The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHANTEL RICHARDEL CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 24-2093
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, LELAND DUDEK, SECTION: “D” (4)
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Plaintiff, Chantel Richardel (“Richardel”), has filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees
and Costs (R. Doc. 22) pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). The matter has
been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge to determine the appropriate amount and to
submit Proposed Findings and Recommendations pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B).1
I. Background
On October 15, 2021, Richardel filed a claim for disability benefits under Titles II and XVI
of the Social Security Act. R. Doc. 10 at 16. After denials through the administrative appeals
process, Richardel filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the denial of her claim. R. Doc. 1
at 1. After Richardel filed her opening brief, the parties agreed to an order remanding the case to
the agency for further proceedings. See R. Doc. 12. See also R. Doc. 18. As a result, a judgment
for Richardel was issued. See R. Doc. 19.
On March 19, 2025, Richardel filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA, 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). R. Doc. 22. Richardel requested attorney’s fees of 6450.00 which
represents thirty (30) hours of work at a rate of $215.00 per hour. R. Doc. 22-3 at 3. Richardel
1 See R. Doc. 24, Order of Reference (Vitter, W.).
asserts that the Commissioner does not oppose the subject motion, and no Opposition was filed.
R. Doc. 22 at 1.
II. Scope of Recoverable EAJA Fees
Under the EAJA, a prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees in any civil action brought
by or against the United States unless the court finds that the United States was “substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust”. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Section 2412(d) serves two purposes: “to ensure adequate representation for those who need it and
to minimize the costs of this representation to taxpayers.” Baker v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 1075, 1083
(5th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original). Both goals need to be considered when evaluating the
Richardel’s motion.
There is no dispute that Richardel was the prevailing party, that the application of fees was
timely and proper, that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified, or that the
amount of hours requested was reasonable. The only issue is the hourly rate to be awarded. The
Court must determine what hourly rate for fees would be reasonable.
III. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The Court must determine a reasonable hourly rate to award.2 Under Title 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A), reasonable attorney’s fees are “based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and
quality of the services furnished, except that . . . attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of
$125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor,
such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a
higher fee.”
2 See Clark v. Am. Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D. La. Apr. 24, 1970) (Rubin, A.), aff’d, 437 F.2d
959 (5th Cir. 1971). In reference to attorneys’ fees, “the criterion for the court is not what the parties agreed but what
is reasonable.” Clark, 320 F. Supp. at 711.
Using measures like the attorney’s usual non-contingent hourly rate or the prevailing
market rate charged in the relevant community for similar legal services, the Fifth Circuit has
applied the “lodestar” method for determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees. Brown v.
Sullivan, 917 F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1990). Under this approach, “the number of hours reasonably
expended on litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate” is what is known as “lodestar”.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). However, the product of the lodestar calculation
can be adjusted based on the twelve (12) factors established in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
Additionally based on the statute, other adjustments can be made to the attorneys’ fees.
Any requested rates higher than the statutory cap of $125 needs to be justified by an increase in
the cost of living or a special factor. However while the statute allows for hourly rate adjustment,
it does not require it. Baker, 839 F.2d at 1075. The EAJA “vests the district courts with discretion
to arrive at a reasonable rate for attorneys’ fees based on cost-of-living adjustments and other
factors.” Yoes v. Barnhart, 467 F.3d 426, 426 (5th Cir. 2006).
IV. The Prevailing Market Rate
The plaintiff carries the burden of proof for showing that the requested rate is in line with
the prevailing market rate. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984). Richardel
contends that she is entitled to attorneys’ fees in the amount of $6,450.00, based on an hourly rate
of $215 per hour. R. Doc. 22-1 at 4-5. Richardel has not provided any information concerning the
prevailing market rate. Instead, Richardel contends that the requested fee complies with the
$125.00 per hour rate specified in the EAJA adjusted for inflation and an enhanced rate for special
skills. R. Doc 22-1 at 4-5.
Federal caselaw, however, shows that the prevailing rate is $175.00. See Kolb v. Colvin,
No. 13-5085, 2016 WL 258621, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2016) (Brown, J.) (“This Court has
previously awarded attorneys’ fees at a rate of $175 per hour in Social Security appeals for work
performed in 2013, 2014, and 2015”); Hallaron v. Colvin, No. 12-2051, 2015 WL 4042144, at *2
(E.D. La. Jun. 30, 2015) (Vance, S.) (“[T]he Court concludes that the hourly rate of $175.00 is
reasonable”); Dubois v. Social Sec. Admin., No. 13-2438, 2014 WL 6485639, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov.
18, 2014) (Knowles, M.J.) (“After due consideration of prevailing market conditions and the
healthy community of social security practitioners in this area, the Court will [] accept the hourly
rate of $175.00 per hour for this EAJA petition and those filed in the near future”). Because
Richardel has not provided any evidence on the prevailing hourly rate, an hourly rate of $175.00
is therefore reasonable.
V. The Cost of Living Adjustment
Richardel further contends that rates higher than the $125 statutory cap can be adjusted
based on changes in the cost of living. R. Doc. 22-1 at 4-5. “When a given locale has experienced
a significant change in the cost of living, the court may increase the hourly rate beyond the nominal
statutory cap.” Kobrock v. Social Security Administration, No. 23-256, 2024 WL 1285242, at *2
(E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2024) (North, M.J.) (citing Baker, 839 F.2d at 1084). Richardel argues that
because the Consumer Price Index for Urban consumers (“CPI-U”) was $155.7 in March 1996,
the rate adjusted for inflation would be $240.71 per hour. R. Doc. 22-1 at 4. Richardel contends
that while she could request up to $240.71/hour using the South Urban B CPI, she is only seeking
$215.00/ hour. Id.
The Fifth Circuit has rejected the argument that increases in the EAJA statutory cap must
precisely track increases in the cost of living. Baker, 839 F.2d at 1084. Thus, while the rate
requested by Richardel is consistent with the CPI-U, the Fifth Circuit has characterized figures
adjusted for cost of living as the maximum: “Congress intended to provide attorneys at most with
an hourly rate in present-day dollars commensurate with seventy-five dollars in 1981.” Id.3
However, given that the Commissioner does not oppose the motion, the Court will permit the use
of the CPI-U finding that a rate of $215 is reasonable.
VI. Hours Reasonably Expended
Next, the Court must determine whether the attorney’s time spent on this case is reasonable.
The fee applicant bears the burden of supporting the reasonableness of all time expenditures.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Moreover, district courts have considerable
discretion in this area because of its familiarity with the case and the attorneys. See Associated
Builder & Contractors, Inc. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990). Since
the 30.00 hours requested by Richardel is not in dispute, the Court finds the 30.00 hours expended
by counsel is reasonable. R. Doc. 22-3 at 1-2.
VII. Recommendation
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Rec. Doc. 22)
be GRANTED and that Plaintiff Chantel Richardel be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees in the
amount of $6,450.00.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
3 The EAJA was amended in 1996 to increase the statutory cap from $75 to $125 per hour. 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
the District Court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430
(Sth Cir. 1996).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this24thgay of April 2025.
KAREN WELLS mors
UNITED STATES MAGISTRA DGE