and Billie Zimmerman, Assistant District Public

Defenders (at trial), for the appellant, Rex A. Martin.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and Sarah N. Davis and

John Westmoreland, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of

Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

During the late evening hours of May 17, 2021, a martial dispute over finances

spiraled into an encounter that resulted in the defendant being charged with two counts of

especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count each

of preventing another from making an emergency call, possession of a firearm while under

a court order, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.1

The victim and the defendant, who married in May 2010 and moved to Rutherford County

in May 2016, testified to rather different accounts of the incident.

Michella Martin, the fifty-year-old victim, testified that she and the defendant were

regularly arguing over money during the time period of the incident. The victim worked

for the Veterans Affairs Medical Center out of a home office above the garage from 7:00

a.m. to 3:30 p.m. and would often work an overtime shift from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. as

well. Though the office was above the garage, there was a landing upon entry into the area,

and the office was recessed, requiring one to descend three stairs into the office. The

defendant worked for Bridgestone Tires as a maintenance engineer, typically overnight

from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., but also often worked overtime. The Bridgestone facility was

a 45-minute drive from the couple’s home, requiring the defendant to generally leave the

house around 5:30 p.m.

On May 17, 2021, the victim worked her regular daytime shift and started working

an evening overtime shift around 6:00 p.m. or 7:00 p.m. Sometime after the defendant was

at work, around 7:30 p.m., the victim and the defendant began to argue about finances over

text messages. The victim found the timing of the argument problematic as she was trying

to work and was also displeased that the defendant was asking her to give him funds that

she was earning for overtime because she usually kept her overtime earnings separately.

The victim admitted that the exchange between the two of them was “not nice.” At one

point, the defendant sent a text that the victim took as threatening, “I don[’]t think it best

to go round kicking me right now,” to which the victim responded, “Don’t threaten me

cause I ain’t skirred.”

The back-and-forth bickering over finances and who paid for various expenses

continued for about twenty minutes until the defendant wrote, “[L]et[’]s just sell the house

[and] split it down the middle[.] I[’]ve had enough[.]” The victim reminded the defendant

that the house could not be sold “until repairs are made,” but then said, “Take ur Harley,

ur car, ur s**t & get the f**k out. There is no equity to split, since u had to refinance to

pay ur debts.” After that, the victim placed her phone in a desk drawer and went back to

1

The defendant was also charged with two counts of possession of a weapon with a prior domestic

conviction, but the State dismissed those charges before trial and renumbered the original indictment.

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her tasks. Although it was not seen until later, the next text on the victim’s phone from the

defendant was at 11:53 p.m. when the defendant texted, “BYE[.]”

Between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., the victim looked up to see the defendant

descending the steps into her office and was surprised to see him home early from work.

The defendant said to the victim, “So take my s**t and leave, huh?” The victim “just

agreed to what he said” because she had work left to complete before her shift ended and

“didn’t want to argue with him.” The defendant shoved items off the victim’s desk, sat

down on the edge, and began speaking to her. The defendant removed the victim’s glasses,

but she grabbed them back and told him that she had work to do. The defendant removed

the victim’s glasses again, giving her the impression that he was going to kiss her, but

instead said he was going to kill her. The victim responded, “You are?” The defendant

answered, “Yes.” Expecting the defendant to pull out a handgun, the victim sat upright

and told him that she was ready. The defendant replied, “No, motherf***er, you’re gonna

feel it.”

At that, the defendant lifted the victim out of her chair and began striking her in the

head. The defendant got the victim on the floor, pinning both of her arms with his knees,

and continued to hit her all over the face with closed fists. While the defendant hit the

victim, he told her “now you won’t have nobody.” The defendant then placed both of his

hands around the victim’s neck and began to choke her. The choking was “such misery”

and “terrible,” and the victim prayed to pass out. However, while the victim was praying

to lose consciousness, she noticed that the hunting knife the defendant wore on a chain

around his neck was possibly in her reach and grabbed at it. The defendant took the knife,

removed it from the sheath, and held it to the victim’s throat, breaking the skin. The

defendant raised his hand and dropped the knife but then returned to hitting and choking

the victim.

Eventually, the defendant paused his attack and sat down on the sofa in the room.

The victim tried to catch her breath and began coughing and vomiting. She told the

defendant that she loved him and begged him to stop. The defendant looked at the victim,

and she expected him to tell her that he loved her as well. Instead, the defendant surprised

the victim by yelling, “Why did you make me do this? Why did you unleash the beast?”

The victim continued to tell the defendant that she loved him and crawled over to him on

the sofa, saying, “Let’s just go lay down, and we’ll talk about it later.” The defendant

responded, “No, you don’t. You are just saying that.”

The defendant led the victim downstairs to the main area of the house. The couple’s

elderly dog was anxious, and the victim picked her up. The victim went out the back door

onto the deck, acting like she was taking the dog to use the bathroom but then turned toward

the neighbor’s house in an attempt to leave. However, the defendant “caught” her and

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brought her back into the kitchen. The victim asked the defendant to take her to the

emergency room because she was worried that her retina was damaged, but the defendant

said, “No, you are not going to the ER.” The defendant told the victim that he “wasn’t

going to jail.” The victim requested a towel, and the defendant wet one and gave it to her.

While the victim “dabb[ed] her face” with the towel, the defendant “said that he was going

to have to tie [her] up.”

The defendant took the victim to their bedroom, inclined the head of their adjustable

bed, and laid the victim on the bed. The defendant secured the victim’s wrists and legs

with duct tape and then left the room to retrieve some tools. The defendant removed the

doorknob and told the victim that he would call someone to let her out. The defendant left

the room, but the victim could hear him walking about inside the house for the next 30 to

40 minutes. In the meanwhile, the victim “wiggl[ed] and twist[ed]” against the duct tape

in an attempt to loosen it.

When the victim heard the truck start and sound as though to drive away, she

“flipped” off the bed and loosened the duct tape enough to walk. The victim retrieved a

long hunting knife from the armoire in the bedroom but could not get into a position to cut

her hands free. However, the victim was able to use the knife to wedge open the bedroom

door. With her legs still duct-taped together, the victim crawled to her office upstairs to

get her cellphone. The victim’s phone was missing from the drawer where she had put it

earlier, but she found an inactive phone that she used for playing music through a Bluetooth

speaker. The victim was able to use that phone to make an emergency call, using a

combination of her tongue, nose, and fingers to dial. Because the phone was still connected

to the Bluetooth speaker, it was often difficult for the parties to understand each other.

However, the victim was able to relay what had happened, that she needed medical

attention, and that the defendant was armed. While the victim was on the phone with 911,

she heard the truck return and made her way back to the bedroom so the defendant would

not know she had escaped. A short while later, the police forced open the bedroom door

and told the victim she was safe.

The victim was taken to the hospital by ambulance and received treatment for her

injuries by Dr. Daniel Evans. According to Dr. Evans, the victim “presented like a

significant, traumatic patient.” The victim had “obvious external signs of blunt trauma.

She had blood all over her face. And was in clear distress.” The doctor expressed that it

was initially difficult to assess the victim “because of all the blood[.]” The victim displayed

ligature marks on the neck along with petechia, small hemorrhages in the skin and eye,

consistent with the reported strangulation. The victim recalled that she sustained

lacerations to her face and lip, her nose cavity was collapsed, and her face was swollen.

She had extensive bruising from her chin to her chest, as well as on her arms. The victim’s

left hand was broken, in a defensive wound-type injury known as a “night stick injury,”

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requiring a cast for six weeks. The victim experienced severe pain, which she estimated

an 8 on a scale of 1 to 10. In the months following the attack, the victim had residual

vision, breathing, and mobility problems, as well as a collapsed eardrum that took eighteen

months to heal.

Officers David Kelch and Tyler McClintock with the Murfreesboro Police

Department responded to the call at the victim’s residence. The suspect vehicle, a black

Ford F-150 truck, was parked in the street outside the home when they arrived. The garage

door was open, and the officers observed a male figure, identified as the defendant, walking

toward the driveway. Officers ordered the defendant to drop an item held in his hand,

which turned out to be a key fob to the victim’s Jeep. Officer McClintock detained the

defendant, while Sergeant Stephen McGowan, who arrived in the meantime, entered the

residence. Officer Kelch followed Sergeant McGowan into the house, and they found the

victim in the bedroom with her hands bound with duct tape and covered in such a large

amount of blood one could not ascertain where she was injured. The victim could speak

but struggled to make her voice heard.

Officers found a large, unsheathed knife on the kitchen counter, as well as three

knives on a table near the front door. A cache of weapons was also found inside the

defendant’s vehicle, including two pistols, a knife, three assault rifles, a hunting rifle, a

katana sword, a tomahawk, a machete-style knife, a crossbow, and plated body armor.

Three knives were found on the defendant’s person. While the officers were still at the

scene, the defendant told Officer McClintock that he had intended to give his guns away

to a friend before taking pills to commit suicide. In light of that statement, the defendant

was taken to the hospital for a suicidal evaluation and then to jail for booking after he was

medically cleared.

At the close of the State’s proof, the defendant made a motion for judgment of

acquittal with regard to the two kidnapping charges, as well as the charges for preventing

another from making an emergency call, possession of a firearm while under a court order,

and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The defendant

provided extensive argument in support of his motion, and the State provided counter

argument. After a brief recess, the trial court partially granted the defendant’s motion,

ruling it would charge the jury with aggravated kidnapping not especially aggravated

kidnapping. The court found that “the confinement was incidental to the Aggravated

Assault,” and there was no proof that the defendant used a deadly weapon or inflicted

serious bodily injury during “the subsequent kidnapping or false imprisonment.” The trial

court denied the motion with regard to the emergency call and two firearm possession

charges.

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The defense then called the defendant to testify on his own behalf. The defendant

said that he left the house around 5:00 p.m. on May 17, 2021, to work an overtime shift.

While at work, he received a text from the victim about money. The defendant felt hurt

and unappreciated by the victim’s text, explaining that he was “working 76 hours a week

and trying as hard as [he] c[ould].” He responded back, “if we’re not going to do it

together, let’s sell the house and go our separate ways.” The defendant claimed that he and

the victim rarely argued about money and explained how they split their joint bills.

That night, the defendant left work around 10:00 p.m. and headed home, exhausted

from having worked overnight the night before. Once he arrived, he went upstairs to the

victim’s office where she was finishing up work. He sat down on the corner of the victim’s

desk and asked her what was wrong. The victim responded, “you are ripping me off” and

walked toward the defendant with her phone in her hand. The defendant thought the victim

was going to show him something on the phone, but she must have hit him with the phone

because the next thing he saw was “real bright light.” He sat there shaking his head, when

“someone” grabbed him and pulled him off the desk. The person pulled him across the

floor, and the defendant thought it must be the victim’s brother who was twenty-five years

his junior. The defendant elaborated that the victim’s brother was “not really stable” and

known to come by the house unannounced.

The defendant fought back as he believed he was being pulled toward the stairs. He

“panicked” and reached out, grabbing at the person he believed was attacking him, but then

realized “[n]obody was pulling at that point.” When his vision recovered, he saw that the

victim had her left hand around the small knife he wore on a necklace. The victim’s hand

“popped” when he tried to open it and, not wanting to hurt her, he cut the strap from the

knife and threw it down. He then noticed that the victim was badly injured.

Being trained as a first responder, the defendant tried to get the victim to

communicate, but the victim did not respond. The victim vomited, which caused the

defendant to worry she might choke. The defendant asked the victim what they should do

given her background in nursing, and the victim said, “let’s just go [lie] down on the bed.”

The defendant thought it was a good idea because the bed tilts up and that would keep her

from choking. They eventually got up and walked downstairs towards the bedroom. The

victim started walking towards an exterior door, but the defendant “was afraid with her

being hurt so bad, and her vision and everything, she’d get hurt worse,” so he said, “Let’s

just go [lie] on the bed.”

In an effort to stabilize the victim and prevent her from hurting herself, the defendant

used duct tape to restrain her. The defendant told the victim that he was going to kill

himself because he “couldn’t live with what had happened.” The victim told the defendant

that she needed to go to the hospital, and he searched the house looking for one of their

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phones. Assuming his phone must be in the truck, he grabbed two bottles of liquor and “a

bunch of pills” that he planned to use to kill himself and left the house in the truck. As he

drove, he noticed that his vision was still compromised and that he was out of gas. He

pulled into a gas station where he overheard that the police were looking for him. He

returned home, parked in front, and walked into the garage, knowing that the police were

on the way. When the police confronted him, he hesitated and held up his hand like he had

a gun hoping they would shoot and kill him. Thinking of his family, though, he dropped

his key fob and surrendered.

On cross-examination, the defendant acknowledged that he previously gave a

statement in which he claimed that he went home that evening because the victim asked

him to. The defendant also acknowledged that when he arrived home that night, there were

no other cars in the driveway or anyone in the house aside from the victim. The defendant

asserted that the victim hit him with her phone after he mentioned “Vickie,” a woman with

whom the defendant claimed the victim believed him to be having an affair. The defendant

believed the victim’s hitting him across both eyes with her phone was the reason for his

“grossly attached [sic] retina.” Asked about the bruising around the victim’s neck, the

defendant speculated that he must have grabbed her neck when he “panicked to keep [from]

being drug down the stairs.” When questioned as to how anyone could have pulled him

down the stairs when the stairs leading out of the office went up, the defendant explained

that he “didn’t know where [he] was at” and that was “[t]he only thing that popped in [his]

mind was stairs.” The defendant claimed that when his vision came back, he saw that the

victim “was hurt, but she wasn’t bleeding that much.”

The defendant explained that he did not call 911 to seek assistance for the victim

because he could not find a phone in the house. However, he admitted that he texted the

victim, “bye,” when he was leaving in the truck. The defendant asserted that he was going

to call 911 for help after putting gasoline in his truck had he not overheard the police officer

and knew they had already been called. The defendant claimed that the doorknob to the

bedroom fell off the door, he did not intentionally remove it. The defendant also claimed

that he put the cache of weapons, along with other items, in his truck the morning of the

incident to take to his sister’s house for storage and that the victim would not have known

this because she was working.

The defendant was taken to the hospital to ensure he had not swallowed pills after

his expression of suicidal intentions. Dr. Tyler Armstrong examined the defendant during

the early morning hours of May 18, 2021. Dr. Armstrong conducted a physical

examination as part of this visit, and the defendant did not report any injuries to his eyes.

The defendant explained that he did not disclose his eye injuries to the doctor evaluating

him because he was distraught about the victim and thought the doctor only wanted to

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know whether he had taken any pills. However, he later notified the jail staff that his vision

was impaired and was ultimately diagnosed with a “grossly detached retina.”

Following the conclusion of the proof, the jury returned verdicts convicting the

defendant of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, one

count of the lesser-included offense of assault, and one count each of preventing another

from making an emergency call, possession of a firearm while under a court order, and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a sentencing

hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. The

defendant appealed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all

of his convictions except the conviction for possession of a firearm while under a court

order. We will address each in turn below.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn.

R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury

shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.

1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions

involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and

all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620,

623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge,

accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of

the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our Supreme

Court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their

demeanor on the stand. Thus, the trial judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a

written record in this Court.

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Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523

(1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant

is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant

has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776,

779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977);

Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence “is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or

circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting

State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). Moreover, the jury determines the

weight to be given to circumstantial evidence and the inferences to be drawn from this

evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and

inconsistent with innocence are questions primarily for the jury. See id. at 379.

Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support a conviction. State v.

Richmond, 7 S.W.3d 90, 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). This Court, when considering the

sufficiency of the evidence, shall not reweigh the evidence or substitute its inferences for

those drawn by the trier of fact. Id. This Court will not exchange its “inferences for those

drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d

776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

I. Aggravated Kidnapping

In Counts 1 and 2, the defendant was respectively convicted of aggravated

kidnapping involving the possession or threatened use of a deadly weapon and aggravated

kidnapping during which the victim suffered bodily injury. As to these convictions, the

defendant argues that there was no proof he possessed a weapon during the removal or

confinement of the victim or that the victim sustained bodily injury during the timeframe

relevant to the aggravated kidnapping. The defendant bases his argument on the drawing

of a demarcation line in which the assaults occurred in the victim’s office upstairs and the

“kidnapping” occurred downstairs. However, the State asserts that kidnapping is a

continuous offense, noting the victim testified that she did not feel free to leave from the

time the defendant told her that he was going to kill her and threw her on the floor until the

police arrived. Under the State’s theory, the jury “could consider what took place from the

outset of the confinement to its conclusion” to determine whether an aggravated

kidnapping occurred. We agree with the State.

Aggravated kidnapping is a “false imprisonment . . . [w]here the victim suffers

bodily injury; or . . . [w]hile the defendant is in possession of a deadly weapon or threatens

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the use of a deadly weapon.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-304(a)(4), (5). “Bodily injury”

involves “a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, and physical pain or temporary

illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” Id. §

39-11-106(a)(3). False imprisonment is the knowing removal or confinement of another

unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other’s liberty. Id. § 39-13-302(a).

In State v. White, our supreme court determined that when a defendant is charged

with kidnapping and another felony, the removal or confinement must have “criminal

significance above and beyond that necessary” to accomplish the accompanying felony in

order to sustain the conviction for kidnapping. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 577-78 (Tenn.

2012). If the confinement or removal associated with a kidnapping charge is merely

incidental to accomplishing another felony, “such as robbery, rape, and assault,” the

defendant cannot be convicted of the kidnapping charge in addition to the underlying

felony. State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2015). Factors for the jury to consider

in determining whether the State has proven every element of a kidnapping charge that

arises out of the same conduct against the same victim of an accompanying felony include

“the nature and duration of the victim’s removal or confinement by the defendant”;

“whether the removal or confinement occurred during the commission of the separate

offense”; “whether the interference with the victim’s liberty was inherent in the nature of

the separate offense”; “whether the removal or confinement prevented the victim from

summoning assistance, although the defendant need not have succeeded in preventing the

victim from doing so”; “whether the removal or confinement reduced the defendant’s risk

of detection, although the defendant need not have succeeded in this objective”; and

“whether the removal or confinement created a significant danger or increased the victim’s

risk of harm independent of that posed by the separate offense.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 580-

81.

In this case, the defendant does not dispute that the trial court properly instructed

the jury as required by White. Accordingly, because the jury was properly instructed and

determined the victim’s confinement was not essentially incidental to the accompanying

felony, this Court reviews the defendant’s claim under the sufficiency of the evidence

standard. Alston, 465 S.W.3d at 562.

Looking at the facts of this case, in light of White, we conclude there is sufficient

evidence to support the jury’s determination that the victim’s removal or confinement

exceeded that necessary to accomplish the assaults. The crime of kidnapping is a

continuing offense. State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 118 (Tenn. 1999).2 “[A] defendant

2

Although the issue in Legg was territorial jurisdiction, it has been observed that kidnapping is a continuing

offense in cases addressing sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Burgins, 2022 WL 2317028, at

*20 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2022) (citing Legg and determining that one kidnapping conviction per

victim was appropriate where the defendant “continuously confined each victim from the beginning of the

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continues to commit the crime at every moment the victim’s liberty is taken.” Id. at 117.

Therefore, we can look at what took place during the entire period of confinement. The

victim testified that she did not feel free to leave from the time the defendant told her that

he was going to kill her and threw her on the floor until the police arrived, a time period

lasting more than an hour. At least for a portion of this time, the defendant possessed a

knife, which he wore on a chain around his neck and at one point used to press to the

victim’s neck. The victim sustained numerous injuries during the ordeal, including

lacerations, a broken nose, petechial hemorrhaging, ligature marks, and a broken hand.

The victim’s confinement continued downstairs, where the defendant stopped the victim’s

attempt to escape under the ruse of taking the dog out, denied her medical assistance, duct-

taped her wrists and ankles, placed her on the bed in a locked room, and removed phones

from the home. Having been properly instructed according to White, the jury was within

its province in finding that the defendant’s confinement of the victim was to a greater extent

than that necessary to commit assault. Put another way, the jury could reasonably

determine that the kidnapping began when the defendant first entered the victim’s office

and started the assault and did not end until the police arrived, i.e., the defendant’s

kidnapping was more than merely “incidental” to the assault.

The defendant relies on the trial court’s statements at the motion for judgment of

acquittal to assert that the assaults only occurred upstairs in the office, and the kidnapping

occurred separately downstairs sometime after the violence ceased. We determine that any

ruling the trial court made suggesting such distinction is contrary to the evidence based on

the victim’s testimony that she did not feel free to leave from the moment the defendant

threw her to the floor upstairs.

The evidence is sufficient, and the defendant is not entitled to relief.

II. Aggravated Assault and Assault

In Counts 3 and 5, the defendant was respectively convicted of aggravated assault

by strangulation and aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury and, in Count 4,

assault based on causing the victim fear of bodily injury. As to these convictions, the

defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient because he acted in self-defense. The

defendant asserts that he never intended to harm the victim or cause her to reasonably fear

imminent bodily injury, but instead, “acted to protect himself against a perceived attack

while blinded from being struck in the eyes.” The State responds that the jury was within

robbery and the [d]efendant’s fleeing the apartment after the rapes”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 16,

2022); State v. Perry, 2015 WL 3540554, at *15-*17 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2015), (citing Legg and

determining evidence sufficient to sustain kidnapping convictions where victims were bound to a cot

multiple times over an almost two-year time period but unrestrained other times), perm. app. denied (Tenn.

Oct. 15, 2015).

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its province in accrediting the victim’s testimony and finding the defendant’s testimony

incredible and rejecting his claim of self-defense. We agree with the State.

Relevant here, a person commits assault who intentionally or knowingly causes

another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a)(2).

A person commits aggravated assault who commits an assault, and the assault results in

serious bodily injury to another or involved strangulation or attempted strangulation. Id. §

39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(i), (iv). The defendant does not dispute that the State established the

essential elements of aggravated assault or assault, but instead, asserts that the evidence is

insufficient because he acted in self-defense.

It is well-established “that whether an individual acted in self-defense is a factual

determination to be made by the jury as the sole trier of fact.” State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d

521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1993)). At the time of the offense, the applicable statute provided:

(1) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful

activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to

retreat before threatening or using force against another person when and to

the degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary

to protect against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.

(2) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful

activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to

retreat before threatening or using force intended or likely to cause death or

serious bodily injury, if:

(A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an

imminent danger of death, serious bodily injury, or grave

sexual abuse;

(B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious

bodily injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time;

and

(C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b). When self-defense is fairly raised by the proof, the State

is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-

defense. State v. Benson, 600 S.W.3d 896, 903 (Tenn. 2020).

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The defendant testified that the victim struck him in the eyes with her phone, causing

temporary blindness, and during such blindness, he felt someone pulling him and believed

he was struggling with the victim’s younger and stronger brother. The defendant flailed at

his believed-to-be assailant before eventually realizing that only the victim was present and

had been badly hurt in the process. However, the defendant acknowledged on cross-

examination that he did not see the victim’s younger brother in the house or his car in the

driveway when the defendant arrived home a short time earlier. The defendant also

acknowledged that the victim’s home office where the attack occurred was recessed, and

therefore, it would have been impossible for him to fall down the stairs as he claimed to

have been worried about during the attack. The jury heard the defendant’s explanation for

his actions, as well as the victim’s testimony depicting the defendant as the first and only

aggressor, and, as was its prerogative, rejected the defendant’s claim of self-defense.

Goode, 956 S.W.2d at 527. The defendant is not entitled to relief.

III. Preventing Another from Making an Emergency Call

In Count 6, the defendant was convicted of preventing another from making an

emergency call. As to this conviction, the defendant argues there was no proof he

prevented the victim from accessing a phone. The State responds that there was sufficient

circumstantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant removed

the operational phones from the home to prevent the victim from summoning aid. We

agree with the State.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 65-21-117(a) provides that it is an offense to

“knowingly prevent[] another individual from placing a telephone call to 911 or from

requesting assistance in an emergency from a law enforcement agency, medical facility, or

other agency or entity the primary purpose of which is to provide for the safety of

individuals.”

The defendant asserts that the victim never asked the defendant to give her a

telephone or testify that the defendant took away or disposed of her phone. The defendant

claims, rather, that he searched the home looking for a phone with which to call for

assistance but was unable to find one. The victim testified that she put her phone in a desk

drawer at the end of their exchange over finances and went back to work. Later, after the

victim crawled to her office bound by the duct tape restraints, she discovered that her phone

was no longer in the desk drawer. The defendant was the only other person in the home

that evening, and he had earlier refused the victim’s request to obtain medical assistance

and indicated that he “wasn’t going to jail.” In addition, even though the defendant claimed

that he could not find a phone with which to call 911, he texted “BYE” to the victim’s

number when he left the house but did not call for assistance. Based on the sum of the

circumstantial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was

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sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant removed the operational phones from the

home to prevent the victim from summoning aid.

IV. Possession of a Firearm

In Count 8, the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm during the

commission of a dangerous felony, specifically, aggravated kidnapping in Count 2. As to

this conviction, the defendant argues that the “proof failed to establish that he possessed a

firearm at any point during the alleged kidnapping.” The State responds that possession

can be actual or constructive, and the proof was that the defendant had guns throughout the

house that he had the ability to control and exercise dominion over.

Constructive possession is established when a person has “‘the power and intention

at a given time to exercise dominion and control over [an object] either directly or indirectly

or through others.’” State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v.

Patterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 445 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). “Constructive possession is

the ability to reduce an object to actual possession.” State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 845-46

(Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949, 955-56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)).

The victim testified that the defendant had a variety of firearms that he normally

kept “[t]hroughout the house.” When the ordeal was over and officers searched in the

defendant’s truck, they found a cache of weapons, including two pistols, three assault rifles,

and a hunting rifle. The defendant indicated in his testimony that he put the guns in the

vehicle earlier in the day planning to take them to his sister’s house before they had

“contractors coming in.” On the contrary though, Officer McClintock testified that the

defendant told him that he had intended to give his guns away to a friend before taking

pills to commit suicide. In addition, the victim testified that while she was duct-taped to

the bed, she heard the defendant rambling around the house for 30-40 minutes. The jury

could determine, in its province, that the defendant put the guns in his truck during that

time. In sum, the timing of when the guns were put in the truck was a question for the jury

and, by its verdict, the jury determined that the guns were in the home during the period of

the kidnapping and were able to be reduced to the defendant’s actual possession. The

defendant is not entitled to relief.

Additionally, though not raised at trial or in his brief to this Court, the defendant

maintained during oral argument before this Court that the weapons were not loaded, and

therefore, the State was unable to establish the “intent to go armed” element of the charged

offense. While our review of the record revealed no testimony establishing whether or not

the guns were loaded, our review Exhibit 6C revealed that not only were several weapons

found in the defendant’s possession as discussed supra, but several magazines of

ammunition and at least one box of ammunition were also found in the defendant’s truck,

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and therefore, in his possession. Based on the location of the ammunition in relation to the

weapons and the ease with which the weapons could be loaded, the evidence is sufficient

to establish the defendant’s intent to go armed and, therefore, sufficient to sustain the jury’s

verdict and the defendant’s conviction. See State v. Watkins, No. 2020-01006-CCA-R3-

CD, 2021 WL 5919119, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2021) (evidence is sufficient to

sustain a finding of the intent to go armed when shotgun shell was found “within five feet”

of an unloaded shotgun and “the shotgun could have been loaded ‘within a matter of

seconds’”).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgments of the

trial court.

S/ J. ROSS DYER _

J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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