Uriana-Uriana v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GASPARITO URIANA-URIANA,

Prisoner,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2497−KKM−NHA

Case No. 8:23-cr-195-KKM-NHA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

____________________________________

ORDER

Prisoner Gasparito Uriana-Uriana moves to vacate his 132-month sentence

for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent

to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Uriana-Uriana claims that his sentence was

improperly enhanced for possession of a dangerous weapon and that counsel

rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance at sentencing. Because his claims lack

merit, his motion to vacate is denied.

I. Background

A grand jury indicted Uriana-Uriana with one count of conspiring to possess

with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)

and 70506(a) and (b) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii); and one count of possessing

with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)

and 70506(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). (Crim. Doc. 1.)

Uriana-Uriana pleaded guilty as charged without a plea agreement. (Crim. Docs. 44,

46, 47, and 54.)

The presentence report calculated an advisory guidelines range of 210 to 262

months based on Uriana-Uriana’s total offense level of 37 and his criminal history

category of I. (Crim. Doc. 59 at ¶ 53.) Counsel objected both to a two-level

enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon and to Uriana-Uriana’s

ineligibility for safety-valve relief and zero-point offender status. (Crim. Doc. 59 at

21–22; Crim. Doc. 71; Crim. Doc. 82 at 5, 7 and 9.) Counsel argued that Uriana-

Uriana lacked knowledge of the firearm that law enforcement recovered from the

vessel. (Crim. Doc. 82 at 5–6.)

The district court overruled counsel’s objections. ( . at 14, 31, and 36.) The

district court found that sufficient evidence established that Uriana-Uriana knew the

firearm was on the vessel based on the uncontested facts that the vessel was small,

the firearm was discovered under a five-gallon bucket “covering the most valuable

items on any go-fast vessel, mainly the cellphones and satellite phone that contained

the [vessel’s destination] coordinates[,]” and Uriana-Uriana admitted that he was

provided the GPS system with preprogramed coordinates.1 ( . at 14–15.) Uriana-

Uriana failed to show that a connection between the firearm and the offenses was

clearly improbable because the “go-fast vessel is extremely small, [and] the gun was

found in the same bucket as the most important navigation tool on the boat, which

is the satellite phones.” ( . at 21–22 and 31.) And, it was reasonably foreseeable,

the district court concluded, that the firearm would be used in connection with drug-

trafficking offenses considering the volume of cocaine. ( . at 31–32.) Citing Uriana-

Uriana’s personal history and characteristics, the district court varied downward from

1 Additionally, counsel represented that Uriana-Uriana’s personal items were found near the five-

gallon bucket, which further confirmed he possessed the firearm in connection with the drug-

trafficking offenses. ( . at 18 and 31.)

the advisory guidelines range and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 132

months. (Crim. Doc. 76; Crim. Doc. 77 at 3.)

Uriana-Uriana filed no appeal. He now moves to vacate his sentence and

claims that (1) his sentence was improperly enhanced for possession of a dangerous

weapon and (2) counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by not objecting

to the enhancement. (Civ. Doc. 1.) The United States responds that Uriana-Uriana’s

claims are meritless.2 (Civ. Doc. 3.)

II. Legal Standards

Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner to “bring a collateral challenge by

moving the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.”

, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215–16 (11th Cir. 2014). But “[o]nce the

defendant’s chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted, [a court is] entitled to

presume he stands fairly and finally convicted, especially when . . . he already has

had a fair opportunity to present his federal claims to a federal forum.”

2 The United States correctly argues that Uriana-Uriana procedurally defaulted his sentencing

claim by neglecting to raise it on direct appeal. For judicial economy, the district court rejects

Uriana-Uriana’s sentencing claim as meritless. , 964 F.3d 1285, 1307 (11th Cir.

2020) (“As we have said many times and as the Supreme Court has held, a federal court may skip

over the procedural default analysis if a claim would fail on the merits in any event.”);

, 73 F.4th 1354, 1359 n.9 (11th Cir. 2023) (same).

, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982). “[A] collateral challenge, such as a § 2255

motion, may not be a surrogate for a direct appeal.” , 365 F.3d

1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) ( ) (citing , 456 U.S. at 165). Because

collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, a defendant must raise on direct

appeal all available claims. Relief under Section 2255 is reserved “for transgressions

of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not

have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete

miscarriage of justice.’” , 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir.

1988) (quoting , 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A Sep.

1981)). For example, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that

“should usually be raised in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”

, 726 F.3d 1260, 1267(11th Cir. 2013).

“[T]he cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground

of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.” ,

46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting , 13 F.3d

384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994)). As , 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir.

1998), explains, , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), governs an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim:

The law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims

is well settled and well documented. In

, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test

for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

According to , first, the defendant must show

that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires

showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the

defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that

counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. , 466

U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

requires proof of both deficient performance and consequent

prejudice. , 466 U.S. at 697 (“There is no reason for a court deciding an

ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”); , 155 F.3d at 1305 (“When

applying , we are free to dispose of ineffectiveness claims on either of its

two grounds.”). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.” , 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness

claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of

the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” 466 U.S. at 690.

requires that “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or

omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”

466 U.S. at 690.

Uriana-Uriana must demonstrate that counsel’s alleged error prejudiced the

defense because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not

warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect

on the judgment.” 466 U.S. at 691–92. To meet this burden, Uriana-Uriana must

show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694.

cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation

of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and

strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely

to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on

investigation.” 466 U.S. at 690–91. A prisoner cannot meet his burden merely by

showing that the avenue chosen by counsel proved unsuccessful.

The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers

would have done. Nor is the test even what most good

lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some

reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the

circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial . . . . We

are not interested in grading lawyers’ performances; we are

interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in

fact, worked adequately.

, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 1992);

, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (“To state the obvious: the

trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more or something different.

So, omissions are inevitable . . . . [T]he issue is not what is possible or ‘what is

prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.’”) (en banc)

(quoting , 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)); ,

463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (counsel has no duty to raise a frivolous claim).

III. Ground One

Uriana-Uriana claims his sentence was improperly enhanced for possession of

a dangerous weapon, specifically the firearm that law enforcement recovered from

the vessel. Despite initially denying his knowledge of the firearm, Uriana-Uriana

now acknowledges, “[o]f course [he] was aware of the weapon’s presence[,]” but

denies he had “the ability or intent to possess [it.]” (Civ. Doc. 1 at 15.) He argues

that his codefendant possessed the firearm, and he “did not try to take the weapon

from [his codefendant].” ( .) He emphasizes that he “was not found with the

weapon on him[,]” he was not the captain of the vessel, and “at no time [did he have]

dominion over the vessel.” ( . at 4.)

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) authorizes a two-level

enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug-

trafficking offense. “The government bears the initial burden of showing by a

preponderance of evidence that a firearm was present at the site of the charged

conduct or that the defendant possessed a firearm during conduct related to the

offense of conviction.” , 123 F.4th 1197, 1288 (11th Cir.

2024) (citing , 463 F.3d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 2006)).

“’[P]roximity between guns and drugs, without more, is sufficient to meet the

government’s initial burden under § 2D1.1(b)(1).’” , No. 24-

11647, 2025 WL 1157025, at * 2 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025) (quoting

, 713 F.3d 82, 96 (11th Cir. 2013)). “In other words, ‘the

government benefits from a rebuttable presumption that a firearm, if present—just

present, not present in proximity to drugs—is connected with the offense.’”

, 4 F.4th 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting ,

713 F.3d at 90). “If the government meets its initial burden, ‘the evidentiary burden

shifts to the defendant, who must demonstrate that a connection between the

weapon and the offense was clearly improbable.” , 123 F.4th at 1288

(quoting , 463 F.3d at 1220).

Uriana-Uriana’s claim fails. The undisputed record shows that he cannot meet

his “heavy” burden of demonstrating that a connection between the firearm and the

drug-trafficking offenses was clearly improbable. , 713 F.3d at 90

(explaining that the enhancement “compels the government to show mere presence

but places a heavy burden of negation on the defendant”). Law enforcement

discovered Uriana-Uriana and his codefendant on board a small go-fast vessel that

contained approximately 23 bales of cocaine and a loaded firearm. (Crim. Doc. 59

at ¶7.) The firearm was discovered underneath a bucket that was covering the most

valuable items on the vessel—cell phones and satellite phones that contained the

coordinates to the vessel’s destination. ( . at ¶ 11.) Uriana-Uriana admits that he

received the vessel’s destination coordinates, and he and his codefendant were at sea

for three days before law enforcement intercepted the vessel. ( . at ¶11.) Uriana-

Uriana cannot meet his heavy burden of negating a connection between the firearm

and the offenses given these undisputed facts.

Moreover, neither the fact that the firearm was not discovered on Uriana-

Uriana’s body nor the fact that he was not the vessel’s captain undermines the

connection between the firearm and the drug-trafficking offenses. “[The Eleventh

Circuit] has applied the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement broadly when firearms are

found in the same location where the defendant commits a controlled substance

offense.” , 981 F.3d 889, 902 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming

the application of the enhancement after the district court concluded that “these

firearms were available for [the defendant] should he need to protect himself or the

drugs”). Here, although neither codefendant claimed to be the captain of the vessel,

the firearm was nevertheless available to Uriana-Uriana to protect himself or the

drugs. , 713 F.3d at 92 (“A firearm found in close proximity to

drugs . . . simply ‘ ’—without any requirement for additional evidence—the

potential to facilitate the drug offense.”); , No. 22-

10367, 2022 WL 17973602 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2022) (affirming that the defendant

possessed the firearm in connection with the drug-trafficking offense “because the

vessel that held the firearm and the drugs was small and confined”).

IV. Ground Two

Uriana-Uriana claims counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance

at sentencing by not objecting to the two-level enhancement for possession of a

dangerous weapon. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 14–18.) He argues that counsel should have

emphasized his lack of control over, or access to, the firearm, and that he was not

the captain of the vessel.3 ( . at 5.)

Uriana-Uriana cannot show that counsel performed deficiently by not

successfully objecting to the enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon.

“[The circuit court] has long held that the fact that a particular defense was

unsuccessful does not prove ineffective assistance of counsel.” , 592

3 Additionally, Uriana-Uriana complains that counsel “spent no time discussing” the presentence

report, failed to prepare him for the presentence interview, and “spent less than 15 minutes talking

to [him].” (Civ. Doc. 1 at 14–18.) The district court rejects these complaints without discussion

because Uriana-Uriana neglects to support them with any details or elaboration.

, No. 21-12552, 2022 WL 41151447, at *5 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting

, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (disavowing relief when a movant’s claims are

merely “conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics or contentions that in the face of the record

are wholly incredible”)).

F.3d 1144, 1164 (11th Cir. 2010). The record shows that counsel repeatedly

objected both to a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon and

to Uriana-Uriana’s ineligibility for safety-valve relief and zero-point offender status.

In a sentencing memorandum, counsel argued that the enhancement was

inapplicable because no evidence was presented to show that Uriana-Uriana knew of

the firearm’s presence before he was detained. (Crim. Doc. 71 at 2.) At sentencing,

counsel repeated the objection. (Crim. Doc. 82 at 5–7.) Counsel further argued that

Uriana-Uriana was not the captain or in charge of the vessel. ( . at 7 and 40.)

Although the district court ultimately overruled counsel’s objections, Uriana-

Uriana cannot show that “no competent counsel would have taken the action that

his counsel did take.” , 218 F.3d at 1315. Indeed, Uriana-Uriana fails to

suggest what more counsel could have argued to support the objection. Uriana-

Uriana’s undeveloped claim “that a different strategy would have been better does

not meet his burden under . ., 50

F.4th 32, 47 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing , 592 F.3d at 1164 (“[C]ounsel cannot be

adjudged incompetent for performing in a particular way in a case, as long as the

approach taken might be considered sound trial strategy.”)).

Furthermore, Uriana-Uriana cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

performance. To demonstrate prejudice, Uriana-Uriana must show “a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding—i.e., the length of his sentence—would

have been different absent counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.”

, 799 F. App’x 718, 722 (11th Cir. 2020 (citing ,

871 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2017)). The record shows that Uriana-Uriana

received a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon not because

of counsel’s ineffectiveness but because, as stated by the district court, he failed to

meet his heavy burden to show that a connection between the firearm and the drug-

trafficking offenses was clearly improbable.

Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the district court would have

imposed a sentence shorter than 132 months—which was a significant downward

variance from the advisory guidelines range of 210 to 262 months—absent counsel’s

performance. In evaluating the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court

emphasized the seriousness of the offense, which involved more than 575 kilograms

of cocaine valued at nearly $11 million (Crim. Doc. 82 at 62–63):

As is true with a lot of these boat cases, the amount of

drugs that is being transported is enormous. I think we

lose sight of that sometimes, because we compare it to

other boat cases where large volumes of cocaine and the

like are being moved. But that weighs in favor of a

substantial sentence, because the circumstances and the

nature of the offense are serious.

Your role was serious. You are literally the one who was

transporting the drugs. They have devastating

consequences in the communities to which they are

distributed, which presumably is the reason that Congress

sets forth significant penalties. . . .

[T]he crime that you actually committed is serious and the

sentence needs to reflect the seriousness of that. It needs

to provide for just punishment, it needs to deter those who

might be similarly inclined to participate in the same

way[.]

Accordingly, Uriana-Uriana has not shown a reasonable probability of a

different sentence absent counsel’s performance.

V. No Certificate of Appealability

Uriana-Uriana is not entitled to a certificate of appealability (COA). A

prisoner moving under § 2255 has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s

denial of his motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must

first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA “only if the applicant

has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” To merit a

certificate of appealability, Uriana-Uriana must show that reasonable jurists would

find debatable both (1) the merits of the underlying claims and (2) the procedural

issues he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 US.

473, 478 (2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir 2001). Because he

fails to show that reasonable jurists would debate either the merits of the claims or

the procedural issues, Uriana-Uriana is entitled to neither a certificate of

appealability nor an appeal in forma pauperis.

VI. Conclusion

Uriana-Uriana’s motion under § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his

sentence (Civ. Doc. 1) is DENIED and a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is similarly DENIED. Uriana-Uriana must obtain

permission from the circuit court to appeal in forma pauperis. The clerk is directed

to enter a JUDGMENT against Uriana-Uriana, terminate any pending motions,

CLOSE this case, and enter a copy of this order in the criminal case.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on May 28, 2025.

father Kiimlal. Marehl

athryn’ Kimball Mizelle

United States District Judge

16