Pamela J. Graziadei v. Capital Health System, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1614-23

PAMELA J. GRAZIADEI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

v. May 23, 2025

APPELLATE DIVISION

CAPITAL HEALTH SYSTEM,

INC.,

Defendant,

and

RECOVERY & MONITORING

PROGRAM OF NEW JERSEY

d/b/a RAMP, THE NEW

JERSEY STATE NURSES'

ASSOCIATION, and INSTITUTE

FOR NURSING, INC.,

Defendants-Respondents.

_____________________________

Argued February 12, 2025 – Decided May 23, 2025

Before Judges Marczyk, Paganelli and Torregrossa-

O'Connor.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2259-19.

Gregory B. Noble argued the cause for appellant

(O'Connor, Parsons, Lane & Noble, LLC, attorneys;

Gregory B. Noble and R. Daniel Bause, on the briefs).

Elizabeth F. Lorell argued the cause for respondents

(Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, attorneys;

Elizabeth F. Lorell and Michael J. Nesse, on the

brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PAGANELLI, J.A.D.

Plaintiff, Pamela J. Graziadei, appeals from three trial court orders that

resulted in the dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, in which she alleged defendants, Capital Health System, Inc.

(Capital Health); Recovery and Monitoring Program of New Jersey d/b/a

RAMP; the New Jersey State Nurses' Association (SNA); and the Institute for

Nursing, Inc. (INI), discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the

New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.

Because we conclude the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over

plaintiff's LAD claims, we reverse and remand.

I.

"[F]or purposes of our review, we accept as true" the allegations

contained in plaintiff's Law Division complaint. Santiago v. N.Y. & N.J. Port

Auth., 429 N.J. Super. 150, 154-55 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Union Ink Co. v.

AT&T Corp., 352 N.J. Super. 617, 627 (App. Div. 2002) ("For the limited

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purposes of the underlying motion to dismiss . . . for lack of jurisdiction over

the subject matter, . . . we must accept as true the allegations of the

complaint.")).

Plaintiff alleged that in 2000 she began employment with Capital Health

as a nurse manager. In 2006, she "was promoted to a director-level position"

and in 2008, she "was promoted to . . . Nursing Divisional Director of

Maternal Child Health." She alleged she was "a strong performer" and

"received favorable performance evaluations."

On the morning of September 24, 2018, while at work, "plaintiff was

asked to submit to a breathalyzer test . . . [and h]er blood alcohol level was

over the legal limit as a result of her consuming alcohol the night before."

"[P]laintiff was referred to defendant RAMP's program. 1 RAMP

purport[ed] to provide recovery and monitoring programs on behalf of" the INI

1

On October 5, 2018, plaintiff and "[t]he New Jersey Board of Nursing

[(Board)] and/or [RAMP]" executed a private letter agreement (PLA). In part,

the PLA provided that plaintiff agreed:

[T]hat any deviation from the terms of this [PLA]

without the prior written consent of the Board shall

constitute a failure to comply with the terms of this

agreement. Upon receipt of any reliable information

indicating that you have violated any term of this

agreement, your nursing license may be automatically

suspended by the Board. You may, upon notice,

request a hearing to contest the entry of such an order.

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and the SNA. "As a result of RAMP and/or Capital Health's internal policies,

plaintiff was on a leave of absence from approximately September 25, 2018

until March of 2019." During this period of time, "plaintiff was assured . . .

that her job would be there for her when she returned."

In November 2018, plaintiff was advised "that she could not go back to

her management position and that it would be two to three years before she

could go back to that job." Thereafter, plaintiff was advised "that a

management position would be 'too stressful' and that she needed to focus on

recovery." Plaintiff was told "that she would not be able to return to a

management position for five years."

Plaintiff "successfully underwent all of RAMP's requirements during her

leave of absence, including three Alcoholics Anonymous meetings per week as

well as an initial period of ninety meetings in ninety days."

Plaintiff "pleaded with RAMP to allow her to return to her management

position, stressing that she had successfully completed all of RAMP's

requirements[,] . . . had been in nurse management for over thirty years[,] . . .

_________________________

At any such hearing the sole issue shall be whether

any of the information received regarding your

violation of the agreement was materially false.

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did not have any primary patient responsibilities[,] . . . [and] was primarily an

administrator."

In February 2019, RAMP advised Capital Health plaintiff "would not be

returning to her management position." Further, "[w]hen [plaintiff wa]s

approved to return to work, RAMP staff w[ould] work with her to find an

appropriate non-managerial position." In April 2019, plaintiff wrote to RAMP

and "implored [it] to allow her to be reinstated to her rightful management

position." In response, plaintiff was advised "that she would not be getting a

managerial position for five years."

In April 2019, "plaintiff returned to work at Capital Health. She was

given the job of Quality and Safety Department, Performance Improvement

Analyst." Her salary was approximately half of what she earned in her prior

position.

In November 2019, plaintiff filed her complaint. She claimed she

"suffer[ed] from alcoholism" and defendants violated the LAD by

discriminating against her on that basis.

On June 28, 2023, the trial court granted plaintiff permission to file an

amended complaint. Plaintiff asserted between "March of 2020 until the

present, there . . . [were] approximately six . . . instances where defendants . . .

failed to cooperate with [her] in her requests for approval to obtain director

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level and/or supervisory positions and/or to secure permission to work

overtime." Further, plaintiff alleged "[t]he refusals to cooperate . . . [were] in

direct retaliation for plaintiff's lawsuit . . . and w[ere] the by-product of

continued discrimination and failure to accommodate."

In addition, plaintiff claimed RAMP, "with . . . knowledge of [her] . . .

discrimination lawsuit," discharged her from the program because "she had

been allegedly non-compliant" and the "decision to discharge plaintiff from

RAMP put[ her] license and career in severe jeopardy." 2 She reiterated her

LAD allegations and included a claim for retaliation.

On September 8, 2023, the trial court heard the parties' oral arguments

regarding defendants', the SNA's, the INI's, and RAMP's, motion to dismiss

plaintiff's complaint for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

At the conclusion of the argument, the court rendered an oral opinion.

The court stated it could "interchange" the allegations from Beaver v.

Magellan Health Services, Inc., 433 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 2013), with the

allegations in this case and "fit them in almost directly" and reach the same

2

On March 23, 2023, the Board executed an "Order of Suspension of License"

(OSL) that provided, in part: Plaintiff "may, under the terms of the [PLA],

request a hearing, within fifteen days of receiving this order, on the sole issue

of whether the information received regarding [plaintiff]'s violation of the

[PLA] was materially false."

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result. The court cited Beaver for the proposition that "stripped to their barest

essentials, plaintiff's claims amount to no more than a collateral challenge to

an[] agency decision," and found "that[ wa]s exactly what we have here."

The trial court cited the following from plaintiff's brief:

This is not a matter which is seeking to directly

overturn or challenge any RAMP decision under the

administrative . . . provisions cited by defendants.

Rather, this is a statutory employment matter under

the LAD which seeks to establish not that such actions

were contrary to the code or any RAMP provisions,

but rather that such actions were made with

discriminatory and . . . retaliatory animus.

The trial court concluded that statement was the "definition of . . . an agency

decision." The court stated there was the "October 2018 PLA which [wa]s a

Board [o]rder"; the November 2022 discharge order from the RAMP program;

and "then the . . . March [20]23 [OSL]." The court noted these "are all agency

actions that had to follow the agency provisions."

In addition, the trial court found plaintiff "had to exhaust her . . .

administrative remedies and file a [fifteen]-day appeal." The court noted "the

[fifteen]-day appeal would kick [plaintiff] right to a hearing, which is what"

the order provided. Further, the trial court stated "a hearing" would allow a

record to be developed for Appellate Division review.

Moreover, the trial court credited defendants' argument:

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The . . . Board . . . has the requisite experience and

understanding of complex regulatory framework

governing these nursing/compliance issues;

inconsistent rulings between the judiciary and the

Board . . . as to the issues [p]laintiff challenges here

could conceivably disrupt the statutory scheme

concerning the Board['s] . . . authority. And there

[wa]s no prior application for the agency involved

here.

Therefore, "the only conclusion" the trial court could reach, "from

reading the[] . . . papers, . . . especially the Beaver . . . case[]," was that

"exclusive jurisdiction rest[ed] with the Board . . . [and plaintiff failed to]

exhaust administrative remedies."

Thus, the trial court executed the September 2023 order that vacated the

"June 28, 2023 [o]rder pursuant to R[ule] 4:50-1(f) and dismiss[ed] the

[a]mended [c]omplaint for failure to state a claim under R[ule] 4:6-2(e) and

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under R[ule] 4:6-2(a)."3

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the September 2023 order. In

response, Capital Health cross-moved for dismissal "for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction" and, if the court was "inclined to permit [p]laintiff's claims to

proceed against" Capital Health, then to allow it to maintain its "cross-claims

3

While the trial court's order stated it granted dismissal under Rules 4:6-2(a)

and (e), and Rule 4:50-1(f), its opinion did not address Rule 4:6-2(e) or Rule

4:50-1(f) to support its analysis. Therefore, although plaintiff briefs the Rule

4:6-2(e) issues, we focus our review on Rule 4:6-2(a).

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against" the other defendants. The trial court heard the parties' oral arguments

on November 2, 2023.

On November 14, 2023, the trial court executed an order denying

plaintiff's motion "for the reasons already articulated by the [c]ourt during the

September 8, 2023 oral argument, [and] under the standards for

reconsideration stated in Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div.

2021)."4

On February 13, 2024, the trial court executed a joint stipulation of

dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's claims against Capital Health and

defendants' cross-claims.

II.

On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred because: (1) "RAMP

and/or the Board . . . in no way hold any jurisdiction, let alone exclusive

jurisdiction, over any dispute wherein plaintiff maintains that certain adverse

actions taken against her were retaliatory, discriminatory or violative of the

LAD"; (2) "in the October 2018 [PLA regarding] . . . plaintiff's RAMP

commitment, the only challenge or appeal . . . was the ability to 'solely'

challenge 'whether any of the information received regarding [plaintiff's]

violation of the agreement was materially false'" and "when plaintiff was

4

While the motion was pending, plaintiff settled her case with Capital Health.

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ejected from RAMP . . . and thereafter had her license suspended, the only

available challenge . . . was to request a hearing with the 'sole issue' . . . being

'whether the information received regarding [plaintiff]'s violation of the [PLA]

was materially false'"; (3) "[i]n no way is plaintiff seeking to undo or revise

any administrative decision or process"; and (4) her claims that defendants

discriminated and retaliated against her "in no way . . . directly challenge or

seek to overturn any decision of the . . . Board . . ., or RAMP . . . rather,

plaintiff merely seeks monetary damages that stem from . . . violations of the

LAD."

Defendants assert the trial court properly granted dismissal. They assert:

(1) the Law Division lacked subject matter jurisdiction because "the Board . . .

ha[d] primary jurisdiction over this matter," and the SNA and the INI "could

never provide and still are not able to provide [the relief plaintiff seeks] as the

Board . . . controls . . . [p]laintiff's ability to work under certain strict

standards—or not work—in the State of New Jersey"; (2) plaintiff failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies by not bringing "her claims directly before

the Board . . . at the outset," and "[h]er failing to do so preclude[d] her from

obtaining any relief or money damages against [d]efendants in connection with

her [a]mended [c]omplaint"; (3) "[p]laintiff was required to pursue relief in

this matter in a manner consistent with the appeal of an administrative

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decision, in which case t[he Law Division] lack[ed] jurisdiction, as [p]laintiff

would have been required to appeal directly to the Appellate Division"; and (4)

"our [c]ourts have consistently issued opinions admonishing and rejecting

attempts by plaintiffs to collaterally attack final agency decisions by asserting

common law and other causes of action," citing Beaver.

A.

We begin our analysis with the LAD. In enacting the LAD:

The Legislature finds and declares that practices of

discrimination against any of its inhabitants, because

of . . . disability . . . are matters of concern to the

government of the State, and that such discrimination

threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of

the inhabitants of the State but menaces the

institutions and foundation of a free democratic State;

....

The Legislature further declares its opposition to such

practices of discrimination when directed against any

person by reason of . . . disability . . . in order that the

economic prosperity and general welfare of the

inhabitants of the State may be protected and ensured.

The Legislature further finds that because of

discrimination, people suffer personal hardships, and

the State suffers a grievous harm. The personal

hardships include: economic loss; time loss; physical

and emotional stress; and in some cases severe

emotional trauma, illness, homelessness or other

irreparable harm resulting from the strain of

employment controversies; relocation, search and

moving difficulties; anxiety caused by lack of

information, uncertainty, and resultant planning

difficulty; career, education, family and social

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disruption; and adjustment problems, which

particularly impact on those protected by this act.

Such harms have, under the common law, given rise to

legal remedies, including compensatory and punitive

damages. The Legislature intends that such damages

be available to all persons protected by this act and

that this act shall be liberally construed in

combination with other protections available under the

laws of this State.

[N.J.S.A. 10:5-3.]

"[T]he LAD is remedial legislation intended to 'eradicate the cancer of

discrimination' in our society. As such, it compels liberal construction in order

to advance its beneficial purposes. Indeed, our courts have found that 'the

more broadly [the LAD] is applied the greater its anti[-]discriminatory

impact.'" Nini v. Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 115 (2010) (second

alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms

River Reg'l Schs. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381, 400 (2007)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

In Clowes v. Terminix International, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme

Court "conclude[d] that alcoholism is a handicap under the" LAD. 109 N.J.

575, 578 (1988); see also Delvecchio v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 224 N.J. 559

(2016).

Under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a):

It shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the

case may be, an unlawful discrimination:

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For an employer, because of the . . .

disability . . . of any individual, . . . to

refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to

discharge . . . from employment such

individual or to discriminate against such

individual in compensation or in terms,

conditions or privileges of employment

....

....

Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit

the application of the doctrine of

"continuing violation" or the "discovery

rule" to any appropriate claim as those

doctrines currently exist in New Jersey

common law. It shall be an unlawful

employment practice to require employees

or prospective employees to consent to a

shortened statute of limitations or to

waive any of the protections provided by

the [LAD] . . . .

Moreover, the LAD forbids retaliation. Under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) it is

unlawful:

For any person to take reprisals against

any person because that person has

opposed any practices or acts forbidden

under this act or because that person has

sought legal advice regarding rights under

this act, shared relevant information with

legal counsel, shared information with a

governmental entity, or filed a complaint,

testified or assisted in any proceeding

under this act or to coerce, intimidate,

threaten or interfere with any person in

the exercise or enjoyment of, or on

account of that person having aided or

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encouraged any other person in the

exercise or enjoyment of, any right

granted or protected by this act.

Under N.J.S.A. 10:5-13(1), "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved . . .

may . . . make, sign, and file with the division [(DCR) 5] a verified complaint in

writing." "Upon receipt of the complaint, the [DCR] shall notify the

complainant . . . [of] the right to file a complaint in the Superior Court to be

heard before a jury." Ibid. "Any complaint filed in the [DCR] . . . pursuant to

th[e LAD] must be so filed within 180 days after the alleged act of

discrimination." N.J.S.A. 10:5-18.

Alternatively, and as happened here, "[a]ny person claiming to be

aggrieved . . . may initiate suit in Superior Court . . . without first filing a

complaint with the" DCR. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13(a)(2). In a Law Division suit, a

plaintiff is entitled to: (a) a jury trial, (b) "[a]ll remedies available in common

law tort actions[,] . . . injunctive relief," and remedies provided in "any other

statute," and (d) treble damages, under N.J.S.A. 10:5-13(a)(2); and "back pay"

under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). Ibid. A plaintiff must file their complaint in the

Law Division within two years. See Henry v. N.J. Dept. of Human Servs., 204

5

N.J.S.A. 10:5-5.1 provides "[t]he Division against Discrimination shall be

known as the 'Division on Civil Rights'" (DCR).

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N.J. 320, 324 (2010) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:14-26; Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J.

282, 285 (1993)).

Further, an aggrieved party is not required to raise claims of

discrimination or retaliation in any other proceeding. In Ensslin v. Township

of North Bergen, we stated the aggrieved party "was under no compulsion to

contest his [alleged discriminatory] termination under the procedures

afforded." 275 N.J. Super. 352, 372 (App. Div. 1994). Instead, that party "had

the right to initiate suit in Superior Court." Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-13);

see also Wolff v. Salem Cnty. Corr. Facility, 439 N.J. Super. 282, 301 (App.

Div. 2015) (Sabatino, P.J., concurring) ("an employee who believes that he or

she has been the victim of retaliation is [not] obligated to raise those

retaliation claims as a defense in . . . disciplinary cases."). Further,

it would be inequitable and contrary to the strong anti-

discriminatory public polic[y] of the LAD . . ., to

impose such an obligation upon an employee. To

deprive an employee of that choice and mandate that

he or she assert and litigate his or her retaliation

claims in a disciplinary proceeding brought by the

employer would severely curtail the employee's rights

under the LAD . . . to the important benefits of a

Superior Court forum. Those benefits include more

expansive discovery, a trial by jury, and the full

6

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) provides that "every action at law for an injury to the

person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this

State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such

action shall have accrued."

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panoply of remedies available in civil actions brought

under those statutes.

[Wolff, 439 N.J. Super. at 302 (Sabatino, P.J.,

concurring).]

Against this backdrop, we are convinced that plaintiff was wrongfully

denied her right to pursue her LAD claims in the Law Division. Plaintiff was

not, as defendants suggest, required to raise her discrimination or retaliation

issues at a "hearing." See Ensslin, 275 N.J. Super. at 372; Wolff, 439 N.J.

Super. at 301 (Sabatino, P.J., concurring). Nor was she then required to pursue

an appeal directly to the Appellate Division or exhaust administrative remedies

in pursuit of LAD relief. Instead, she had the right to file a complaint in the

Law Division, which she did.

Moreover, implicit in defendants' argument, is that plaintiff somehow

lost or waived her LAD claims by participating in RAMP or because she failed

to raise her LAD claims within fifteen days as provided in the PLA and

referenced in the OSL. However, there can be no waiver of "any of the

protections provided by the" LAD or "consent to a shortened [fifteen -day]

statute of limitations period." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a).

Further, under the PLA, and again referenced in the OSL, plaintiff was

limited to "request[ing] a hearing . . . on the sole issue of whether the

information received regarding [plaintiff]'s violation of the [PLA] was

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materially false." It is unclear how the "hearing" on that "sole issue" could or

would have addressed plaintiff's LAD claims, or replicated her rights as

accorded in a Law Division proceeding and the array of LAD remedies.

Under these circumstances, plaintiff was wrongfully denied her right to

bring her LAD claims in the Law Division. We note the limited scope of our

opinion. We merely conclude the Law Division had subject matter jurisdiction

over plaintiff's LAD complaint. We offer no opinion as to the ultimate merits

of her LAD claims or defendants' defenses.

B.

Defendants assert the Law Division lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over plaintiff's LAD claims and plaintiff is prohibited from "collaterally

attack[ing a] final agency decision[]."

Rule 4:6-2(a) allows a party to assert the defense of "lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter," in either their answer or by motion. "Whether subject

matter jurisdiction exists presents a purely legal issue . . . which we review de

novo." Beaver, 433 N.J. Super. at 437-38 (quoting Santiago, 429 N.J. Super.

at 156).

Deference to an agency's primary jurisdiction "is appropriate only if 'to

deny the agency's power to resolve the issues in question' would be

inconsistent with the 'statutory scheme' which vested the agency 'with the

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authority to regulate [the] industry or activity' it oversees." Muise v. GPU,

Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 140, 160 (App. Div. 2000) (alteration in original)

(citation omitted).

The factors to be considered in deciding whether to

invoke the doctrine include 1) whether the matter at

issue is within the conventional experience of judges;

2) whether the matter is peculiarly within the agency's

discretion, or requires agency expertise; 3) whether

inconsistent rulings might pose the danger of

disrupting the statutory scheme; and 4) whether prior

application has been made to the agency.

[Ibid. (citation omitted) (quoting Boldt v.

Correspondence Mgmt., Inc., 320 N.J. Super. 74, 85

(App. Div. 1999)).]

Applying the jurisdictional factors, we are convinced the Law Division

had subject matter jurisdiction. First, as provided by statute, plaintiff has the

right to file her complaint in the Law Division. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-13(a)(1).

Second, there is nothing about plaintiff's LAD discrimination or retaliation

claims that are "peculiarly within the agency's discretion, or requires agency

expertise." Ibid. (quoting Boldt, 320 N.J. Super. at 85). Third, defendants

argue "[n]otably, inconsistent rulings between the judiciary and the Board . . .

as to the issues [p]laintiff challenges here would disrupt the statutory scheme

concerning the Board['s] . . . authority." However, plaintiff is not seeking

anything other than a determination regarding whether defendants

discriminated or retaliated against her in violation of the LAD. Defendants

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never considered these issues, therefore, there could be no inconsistency.

Fourth, plaintiff has not raised her LAD claims with defendants. Thus,

applying the Muise factors, subject matter jurisdiction was properly vested in

the Law Division.

In addition, we conclude that reliance on Beaver is misplaced. In

Beaver, we considered "[u]nder what circumstances may a litigant pursue

common law and statutory causes of action in the Law Division, rather than

appeal from [a] State final agency determination, where the merits of the

agency determination are at issue?" Beaver, 433 N.J. Super. at 432.

Beaver did not concern subject matter jurisdiction over an LAD

complaint. Instead, in Beaver, the State Health Benefits Commission (SHBC)

"adopted the [Administrative Law Judge's] findings and conclusions" that

Beaver did not meet "his burden of proof." Id. at 436. Beaver "filed a notice

of appeal [with the Appellate Division] from the SHBC's final decision." Ibid.

Beaver "later voluntarily withdrew his appeal and the appeal was dismissed."

Ibid.

Thereafter, Beaver "filed a complaint in the Law Division," alleging:

"(1) breach of contract; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) violation of the New

Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -184; and (4) unjust

enrichment." Ibid.

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We noted "we ha[d] consistently recognized the statutory and regulatory

scheme that require[d] disputes . . . to be submitted first to the SHBC, and,

only thereafter, to this court for resolution." Id. at 439. Moreover, we stated

Beaver's complaint was a "thinly disguised effort to . . . divest this court of

our[] jurisdiction." Id. at 442. Therefore, we affirmed the trial court's

dismissal of Beaver's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because

"[t]o hold otherwise would permit [Beaver] to collaterally attack a State

administrative determination in the Law Division. [But t]he Law Division

[wa]s without jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. R[ule] 2:2-3(a)."7 Id. at

444.

Plaintiff's situation is wholly distinguishable from Beaver's. Here,

plaintiff did not attempt "to divest this court of our jurisdiction." Id. at 442.

Indeed, she was not required to and did not, pursue her LAD discrimination

and retaliation claims at a "hearing." Therefore, there was no "state

administrative agency" "final decision" on her LAD claims that would have

provided us with jurisdiction. See R. 2:2-3(a)(2).

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

7

Under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2), "appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division as

of right" "to review final decisions . . . of any state administrative agency."

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