Bar-Levy v. Cruze

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

YAAKOV BAR-LEVY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-318-KKM-PRL

GINGER CRUZE, in her individual and

official capacity as Principal of

Westport High School, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________

ORDER

Yaakov Bar-Levy, a senior at West Port High School, moves for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction allowing him to wear a stole displaying

the Star of David, the Israeli flag, and a U.S. Army insignia at his graduation

ceremony on May 31, 2025. Mot. for Preliminary Injunction (MPI) (Doc. 3). By

denying him permission to don that garment at the school’s event, Bar-Levy alleges

that school officials will violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that the

World Equestrian Center, the site of the graduation, will violate the Civil Rights of

Act of 1964.

The Supreme Court has long held that schools may not ordinarily censor

speech based on viewpoint. Had the evidence demonstrated viewpoint

discrimination or selective enforcement, the equities otherwise favor a preliminary

injunction. But Bar-Levy fails to present evidence that the school discriminates

based on religion or viewpoint in prohibiting any non-academically earned stoles and

honor cords, so he has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. I

therefore deny his motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Bar-Levy is “a devout practicing Jew and a dual citizen of the United States

and Israel.” Verified Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 17. His “Jewish faith is central to his identity

and daily life,” and he “is active in religious studies and observance, and maintains

traditional Jewish customs with the support of his family and community.” After

graduation, Bar-Levy, who has already completed boot camp, will attend college and

serve in the National Guard. ¶ 18. To represent his faith and future, Bar-

Levy seeks to wear a homemade stole at graduation on May 31, 2025. The stole

looks like this:

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ii

Verified Compl. at 28. One side has the blue and white flag of Israel, including the

Star of David, and the other is green and emblazoned with “U.S. Army.”

In a meeting earlier this month, Bar-Levy claims that Defendant Ginger

Cruze, West Port’s principal, informed Bar-Levy’s father that, under a school policy,

“no modifications to the graduation gown were permitted, and that any deviation

from the standard attire would be met with removal from the ceremony.” Jd. ¥ 23;

see id. § 24 (“Principal Cruze further stated that no exceptions would be granted,

even for religious purposes, and refused to consider or discuss any reasonable

accommodation.”). A follow-up conversation with the “Marion County School

District Office” confirmed that Cruze has full authority to set the graduation policy.

¶¶ 27–28.

Bar-Levy sued Cruze (in both her official and individual capacities), West

Port High School administrator Scott McLain (in his official capacity), countywide

Superintendent Diane Gullett (in her official capacity), the Marion County School

Board, and the World Equestrian Center (WEC). Verified Compl. ¶¶ 11–15. Bar-

Levy brings § 1983 claims against the first four defendants (the government

defendants), alleging violations of the Free Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause,

the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Verified Compl. ¶¶ 36–

56, 63–68.1 Bar-Levy brings a claim against WEC under Title II of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. ¶¶ 57–62. Bar-Levy also brings a claim

against the School Board and Gullett and a “chilling effect” § 1983 claim against all

defendants. ¶¶ 69–72.

Shortly after filing his complaint, Bar-Levy moved for a temporary restraining

order and a preliminary injunction. MPI. I held an evidentiary hearing on May 27,

2025. (Doc. 22). In support of his motion, Bar-Levy presented evidence of the

1 With respect to McLain, Bar-Levy brings only the free-speech claim.

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religious significance of the symbolism on his stole. Rabbi Bar-Levy Decl. (Doc. 16

at 3–4) at 1–2. Bar-Levy and his father, an ordained Jewish rabbi, also testified that

the school selectively enforced its graduation policy. Verified Compl. ¶ 21

(alleging that “[s]imilar forms of graduation expression - such as leis, cords, and

cultural symbols - have routinely been permitted or overlooked in . . . [West Port]

High School ceremonies.”). But when pressed, both Bar-Levy and his father failed

to identify any exemptions that West Port had granted to graduating students or

identify any violations that West Port routinely tolerated.

In response, the defendants provided more evidence about the policy. Cruze

testified that the Marion County School Board delegates to each school principal

the discretion to set the rules for permissible dress at graduation. Marion

County Public Schools 2024-2025 Code of Student Conduct Secondary (Doc. 19

(4–66)) at 32 (“Regulations in reference to grooming and dress for special activities

such as athletics, fine arts and drill team will be governed by the immediate person

in charge of these activities under the direction of the principal.”). As for West Port’s

current policy, Cruze testified that students are allowed to wear honor cords that

correspond to approved academic clubs and career and technical certifications, as

well as three stoles predicated on academic achievement. (Doc. 19) at 69–

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78 (West Port graduation programs identifying “Honor Stoles & Cords” and

“Academically Earned Recognition Cords”); at 151, 153 (West Port website

providing that “Students may only wear academically earned stoles and honor cords.

The academically earned stoles approved for the Class of 2025 are: West Port Latin

Honors Stole, Phi Theta Kappa Stole, and AP Capstone Stole”). Students are not

allowed to decorate their caps. These restrictions, Cruze testified, serve West Port’s

goal of celebrating academic achievements.

Despite receiving requests, Cruze testified that she has never granted an

exception to these policies in the eight years that she has served as principal. Cruze

is also unaware of any other school principal in Marion County granting any sort of

exception at graduation ceremonies. To prevent students from wearing non-

compliant garb, Cruze stated that school employees screen graduating students as

they enter the venue. This screening process, admittedly, is not entirely foolproof, as

sometimes a student may slip through undetected or get handed something as the

student walks in. In such a scenario, Cruze said that she would not “wrestle

somebody on the stage” to prevent a student walking in an unapproved garment.

Cruze noted that, despite having staff dedicated to quietly and unobtrusively

enforcing the rules, policing the approximately 750 students at graduation when held

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at WEC complicates perfect compliance with the dress code.

Adam Langenmayr, who has served as West Port’s graduation coordinator

since 2014, testified similarly. West Port’s policy, Langenmayr stated in his affidavit,

“accomplishes West Port’s primary objective of conducting a ceremony to

commemorate each graduate’s academic achievements, and to provide a memorable

and positive experience for all graduates.” Langenmayr Aff. (Doc. 20 (11–17)) ¶ 10.

Although the final decision does not rest with him, Langenmayr has always refused

to grant any exception. ¶¶ 12, 14. To Langenmayr’s knowledge, the last three

West Port principals have “refused p[ro]spective graduate requests to wear personal

adornments” during graduation. ¶ 15. Most of the time, West Port staff has been

able to discover and confiscate unauthorized garments at graduation. ¶ 18.

“Occasionally, however, some items may not be located prior to the student walking

during graduation. Regardless, students adorning or displaying any garment or item

other than the ones [approved by the policy] is not permitted or endorsed by West

Port.” Finally, although Langenmayr has not, before now, formally memorialized

this policy, he states that “[w]ith potentially minor changes, [the] policy has

remained mostly the same” since he started as Graduation Coordinator. ¶ 19.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

To warrant a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish (1) “a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits;” (2) “irreparable injury” without an

injunction; (3) “the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the

proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction

would not be adverse to the public interest.” , 234 F.3d 1163, 1176

(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam);

, 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009). Since a

“preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,” a court is not to

grant it “unless the movant ‘clearly carries the burden of persuasion’ as to the four

prerequisites.” , 720 F.2d 1511, 1519 (11th Cir.

1983) (quoting , 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir.

1974)). Accordingly, “[f]ailure to show any of the four factors is fatal.”

, 557 F.3d at 1198.

III. ANALYSIS

In his motion, Bar-Levy argues that he has a substantial likelihood of success

on the merits with respect to his free-speech, free-exercise, equal-protection, and

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due-process claims as well as his claim against WEC under the Civil Rights Act.

MPI at 7–9, 11–17. I disagree and therefore deny Bar-Levy’s motion.

A. Free-Speech Claim

Through incorporation of the First Amendment, the government defendants

are forbidden from “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I;

, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Bar-Levy argues that he has a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his free-speech claim because the

school’s policy draws lines based on both content and viewpoint and the government

defendants cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. MPI at 8. The unwritten nature of the

policy, Bar-Levy contends, only confirms its likely unconstitutionality. at 11. The

government defendants argue in response that Bar-Levy does not have a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits because the graduation ceremony is a school-

sponsored event and West Port’s restriction is “reasonably related to legitimate

pedagogical concerns.” Resp. (Doc. 20) at 7 (quoting

, 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1163 (N.D. Okla. 2016)). Under governing law, I agree

with the defendants.

Although a public-school student does not lose his right to speak when he

passes through the “schoolhouse gate,”

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, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), the scope of the right is not “automatically

coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”

, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). The standards that apply in adjudging a school’s

regulation of speech “depend on the nature of the forum.”

, 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). In both limited public fora—which

arise when the government “reserv[es] [the forum] for certain groups or for the

discussion of certain topics,” , 515

U.S. 819, 829 (1995)—and nonpublic fora—which constitute “property at which the

government ‘act[s] as a proprietor, managing its internal operations,’ ”

, 872 F.3d 1209, 1225 (11th Cir. 2017) (alteration in the

original) (quoting , 576 U.S.

200, 216 (2015))—the government may “impose restrictions on speech that are

reasonable and viewpoint neutral,” , 555 U.S. 460,

470 (2009); , 664 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2011).

“Within scholastic nonpublic fora, there are four clear categories of expression:

vulgar expression, pure student expression, government expression, and school-

sponsored expression.” , 387 F.3d 1208,

1213 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). The fourth category considers the extent of

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“educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and

other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might

reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,” and the First Amendment

requires less of the school in that context. , 484

U.S. 260, 271 (1988). In , for example, the Supreme Court held “that

educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over

the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so

long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”

at 273. This is a much more forgiving standard than , which concerns “pure

[student] speech” and allows for regulation only when the student’s articulation of a

“particular expression of opinion” “substantially interfere[s] with the work of the

school or impinge[s] upon the rights of other students.” 393 U.S. at 508–09.

Bar-Levy argues that governs; 2 the defendants respond that

controls. Eleventh Circuit precedent cuts in the latter direction. School-

2 At the evidentiary hearing, Bar-Levy’s counsel suggested that the school’s graduation is a

“limited public forum.” Even if true, this difference would be immaterial to the outcome. After all,

the normal standard for both limited and nonpublic fora is the same: the government must act

reasonably and in a viewpoint-neutral manner. , 555 U.S. at 470 (limited public

fora); , 664 F.3d at 872. West Port’s policy is “reasonable in light of the purpose served by

the forum,” , 515 U.S. at 829 (quoting

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sponsored speech, like in , is “all expression that (1) bears the imprimatur

of the school, and (2) occurs in a curricular activity.” , 387 F.3d at 1214.

“[E]xpressive activities are curricular so long as they are merely (1) ‘supervised by

faculty members,’ and (2) ‘designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to

student participants and audiences.’ ” (quoting , 484 U.S. at 271).

As for whether the graduation “bears the imprimatur of the school,” I find

persuasive an out-of-circuit opinion that compares a graduation ceremony to a

theatrical production. , 714 F. Supp. 2d 972, 988

(D.S.D. 2010) (“A graduation proceeding is a theatrical production in a sense—the

actors, director, and stage crew, or rather the students, administrators, teachers, and

staff members, hope to convey a message the audience will understand and

appreciate.”). Among other things, the school communicates its message celebrating

academic achievement by prescribing the academic regalia worn at the ceremony and

providing attendees with a bulletin explaining each adornment’s meaning. (Doc.

19) at 76–78 (2025 West Port Graduation Bulletin). Given the school’s involvement

in curating the graduation ceremony, “students, parents, and members of the public

, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)), and, as discussed below, Bar-Levy fails to present evidence

that West Port applies the policy in a viewpoint-based way.

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might reasonably perceive” any student speech as receiving the school’s approval.

, 484 U.S. at 271; , 157 F. Supp.

3d 1159, 1164 (N.D. Okla. 2016) (“Given the degree of control the school exercised

over this event, observers reasonably could have perceived the expressions made

through the students’ graduation regalia as bearing the imprimatur of the school.”).

When it comes to whether the activity is “curricular,” the graduation is

“supervised by” Langenmayr and Cruze, among other “faculty members.” ,

387 F.3d at 1214. And West Port’s graduation is designed “to impart particular

knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.’ ” (quoting ,

484 U.S. at 271). At issue in was a school beautification project that involved

students painting murals. at 1210. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “the

beautification project was designed to impart particular knowledge and skills to

student participants and audiences; it allowed student participants to express

themselves artistically, allowed student audiences to appreciate their fellow students’

artwork, and promoted school spirit, among other things.” at 1215. Here, the

school officials explained that the school’s graduation is designed to “present a

unified sense of the class at graduation” and “honor individual academic

achievements.” In other words, the school’s graduation allows the audience to

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“appreciate” the students’ academic work and “promote[s] school spirit.” ,

387 F.3d at 1215. It follows that Bar-Levy’s planned expression would “occur[] in a

curricular activity.” at 1214.

Because any expressive activity is school-sponsored, West Port’s policy will

withstand constitutional scrutiny if it is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical

concerns” and viewpoint neutral. at 1213–15. On the current record, both

requirements are met.

First, the school’s policy—which allows for the donning of only pre-approved

academic stoles—is reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical goal of

celebrating academic achievement. , , 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1164

(explaining that the policy at issue “allows the school to reserve special recognition

for student achievement or participation in school-related activities”);

, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (explaining that the policy at issue “furthers the school

board’s interest in demonstrating the unity of the class and celebrating academic

achievement”). The policy also allows the school to avoid endorsing specific policy

or religious positions. , , 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1164 (collecting cases

recognizing this interest). , 596 U.S. 767, 781 (2022) (noting

the limits of a state’s antiestablishment interest).

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Second, there is not enough evidence in the record to conclude that the

government defendants are engaged in viewpoint discrimination. At the hearing,

Bar-Levy’s counsel suggested that, for this inquiry, I should consider the school

district’s policy—which delegates discretion to each principal—rather than West

Port’s policy that liquidates Cruze’s exercise of discretion. Either way, Bar-Levy’s

evidence is insufficient. As for West Port, the school codified on its website its

longstanding, viewpoint-neutral policy allowing for the wearing of only academic

stoles. (Doc. 19) at 151, 153; Langenmayr Aff. ¶¶ 6–15, 19. Although Bar-Levy

alleges that “[s]imilar forms of graduation expression - such as leis, cords, and

cultural symbols - have routinely been permitted or overlooked in past [West Port]

High School ceremonies,” Verified Compl. ¶ 21, Bar-Levy walked this allegation

back during the evidentiary hearing, testifying that he was unaware of any

exemption. Bar-Levy’s father was similarly unable to identify such an exemption at

West Port. Indeed, Bar-Levy’s counsel could not point to any such evidence

either.

As for district-wide evidence, Bar-Levy’s counsel relied on vague testimony

from Bar-Levy’s father that suggested he witnessed deviations at other schools’

graduation ceremonies. Bar-Levy’s father did not identify what those instances

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included, how many, or any other specific details. Given Bar-Levy’s burden, this

testimony is far from enough to establish that the school district’s policy is applied

in a viewpoint-based manner. Therefore, no matter which policy is examined—

whether West Port’s or the district’s—Bar-Levy has not established a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits.

Under precedent, Bar-Levy’s planned expression of wearing a stole at

graduation would be school-sponsored speech. Because the challenged policy “is

“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” and viewpoint neutral,

, 387 F.3d at 1213–15, Bar-Levy has not shown a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits.

B. Free-Exercise Claim

Bar-Levy also argues that the policy violates his First Amendment right to

freely exercise his religion. MPI at 7–10. I conclude that Bar-Levy fails to show a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of this claim as well.

The First Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment,

provides that States may not “prohibit[] the free exercise” of religion. U.S. CONST.

amend. I; , 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). To successfully

challenge a law or rule as violating the Free Exercise Clause, a plaintiff must show

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“that the government has impermissibly burdened one of [his] ‘sincerely held

religious beliefs.’ ”

, 942 F.3d 1215, 1246 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting ,

495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007)). Put another way, a plaintiff must show that

“(1) [he] holds a belief, not a preference, that is sincerely held and religious in nature,

not merely secular; and (2) the law at issue in some way impacts the plaintiff’s ability

to either hold that belief or act pursuant to that belief.” (quoting

, 687 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012)).

If this threshold showing is met, the showing the government must make to

sustain its practice depends on the nature of the regulation. If the challenged rule is

both neutral and generally applicable,

, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), the government need only show that it has

a rational basis for the policy, ,

, 83 F.4th 922, 928 (11th Cir. 2023). If, on the other hand, the rule is

motivated by antireligious animus,

, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993), or the rule applies differently to religious

contexts than secular ones, , 593 U.S. 522, 534

(2021), then the government must satisfy strict scrutiny,

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, 597 U.S. 507, 525 (2022).

Assuming without deciding that Bar-Levy has shown a burden on a sincere

religious belief in the prohibition on wearing the stole, he nevertheless fails to show

a constitutional violation under . None of the evidence presented through the

papers or at the hearing supports an inference that West Port’s policy is not neutral

and generally applicable. The policy is facially neutral as to religion—no non-

academic expressive stoles are allowed, religious or not. Verified Compl. ¶¶ 23–

24.3 As noted above, neither Bar-Levy nor his father could identify any exceptions

to the policy, and Cruze testified consistently that she has never granted an

exception. Finally, Bar-Levy’s counsel admitted he could not point to any way in

which the school’s policy was not neutral and generally applicable. The policy

therefore faces rational-basis review, , 83 F.4th at 928, and

3 To the extent that Bar-Levy challenges the policy’s neutrality based on hostility toward his

religious beliefs, his evidence is insufficient. ,

584 U.S. 617, 639 (2018). Bar-Levy echoes his father’s claim that the policy was motivated by

animus because Cruze’s “tone” was “dismissive and authoritarian” and she “smirked” during the

interview, Verified Compl. ¶ 26, and his father testified that “[t]hey were just not being

professional and laughing about the situation.” These vague allegations fall far short of the

language the Supreme Court found adequate to show animus in .

584 U.S. at 635 (recounting the Colorado Civil Rights Commission as “describ[ing] a man’s faith

as ‘one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use’ ”). More, Cruze “strongly

disagree[s]” with Rabbi Bar-Levy’s “characterization” of the meeting. Cruze Aff. ¶ 8. Accordingly,

Bar-Levy has not persuaded me that the policy or its application against him was motivated by

antireligious prejudice.

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Bar-Levy does not argue that he can prevail under that standard, MPI at 8–9.

Accordingly, Bar-Levy has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on

his free-exercise challenge.

C. Other Claims

Bar-Levy also mentions his due-process and equal-protection claims, which

he bases on the unwritten policy and alleged uneven enforcement. MPI at 9, 11–13.

As for his equal-protection claim, the school policy does not distinguish based on a

protected characteristic. Nor has Bar-Levy shown that it is applied in a

discriminatory way. Thus, Bar-Levy lacks a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits. , 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004) (applying “rational-basis

scrutiny to [the plaintiff’s] equal protection claims” when the challenged program

did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).

As for due process, Bar-Levy does not provide support for the proposition

that the government defendants failed to provide him with the process he was due.

The record proves the opposite. Bar-Levy received notice of the policy and then met

with the principal and other administrators. He then had a hearing in federal court.

Accordingly, Bar-Levy does not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

of his due process claim. , 953 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1992)

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(“Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).

Given the lack of merit in Bar-Levy’s constitutional claims against the school

officials, Bar-Levy also lacks a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

regarding his claim against Gullett and the School Board.

, 85 F.4th 1121, 1129 (11th Cir. 2023) (“A claim is

derivative of—and so requires—an constitutional violation by an

officer.”), , 144 S. Ct. 1349 (2024);

, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). And because

Bar-Levy has provided no indication that WEC can remedy his stated injuries,

Resp. at 1 n.2, Bar-Levy lacks standing to seek an injunction against WEC,

, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (“A plaintiff must allege

personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and

likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” (citation omitted));

, 940 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[A] plaintiff

must establish standing for each type of relief sought.”). In any case, there is no

evidence that WEC has a policy that discriminates based on religion or that WEC

is acting in concert with the government defendants to enforce such a policy. Bar-

Levy has thus not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his other claims.

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D. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors

Though Bar-Levy’s failure to show any likelihood of success on the merits is

“fatal” to his request for a preliminary injunction, , 557

F.3d at 1198, for completeness I consider the other three factors.

First, irreparable harm is ordinarily presumed in First Amendment cases, so

that factor cuts in Bar-Levy’s favor. , 427 U.S. 347, 373–74

(1976); , 658 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1128 (M.D.

Fla. 2023), 134 F.4th 1178 (11th Cir. 2025).

Second, the potential harm to Bar-Levy outweighs the potential harm to the

government defendants. Bar-Levy will graduate high school only once, and the harm

of being unable to express himself and practice his religious beliefs in his preferred

way at that graduation is significant. On the other hand, the dilution of the school’s

message of the value of academic achievement is less.

Third, the public interest is mostly neutral. On one hand, protecting First

Amendment rights is in the public interest. ,

94 F.4th 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024). But Bar-Levy has not shown a likely First

Amendment violation. On the other hand, the public has an interest in orderly

public-school graduations, in the celebration of academic accomplishment, and in

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the administration of the public schools by democratically elected school boards and

their delegees, rather than federal judges. , 515 U.S. 70, 131–

32 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that school officials “are better

equipped than a single federal judge to make . . . day-to-day policy, curricular, and

funding choices”).

Despite some support in the other three factors, Bar-Levy’s lack of likelihood

of success on the merits is conclusive here. Bar-Levy’s principal aim is to wear his

stole to graduation and granting a preliminary injunction would allow just that. In

essence, the grant of a preliminary injunction is equivalent to victory on the merits.

He should thus have to make a strong showing that he is entitled to such a victory.

. , 253 F.3d 1234, 1247 (10th Cir.

2001) (“The only reason to disfavor a preliminary injunction that grants substantially

all the relief sought is if it would ‘render a trial on the merits largely or completely

meaningless.’ ” (quoting , 60 F.3d

27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995))). As he has not done so, a preliminary injunction is

unwarranted.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Bar-Levy’s desire to celebrate his faith and military service to our Country is

admirable. But based on precedent and the absence of evidence of viewpoint or

religious discrimination, Bar-Levy has failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood

of success on the merits of his claims. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that plaintiff

Yaakov Bar-Levy’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction (Doc. 3) is DENIED.

ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, on May 29, 2025.

athryn’ Kimball Mizelle

United States District Judge

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