Com. v. Henderson, E.

J-S01004-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

EVELYN HENDERSON :

:

Appellant : No. 819 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 14, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-22-CR-0003070-2022

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: MAY 22, 2025

Appellant Evelyn Henderson1 appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted her of one count each of second-degree

murder, aggravated arson, and arson.2 On appeal, Appellant argues that her

waiver of the right to counsel was invalid and that her statement to police

should have been suppressed. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

The instant matter arises out of the death of Appellant’s husband,

Carmen Henderson (hereinafter “Victim”). Shortly after 5:30 a.m.

on June 16, 2022, Susquehanna Township police officers

responded to a residence at 306 Stuart Place in response to a 911

call made by Appellant. Upon arrival to the residence, officers

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant also identified herself as Evelyn Zigerelli and Evelyn Zigerelli

Henderson. See Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 10; Appellant’s Brief at 9.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 3301(a.1)(1)(i), and 3301(a)(1)(i), respectively.

J-S01004-25

found the deceased victim naked in a fetal position on the back

porch of the residence. It was apparent that Victim had been

deceased for a while, and it was apparent that Victim’s entire body

had been burned severely. Investigators also observed fire debris

surrounding a table on the patio.

When officers and other individuals attempted to ask questions to

Appellant at the scene, she appeared aloof, distracted, and

emotionless, and she provided very short responses to the

officers’ inquiries. She was particularly hesitant and evasive when

an officer asked her whether she and Victim had been on good

terms. Moreover, when one of the officers arrived on the scene,

Appellant was pacing back and forth, and she stated to the officer,

“I’m in trouble. I know that.” In recounting when she had last

seen . . . Victim, Appellant provided several contradictory

statements. Specifically, she told the coroner that she had last

seen Victim at 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. when he went out to smoke

a cigar, but she told a police officer that she had last seen Victim

at 11:00 p.m. in the living room when they were having an

argument.

Later that morning, Appellant was taken to the police station for

questioning. When asked about the events that had transpired

prior to Victim’s death, Appellant again provided various

contradictory statements regarding the timeline of events. For

example, when she had called 911 shortly after 5:00 a.m., she

told dispatchers that she heard Victim scream at about 1:00 a.m.,

noticed he had burned and injured himself. However, in the

interview at the station, Appellant indicated that the incident

involving Victim had happened at 4:30 p.m. the previous

afternoon and that they had been arguing about money prior to

the incident. An officer who testified at trial recalled that Appellant

altered the purported timeline of events no fewer than four or five

times throughout the course of her interview. As was the case at

the scene, Appellant did not show much emotion at the police

station, she frequently stalled before answering questions, and

officers observed that she appeared unusually laid back

considering the circumstances.

Fire investigators conducted a thorough investigation and

ultimately determined that the origin of the fire was the back

strapping of the folding chair that Victim was sitting in at the time

of his death, and the cause of the fire was an open flame to that

back strapping of the chair. Investigators also determined that

the fire was incendiary, meaning that it was set intentionally. The

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medical examiner conducted an autopsy and determined that

Victim’s cause of death was thermal burns, and the manner of

death was homicide.

On June 21, 202[2], shortly following Victim’s autopsy, Appellant

was interviewed by police again, this time at Dauphin County

Prison. When confronted with the evidence of the autopsy,

Appellant initially insisted that she did not set Victim on fire.

However, after being left in silence for a few minutes, Appellant

looked up and told the officers, “I can’t have a jury trial.” Corporal

Richard Wilson then told Appellant that the only way the District

Attorney might offer her a plea deal of any sort would be if she

was forthcoming and truthful about what happened. Appellant

then sat quiet for a few minutes before confessing and proclaiming

that she set Victim on fire.

In connection with the aforementioned events, Appellant was

charged with one count of criminal homicide and two counts of

arson. Following a trial held from March 12-14, 2024, a jury found

Appellant guilty at count 1— second[-]degree murder; count 2 —

aggravated arson — bodily injury; and count 3 — arson — danger

of death or bodily injury.[3] On May 14, 2024, this [c]ourt

sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of

parole at Count 1, and no penalty was imposed at counts 2 and 3,

as they merged with count 1 for sentencing purposes.[4]

Trial Ct. Op., 8/21/24, at 1-3 (some formatting altered).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both the trial court and

Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue:

Whether the trial court erred in holding that [Appellant] knowingly

waived her right to an attorney when she had previously invoked

that right, asking for a public defender, and the Commonwealth

____________________________________________

3 See N.T., Trial, 3/12-14/24, at 534.

4 See N.T., Sentencing 5/14/24, at 6; see also Sentencing Order, 5/14/24.

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knew [Appellant] had made that request and chose to interview

her prior to any cooling off period?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).5

____________________________________________

5 We note that in her Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant also presented an

issue stating: “The [c]ourt imposed an illegal sentence of no further penalty

at counts 2 and 3, (the arson counts) when the counts should have merged

with count 1, second degree murder.” Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/11/24, at

1-2. However, Appellant also added a footnote to that assertion stating:

There is an ambiguity, as the [c]ourt during sentencing remarked

that counts 2 and 3 should merge but stated no ‘additional

sentences imposed with regard to that.’ The sentencing order

reflects that ‘no additional sentences shall be imposed.’ If the

[c]ourt meant that the offenses merge, then there would

be no error.

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

The trial court addressed this issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion and concluded

it was meritless because the record reflected that the trial court acknowledged

that the arson counts merged with second-degree murder for sentencing

purposes. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/21/24, at 3, 7. Although Appellant did not

raise this merger issue in her appellate brief, we note that merger implicates

the legality of the sentence, and the legality of a sentence is an issue this

Court can raise sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928,

941 (Pa. Super. 2020). Upon review, the record reflects that the trial court

explained that there would not be an additional penalty on the two arson

convictions, and it specifically stated that the arson convictions merged with

second-degree murder for sentencing purposes. See N.T., Sentencing

5/14/24, at 6 (stating “[w]ith regard to the offense of murder in the second

degree, I sentence you to life imprisonment without parole. The two

remaining findings of the jury of guilt on Count 2 and 3, aggravated arson and

arson, I agree they will merge for purposes of sentencing, so there won’t

be any additional sentences imposed with regard to that.”) (emphasis added);

Sentencing Order, 5/14/24 (stating that Appellant “is sentenced to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole and ordered to pay the costs of

these proceedings. Counts 2 and 3 shall merge for purposes of

sentencing, so no additional sentences shall be imposed.”) (emphasis

added); see also Trial Ct. Op., 8/21/24, at 3, 7 (stating that “no penalty was

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant argues that her waiver of counsel was invalid under Article 1,

Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Art. 1, Section 9) and the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution (Sixth Amendment).

Appellant’s Brief at 16-18. Appellant contends that she expressly requested

an attorney, but the Commonwealth continued to question her. See id.

Appellant contends that because her waiver of counsel was invalid, the trial

court should have suppressed her statements to police. See id. at 21-35.

The Commonwealth argues that Appellant failed to unequivocally invoke

her right to counsel and that the trial court properly concluded that Appellant

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her right to counsel.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. The Commonwealth contends that although

Appellant asked Corporal Wilson “[d]o I still get a [p]ublic [d]efender[,]” this

question was not an unequivocal invocation of her right to counsel. Id. at 8.

Moreover, Corporal Wilson told Appellant that she would have to apply for a

public defender. See id.

____________________________________________

imposed at counts 2 and 3, as they merged with count 1 for sentencing

purposes[,]” and concluding that Appellant’s merger claim is meritless

because the trial court specifically acknowledged that the arson counts

merged with second-degree murder for purposes of sentencing) (emphasis

added). Accordingly, because the trial court specifically stated that the arson

convictions merged with second-degree murder, we discern no error with

respect to the legality of Appellant’s sentence. See Commonwealth v.

Adams, 39 A.3d 310, 325 (Pa. Super. 2012) (explaining that the underlying

or predicate felony merges with second-degree murder for purposes of

sentencing) (citing Commonwealth v. Harper, 516 A.2d 319, 321 (Pa.

1986)).

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Our review of a challenge to the denial of motion to suppress is limited

to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported

by the record and whether the suppression court’s legal conclusions drawn

from those facts are correct. Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654

(Pa. 2010). We may only review “the evidence presented at the suppression

hearing when examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.”

Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208 A.3d 497, 499 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted). Further, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to

their testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.

Byrd, 185 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). This Court

is bound by the suppression court’s factual findings that are supported by the

record, but we are not bound by its legal conclusions, which we review de

novo. Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 320-21 (Pa. 2011).

However, before we may reach Appellant’s claim concerning suppression

of her statements, we must first address whether Appellant waived her right

to counsel. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 158 A.3d 117, 121 (Pa. Super.

2017) (stating that this Court must review whether the appellant properly

waived the right to counsel prior to reviewing suppression claim). This Court

has previously explained:

In Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)], the United

States Supreme Court established that an accused has the right

to have counsel present during custodial interrogations under the

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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. This right to counsel is part of “a set of prophylactic

measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee

against self-incrimination.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S.

261, 269 (2011).

In Edwards v. Arizona, [451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981)], the

Supreme Court addressed the consequences of a suspect’s

invocation of the right to counsel. The Edwards court held that

“when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present

during custodial interrogation,” police may not conduct further

interrogations “until counsel has been made available to him,

unless the accused himself initiates further communication,

exchanges, or conversations with the police.” If police conduct

further interrogations outside the presence of counsel, “the

suspect’s statements are presumed involuntary and therefore

inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the

suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be

considered voluntary under traditional standards.” McNeil v.

Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991).

To trigger these protections, a defendant’s request for counsel

must be sufficiently clear “that a reasonable police officer would

understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”

Davis[ v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 454 (1994)]. In Davis,

police officers were investigating a murder that occurred after the

victim lost a pool-game bet and refused to pay. Id. at 454. Naval

criminal investigators focused on Davis when they discovered that

he had been at the bar on the evening in question and owned a

pool cue that was stained with blood. Id. Davis was brought in

for questioning, provided his rights,[FN8] and waived his rights to

remain silent and to counsel. Id. at 454–55. During the

interview, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Id. at

455. In response, the criminal investigator reminded him of his

right to counsel and asked Davis to clarify whether he wanted a

lawyer. Id. Davis responded that he was not asking for a lawyer

and did not want one. Id. However, one hour later, Davis said,

“I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else,” at which point

investigators ended the interrogation. Id.

[FN8] Because Davis was an active military service member

and the killing took place on a naval base, Davis was given

his rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military

Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 831.

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The Davis Court declined to disturb the conclusion of the lower

courts that Davis’s “maybe” statement was insufficiently clear to

invoke his right to counsel. Id. at 462. The Court rejected the

argument that an equivocal or ambiguous reference to counsel

requires the police to stop questioning a suspect:

We decline petitioner’s invitation to extend Edwards and

require law enforcement officers to cease questioning

immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal

reference to an attorney. The rationale underlying

Edwards is that the police must respect a suspect’s wishes

regarding his right to have an attorney present during

custodial interrogation. But when the officers conducting

the questioning reasonably do not know whether or not the

suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate

cessation of questioning “would transform the Miranda

safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate

police investigative activity,” Michigan v. Mosley, 423

U.S. 96, 102 (1975), because it would needlessly prevent

the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of

counsel even if the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer

present. Nothing in Edwards requires the provision of

counsel to a suspect who consents to answer questions

without the assistance of a lawyer.

Id. at 459–60 (some internal citations omitted). The Court went

on to conclude that while “it will often be good police practice for

the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not [a suspect]

actually wants an attorney,” the officers need not do so; instead,

they “may continue questioning until and unless the suspect

clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461.

The inquiry into whether or not a suspect has invoked the right to

counsel is an objective one. Id. at 459. The Davis Court

explained that a suspect “must articulate his desire to have

counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police

officer in the circumstances would understand the

statement be a request for an attorney.” Id. (emphasis

added). However, if the statement is “ambiguous or equivocal in

that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have

understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to

counsel,” police are not required to cease questioning. Id.

(emphasis in original).

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Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 272–73 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(some formatting altered).

Moreover, the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of

Counsel for his defen[s]e.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. “The Sixth Amendment

right is intended to protect the unaided layman at critical confrontations with

the government after the initiation of the adversary process with respect to a

particular crime[.]” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 171 (quoting United States v.

Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel

“attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings

against the defendant.” Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187. More specifically, “[t]he

Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel attaches at the initiation

of formal judicial proceedings against an individual by way of formal charge,

preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”

Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 212 (Pa. 2016) (citation

omitted).

“Any statement made by the individual thereafter which is ‘deliberately

elicited’ by police, without the individual making a valid waiver of the right to

counsel, is deemed a contravention of this right.” Id. (citation omitted).

Further, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the right to counsel

under Art. I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution “is coterminous with the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel for purposes of determining when the right

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attaches.” Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1065 (Pa. 2012)

(citing Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 1999)).

Regarding the waiver of the right to counsel under the Sixth

Amendment, our Supreme Court has stated: “[s]o long as the accused is made

aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation during post[-

]indictment questioning . . . by use of the Miranda warnings, [her] waiver of

[her] Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is knowing and

intelligent.” Commonwealth v. Rawls, 256 A.3d 1226, 1234 (Pa. 2021)

(quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 300 (1988)); see also

Commonwealth v. Garcia, 877 EDA 2023, 2024 WL 4624682, at *7 (Pa.

Super. Oct. 30, 2024) (unpublished mem.) (stating that “[a] waiver of

Miranda warnings also serves to waive one’s Sixth Amendment right to

counsel.”).

Further, “[n]o per se rule automatically renders invalid a waiver of

constitutional rights based on mental disease or deficiency.” Commonwealth

v. Cox, 686 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Pa. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Bracey,

461 A.2d 775 (Pa. 1983)). “[A] person with mental illness including a history

of hallucinations and delusions may be capable of waiving her constitutional

rights.” Bracey, 461 A.2d at 782, n.7. “Thus, in the suppression realm, the

focus is upon police conduct and whether a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

waiver was effected based on a totality of the circumstances, which may

include consideration of a defendant’s mental age and condition, low IQ,

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limited education, and general condition.” Commonwealth v. Sepulveda,

55 A.3d 1108, 1136–37 (Pa. 2012).

Here, the trial court addressed this issue as follows:

Appellant asserts that this [c]ourt erred when it denied

[Appellant’s] motion to suppress, and reasoned that [Appellant’s]

confession was a knowing, intelligent and voluntary confession,

was not a violation of her Sixth Amendment and Article I Section

9 rights and thus was admissible. Appellant’s pretrial motion to

suppress was filed on February 5, 2024, and this [c]ourt held a

suppression hearing on February 21, 2024. Thereafter, on March

1, 2024, this [c]ourt issued a three-page order denying

Appellant’s motion to suppress and thoroughly explain[ed] its

reasoning for denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.

Specifically, it was found as follows:

1. On June 16, 2022, as part of the initial investigation into

the death of [Victim], Corporal Wilson of the Susquehanna

Township Police Department interviewed [Appellant] after

advising her of her Miranda rights, both orally and in

writing.[6]

____________________________________________

6 See N.T., Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 11; Com. Exh. 1 (Susquehanna Township

Police Department Miranda Warnings Waiver Form 6/16/22). The June 16,

2022 Susquehanna Township Police Department Miranda warnings waiver

read, in relevant part, as follows:

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will

be used against you in a court of law.

You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an

attorney, one will be provided to you without charge prior to

questioning.

Knowing these rights, do you wish to speak to me without the

presence of an attorney? Yes

s/ Evelyn Zigerelli

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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2. [Appellant] corrected her name on the waiver form and

signed it.[7]

3. [Appellant] was coherent and never invoked her right to

silence or counsel during the seven hours in the police

interview room. There were no inculpatory statements

made by her.

4. On the audio and video tape, it was clear that the

following exchange took place:

CPL. WILSON: “OK, stand up, you’re under arrest.

Criminal Homicide. Hands behind your back, please.

The car is out back ... Do you have any questions for

me?”

EVELYN HENDERSON: “No, do I still get a public

defender?”

CPL. WILSON: “You’ll have to apply for one, correct,

yeah, but yes, you’ll definitely get an attorney. But

uh so you’re going ... You searched her before?”

5. On June 21, 2022, Corporal Wilson went to see

[Appellant] at the Dauphin County Prison after he was

present at the autopsy earlier that day. She was brought to

an interview room at the prison, and she was asked if she

obtained a lawyer. [Appellant] replied that someone from

the prison was helping her fill out paperwork, and this

person told her that she did not qualify for a public defender.

6. [Appellant] was then advised of her Miranda rights, the

form was reviewed and signed by her. Where it’s stated on

the written form “Knowing these rights, do you wish to

____________________________________________

6/16/22 8:58 AM[.]

Id.

7 See N.T., Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 11; Com. Exh. 1 (Susquehanna Township

Police Department Miranda Warnings Waiver Form 6/16/22).

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speak to me without the presence of an attorney?”

[Appellant] wrote “Yes.”[8]

7. The interview was not recorded; however, Corporal

Wilson testified that [Appellant] was told that her original

story did not match the evidence. [Appellant] tells them

she can’t have a jury trial, and she was told that the only

way they would agree to a plea bargain with the district

attorney’s office was if she came forth with what truly

happened, to avoid a jury trial. After sitting quietly for

about five to ten minutes, she proceeded with her

confession.

8. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), it was held

that an accused “having expressed his desire to deal with

the police only through counsel, is not subject to further

interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made

available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further

communication, exchanges or conversations with the

police.” Id. at 484-85.

9. The Edwards rule was clarified in Davis v. United

States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) by holding that the

____________________________________________

8 See N.T., 2/21/24, at 19-22; Com. Exh. 4 (Susquehanna Township Police

Department Miranda Warnings Waiver Form 6/21/22). The June 21, 2022

Susquehanna Township Police Department Miranda warnings waiver read, in

relevant part, as follows:

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will

be used against you in a court of law.

You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an

attorney, one will be provided to you without charge prior to

questioning.

Knowing these rights, do you wish to speak to me without the

presence of an attorney? Yes

s/ Evelyn Henderson

6/21/22 10:55 AM[.]

Id.

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“determination of whether the right to counsel was invoked

by the accused is an ‘objective inquiry.’” Id. at 458-59 (The

remark — “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” — was not a

request for counsel). See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.

171, 178 (1991) (The likelihood that a suspect will wish

counsel to be present is not the test for the applicability of

Edwards).

10. [Appellant] never made a request for counsel during any

of the actual interrogations by Corporal Wilson on either

June 16 or June 21, 2022. On each occasion, she was

provided Miranda warnings and wrote “Yes” to the question

on the waiver form that she wished to speak with the officer

without the presence of an attorney.

11. The statement by [Appellant] after the first interrogation

was already concluded was only a question by her relating

to her arrest. It does not meet the objective standard of a

statement that a reasonable police officer would understand

to be that he could not interview her at a later date.

12. At no time during the interrogation while in the prison

on June 21, 2022, did [Appellant] make any request for

counsel.

13. The police are not required under Edwards to follow up

or ask clarifying questions as to whether a suspect wants an

attorney prior to the interrogation. Davis, supra. There is

no requirement that the public defender’s office be

contacted by the police, especially when [Appellant]

indicated that she had been told she did not qualify.

14. The police did not make any inducements in order for

[Appellant] to not seek the assistance of counsel during her

interrogation on June 21, 2022[,] and to execute a waiver.

Cf. Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 553 A.2d 409 (Pa. 1989).

15. Under the totality of the circumstances, the

[Appellant’s] confession was knowing, intelligent and

voluntary, along with her waiver of her Miranda rights.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hubble, 504 A.2d 168 (Pa.

1986).

Court Order Denying Motion for Suppression, 3/1/24, ¶¶ 1-15.

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In summary, it was significant that at the time of the interview on

June 21, 2022, Appellant executed the written waiver form after

being advised of her Miranda rights. She was sophisticated with

all her wits about her. It was five days after her arrest. Someone

from the public defender’s office had already spoken to her in the

jail. It was [Appellant’s] choice to verbally confess and then write

out on paper that “I set the fire with . . . match[es].” That [Victim]

cried out “help me, Evy”, and [Appellant] stood there and watched

[Victim] burn.

The police were not required to be [Appellant’s] advocate to

arrange for counsel before [Appellant] decided to waive after

being advised of her Miranda rights. Appellant had five days to

obtain counsel. There was no impediment on the police

approaching [Appellant] again after the autopsy, and there was

no pressure exerted upon [Appellant] to waive her right to

counsel.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/21/24, at 4-6 (some formatting altered).

After review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion, which is

supported by the record. See Briggs, 12 A.3d at 320-21; Jones, 988 A.2d

at 654. The record reflects that the police provided Appellant with her

Miranda rights prior to speaking with her on June 16, 2022, and we agree

with the trial court that Appellant did not assert her right to counsel by asking

whether she would be entitled to a public defender. See Trial Ct. Op.,

8/21/24, at 5. Appellant’s statement was not such that a reasonable police

officer would understand it to be a request for an attorney. Champney, 161

A.3d at 273 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 461). Additionally, Appellant answered

questions coherently, exhibited no signs of a mental health crisis, and gave

no indication that she could not understand what was asked of and what was

said to her. See N.T., Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 11-13.

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Further, the record reflects that after the autopsy had been conducted

and Appellant had been charged, police returned to speak with Appellant on

June 21, 2022. Because charges had been filed against her, Appellant’s right

to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I,

Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution had attached. See Hannibal, 156

A.3d at 212; Keaton, 45 A.3d at 1065. However, once again, the police

informed Appellant of her Miranda rights, including her right to counsel, and

Corporal Wilson asked if Appellant had retained counsel. See N.T., Pretrial

Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 18-21, 22; Com. Exh. 4 (Susquehanna Township Police

Department Miranda Warnings Waiver Form 6/21/22). After Appellant

responded that she had not retained counsel, the police asked if Appellant

would be willing to speak with the police without an attorney present. See

id. at 19, 22; Com. Exh. 4 (Susquehanna Township Police Department

Miranda Warnings Waiver Form 6/21/22).

Ultimately, after police provided Appellant with Miranda warnings,

Appellant executed a second waiver of her rights which included a waiver of

her right to counsel. See N.T., Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 19, 22; Com. Exh. 4

(Susquehanna Township Police Department Miranda Warnings Waiver Form

6/21/22). Although police reiterated that Appellant had the right to counsel,

she did not invoke her right to counsel, and she agreed to speak to the police

without an attorney present. See N.T., Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 19, 22; Com.

Exh. 4 (Susquehanna Township Police Department Miranda Warnings Waiver

Form 6/21/22). Corporal Wilson testified that Appellant understood her rights,

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engaged in coherent conversation, responded coherently and logically to

questions, and did not exhibit any signs of a mental health issue. See N.T.

Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 19-21. Additionally, Appellant never invoked her

right to counsel or her right to remain silent. See id. at 21; see also

Champney, 161 A.3d at 272–73. Thereafter, Appellant provided a knowing

and voluntary inculpatory statement. See N.T. Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 21-

22; Com. Exh. 4 (Susquehanna Township Police Department Miranda

Warnings Waiver Form 6/21/22). In sum, the record reflects that although

Appellant was informed of her rights before the interview on June 21, 2022,

Appellant did not invoke her right to counsel. See N.T., Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24,

at 21-22; Com. Exh. 4 (Susquehanna Township Police Department Miranda

Warnings Waiver Form 6/21/22). Instead, Appellant agreed in writing to

speak to Corporal Wilson without an attorney present, and she provided a

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of her right to counsel. See N.T.,

Pretrial Hr’g, 2/21/24, at 19-22; Com. Exh. 4 (Susquehanna Township Police

Department Miranda Warnings Waiver Form 6/21/22). Accordingly,

Appellant waived her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution and Art. 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See

Rawls, 256 A.3d at 1234; Garcia, 2024 WL 4624682, at *7; Keaton, 45

A.3d at 1065. For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s

statements to police were obtained legally, and therefore there is no basis to

suppress Appellant’s statements. See Rawls, 256 A.3d at 1234. Accordingly,

we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

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J-S01004-25

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/22/2025

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