Jalen Bass v. Roland Jones, Jr.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-10261

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JALEN BASS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROLAND JONES, JR.,

In his individual capacity,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-04031-TWT

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10261

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and BRASHER,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jalen Bass appeals the summary judgment in favor of Officer

Ronald Jones Jr. and against his complaint alleging claims of exces-

sive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

and state law assault and battery, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 51-1-13, 51-1-14.

We affirm.

We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Bass ex-

cept when the body camera “video actually proves that the plain-

tiff’s version of the facts cannot be true.” Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th

1267, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2023). Officer Jones initiated a traffic stop

and advised Bass that he was being stopped because he failed to

stop at a flashing red light. See Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-23(1). Officer

Jones stated that Bass was slurring his words. He asked Bass to stop

the car engine seven times but, as the video records, Bass did not

turn the engine off. Officer Jones reached through the window, un-

buckled Bass’s seatbelt, and placed the car in park. He then asked

Bass to step out of the car multiple times but, as the video records,

Bass asked what he needed to step out for and did not exit. Officer

Jones grabbed Bass’s arm, pulled him from the car, and handcuffed

him. A passenger remained in the car. Officer Jones decided to place

Bass in the police car because he was by himself, felt his safety was

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25-10261 Opinion of the Court 3

threatened by the presence of the passenger, and wanted to know

where Bass was.

He walked Bass to his patrol car and told him to have a seat

in the back of the car. But, as the video records, Bass did not step

into the car and stated that he felt uncomfortable. Officer Jones

again told Bass to have a seat, and when Bass stated he wanted to

talk to a supervisor, Officer Jones stated he would speak to a super-

visor in a minute. When Bass spoke again, the video records Officer

Jones putting his hand on Bass’s chest and shoving him into the

car’s backseat. The video does not record whether Bass hit his head

on the car, but it does record Officer Jones pushing him into the

backseat of the car on his back, not slamming his head on the metal

divider that separated the front and backseat. While we accept

Bass’s version of the facts to the extent that he asserts he hit his

head on the car because the video does not record whether his head

hit the car, we rely on the body camera footage recording that Of-

ficer Jones pushed him into the backseat and did not slam his head

into the metal divider. See Brooks, 78 F.4th at 1271–72. Officer Jones

then picked up Bass’s feet and moved them into the patrol car and

shut the car door. Bass eventually sat himself upright, spoke to sev-

eral other officers that arrived, and did not complain of any injury.

He was given a field sobriety test that determined he was not under

the influence of alcohol and was allowed to leave with a citation

for the traffic violation. He later received treatment for a concus-

sion and problems with his vision based on this incident and prior

injuries.

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10261

Bass filed a complaint alleging claims of excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and assault

and battery under state law, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 51-1-13, 51-1-14, and

requested punitive damages. Officer Jones moved for summary

judgment. He argued that Bass had not established a Fourth

Amendment violation because his use of force was de minimis and

reasonable under the circumstances. He also argued that he was

entitled to qualified immunity because he had not violated Bass’s

clearly established constitutional rights. He argued that he was en-

titled to official immunity as to the state law claims because Bass

presented no evidence that he acted with actual malice or intent to

cause injury. Bass responded that the force was excessive and that

Officer Jones violated clearly established law because he was not

suspected of committing a serious crime, was handcuffed and

posed no threat, offered no active resistance, and suffered severe

injuries. As to official immunity, Bass argued that providing him

with a warning was a ministerial duty that did not require him to

establish actual malice because the City of Atlanta’s use of force

policy required Officer Jones to warn him before using force.

The district court granted Officer Jones’s motion for sum-

mary judgment. It ruled that Officer Jones was entitled to qualified

immunity because Bass failed to establish a violation of the Fourth

Amendment. It determined that Bass failed to follow commands

several times before Officer Jones pushed Bass into the car to sepa-

rate him from the passenger and that although it was unclear in the

video whether Bass’s head struck the car, Officer Jones did not slam

Bass’s head against metal bars. It also ruled that Officer Jones was

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25-10261 Opinion of the Court 5

entitled to official immunity on his state law claims because the use

of force was a discretionary act, and Bass did not allege Officer

Jones acted maliciously or with intent to cause injury.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo, viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual

inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Richmond v. Badia, 47

F.4th 1172, 1179 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

The district court did not err in ruling that Officer Jones was

entitled to qualified immunity because Bass did not establish a vio-

lation of the Fourth Amendment. Qualified immunity protects a

government official from suit in their individual capacity unless

their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitu-

tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 698 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). After an official establishes that

he was acting within his discretionary authority, the plaintiff bears

the burden to establish that the official violated a clearly established

constitutional right. Id. In determining whether the use of force

was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we look

at the totality of the circumstances and consider “the fact pattern

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene with

knowledge of the attendant circumstances and facts.” Id. at 699 (ci-

tation and internal quotation marks omitted). We consider “the se-

verity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immedi-

ate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-10261

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “We also consider

the justification for the application of force, the relationship be-

tween the justification and the amount of force used, and the ex-

tent of any injury inflicted.” Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1182. “Not every

push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace

of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Charles,

18 F.4th at 699 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Officer Jones did not use excessive force when he pushed

Bass into the backseat of the police car. Officer Jones had a valid

law enforcement reason for placing Bass in the patrol car. He was

by himself and felt his safety was threatened by having Bass outside

of the car with a passenger present. The push into the patrol car

was proportional to the need to secure Bass in the car. Because Bass

was refusing to obey his commands to step into the car, Officer

Jones had to put Bass into the car himself. And Bass had previously

refused to comply with his commands to turn off and step out of

the car, so a reasonable officer in Officer Jones’s position could have

assumed Bass would fail to comply with his command to step into

the patrol car. See id. Although Bass argues that he was handcuffed

and not actively resisting, he was disobeying Officer Jones’s com-

mands to step into the car. And we have held much more serious

forms of force to be reasonable when a suspect is ignoring com-

mands, even when they are handcuffed. See Zivojinovich v. Barner,

525 F.3d 1059, 1072–73 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that use of a taser

when a suspect was handcuffed was not excessive when he had

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repeatedly ignored police instructions and acted belligerently to-

ward police).

Contrary to Bass’s argument that he did not have time to

comply before Officer Jones pushed him, he had time to state he

was uncomfortable and that he wanted a supervisor. Bass also ar-

gues that his crime was a misdemeanor such that no force was jus-

tified. Although “less force is appropriate for a less serious [of-

fense],” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002), we have

“made clear that some use of force by a police officer when making

a custodial arrest is necessary and altogether lawful, regardless of

the severity of the alleged offense,” Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080,

1094 (11th Cir. 2003). Bass also argues that his serious injuries made

the force excessive. Even accepting as true that Bass hit his head on

the car and received treatment for a head injury such that the force

might not be classified as de minimis, the “core judicial inquiry” is

the “nature of the force,” not the “quantity of injury.” Saunders v.

Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quo-

tation marks omitted, alterations adopted); see also Rodriguez v. Far-

rell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[R]easonable force does

not become excessive force when the force aggravates (however se-

verely) a pre-existing condition the extent of which was unknown

to the officer at the time.”).

The precedents Bass cites are distinguishable. In Patel, we

held that an officer’s use of force in sweeping Patel’s legs out from

under him while his arms were being held such that he hit the

ground face first and was permanently paralyzed was drastically in

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-10261

excess of any force warranted by the minor movements Patel made

away from the officer. Patel v. City of Madison, Ala., 959 F.3d 1330,

1335, 1339–42 (11th Cir. 2020). In Stephens, we held that the use of

force was excessive when an officer hit Stephens’s chest and

slammed him backward against the car door frame even though he

was under control, not resisting, and obeying commands. Stephens

v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1308, 1322–28 (11th Cir. 2017). And in

Lee, we held an officer engaged in excessive force when he slammed

Lee’s head against a truck without a legitimate law enforcement

reason, and she did not resist or attempt to flee. Lee, 284 F.3d at

1198. In contrast to those instances of disproportionate force

against compliant suspects, Officer Jones pushed Bass into the

backseat of the patrol car after Bass repeatedly failed to comply

with his command to step into the car. The force was proportionate

to Officer Jones’s legitimate need to place Bass in the police car and

separate him from the passenger. Because Officer Jones has “not

violated the law at all, he certainly has not violated clearly estab-

lished law.” Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1345 (citation and internal quota-

tion marks omitted).

The district court also did not err in ruling that Officer Jones

was entitled to official immunity for the state law claims. Bass ar-

gues that he was not required to prove actual malice or intent to

injure because providing a warning before using force is a ministe-

rial duty required by City policy. Under Georgia law, officers are

not entitled to official immunity for discretionary acts performed

with actual malice or intent to injure or ministerial acts negligently

performed. Roberts v. Mulkey, 808 S.E.2d 32, 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017);

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GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. IX(d). A ministerial act is “one that is

simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or

proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific

duty.” Roberts, 808 S.E.2d at 35 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). A discretionary act “calls for the exercise of per-

sonal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining

the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a

way not specifically directed.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). When a “written policy requires the public official

to exercise discretion in the implementation of the written policy,

the policy does not require the performance of a ministerial duty.”

Grammens v. Dollar, 697 S.E.2d 775, 778 (Ga. 2010).

Although the City’s policy states that “[w]arnings should be

given to the suspect . . . when it does not pose a threat to the safety

of the employee,” and Officer Jones testified that a warning would

not have threatened his safety, the policy is not mandatory. Officer

Jones had to exercise his discretion in determining whether a warn-

ing would threaten his safety. Because he had to exercise his discre-

tion in determining whether to issue a warning, the policy did not

impose a ministerial duty. See id. And Bass does not argue that the

use of force is a ministerial act. Because Bass provided no evidence

that Officer Jones acted with actual malice or intent to injure, he

was entitled to official immunity. See Roberts, 808 S.E.2d at 35.

We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of

Officer Jones.