stating that, “[m]atters of custody and placement for a dependent child must be decided under the standard of the child’s best interests, not those of his or her parents”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, “[m]atters of custody and placement for a dependent child must be decided under the standard of the child’s best interests, not those of his or her parents”
- stating, “[t]he extreme action of dismissal should be imposed by an appellate court sparingly, and clearly would be inappropriate when there has been substantial compliance with the rules and when the moving party has suffered no prejudice”
- stating, “the failure of an appellant in a children’s fast track case to file contemporaneously a concise statement with the notice of appeal pursuant to [R]ules 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2
- stating, “[a] placement goal change to [a]doption does not terminate the parents’ rights; however, it is a step in that direction”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: W.G., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: B.P.-G., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 67 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered December 12, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Children and Youth
Services at No(s): CP-11-DP-0000056-2023
BEFORE: OLSON, J., SULLIVAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: June 4, 2025
Appellant, B.P.-G., (“Mother”) appeals from the December 12, 2024
permanency review order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria
County that changed the permanent placement goal for W.G., a male child
born in February 2022, (“the Child”) from one of reunification to one of
adoption.1 We affirm.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 “[A]n order granting or denying a goal change in a dependency proceeding
is [an] appealable [order.]” Interest of J.B., 296 A.3d 1234, 1236 n.1
(Pa. Super. 2023). Mother filed her notice of appeal on January 9, 2025. The
notice of appeal did not contain a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal as required by Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 905(a)(2)
and 1925(a)(2)(i). See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(2) (stating that, “[i]f the appeal is
a children’s fast track appeal, a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal as described in [Rule] 1925(a)(2) shall be filed with the notice of appeal
and served on the trial [court]”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) (stating,
“[t]he concise statement of errors complained of on appeal shall be filed and
J-S15001-25
The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:
On July 18, 2023, [the Child] was placed in the protective custody
of the Cambria County [Children and Youth Services (“CYS”)] after
Mother and [Father] were arrested by the Pennsylvania State
Police in Indiana County[, Pennsylvania] on charges of homicide.[2
According to the shelter care application filed on July 19, 2023,]
Father [informed CYS] that he had no friends or relatives available
to care for the Child[. CYS] was unable to locate alternative
caretakers. The Child was removed from the parents’ care and
placed in the custody of [CYS] by a July 18, 2023[] verbal
emergency order [issued by] the trial court. The Child was then
____________________________________________
served with the notice of appeal”). The failure to file a concise statement
pursuant to Rules 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2)(i) results in a defective notice of
appeal. In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating, “the
failure of an appellant in a children’s fast track case to file contemporaneously
a concise statement with the notice of appeal pursuant to [R]ules 905(a)(2)
and 1925(a)(2)[] will result in a defective notice of appeal. The disposition of
the defective notice of appeal will then be decided on a case by case basis[.]”).
Mother corrected her procedural defect by filing her concise statement on
January 27, 2025, and the trial court subsequently filed its Rule 1925(a)
opinion on February 7, 2025. As Mother cured her defect promptly, the defect
did not impede the trial court’s ability to issue its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and
there is no discernable prejudice, Mother’s misstep did not defeat jurisdiction,
and we proceed to address the merits of Mother’s appeal. See Stout v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 421 A.2d 1047, 1049 (Pa. 1980) (stating,
“[t]he extreme action of dismissal should be imposed by an appellate court
sparingly, and clearly would be inappropriate when there has been substantial
compliance with the rules and when the moving party has suffered no
prejudice”).
The biological father, J.G., (“Father”) did not appeal the December 12, 2024
order.
2 According to Mother, her criminal conviction, as well as Father’s criminal
conviction, stemmed from an incident where “[F]ather shot a co-worker in
Cambria [County], placed the body in his vehicle and then picked up [Mother]
and [the Child] and drove to Indiana [County, Pennsylvania] where he tossed
the body into the woods.” Mother’s Brief at 9. Mother and Father were
subsequently arrested by the Pennsylvania State Police in Indiana County. Id.
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placed in foster care. On July 20, 2023, the trial court
memorialized the verbal order in a written order. On July 26,
2023, after an adjudicatory dependency hearing, the [trial] court
ruled that the Child was dependent as he was without proper care
or control, subsistence, and education as required by law
[because] his parents were [] incarcerated on homicide charges.
Mother and Father were ordered to complete parenting skill
classes. About 4[ to] 5 months after the Child’s placement,
Mother requested[, and was granted,] visitation with the Child[,
and] once a month, she has supervised video calls with the Child
for about [10 minutes.3]
On January 17, 2024, [the trial] court held a review hearing and
found that the placement of the Child in foster care continued to
be necessary and appropriate as both his parents were still
incarcerated. The permanency plan and placement goal
developed for the Child was reunification with his parents with the
concurrent plan of adoption. At the time of [the review] hearing,
the Child was in placement for five months. Mother, now
incarcerated at the Centre County Prison, completed parenting
classes.
...
At the time of the July [2024] permanency hearing,[4] Mother had
posted bail but was still incarcerated [in] the Centre County
Prison. On direct examination by counsel for [CYS], the
caseworker for the Child[] stated that Mother was still
incarcerated because she did not have a home plan, that “some
places thought she would be a high risk for running,” and that she
had no support system in Pennsylvania as her family [resided] in
Louisiana. When asked about the monthly supervised video calls,
[the caseworker] said that the Child recognized Mother, would
____________________________________________
3 The CYS caseworker indicated that the video calls between Mother and the
Child “last about 10 minutes in duration” and occur monthly. CYS Exhibit 1
(October 23, 2024 Memorandum).
4 The goal change hearing scheduled to occur in conjunction with the
permanency review hearing was continued at the request of Mother’s counsel,
and without objection, so Mother could have “additional time to establish her
ability to parent.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/25, at 2-3.
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interact with her, blow kisses or wave goodbye when prompted,
but did not reply with “mom” anymore.
When asked by counsel for [CYS] about how the Child was doing
in his foster care placement, [the caseworker] stated[, “the Child]
is doing extremely well in the foster home. He would have daily
tantrums, head banging, would cry terribly anytime the foster
parents would leave his eyesight. They all had to be in the same
room when I conducted video calls. [The Child] has successfully
graduated all of his early intervention services and he also now
has a level of comfort to where I can conduct a video [call] with
just myself [and the Child] in the room. The foster parents can
be out doing other things and [the Child] feels comfortable.”
[The trial] court asked [the caseworker] if [CYS] had additional
concerns other than Mother’s incarceration[. The caseworker
responded that “we would have additional concerns upon release.
We would have concerns of the housing, the income, mental
health, parenting skills, [and] decision making processes.”]
On September 30, 2024, Mother pleaded guilty to abuse of a
corpse[, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5510,] and [altered, forged or counterfeit
documents and plates, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7122.] On September 25,
2024, Father pleaded guilty to murder of the third degree[, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).]
. . . On November 13, 2024, [the trial] court held [a] permanency
review and goal change hearing. At this point in time, the Child
had been in [CYS’s] care and placement for 15 of the last 22
months.
Mother and Father had been incarcerated since the time of the
placement, and Mother and Father were still awaiting sentencing
at the time of the hearing. [CYS] recommended the goal change
of adoption based on the Child’s need of a permanent and
consistent environment.
At the November hearing, counsel for [CYS] asked [the
caseworker] how [the Child] was doing in his foster care
placement. [The caseworker] stated that [the Child] was “doing
very well.” When asked if [the Child] was developmentally on
target and if his foster home appears to be meeting his needs, she
stated “yes” to both questions.
[Mother’s counsel] cross-examined [the caseworker] about
[CYS’s] recommendation of a goal change [as follows]:
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[Mother’s Counsel:] What is [CYS’s] reasoning for the
change of goal or why do you
believe it’s in the best interest of the
Child?
[CYS Caseworker:] The Child has been in care for over
15 months. It would not be in his
best interest to continue with the
goal of reunification. [] Mother has
not yet been sentenced, and so that
just leaves a question of how much
longer would he continue to be in
[foster] care if [the goal is not
changed.]
Counsel for CYS cross-examined Mother about her housing plan
upon her release from incarceration [as follows]:
[CYS Counsel:] Mother, you indicated that you’re
going to the Centre Safe domestic
violence shelter if you’re released?
Mother: Yes.
[CYS Counsel:] Why a domestic violence shelter?
Mother: It’s the only resource that’s
available to me at the moment.
[CYS Counsel:] It’s not a long-term housing plan[,]
right?
Mother: It’s for 30 to 60 days and they offer
long-term housing as a result of the
shelter. They have a grant per se
that will give you housing.
[CYS Counsel:] Are you already accepted into this
program?
Mother: Yes.
[CYS Counsel:] And how long do you plan to stay
there?
Mother: Until I get into an apartment where
they offer the grant money.
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[CYS Counsel:] So you don’t know?
Mother: I am not aware of my release date,
so I’m unsure of all those logistics.
Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing,
[the trial] court ordered the permanent placement goal be
changed from reunification to adoption [on December 12, 2024.]
Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/25, at 1-6 (extraneous capitalization and original
brackets omitted). This appeal followed.5
On appeal, Mother challenges the December 12, 2024 permanency
review order on the ground the trial court erred by changing the goal from
one of reunification to one of adoption based solely on Mother’s incarceration
and her inability to parent her child.6 Mother’s Brief at 4, 7-13.
When we review a trial court’s order to change the placement goal
for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is abuse of
discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion, we must determine that the [trial] court’s judgment
was manifestly unreasonable, that the [trial] court did not apply
the law, or that the [trial] court’s action was a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias[,] or ill[-]will, as shown by the record. We are
bound by the trial court’s findings of fact that have support in the
record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with
____________________________________________
5 As discussed supra, Mother filed her concise statement on January 27, 2025.
The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 7, 2025.
6 Mother characterizes the December 12, 2024 permanency review order as
an order terminating her parental rights to the Child. Mother’s Brief at 4
(asking whether, or not, the trial court erred in “terminating the parental
rights of [Mother to the Child] by changing the [placement] goal”). The
December 12, 2024 order changed the permanency goal for the Child from
one of reunification to one of adoption and did not terminate Mother’s parental
rights. Interest of H.J., 206 A.3d 22, 25 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating, “[a]
placement goal change to [a]doption does not terminate the parents’ rights;
however, it is a step in that direction”).
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the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and
resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these
responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence. When the trial court’s findings are supported by
competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record
could also support an opposite result.
In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822-823 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). “Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent
children are controlled by the Juvenile Act, [codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 6301-6387.]” N.C., 909 A.2d at 823.
The policy underlying these statutes is to prevent children from
languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack of
permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental commitment.
Consistent with this underlying policy, [] the focus of dependency
proceedings, including change of goal proceedings, [is] on the
child. Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take
precedence over all other considerations, including the rights of
the parents.
Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he focus of all dependency proceedings, including
goal change proceedings, is on the safety, permanency, and well-being of the
child[,] and the best interests of the child must take precedence over all other
considerations.” H.J., 206 A.3d at 25; see also N.C., 909 A.2d at 823
(stating that, “[m]atters of custody and placement for a dependent child must
be decided under the standard of the child’s best interests, not those of his or
her parents”). “[T]here is no minimum period of time that a child’s goal must
be set at reunification before it can be changed [because, as courts have
long-held] a child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the
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parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”
J.B., 296 A.3d. at 1239 (citations and original quotation marks omitted).
Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act requires that, at each permanency
hearing, the trial court shall determine, inter alia,
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility[,] and extent of compliance
with the permanency plan developed for the child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement
goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child might
be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the
permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
...
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 22
months or the [trial] court has determined that aggravated
circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need to remove the child from the child’s parent,
guardian[,] or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family
need not be made or continue to be made, whether the county
agency has filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental
rights and to identify, recruit, process[,] and approve a qualified
family to adopt the child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best suited to
the physical, mental[,] and moral welfare of the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling reason
for determining that filing a petition to terminate parental
rights would not serve the needs and welfare of the child;
or
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(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with necessary
services to achieve the safe return to the child’s parent,
guardian[,] or custodian within the time frames set forth in
the permanency plan.
...
(12) If the child has been placed with a caregiver, whether the
child is being provided with regular, ongoing opportunities to
participate in age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate
activities. In order to make the determination under this
paragraph, the county agency shall document the steps it has
taken to ensure that:
(i) the caregiver is following the reasonable and prudent
parent standard; and
(ii) the child has regular, ongoing opportunities to engage in
age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities.
The county agency shall consult with the child regarding
opportunities to engage in such activities.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1-6, 9, 12).
Based upon the determinations made under [Section 6351(f)] and
all relevant evidence presented at the hearing, the [trial] court
shall determine, inter alia, the following:
(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s
parent, guardian[,] or custodian in cases where the return
of the child is best suited to the safety, protection[,] and
physical, mental[,] and moral welfare of the child.
(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and
the county agency will file for termination of parental rights
in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian[,] or
custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection[,] and
physical, mental[,] and moral welfare of the child.
...
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(1) and (2). “Because the focus is on the child’s best
interests, a goal change to adoption might be appropriate, even when a parent
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substantially complies with a reunification plan.” In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339,
347 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 12 A.3d 372 (Pa. 2010); see also N.C.,
909 A.2d at 826-827.
In the case sub judice, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in
changing the permanency goal from one of reunification to one of adoption
based upon a determination that no exception preventing the goal change
existed under Section 6351(f)(9). Mother’s Brief at 10. Mother contends that
CYS “did nothing more than facilitate a [10] minute video [call] between
[Mother and the Child] once each month” and, therefore, did not provide the
necessary services to achieve reunification. Id. Mother further asserts that
CYS “made no effort to assist her with [obtaining] housing [so it could] then
expand [her] contact with [the Child].” Id. at 11. Mother argues that “while
[CYS] may be required to seek a goal change when the [Child] has been in
care for 15 out of the last 22 months, the [trial c]ourt is not required to grant
such a request.” Id. Mother argues that the trial court “abused its discretion
by fixating on the [Section 6351(f)(9)] factor without giving fair consideration
to when [Mother] will be released from custody and return to care for [the
Child and that Mother] kept in contact with [the Child] each month while [he
was] in placement and had a close relationship [with the Child from the time
of his birth until he] entered placement.” Id. at 12.
In support of its decision to change the permanency goal from one of
reunification to one of adoption, the trial court explained,
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[Section] 6351(f) “creates a mechanism for keeping [trial] courts
alert to the potential for foster care drift, i.e., where children
languish in the foster care system while their parents
unsuccessfully attempt to regain custody. Thus, once a child’s
placement in foster care reaches the fifteen-month threshold,
[trial] courts are mandated to query whether the agency has
initiated proceedings to terminate parental rights[. ]Specifically,
if a child has been in custody for 15 of the last 22 months, the
[trial] court must inquire as to whether a termination petition has
been filed, absent the [applicability of one of the] listed exceptions
[under Section 6351(f)(9)], including whether the parents have
been provided necessary services.
At the time of the November 13, 2024[] goal change hearing, the
Child had been in foster care placement for nearly 16 of the last
22 months. At both the July 10, 2024, and November 13, 2024[]
hearings, the Child’s caseworker reported that [the Child] was
doing very well with his foster family, that he had completed all
early intervention behavioral classes, [and] that he was
comfortable with his foster parents leaving the room for video calls
with Mother. By this time, the Child appeared to have bonded
with his foster family.
[The trial] court originally scheduled the goal change hearing for
July 10, 2024, but granted Mother’s request to continue the
hearing so that she would have more time to resolve her criminal
charges and make stable housing arrangements. However, by the
time of the November [13, 2024] goal change hearing, Mother
was still incarcerated despite posting bail because she did not
have a stable or permanent housing plan. When questioned by
counsel for [CYS], Mother indicated in her responses that she did
not know when[,] or if[,] she would have stable housing
arrangements. At the time of the hearing, Mother was still
awaiting her sentencing for the charges [to which] she pleaded
[guilty], and [the trial] court was uncertain how long her
incarceration would last.
Mother did not state that she had employment set up upon her
release nor family support in Pennsylvania[. I]n fact, her family
appears to reside in Louisiana. In addition, [CYS] would need to
address Mother’s mental health, parenting skills, and
decision[-]making processes before [the trial court would permit]
reunification with [the] Child. [The trial] court determined that
this process could take several additional months on top of the 15
months the Child had already been in foster care.
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As required by statute, [CYS] was required to initiate proceedings
to terminate the parental rights of Mother as the Child was in
placement for 15 of the last [22] months. No exception to
[Section 6351(f)(9)] applied. Despite additional time to make
housing [and] employment arrangements, Mother did not have a
stable housing plan upon her release from incarceration. At the
time of [the trial] court’s December 12, 2024[] order, the Child
had been with his foster family for 16 months[. The Child] had
bonded with his foster parents, he was developmentally on track,
and his needs were being met. [The trial] court determined that
it was not in the Child’s best interest to continue to languish in the
foster care system while [Mother] remained incarcerated and
without stable housing or employment. Because of this, [the trial]
court determined that it was in the Child’s best interest to change
his placement goal from reunification with Mother to permanency
through adoption.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/25, at 8-10 (original brackets, citations, and
extraneous capitalization omitted).
At the November 13, 2024 hearing, the caseworker testified that the
Child had been in placement since July 18, 2023. N.T., 11/13/24, at 5.
Therefore, at the time of the hearing, the Child had been in placement for
5-days short of 16 months. The caseworker explained that the Child was
“doing very well” and was generally “on target” developmentally. Id. at 5-6.
By way of example, the caseworker explained that, initially, the Child was
terrified to be left alone but now was comfortable being outside the presence
of the foster parents. Id. The caseworker agreed that the foster parents were
meeting the Child’s needs. Id. at 6. The caseworker stated that Father, as
well as other family members, including maternal grandmother, were
excluded as placement options for the Child. Id. at 8. The caseworker stated
that she facilitated video calls between Mother and the Child. Id. at 6. CYS
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has not, however, been able to provide Mother with additional services due to
her incarceration. Id. at 8-9.
On cross-examination by Mother’s counsel, the caseworker described
the Child’s relationship with Mother as one in which the Child will “show
[Mother] the toys he’s playing with, repeat words, colors, [and] numbers that
[Mother] instructs him to repeat[, and] wave goodbye and blow a kiss goodbye
when prompted.” Id. at 11. The caseworker explained, however, that she
did not feel the Child recognized the video calls with Mother as “a visitation
between parent and child” but, rather, the Child recognized the caseworker
“as the girl that comes with the [tele]phone to read books and talk to
somebody else on a video call.” Id. at 12. The caseworker was aware that,
while incarcerated, Mother received “some certificates for her efforts
[towards] rehabilitation.” Id. at 14.
Finally, on cross-examination by the guardian ad litem, the caseworker
explained that the reason for the request in goal change from one of
reunification to one of adoption was due to the length of time the Child has
been in foster case. Id. at 17. The caseworker explained that a determination
as to the feasibility of reunification “would only be able to be determined if
[Mother] was released from incarceration and [CYS was] able to move forward
with in-person visits.” Id. The caseworker agreed that the process of CYS
establishing in-person visitation between Mother and the Child, and Mother
finding suitable housing and obtaining employment would be greater than 6
months after Mother’s release from incarceration. Id. at 17-18.
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Mother testified that, while incarcerated, she obtained certificates in a
parenting program, nutrition and food preparation, employment readiness and
skilled career development, and community re-entry, as well as a 12-week
drug and alcohol program. Id. at 20-21. Mother explained that, once
released, her plan was to reside at a domestic violence shelter until she is able
to obtain an apartment through a housing program. Id. at 21. Mother further
stated that she has been on work release from her incarceration as part of a
work program. Id. at 22. Mother described her relationship with the Child as
“a good relationship.” Id. at 21.
On cross-examination by CYS counsel, Mother acknowledged that her
plan to reside at the domestic violence shelter was only temporary (30 to 60
days) and that she did not have permanent housing arranged due to her
continued incarceration. Id. at 23. Mother explained that she had not
received her release date yet, so she was not sure of the logistics regarding
her housing situation. Id.
Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the
trial court’s order changing the permanency goal from one of reunification to
one of adoption. In ordering the goal change, the trial court considered, and
the record supports, the factors required by Section 6351. As detailed in its
permanency review order, the trial court found, inter alia, that the placement
of the Child continues to be necessary and appropriate, that Mother
demonstrated “minimal compliance” with the permanency plan and “no
progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
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placement,” that the Child has been in placement for 15 of the last 22 months
and the current plan of reunification is no longer appropriate or feasible, that
the Child is safe, that reasonable efforts have been made by CYS to achieve
the reunification plan, and that CYS will file a petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights at an appropriate time. Permanency Review Order, 12/12/24;
see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). Mother takes issue with a single factor
within the broader list of factors set forth in Section 6351, namely the trial
court’s determination that CYS provided necessary and reasonable services to
Mother to assist her in reunification and that an exception under Section
6351(f)(9)(iii) does not exist. Section 6351(f)(9) “is merely one of a number
of factors a trial court must consider in ultimately determining whether[, or
not,] the current placement is appropriate[.]” In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). The sole focus of the trial court in a petition seeking the
change of a goal in a permanency plan is on the best interest of the child and
not that of the parent as a child’s youth is too short and cannot be put on
hold. H.J., 206 A.3d at 25. As the trial court noted, the December 12, 2024
order does not terminate Mother’s parental rights to the child but, rather,
continues to move the child’s life forward to avoid “foster-care drift.” N.T.,
11/13/24, at 28. Mother still has an opportunity to demonstrate her ability to
parent, including, inter alia, her achievement of stable housing and consistent
employment, at a later proceeding.
Mother continues to be incarcerated and, as such, CYS is unable to
provide Mother with additional services until Mother is released. The
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circumstances in the case sub judice do not give rise to an exception under
Section 6351(f)(9). Therefore, we discern no error of law or abuse of
discretion in the order changing the Child’s permanency plan from a goal of
reunification to one of adoption.
Order affirmed.
DATE: 6/4/2025
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