Opinion

Gerald Brown v. State of Florida

Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed
May 30, 2025
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.9%

The opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D2024-3233

LT Case No. 2010-CF-08065-A

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GERALD BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Mark Jeffrey Borello, Judge.

Gerald Brown, Lake City, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

May 30, 2025

EISNAUGLE, J.

Gerald Brown appeals the postconviction court’s dismissal of

his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion in which—

relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Alleyne v. United States, 570

U.S. 99 (2013); and Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821

(2024)—he argued his Habitual Felony Offender (“HFO”)

sentences are illegal because the trial court, and not the jury, made

the requisite factual findings. In dismissing the motion, the

postconviction court reasoned, inter alia, that (1) Brown’s

Apprendi challenge to his HFO sentences “is not the kind of issue

that Rule 3.800(a) motions are intended to resolve,” and (2)

Erlinger does not apply retroactively. Given the nature of the

postconviction court’s analysis and disposition, it did not attach

records to the order. We reverse.

While we are sympathetic to the postconviction court’s view

that Brown’s Apprendi challenge is an odd fit for rule 3.800(a), our

supreme court’s decision in Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 95 (Fla.

2014), concludes that claims of Apprendi error are indeed

cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. We are, of course, bound by

Plott, as is the postconviction court.

Moreover, the postconviction court’s unelaborated statement

that Erlinger is not retroactive misses the mark because, for one,

Brown did not rely on Erlinger alone. He relied on Apprendi and

its progeny which happens to include Erlinger. Importantly,

Brown’s sentence became final long after Apprendi and Blakely

were decided. At a minimum, we fail to see how Apprendi and

Blakely would require retroactive application.1

Finally, given the postconviction court did not attach any

records to its order, our record is insufficient for us to conduct a

harmless error analysis, Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 522–23

(Fla. 2007), or to determine if Brown’s Apprendi argument was

preserved, McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001). We

therefore reverse and remand to the postconviction court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.

1 For this reason, we need not decide if Erlinger announces a

new rule, and if it does, whether it requires retroactive application.

See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980).

2

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Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

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3

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