The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
ZACHARY BARFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 1:24-cv-319
Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
C/O HAYES, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Zachary Barfield, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, sues Defendants, corrections officers Hayes and Gaffin, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
failure to protect him from assault by another inmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
(Compl., ECF No. 3.) This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 43.) For the reasons below, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 43) be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on April 29, 2024, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility, an inmate named Tumey slipped into Plaintiff’s cell behind Plaintiff
just before the cell door was closed at 4:31pm. Tumey remained in Plaintiff’s cell until 5:03pm
and assaulted Plaintiff during that time. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gaffin, who was
manning the booth that controlled the cell doors and contained video monitors showing
Plaintiff’s cell, and Defendant Hayes, who was patrolling Plaintiff’s cellblock, both saw Tumey
enter Plaintiff’s cell and did nothing to prevent Tumey from assaulting Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges
that even after Tumey left Plaintiff’s cell, neither Gaffin nor Hayes reported the incident in
contravention of prison policies. (Compl., ECF No. 3.)
On initial screen under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(b), the undersigned
recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief and for Defendants’ criminal
prosecutions, but permitted Plaintiff to proceed on his individual-capacity Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claims against Defendants Hayes and Gaffin for compensatory, punitive, and
nominal damages. (ECF No. 4.) The Court adopted that recommendation on February 19, 2025.
(ECF No. 38.) Defendants filed the subject Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
remaining claims on April 2, 2025. (ECF No. 43.) Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on
April 14, 2025 (ECF No. 44), although he submitted no evidence or verified allegations that the
Court may consider under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff’s opposition relies, in
part, on security camera and body camera footage, which he was permitted to view, but he was
not permitted to retain copies. The Court therefore ordered Defendants to file copies of the
relevant video, which Defendants did on April 25, 2025. (ECF Nos. 48–49.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party has the initial
burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the court must draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stansberry v. Air
Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s
assertion of fact” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”).
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in his favor.” Id. at 255 (citation omitted). “The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, . . . there must be evidence
upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party to create a
genuine dispute.” Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
(requiring a party maintaining that a fact is genuinely disputed to “cit[e] to particular parts of
materials in the record”). “When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and
supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an
essential element of its case, summary judgment is appropriate.” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim arises under the Eighth Amendment. “The [Eighth]
Amendment . . . imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of
confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates . . . .”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 932–33 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (quoting DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment “requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is
‘reasonable safety’”).
Such claims under the Eighth Amendment require a plaintiff “to prove both the
subjective and objective elements necessary to prove an Eighth Amendment violation.” Helling,
509 U.S. at 35. To satisfy the objective component for a claim based upon a failure to prevent
harm, “the inmate must show he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court
has offered the following guidance with respect to the objective factor:
[The objective factor] requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk
that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards
of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner
must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s society
chooses to tolerate.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.
“To satisfy the subjective component, an inmate must show that prison officials had a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Berksire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 535 (6th Cir. 2019)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has explained as follows:
“[T]hat state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.
Although the deliberate indifference standard describes a state of mind more
blameworthy than negligence, this standard is satisfied if the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Id. (quoting Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). However, “a prison official who was unaware of a substantial risk of harm to
an inmate may not be held liable under the Eighth Amendment even if the risk was obvious and a
reasonable prison official would have noticed it.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir.
2011) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims turn on the subjective prong—i.e., whether Defendants
were subjectively aware that Tumey improperly entered Plaintiff’s cell. Having reviewed
Defendants’ verified interrogatory responses, Tumey’s conduct report, and the available video
footage, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Defendants’ lack of
knowledge that Tumey improperly entered Plaintiff’s cell.
First, Defendants categorically deny under oath that they saw Tumey enter the cell.
(Interrog. Resps., ECF Nos. 43-1, 43-2.) Second, Tumey’s conduct report explains that “[d]ue to
the visibility restrictions into this type of cell and after a review of the Body Worn Cameras,
[Defendant Hayes] was unaware that two people were in that cell.” (Conduct Report, ECF No.
43-1.) Third, the DVR footage does reflect two inmates entering the same cell at 4:31pm, but the
cameras are far away from the cell in question and it requires close inspection to make out
Tumey’s entrance behind Plaintiff. The undersigned would not have observed Tumey enter
Plaintiff’s cell if the exact time of entrance had not been identified by the parties. It is therefore
by no means evident from the DVR footage that Defendant Gaffin, in the booth, would have seen
Tumey enter Plaintiff’s cell. Further, the DVR footage and Defendant Hayes’s body camera
footage confirm that he was observing inmates from the opposite end of the corridor from
Plaintiff’s cell and it is not clear that he was even looking in the direction of Plaintiff’s cell at the
time of Tumey’s entrance. And although Plaintiff asserts that the video evidence would reveal
that he called out Hayes’s name as he passed the cell on his rounds, no such call from Plaintiff is
evident on the video.1
1 In fact, the video reflects that Tumey is heard to call out to Defendant Hayes, but does so only
to request permission to use the wall phone. As Hayes stops by the cell to speak with Tumey,
Plaintiff remains out of view and apparently silent. Thus, although Hayes was certainly aware
The undersigned therefore finds that Defendants have carried their initial burden to
demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact as to Defendants’ lack of
knowledge of Tumey’s improper entrance into another inmate’s cell, and that Plaintiff has failed
to set forth specific facts, supported with citations to evidence that may be considered under Rule
56(c), showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to Defendant’s knowledge. This lack of
actual knowledge of Tumey’s improper entrance into Plaintiff’s cell is fatal to his claim that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety posed by
Tumey’s presence. See Bishop, 636 F.3d at 767 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
IV. DISPOSITION
For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 43) be GRANTED.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
that Tumey was present in that cell, there was no apparent indication to Hayes that Tumey
should not have been there.
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE