Jarrell v. Haaji

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LYNN JARRELL, LINDA JARRELL, )

DUSTIN CHANCE, and DUSTIN )

CHANCE, as father and next friend of )

T.C., a minor, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-23-37-PRW

)

AHMED IBRAHIM HAAJI, )

U.S. ROADWAYS ENTERPRISES, INC. )

and CSAA GENERAL INSURANCE )

COMPANY, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell’s First Motion to Compel Supplemental

Discovery Responses from Defendant US Roadways Enterprises, Inc. (Dkt. 47);

Roadways’ Response (Dkt. 56); and Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell’s Reply (Dkt. 63). Also before

the Court is Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell’s First Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery

Response from Defendant Ahmed Ibrahim Haaji (Dkt. 48), to which no response was filed.

Background

This case arises from the collision of a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Haaji and

owned by Defendant Roadways and a truck driven by Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell, which

contained Plaintiffs Linda Jarrell, Dustin Chance, and T.C. as passengers. Plaintiffs allege

that Haaji made a negligent U-turn on to westbound US-412, blocking the roadway on

which Plaintiffs were traveling and resulting in an unavoidable accident. Plaintiffs further

allege that Haaji first attempted to flee the scene of the accident, and failed to render aid to

Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs filed this action in state court, and Defendants removed it to this Court on

January 11, 2023. On May 8, 2025, Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended

complaint. The Amended Complaint asserts claims against Defendant Haaji for (1)

negligence, (2) negligence per se, and (3) punitive damages, and against Defendant

Roadways for (1) vicarious liability via the doctrine of respondeat superior, (2) negligent

entrustment, and (3) punitive damages.1 Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell now seeks to compel

Roadways and Haaji to supplement their responses to various interrogatories and requests

for production.

Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize parties to obtain discovery of “any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the

needs to the case.”2 “Information within this scope . . . need not be admissible in evidence

to be discoverable.”3 Rule 37(a) provides that a party may move to compel discovery so

long as that party certifies “that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to

1 Though not relevant here, Plaintiffs also assert an uninsured/underinsured motorist claim

against Defendant CSAA General Insurance Company. See Pls.’ Am. Compl. (Dkt. 73).

2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

3 Id.

confer with the person or party failing to make disclosures or discovery in an effort to

obtain it without court action.”4

When a party withholds discoverable information due to a claimed privilege, “the

party must: (i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the documents,

communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed--and do so in a manner that,

without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to

assess the claim.”5 “Generally, a privilege log is the tool the withholding party uses to

comply with this rule.”6 If a party fails to timely and adequately make an objection, any

privilege, even if it would have been applicable, may be deemed waived.7

When a party asserts that information is protected from discovery due to the

attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, it “has the burden of establishing

that either or both is applicable.”8 In diversity cases, attorney-client privilege claims are

governed by state law, while work product claims are governed by federal law.9 Under

Oklahoma law, attorney-client privilege is established when “the status occupied by the

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); see also LCvR37.1.

5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A).

6 Producers Coop. Oil Mill v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., No. CIV-14-703-C, 2016 WL

11613007, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2016); Jackson v. Terrace Gardens Nursing Ctr.,

LLC, No. CIV-23-00319-JD, 2025 WL 1020888, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 4, 2025).

7 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1984).

8 Barclaysamerican Corp. v. Kane, 746 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1984).

9 See Frontier Refining, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 702 n.10 (10th Cir.

1998). Courts often merge the analyses. Lindley v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 267

F.R.D. 382, 395 (N.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d in part as modified by 2010 WL 1741407 (N.D.

Okla. Apr. 28, 2010).

parties was that of attorney and client and . . . their communications were of a confidential

nature,”10 and when those communications were “made for the purpose of facilitating the

rendition of professional legal services to the client.”11 Determining whether the privilege

applies is a fact-driven and circumstantial exercise.12

The attorney work product privilege is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(b)(3).13 Generally, the privilege protects from discovery “documents and tangible

things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation.”14 To determine whether a document

was prepared in anticipation of litigation, “courts should consider whether ‘in light of the

nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can

fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.’”15

Documents that would have been produced in the ordinary course of business and bare

facts are not protected.16

10 Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855, 865 (Okla. 1987).

11 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2502(B).

12 See Lindley, 267 F.R.D. at 391–92.

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see Frontier Refining, 136 F.3d at 702–03.

14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).

15 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. CIV-08-1125-C, 2010 WL

2594828, at *5 (W.D. Okla. June 22, 2010) (quoting Retail Brand All., Inc. v. Factory Mut.

Ins. Co., No. 05 Civ. 103 1(RJH)(HBP), 2008 WL 622810, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2008)).

16 See id (quoting E.B. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. CV 2002–5118(CPS)(MDG), 2007

WL 2874862, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007)); Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262,

266 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 86, 89

(W.D.Okla.1980)).

Analysis

I. Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell’s First Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery

Responses from Defendant US Roadways Enterprises, Inc. (Dkt. 47)

Plaintiff Jarrell seeks supplementation from Roadways on three interrogatories and

two requests for production. Roadways argues that supplementation is not warranted,

largely relying on the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege as its basis for

doing so. Plaintiff certified that the parties met and conferred prior to filing his Motion to

Compel.17

Interrogatories 3 and 4

Interrogatory 3 asks Roadways to identify “any statements . . . pertaining to

Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages” obtained by Roadways.18 Interrogatory 4 asks Roadways

to the identify of all individuals who investigated the accident or its consequences.19

Roadways objected to both interrogatories, stating: “To the extent this Interrogatory seeks

information related to Defense counsel’s investigation which is clearly protected by the

attorney client privilege and/or the work product doctrine, Defendant objects to identifying

or providing the same.”20 Then, its answer was “limit[ed] . . . to non-protected

information.”21

17 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); see also LCvR37.1.

18 Roadways’ Answers to Pl.’s First Set of Interrogs. (Dkt. 47-1), at 3–4.

19 Id. at 4.

20 Id.

21 Id.

The dispute surrounding these two interrogatories largely turns on a provision

contained within Roadways’ Driver and Vehicle Safety Handbook, which provides that

Roadways’ Accident Review Committee will review each accident and make a

preventability determination based upon its review.22 Plaintiff argues that the identifies of

the individuals involved in this review, and any responsive statements taken during the

course of the review, are subject to disclosure. Roadways argues in response that defense

counsel’s investigation into the accident is protected by the work product doctrine, and any

communications between Roadways and counsel are protected by the attorney-client

privilege.

While Roadways argues that defense counsel’s investigation into the accident is

privileged, Roadways provides no argument as to how the Accident Review Committee’s

investigation falls within the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege. It appears

that this review took place during Roadways’ normal course of business, as it is Roadways

policy to conduct the review after “each vehicle accident.”23 As such, it does not appear to

be protected by either privilege.24

Further, Interrogatory 4 seeks only the identification of persons who investigated

the accident. Roadways argues that the identities of the individuals who are hired to

investigate at counsel’s direction can be protected if their disclosure would somehow

divulge counsel’s legal strategy or mental impressions. But this argument is unpersuasive

22 Roadways’ Driver and Vehicle Safety Handbook (Dkt. 47-7), at 6.

23 Id.

24 See Wells Fargo Bank, 2010 WL 2594828, at *5.

because facts alone are not protected by the work product doctrine,25 and Roadways does

not explain how their disclosure would divulge counsel’s legal strategy or mental

impressions here. Additionally, besides generally referencing the privilege, Roadways

makes no attempt at demonstrating how the attorney-client privilege is applicable.26 As

such, Roadways has not satisfied its burden of establishing that either privilege is

applicable to these interrogatories.27

Plaintiff’s requests for supplementation of Roadways’ responses to Interrogatories

3 and 4 are GRANTED. Roadways shall supplement its responses to Interrogatories 3 and

4. In the event that there was no review by the Accident Review Committee, Roadways

shall affirmatively say so. For any responsive statements withheld that Roadways

justifiably believes to be privileged, Roadways shall produce a privilege log describing

them.28

25 Resol. Tr. Corp, 73 F.3d at 266 (“Because the work product doctrine is intended only to

guard against divulging the attorney’s strategies and legal impressions, it does not protect

facts concerning the creation of work product or facts contained within work product.”

(citing Feldman, 87 F.R.D. at 89)).

26 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be

stated with specificity.”); Pruess v. Presbyterian Health Plan, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 3d 1235,

1240 (D.N.M. 2022) (“Arguments against discovery must be supported by ‘specific

examples and articulate reasoning.’” (quoting U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Ent., 237 F.R.D.

428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006))); Kizer v. N. Am. Transp. Servs., LLC, No. CIV-18-846-D, 2020

WL 6263733, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 23, 2020) (“When a responding party . . . generally

asserts a privilege objection within an individual discovery response, the resulting ‘blanket

objection’ is decidedly improper.” (citing Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 748 F.2d at 541–

42)).

27 See Barclaysamerican, 746 F.2d at 656.

28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii); Kizer, 2020 WL 6263733, at *4.

Interrogatory 17

Interrogatory 17 states:

“If [US Roadways] ha[s] performed any review (e.g., accident review board,

preventability determination) of the Incident to determine preventability

and/or fault, Identify all Persons involved in the review, the dates of the

review and the conclusions that were reached.”29

Roadways objected to this request on the basis that this information is overly broad,

unduly burdensome, seeks information that is privileged pursuant to the self-critical

analysis privilege, the statutory privilege provided by 49 U.S.C. § 504(f), the work product

doctrine, and the attorney-client privilege, and because it is not relevant or admissible.

As an initial matter, Roadways makes no attempt at elaborating on how this request

is overly broad or unduly burdensome. Such boiler plate objections are insufficient.30 Its

invocation of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine fare no better.

Roadways makes only general references in its Response to these privileges and fails to

show how any of the information sought in this interrogatory—the identities of those

involved in Roadways’ review of the accident, the dates of the review, and their

conclusions—fall within these privileges.

29 Roadways’ Answers to Pl.’s First Set of Interrogs. (Dkt. 47-1), at 5 (first alteration in

original).

30 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (requiring the grounds of an objection to be “stated with

specificity”); Heuskin v. D&E Transp., LLC, No. CV 19-957 MV/GBW, 2020 WL

1450575, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 25, 2020) (“Boilerplate, generalized objections are

inadequate and tantamount to not making any objection at all.” (quoting D.J. Simmons, Inc.

v. Broaddus, 2001 WL 37125080, at *3 (D.N.M. Jul. 10, 2001))).

As to the self-critical analysis privilege, Roadways’ objection states that “[t]he self-

critical analysis privilege, where recognized, generally protects from disclosure” certain

documents.31 But absent in the objection and the briefing is any argument that the self-

critical analysis privilege has been, or should be, recognized in Oklahoma or the Tenth

Circuit.32 The Court declines to do so today.

Roadways’ next argument centers around the statutory privilege set forth in 49

U.S.C. § 504(f), which provides that:

No part of a report of an accident occurring in operations of a motor carrier,

motor carrier of migrant workers, or motor private carrier and required by

the Secretary, and no part of a report of an investigation of the accident made

by the Secretary, may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for

damages related to a matter mentioned in the report or investigation.

Roadways asserts that § 504 shields all of the information sought in this interrogatory from

discovery. The privilege afforded by § 504, however, does not appear to be so broad.

Instead, § 504 shields accident registers and reports made as a requirement of the Secretary,

or any reports made by the Secretary, from disclosure.33 It logically follows that § 504 also

31 Roadways’ Answers to Pl.’s First Set of Interrogs. (Dkt. 47-1), at 5 (emphasis added).

32 See Lindley, 267 F.R.D. at 387–88 (declining to adopt the self-critical analysis privilege

when offered no authoritative support for its application); In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc.,

450 F.3d 1179, 1198 n.8 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that the self-critical analysis privilege is

“recognized for specified situations in a minority of states”).

33 Scott v. Waste Connections US, Inc., No. 323CV00142RJCSCR, 2023 WL 8628333, at

*2 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2023) (collecting cases); Booker v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., No. 2:23-

CV-18 WJ/KRS, 2023 WL 7182280, at *6 (D.N.M. Nov. 1, 2023) (“[R]egister reports are

not subject to discovery.”); Sykes v. Bergerhouse, No. CIV-20-333-G, 2021 WL 5098291,

at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2021) (holding that DOT accident registers are protected by §

504).

shields the specific information Roadways is required to include in its accident register.34

But any other information related to Roadways’ internal review of the accident not

specifically required by the Secretary is not shielded from discovery by § 504.35 Specific

to this interrogatory, Roadways has not shown that the identities of the individuals involved

in the accident review, the dates of the review, or their conclusions constitute “part of a

report . . . required by the Secretary.”36

Finally, Roadways argues that this information is not relevant and is inadmissible.

But this information is clearly relevant because whether the accident was preventable bears

directly on whether there was breach of the duty of care, which is essential to Plaintiffs’

negligence claims. Further, any individuals involved in Roadways’ internal investigation

34 See 49 C.F.R. § 390.15(b) (setting forth the information required in an accident register);

Booker, 2023 WL 7182280, at *6.

35 See Sajda v. Brewton, 265 F.R.D. 334, 341 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (“The statute provides

protection for all parts of ‘a report of an accident’ required by the Secretary, but it does not

extend to regularly-gathered information that the carrier acquires and uses to fill in the

blanks on that DOT report.”); Sykes, 2021 WL 5098291, at *2 (holding that a company’s

internal accident review was subject to disclosure because it contained “information

beyond what is required for the accident register and there has been no showing that such

additional information has been requested by DOT through an audit or otherwise”); Rogers

v. Quality Carriers, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-22-JD-JEM, 2016 WL 3413766, at *5 (N.D. Ind.

June 21, 2016) (concluding that an incident report “not made by the Secretary of

Transportation” and which defendants did not argue was required by the Secretary of

Transportation was not protected by § 504); see also Pierce Cty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537

U.S. 129, 144 (2003) (“[S]tatutes establishing evidentiary privileges must be construed

narrowly because privileges impede the search for the truth.” (citing Baldrige v. Shapiro,

455 U.S. 345, 360 (1982))).

36 49 U.S.C. § 504(f).

are very likely to have knowledge regarding the underlying accident and its cause. Any

admissibility issues that arise can be addressed at a later date.37

Plaintiffs’ request for supplementation of Roadways’ response to Interrogatory 17

is GRANTED. Roadways shall supplement its response to this interrogatory. And again,

to the extent that the Accident Review Committee did not conduct a review, Roadways

shall affirmatively say so.

Request for Production 10

Request for Production 10 seeks any notes relating to the events which form the

basis for the lawsuit.38 Roadways objects, again raising the attorney-client privilege and

work product doctrine.39 Roadways specifically argues in its Response that any notes

created during defense counsel’s investigation into the accident, or by Roadways’ Accident

Review Committee during its internal review of the accident, are protected by privilege

and not subject to disclosure. Plaintiff argues that because Roadways has failed to produce

a privilege log, all of its objections to this request should be deemed waived.

37 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Information within this scope of discovery need not be

admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”).

38 Roadways’ Resp. to Pl.’s First Set of Reqs. for Produc. (Dkt. 47-2), at 3.

39 In its Response, Roadways asserts for the first time that the documents requested are not

relevant, overly broad, and cumulative. Roadways’ Resp. (Dkt. 56), at 12. But these

objections were not timely made and are therefore waived. Taylor v. Boise Cascade

Express, No. CIV-04-0266-L, 2005 WL 8164845, at 2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 9, 2005) (“[A]

party’s failure to make a clear and timely showing that privilege applies constitutes a

waiver of the privilege, regardless of the nature of the documents at issue.” (citing Peat,

Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 748 F.2d at 542)).

When a party withholds information due to a claim of privilege, Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) requires both (1) an express claim of privilege and (2) for the

party withholding information to “describe the nature of the documents, communications,

or tangible things not produced or disclosed--and do so in a manner that, without revealing

information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.”

Though Roadways has expressly claimed that this information is privileged and argues that

the “discoverability of any notes depends upon the circumstances of their making,”40

Roadways has failed to sufficiently describe the nature of the documents withheld or the

circumstances surrounding their creation such that Plaintiff and the Court can assess its

claim of privilege—despite a direct request from Plaintiff for a privilege log.41 This is

inadequate.

Further, as mentioned above, Plaintiff has put forth support demonstrating that

Roadways’ Accident Review Committee conducts an internal review of all accidents as

part of its normal course of business.42 Based on the information before the Court,

documents created during this review would not be protected from disclosure by either the

40 Def. Roadways’ Resp. (Dkt. 56), at 11.

41 Pl.’s Req. for Suppl. (Dkt. 47-5), at 5 (“If US Roadways is claiming responsive

documents in its possession, custody, or control are privileged, please identify them on a

privilege log.”); see Kizer v. N. Am. Transp. Servs., LLC, No. CIV-18-846-D, 2020 WL

1161094, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 10, 2020) (“The specific objection requirement provides

the party seeking discovery with a basis for determining what documents the party asserting

the privilege has withheld.”).

42 Roadways’ Driver and Vehicle Safety Handbook (Dkt. 47-7), at 6.

work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege.43 However, Roadways has also

affirmatively asserted that experts hired by defense counsel have generated responsive

notes. Such notes are protected by the work product doctrine and need not be produced.

As such, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel as to Request for Production 10 is

GRANTED IN PART. To the extent that there are responsive documents to this request

created or compiled by the Accident Review Committee, Plaintiff is entitled to their

disclosure44 and any objections specific to such documents have been waived due to

Roadways failure to produce a privilege log.45 Any notes generated by defense counsel—

or the investigator hired by defense counsel—are protected by the work product doctrine

and need not be produced.

Request for Production 13

Request for Production 13 seeks the production of any leases or contracts in effect

at the time of the accident.46 Roadways objects, arguing that these documents are not

relevant because they have no bearing on the claims or defenses at issue.

43 See Wells Fargo Bank, 2010 WL 2594828, at *5.

44 Plaintiff has clarified that he is not seeking Roadways’ accident register, which is

protected from disclosure under 49 U.S.C. § 504.

45 See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 748 F.2d at 542 (Even if “the privilege would have

attached if the objection had been timely and adequately asserted, that such a showing had

not been made when the trial court was called upon to make its ruling defeats the

privilege.”); White v. Graceland Coll. Ctr. for Pro. Dev. & Lifelong Learning, Inc., 586 F.

Supp. 2d 1250, 1266–67 (D. Kan. 2008) (finding that waiver may be appropriate when a

privilege log is not produced until after a party is ordered to produce various documents).

46 Roadways’ Resp. to Pl.’s First Set of Reqs. for Produc. (Dkt. 47-2), at 4.

At the time Plaintiff filed his Motion to Compel, the only pending claims were for

negligence, negligence per se, and punitive damages against Defendant Haaji, and for

vicarious liability against Roadways. But since the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiffs

were granted leave to file an Amended Complaint, in which Plaintiffs reassert their claims

for negligent entrustment and punitive damages against Roadways. So regardless of

whether ownership of the tractor-trailer is relevant to the negligence claims against Haaji,

it is relevant to Plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment claim. As such, any contracts or leases

involving the tractor-trailer at the time of the accident are within the scope of discovery.47

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Roadways’ response to request for production 13 is

GRANTED. Roadways shall produce any documents responsive to this request.

II. Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell’s First Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery

Responses from Defendant Ahmed Ibrahim Haaji (Dkt. 48)

Plaintiff Jarrell also seeks supplementation from Defendant Haaji on three

interrogatories. Haaji filed no response to the motion. Plaintiff certified that the parties met

and conferred in good faith prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.48

Interrogatories 4 and 19

Interrogatories 4 and 19 are substantially similar to Interrogatories 3 and 4 issued to

Roadways and addressed above. Interrogatory 4 seeks the identification of all persons who

have investigated the accident or its consequences.49 Interrogatory 19 seeks the disclosure

47 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).

48 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a); see also LCvR37.1.

49 Haaji’s Answers to Pl.’s First Set of Interrogs. (Dkt. 48-1), at 4.

of all written or verbal statements given by Haaji or others regarding the accident.50 Haaji’s

objection to both interrogatories states: “To the extent this Interrogatory seeks information

related to Defense counsel’s investigation which is clearly protected by the attorney client

privilege and/or the work product doctrine, Defendant objects to identifying or providing

the same.” Then, his answer was “limit[ed] . . . to non-protected information.”

Haaji has not established that either privilege applies to the information sought in

these interrogatories.51 As set forth above, the identities of the individuals who have

investigated the accident do not fall within the work-product doctrine because the work-

product doctrine does not protect bare facts.52 And Haaji fails to elaborate on how the

information sought falls within the protections of either privilege.53 Further, Plaintiff

argues that Haaji was required to notify his supervisor following the accident and to

complete a “Drivers Report.”54 To the extent that such statements exist, Plaintiff is entitled

to their disclosure.

50 Id. at 8.

51 See Barclaysamerican, 746 F.2d at 656 (“The party seeking to assert the attorney-client

privilege or the work product doctrine as a bar to discovery has the burden of establishing

that either or both is applicable. “).

52 See Resol. Tr. Corp., 73 F.3d at 266.

53 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be

stated with specificity.”); Kizer, 2020 WL 6263733, at *2 (“When a responding party . . .

generally asserts a privilege objection within an individual discovery response, the

resulting ‘blanket objection’ is decidedly improper.” (citing Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &

Co., 748 F.2d at 541–42).

54 Driver and Vehicle Safety Handbook (Dkt. 48-3), at 6.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Haaji’s responses to these interrogatories is

GRANTED. To the extent that there are any responsive statements withheld Haaji believes

to be justifiably privileged, Haaji shall produce a privilege log describing them.55

Interrogatory 10

Interrogatory 10 requests Haaji to provide his employment history for the past ten

years.56 Haaji objected, arguing that this request is overbroad as to timeframe and not

relevant. His answer solely stated that he was employed by Roadways at the time of the

accident.

As to relevancy, Haaji primarily argues that his employment history is not relevant

because it has no bearing on the general negligence claims against Haaji. But as argued by

Plaintiff, Haaji’s experience as a commercial driver is relevant to whether Haaji reasonably

relied on this experience when making the U-turn that led to the underlying accident. And

as mentioned above, Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an Amended Complaint, which

reasserts their previously dismissed negligent entrustment claim. Haaji’s employment

history is relevant to Plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment claim because it provides some

insight into whether Roadways had reason to know that Haaji might use the tractor-trailer

in a manner that was dangerous to others.57

55 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii); Kizer, 2020 WL 6263733, at *4.

56 Haaji’s Answers to Pl.’s First Set of Interrogs. (Dkt. 48-1), at 7.

57 See Pierce v. Okla. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 901 P.2d 819, 823 (Okla. 1995) (setting

forth the elements of negligent entrustment).

The Court agrees with Haaji, however, that Haaji’s employment history after the

accident is not relevant to any of the claims or defenses at issue, and that the timeframe is

overbroad. As such, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s request for supplementation

of this interrogatory. Haaji shall supplement this response and provide his employment

history for the five years preceding the date of the accident. His work history following the

accident is not relevant to any claims or defenses and need not be provided.

III. Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement of expenses incurring in bringing the

Motions

Plaintiff requested reimbursement for his expenses in each motion to compel.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C) provides that when a motion to compel is

granted in part and denied in part, the Court “may, after giving an opportunity to be heard,

apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” With the exception of Roadways’ and

Haaji’s failure to produce a privilege log, it appears that the remainder of their objections

were made in good faith and were mostly substantially justified.58 For this reason, the Court

declines to apportion the reasonable expenses for the motions. Each party shall bear its own

fees and costs associated with the motions.

Conclusion

Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell’s First Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses

from Defendant US Roadways Enterprises, Inc. (Dkt. 47) is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART as set forth above, and Plaintiff Lynn Jarrell’s First Motion to Compel

58 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii).

Supplemental Discovery Response from Defendant Ahmed Ibrahim Haaji (Dkt. 48) is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth above.

Roadways and Haaji shall supplement their responses and produce the responsive

documents as ordered herein within ten days of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of May 2025.

PATRICK R. WYRICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18