(PC) Taylor v. Leatherman

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 FORREST C. TAYLOR, No. 2:25-cv-1100 CSK P

12 Plaintiff, ORDER

13 v.

14 J. LEATHERMAN, et al.,

15 Defendants.

16

17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

18 § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This

19 proceeding was referred to this Court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

20 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

21 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.

23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in

24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the Court will

25 direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account

26 and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly

27 payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account.

28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time

1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.

2 § 1915(b)(2).

3 As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

4 I. SCREENING STANDARDS

5 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

6 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

7 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally

8 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

9 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

10 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

11 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

12 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an

13 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

14 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

15 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

16 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.

17 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably

18 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at

19 1227.

20 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain

21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

22 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

23 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

24 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a

25 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations

26 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.

27 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the

28 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.

1 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal

2 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as

3 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the

4 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

5 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

6 II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

7 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a federal

8 constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under

9 the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d

10 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the

11 facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal

12 connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

13 See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44

14 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable

15 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

16 (2009). The requisite causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

17 violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights can be established in a number of ways, including

18 by demonstrating that a supervisor’s own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision,

19 or control of his subordinates was a cause of plaintiff’s injury. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,

20 1208 (9th Cir. 2011).

21 III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

22 Plaintiff raises four separate claims, as follows. In his first claim alleging failure to

23 protect, plaintiff alleges that defendants A. Konrad, A. Oyazabol, J. Lynch, D. Heinkel, C. Pierce,

24 and J. Leatherman subjected plaintiff to “intimidation, abuse, harassment, and “other violations of

25 law,” and failed to “adequately supervise.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) In his second claim alleging

26 violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to have personal safety, plaintiff claims

27 defendants A. Konrad, A. Oyazabol, J. Lynch, D. Heinkel, C. Pierce, and J. Leatherman “knew of

28 and disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health and safety,” and “acted with deliberate

1 indifference to plaintiff’s personal safety and subjected him to unnecessary pain” and

2 “psychological distress.” (Id. at 7.) In the third claim alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate

3 indifference, plaintiff claims that defendants A. Konrad, A. Oyazabol, J. Lynch, D. Heinkel, C.

4 Pierce, and J. Leatherman “knew or should have known that their conduct, attitudes, and actions

5 created an unreasonable risk of serious harm to plaintiff” by their deliberate indifference to

6 plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 10-11.) In his fourth claim alleging retaliation for

7 protected speech in violation of the First Amendment, “causally associated with Eighth

8 Amendment,” plaintiff asserts that defendants A. Konrad, A. Oyazabol, D. Heinkel, C. Pierce,

9 and J. Leatherman violated plaintiff’s right to free speech by “actions of intimidation, harassment,

10 retaliation, abuse and other violations of law against plaintiff.” (Id. at 13.) He claims defendants

11 retaliated against plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment right to “petition, or redress a

12 grievance,” and took adverse action against plaintiff to chill or silence him. (Id. at 14.)

13 Following the above causes of action, plaintiff appends a diary style “Facts of Case,” in

14 which he recounts events beginning on August 4, 2021, and including information concerning his

15 unrelated eye injury, how he had to jump up on the bed to speak to another inmate through the

16 vent, and other comments. (Id. at 15-22.)

17 As a result of these alleged violations, plaintiff suffered a chipped and cracked front tooth,

18 and required four to five stitches to his lip, shame, humiliation, degradation, emotional distress,

19 PTSD, embarrassment, mental distress and other injuries. (Id. at 6, 8-9, 10-12, 14.) Plaintiff

20 seeks a declaratory judgment and money damages.

21 IV. DISCUSSION

22 The Court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is

23 unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief.

24 Plaintiff is advised that he must specifically set forth what each named defendant did or did not

25 do that violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court (and the defendants) are not required

26 to dig through plaintiff’s “Facts of Case” to attempt to figure out what actions or omissions

27 plaintiff claims a defendant did or did not do that violated plaintiff’s rights.

28 ///

1 Further, the federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara,

2 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved

3 any heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b).”); Fed. R. Civ.

4 P. 84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff’s claims must

5 be set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

6 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system,

7 which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff must

8 eliminate from plaintiff’s pleading all preambles, introductions, speeches, explanations, stories,

9 summaries, and the like. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming

10 dismissal of § 1983 complaint for violation of Rule 8 after warning); see Crawford-El v. Britton,

11 523 U.S. 574, 597 (1998) (reiterating that “firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil

12 Procedure is fully warranted” in prisoner cases). The Court (and defendants) should be able to

13 read and understand plaintiff’s pleading within minutes. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177. A long,

14 rambling pleading, including many defendants with unexplained, tenuous or implausible

15 connection to the alleged constitutional injury or joining a series of unrelated claims against many

16 defendants, very likely will result in delaying the review required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and an

17 order dismissing plaintiff’s action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 for violation of these

18 instructions.

19 In addition, throughout the “Facts of the Case,” plaintiff refers to exhibits, but no exhibit

20 was attached. (ECF No. 1 at 18:6, 19:1, 19:11, 20:5, 22:28.)

21 The Court determines that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as

22 required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy,

23 a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones

24 v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least

25 some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's claim.

26 Id. Because plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the

27 complaint must be dismissed. However, the Court grants plaintiff leave to file an amended

28 complaint.

1 V. GUIDANCE REGARDING LEGAL STANDARDS

2 In an effort to assist plaintiff in drafting the amended complaint, plaintiff is provided the

3 following standards governing the claims raised in his complaint.

4 A. Failure to Protect

5 The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee

6 the safety of prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, prison

7 officials have an affirmative duty “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

8 prisoners.” Id. at 833 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Robins v.

9 Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] prison official can violate a prisoner's Eighth

10 Amendment rights by failing to intervene.”). There are two components to an Eighth

11 Amendment claim based on a prison official’s failure to protect an inmate from an attack by other

12 inmates: (1) an objective component, requiring the prisoner to show that that “conditions pos[ed]

13 a substantial risk of serious harm”; and (2) a subjective component, requiring the prisoner to show

14 that the defendant was aware of the risk and disregarded it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing

15 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)). “In determining whether a deprivation is

16 sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a court

17 must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation and determine whether

18 they pose an intolerable risk of serious harm.” Finkle v. Ryan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1190 (D.

19 Ariz. Mar. 30, 2016) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The necessary state of mind for the

20 subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is “deliberate indifference.” Farmer, 511

21 U.S. at 834. “A prison official is liable under the Eighth Amendment for failing to guarantee the

22 safety of a prisoner if . . . the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

23 or safety.” Finkle, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 1190 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

24 Plaintiff is cautioned that he must set forth specific facts that demonstrate how each

25 defendant acted with a culpable state of mind; he cannot simply state that “defendant was

26 deliberately indifferent,” or “defendant acted with a culpable state of mind.” Plaintiff must

27 identify facts that demonstrate the elements required to plead an Eighth Amendment failure to

28 protect claim as to each named defendant.

1 B. False Report

2 A “complaint alleging that an officer filed a false report, by itself, fails to state a claim

3 upon which relief can be granted.” Koch v. Austin, 2006 WL 403818, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16,

4 2006), adopted by 2006 WL 842585 (Mar. 28, 2006). A cognizable claim is stated only if there is

5 evidence that the false report was retaliatory, or the inmate is not afforded procedural due process

6 in the hearing on the disciplinary charge. See Pratt v. Rowland, 769 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (N.D.

7 Cal. 1991) (filing false report states a claim only if retaliatory); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d

8 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1986) (guards’ “filing of unfounded charges did not give rise to a per se

9 constitutional violation actionable under section 1983”); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452

10 (9th Cir. 1989) (claim based on falsity of charges, standing alone, did not state a constitutional

11 claim); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984) (guards’ fabrication of

12 evidence does not state a claim if procedural protections are provided during disciplinary

13 hearing).

14 C. Retaliation

15 “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to

16 be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012)

17 (citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). A viable retaliation claim in the

18 prison context has five elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

19 against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action

20 (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not

21 reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68

22 (9th Cir. 2005). Because timing is often critical in analyzing retaliation claims, plaintiff should

23 make clear when he exercised the protected conduct, as well as when each defendant took the

24 identified adverse action.

25 D. Harassment

26 Allegations of harassment, embarrassment, and defamation are not cognizable under

27 section 1983. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d sub

28 nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); see also Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

1 (9th Cir. 1982) (allegations of harassment with regards to medical problems not cognizable);

2 Ellingburg v. Lucas, 518 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th Cir. 1975) (Arkansas state prisoner does not have

3 cause of action under § 1983 for being called obscene name by prison employee); Batton v. North

4 Carolina, 501 F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (mere verbal abuse by prison officials does

5 not state claim under § 1983). Nor are allegations of mere threats cognizable. See Gaut v. Sunn,

6 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (mere threat does not constitute constitutional wrong, nor do

7 allegations that naked threat was for purpose of denying access to courts compel contrary result).

8 E. Failure to Supervise

9 Plaintiff names Warden J. Lynch as a defendant, but included no facts as to defendant J.

10 Lynch’s personal involvement in plaintiff’s “Facts of the Case.” (ECF No. 1 at 15-22.) Plaintiff

11 is advised that defendant J. Lynch cannot be held liable on the ground that, as a supervisor, he is

12 liable for the conduct of his subordinates. Under section 1983, plaintiff must prove that the

13 defendants holding supervisory positions personally participated in the deprivation of his rights or

14 failed to act knowing of the violations. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

15 There is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her own

16 misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. A supervisor may be held liable for the constitutional

17 violations of his or her subordinates only if he or she “participated in or directed the violations, or

18 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

19 (9th Cir. 1989); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009).

20 VI. LEAVE TO AMEND

21 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

22 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See e.g.,

23 West, 487 U.S. at 48. Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

24 defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no liability

25 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s

26 actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167

27 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil

28 rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

1 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

2 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

3 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists

4 because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez

5 v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint

6 supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation

7 omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any

8 function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim

9 and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

10 Finally, plaintiff is required to file his amended complaint on the form civil rights

11 complaint provided by the Clerk of Court. Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall not exceed

12 fifteen pages.

13 VII. ORDERS

14 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

15 1. Plaintiff’s requests for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 4, 10) are

16 granted.

17 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff

18 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

19 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the

20 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently

21 herewith.

22 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.

23 4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached

24 Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

25 a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

26 b. An original of the Amended Complaint.

27 Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall be filed on the form civil rights complaint provided by the

28 Clerk of Court and shall not exceed fifteen pages. The amended complaint shall comply with this

1 | order, and with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

2 || and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must also bear the docket number

3 || assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.”

4 Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the

5 || dismissal of this action.

6

7 || Dated: May 27, 2025 4 aA

Cn Ye \L

CHI SOO KIM

? UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10 /V/tayl1100.14n

1]

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

FORREST C. TAYLOR, No. 2:25-cv-1100 CSK P

11

Plaintiff,

12

v. NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

13

J. LEATHERMAN, et al.,

14

Defendants.

15

16

17 Plaintiff submits the following document in compliance with the court’s order

18 filed on ______________ (date).

19

20 Amended Complaint on the Court’s form civil rights

21 complaint and does not exceed fifteen pages.

22 (Check this box if submitting an Amended Complaint)

23 DATED:

________________________________

24 Plaintiff

25

26

27

28