explaining 23 that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “raises a presumption of the defendant’s negligence, and casts upon the defendant the burden of showing that ordinary 24 25 26 27 1 care was exercised”
How later courts described this case
- explaining 23 that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “raises a presumption of the defendant’s negligence, and casts upon the defendant the burden of showing that ordinary 24 25 26 27 1 care was exercised”
- “The 17 doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies unconditionally, or ‘as a matter of law,’ 18 when undisputed evidence establishes that plaintiff’s car was stationary when 19 struck from behind by defendants’ vehicle[.]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
CASE NO. 2:23-02371-JLS-PD
11
12
13 BRENT NUSSBAUM,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
14
Plaintiff. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER
15 v. BENCH TRIAL
16
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
17
18 Defendant.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiff Brent Nussbaum filed this action following a motor vehicle accident in
3 which a United States Postal Service (“USPS”) mail delivery truck rear-ended Plaintiff’s
4 parked vehicle. Plaintiff asserts a single claim against Defendant United States of America
5 for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).
6 The Court held a two-day bench trial on February 11 and 12, 2025. Thereafter, the
7 parties filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Docs. 68–69.) Having
8 considered the testimony of all four witnesses, all admitted exhibits, the parties’ arguments
9 at trial, and the parties’ post-trial submissions, the Court makes the following findings of
10 fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52.1
11 II. FINDINGS OF FACT
12 A. The Accident
13 1. The accident giving rise to this action (the “Accident”) occurred around 12:00
p.m. on December 8, 2019, on Foothill Boulevard in La Cañada Flintridge,
14
California. (Admitted Fact ¶ 4, Doc. 55; Trial Transcript, Volume I (“T1”) at
15
48:12–14.) It had rained earlier that morning, so the roadway was slick and wet.
16
(T1 at 37:2–5, 48:15–21.)
17
2. Orlando Chavez, a USPS employee, was driving a USPS mail delivery truck on
18
Foothill Boulevard at approximately 15 to 20 miles per hour when he saw a car
19
in front of him straddling two lanes and slowing down. (Admitted Fact ¶ 6; T1
20
at 26:7–19.)
21
3. Chavez applied his brakes, but upon doing so, the steering wheel locked up and
22
the postal truck began to hydroplane. (T1 at 26:12–20, 36:12–25.)
23
4. As Chavez lost control of his vehicle, the postal truck rear-ended Plaintiff’s
24 2012 Scion iQ2 door Hatchback, which was parked in a parking space outside of
25
26
1 To the extent that any findings of fact are included in the Conclusions of Law section, they
27
shall be deemed findings of fact. To the extent that any conclusions of law are included in the
1 Min’s Kitchen restaurant located at 1040 Foothill Boulevard. (Admitted Fact □□
2 5; Tl at 26:23-25, 36:25—40, 48:2—12, 49:11—20, 50:3-12.)
3 5. Plaintiff, then 49 years old, was sitting in the driver’s seat of his car with the
4 ignition off when the Accident occurred. (Admitted Fact §[f[ 2, 5; T1 at 50:13—
5 17.) Plaintiff was not wearing his seatbelt. (T1 at 50:4—9.)
6 6. The airbags of Plaintiff's car did not deploy; however, the force of the collision
7 pushed Plaintiff into the steering wheel, causing his left ribcage, left spine, and
g left hip region to come into contact with objects inside his car. (Ud. at 51:9-13,
9 52:2-3.)
10 7. After the Accident, Plaintiff exited his car from the driver’s side, inspected the
back of his car, and walked around it while taking photographs and a video of
11
the damage. (/d. at 40:14-41:4.)
12 8. The Accident caused visible damage to the back of Plaintiff's car, as depicted
13 .
below:
te ~ — : a J on a "
24
5 (Exs. 2-1, 2-2.)
26 9. The cost to repair the damage to Plaintiff's car was $4,464.44. (TI at 57:12-
20.)
27
28
sy
1 B. Plaintiff’s Pre-Accident Back and Neck Surgeries
2 10. Plaintiff had a history of back and neck surgeries prior to the Accident.
3 11. In 2004, Plaintiff had spinal decompression surgery at the L5-S1 level. (Id. at
4 177:25–178:2.)
12. In 2014, Plaintiff had a neck fusion surgery, also known as a cervical spinal
5
fusion. (Id. at 59:24–60:14, 100:17–20.)
6
C. Plaintiff’s Post-Accident Medical Care and Injuries
7
13. On the evening of December 8, 2019, the day of the Accident, Plaintiff visited
8
the emergency room at USC Verdugo Hills Hospital. (Id. at 98:10–13.) The
9
defense’s medical expert, Dr. Brian Rudin, testified that the medical report2
10
documenting this visit reflects that (i) Plaintiff complained of pain in his neck
11
and back at a severity level of five out of ten; (ii) Plaintiff reported having no
12
numbness, tingling, or radiating pain in his legs;3 (iii) Plaintiff’s physical exam
13
showed no neurologic problems; (iv) Plaintiff’s gait was normal; and (v) the
14
range of motion of Plaintiff’s spine was reported as “at his baseline” given his
15 history of back and neck surgeries. (Id. at 189:19–190:18.) Plaintiff testified at
16
17 2 This medical report was not admitted into evidence at trial. However, Dr. Brian Rudin
testified that he reviewed this report and relied on its contents in reaching his opinions about
18 Plaintiff’s injuries, and so the Court permitted Dr. Rudin to describe the contents of this report on
which he relied. (T1 at 187:15–189:13.) To the extent that Plaintiff’s counsel disputed the
19
accuracy of Dr. Rudin’s account of the report’s contents, the Court permitted Plaintiff’s counsel to
20 cross-examine Dr. Rudin on this issue. (Id. at 189:11–18.)
3 On cross-examination of Dr. Rudin, Plaintiff’s counsel suggested that the language of the
21 medical report documenting this visit is ambiguous as to whether Plaintiff presented with
neurologic problems because the report, as read by Plaintiff’s counsel, states: “[Plaintiff] rates his
22 neck and lower back pain five out of ten in severity, not radiating, no modifying factors,
associated with numbness and tingling to bilateral toes, fingers, and back.” (Id. at 226:6–11.)
23
Plaintiff’s counsel noted that, due to the placement of the comma, one “could read” this statement
24 as indicating that Plaintiff “had associated numbness, tingling to the bilateral toes, fingers and
back.” (Id. at 226:23–25.) Dr. Rudin testified, however, that he read this statement as indicating
25 “no” to “all of the following.” (Id. at 226:13–11.) Dr. Rudin further noted that his reading was
consistent with “the rest” of the medical report, which indicated that Plaintiff’s “neurological
26 exam was completely normal” and that Plaintiff’s gait was “normal” as well. (Id. at 227:3–6.) As
Plaintiff’s counsel did not dispute the accuracy of the rest of the report’s contents as recounted by
27
Dr. Rudin and presented no expert testimony to contradict Dr. Rudin’s interpretation of this report,
1 trial, however, that he had started to experience pain, tingling, numbness, and
2 weakness in his left leg before he visited the emergency room and that he was
3 not “walking normally” when he went there. (Id. at 58:1–7, 98:15–18.)
4 14. On December 27, 2019, Plaintiff had an MRI scan of his lumber spine. (Ex. 18-
11; T1 at 181:11–25.)
5
15. Plaintiff later scheduled a consultation with Dr. Jason Berkley, who referred
6
Plaintiff to Dr. Gabriel Hunt, a neurosurgeon at Cedars Sinai. (T1 at 60:24–
7
61:12).
8
16. Sometime in mid-January of 2020, Plaintiff visited Dr. Hunt and complained of
9
severe left leg pain with persistent numbness radiating down into his left calf
10
and anterior shin. (Id. at 61:2–13, 196:1–8.)
11
17. Since the Accident, Plaintiff has had four surgical procedures on his back,
12
several epidural injections, and a sacroiliac joint injection—all aimed at
13
relieving the pain in his back and the neurologic symptoms he was experiencing
14
in his left leg. (Id. at 103:22–105:22.)
15 18. Dr. Hunt performed the first three of Plaintiff’s post-Accident surgical
16 procedures, which were covered by Plaintiff’s private health insurance. (Id. at
17 104:13–105:9.) First, on January 22, 2020, Plaintiff had a microdiscectomy at
18 L4-L5. (Id. at 61:16–24, 104:10–105:22.) Second, on October 9, 2020, Plaintiff
19 had another microdiscectomy, this time at L4-5 and L5-S1. (Id. at 63:23–64:7,
20 104:10–105:22.) Third, on November 10, 2021, Plaintiff had a spinal fusion
21 procedure at L4-5 and L5-S1. (Id. at 203:21–25.) Although Plaintiff
22 experienced some temporary relief from his symptoms following these
23 procedures, the pain, numbness, and tingling in his left leg eventually returned
after each one. (Id. at 62:21–23, 64:14–18, 70:1–4.)
24
19. Following the third surgical procedure, Dr. Hunt told Plaintiff that there was
25
nothing more that could be done surgically to relieve Plaintiff’s pain. (Id. at
26
105:16–19.) Plaintiff then sought a consultation with a different neurosurgeon,
27
Dr. Andrew Fox. (Id. at 69:25–70:9.)
1 20. Per Dr. Fox’s recommendation, Plaintiff had a spinal decompression surgery on
2 November 9, 2022. (Id. at 70:10–23, 105:20–21.) Plaintiff underwent this
3 fourth post-Accident surgical procedure on a lien basis, as his private health
4 insurance was cancelled at the time. (Id. at 73:9–15, 105:4–9.) After
undergoing this spinal decompression surgery, Plaintiff felt “50 percent” relief
5
from his symptoms. (Id. at 72:1–3.)
6
21. Plaintiff testified that his quality of life is far worse now than it was before the
7
Accident. (Id. at 78:18–23.) Plaintiff testified that he had no neck pain and no
8
numbness, pain, or weakness in his left leg the day before the Accident. (Id. at
9
85:5–10.) Plaintiff explained that he still suffers from chronic back and left leg
10
pain and that simple daily tasks, such as breathing, eating, walking, and driving,
11
cause him pain. (Id. at 78:18–23.)
12
22. Plaintiff also testified that the Accident and his chronic pain have affected his
13
relationship with his wife and have hindered his ability to engage in certain
14
hobbies, including camping, playing sports with his kids, and traveling. (Id. at
15
78:20–79:23, 81:17–82:25.)
16 D. Expert Witness Testimony
17 i. Defense Accident Reconstruction Expert Benjamin Molnar
18 23. Benjamin Molnar, an engineer with 9 years of experience specializing in vehicle
19 collision reconstruction, inspected Plaintiff’s car after it had been repaired,
20 examined an exemplar USPS postal truck, reviewed post-Accident photos of the
21 vehicles, and conducted impact configuration and simulation analyses of the
22 Accident. (Id. at 122:2–25, 139:1–12, 45:11–146:9.)
24. Molnar opined that the change in speed experienced by Plaintiff’s car at the
23
moment of impact was 6.9 to 7.7. miles per hour and that, as a result, Plaintiff’s
24
car was pushed forward approximately 3.7 feet. (Id. at 145:11–146:9.)
25
25. Molnar further opined that the impact experienced by Plaintiff’s car was
26
comparable to that of the “average amusement park bumper car ride.” (Id. at
27
146:21–23.)
1 26. The Court found Molnar’s testimony credible and reasonably supported, as it
2 was based on his extensive knowledge and experience in accident
3 reconstruction, his investigation of the Accident, and several peer-reviewed
4 articles that measured the accelerations of amusement park bumper car
collisions. (Id. at 122:2–25, 146:16–23.)
5
27. Plaintiff presented no expert testimony to rebut Molnar’s opinions.
6
ii. Defense Medical Expert Dr. Brian Rudin
7
28. In May of 2024, Dr. Brian Rudin, a board-certified orthopedic spine surgeon,
8
reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and personally examined Plaintiff. (Id. at
9
167:3–22, 208:13–16.)
10
29. Based on his review of Plaintiff’s pre- and post-Accident imaging, Dr. Rudin
11
opined that Plaintiff has suffered from chronic degenerative disease for
12
approximately the past 20 years. (Id. at 177:3–8, 183:21–25, 214:4–6.)
13
Degenerative disc disease causes the discs between spinal vertebrae to
14
degenerate over time. (Id. at 170:3–18.) Disc bulges and disc herniations,
15 including spontaneous herniations, are associated with degenerative disc disease.
16 (Id. at 171:7–12.)
17 30. Dr. Rudin also opined that Plaintiff suffered from spinal stenosis prior to the
18 Accident. (Id. at 205:19–21.) Spinal stenosis is a condition where bone spurs
19 grow toward the spinal canal and squeeze the nerves, which can cause pain
20 down the legs. (Id. at 172:12–17.)
21 31. Dr. Rudin testified that typical symptoms of a person with degenerative disc
22 disease and spinal stenosis include back pain with radiating pain down the legs,
and that this pain may wax and wane or switch sides, depending on the
23
pathology. (Id. at 173:1–5.)
24
32. Dr. Rudin testified that Plaintiff’s post-Accident imaging indicates that Plaintiff
25
has “extensive degeneration for someone in their late 40s, early 50s,” as nearly
26
all of Plaintiff’s spinal discs showed a significant loss of disc height and almost
27
1 every level of Plaintiff’s spine had bone spurs. (Id. at 176:6–23, 177:14–25,
2 180:11–21.)
3 33. Dr. Rudin opined that the Accident could not have caused the level of
4 degeneration reflected in Plaintiff’s post-Accident imaging; rather, he opined
that this level of degeneration occurred over the course of 10 to 20 years—
5
though 20 years seemed more likely given that Plaintiff had a herniated disc at
6
the L5-S1 level back in 2004. (Id. at 183:18–25.)
7
34. Dr. Rudin opined that Plaintiff’s post-Accident disc herniation, which his first
8
post-Accident surgical procedure aimed to address, was caused by Plaintiff’s
9
chronic disc degeneration and stenosis, not any acute trauma. (Id. at 190:16–
10
192:12.) Dr. Rudin explained that when someone has an acute disc herniation,
11
they will typically experience immediate nerve pain (including radiating pain
12
down the legs) and will usually have antalgic gait. (Id. at 190:25–191:7.)
13
Dr. Rudin testified that, by contrast, the medical report of Plaintiff’s emergency
14
room visit several hours after the Accident reflects that Plaintiff did not
15
complain of leg pain, had no neurologic symptoms, and had a normal gait. (Id.
16 at 191:8–192:19.) Dr. Rudin testified, based on his review of Plaintiff’s post-
17 Accident medical records, that the first time Plaintiff reported having leg pain to
18 a medical professional was in mid-January of 2020, when Plaintiff went to visit
19 Dr. Hunt. (Id. at 61:2–13, 196:1–8.) Dr. Rudin opined that this 5-week delay
20 between the Accident and the onset of Plaintiff’s leg pain is inconsistent with an
21 acute disc herniation and instead indicates that Plaintiff’s post-Accident leg pain
22 was caused by his chronic disc degeneration disease. (Id. at 196:3–19.) Further,
23 Dr. Rudin opined that Plaintiff’s post-accident imaging is more consistent with
chronic degenerative disc disease than an acute herniation because it shows that
24
Plaintiff’s herniation bulges “primarily in the center,” whereas acute herniations
25
“are almost all one-sided.” (Id. at 192:2–12.)
26
35. Dr. Rudin testified that Plaintiff’s 2024 medical imaging of his spine show a
27
new herniation that was not present on a previous 2022 image. (Id. at 209:1–
1 23.) Dr. Rudin opined that this spontaneous herniation further evinces that
2 Plaintiff has chronic degenerative disc disease.
3 36. Finally, Dr. Rudin opined that, while the Accident did not cause Plaintiff to
4 develop any disc herniations or bulges, the Accident did likely cause Plaintiff to
suffer a soft tissue strain in his lower back, which caused pain in Plaintiff’s back
5
and neck. (Id. at 192:13–193:8, 214:2–15.) Dr. Rudin testified that surgeries
6
and epidural injections would not be recommended treatment for this type of
7
injury; rather, a soft tissue strain would typically resolve on its own with time
8
and would be treated with anti-inflammatory medicines and/or physical or
9
chiropractic therapy. (Id. at 192:20–193:8.)
10
37. On cross examination, Dr. Rudin acknowledged that he has seen patients with
11
acute disc herniation present with “delayed onset of radicular complaints,” but
12
explained that this “happens rarely” and is “very atypical.” (Id. at 222:19–23.)
13
38. The Court found Dr. Rudin’s testimony and opinions credible and reasonably
14
supported, as they were based on his experience as an orthopedic surgeon and
15
knowledge of the field, review of Plaintiff’s pre-and post-Accident medical
16 records and imaging, and examination of Plaintiff. Dr. Rudin’s concessions that
17 the Accident likely caused Plaintiff to suffer a soft tissue sprain in his back and
18 that it is possible, though highly unlikely, for a patient with acute disc herniation
19 to present with delayed onset of radiating pain strengthened Dr. Rudin’s
20 credibility. The Court also found that Dr. Rudin’s opinions stayed consistent
21 throughout direct and cross-examination.
22 39. Plaintiff presented no medical expert testimony at trial to rebut Dr. Rudin’s
23 opinions.
E. Credibility Concerns with Plaintiff’s Testimony
24
40. The Court found credibility issues with Plaintiff’s testimony that undermine the
25
weight of his subjective complaints.
26
41. A particularly striking example is that Plaintiff testified on direct examination
27
that he had not been involved in “any car crashes” between 2008 and December
1 8, 2019, the date of the Accident, yet Plaintiff conceded on cross-examination
2 that he had been involved in another motor vehicle accident on April 1, 2019.
3 (Id. at 85:19–21, 112:9–113:22.) This prior accident occurred while Plaintiff
4 was driving his son’s truck in Pismo Beach. (Id.) Plaintiff described it as a
“little” accident where he drove into a “little” culvert after swerving to avoid a
5
deer. (Id. at 109:22–110:2.) On further examination and when confronted with
6
insurance records, Plaintiff acknowledged that his son’s truck was in the body
7
shop for three to four months and was ultimately declared a total loss as a result
8
of the accident, with the cost of repairs estimated at about $39,000. (Id. at
9
112:15–22; 115:9–18.) Further eroding the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony is
10
that, when Plaintiff was asked on cross-examination why he neither informed his
11
treating physicians (i.e., Dr. Hunt and Dr. Fox) about the April 1, 2019 motor
12
vehicle accident nor disclosed it to defense counsel during his deposition on
13
May 9, 2024, Plaintiff stated that the prior accident “completely slipped [his]
14
mind.” (Id. at 113:12–16.)
15 42. There were also inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony as to when he began to
16 experience certain symptoms and the extent to which his post-Accident injuries
17 have affected his ability to participate in certain activities. For instance, as
18 noted above, Plaintiff testified at trial that he was experiencing pain, tingling,
19 and numbness in his left leg and was not “walking normally” when he went to
20 USC Verdugo Hills Hospital’s emergency room on the evening of the Accident.
21 (Id. at 57:25–58:9, 98:15–19.) But during his deposition on May 9, 2024,
22 Plaintiff testified under oath that his “walking was okay” and “normal” when he
23 went to USC Verdugo Hospital’s emergency room. (Id. at 99:19–100:10.)
Moreover, Plaintiff testified at trial on direct examination that (1) aside from
24
taking separate trips to Germany, North Carolina, and Miami, he had not
25
traveled since the Accident and (2) he has had difficulty driving since the
26
Accident, noting that it “hurts [his back] to touch the accelerator or the brake
27
pedal.” (Id. at 81:17–83:20, 106:12–22.) Yet Plaintiff admitted on cross-
1 examination that, in 2021, he drove a mobile home to Phoenix, Arizona to attend
2 a music festival; this trip entailed a 7-hour drive. (Id. at 106:12–108:4.)
3 43. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s credibility is undermined.
4 Thus, as a general matter, the Court attributes less weight to Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints. However, to the extent that Plaintiff’s subjective
5
complaints conflict with the credible testimony of Dr. Rudin and are
6
unsupported by any evidence other than Plaintiff’s own testimony—e.g.,
7
Plaintiff’s testimony that he was experiencing pain, tingling, and numbness in
8
his left leg and was not walking normally when he went to the emergency room
9
on the evening of the Accident—the Court concludes that such complaints lack
10
veracity and therefore gives them no weight.
11
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
12
A. Liability
13
43. Plaintiff asserts a single claim for violation of the FTCA alleging that Chavez
14
negligently operated his vehicle, resulting in Plaintiff’s injuries. (Compl., Doc.
15 1.)
16 44. Under the FTCA, “district courts … have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
17 or claims against the United States … for … personal injury … caused by the
18 negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
19 acting in the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Here,
20 Chavez was a government employee acting within the scope of his employment
21 with the USPS when his postal truck rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle.
22 45. To establish negligence under California law,4 Plaintiff must prove “(a) a legal
duty to use due care, (b) a breach of that duty, and (c) that the breach was the
23
proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Ladd v. Cty. of San Mateo, 12
24
Cal. 4th 913, 917 (1996) (cleaned up).
25
26
27
4 Because the Accident occurred in California, California law governs Plaintiff’s claim.
1 i. Duty and Breach of Duty
2 46. The Court concludes—and Defendant does not dispute—that Chavez owed
3 Plaintiff a duty of care and breached that duty. Chavez had a duty to use
4 ordinary care in the operation of his postal truck. See Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery
Co., 51 Cal. 4th 764, 771 (2011) (“[E]ach person has a duty to use ordinary care
5
and ‘is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
6
circumstances.’”) (citation omitted). Moreover, the undisputed facts of this
7
case, showing among other things that Plaintiff’s vehicle was parked when it
8
was rear-ended by Chavez’s postal truck, are amply sufficient to justify the
9
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and consequently a presumption of
10
negligence that Defendant bears the burden to rebut. See Beck v. Kessler, 235
11
Cal. App. 2d 331, 337 (1965) (“Particularly in those situations where the rear car
12
has collided with a stopped or stationary vehicle, the courts have applied the
13
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and have held that an inference arises that the
14
collision was caused by some negligent conduct on the part of the driver of the
15
rear car, which the latter was thereupon required to rebut.”); see also Gagosian
16 v. Burdick’s Television & Appliances 254 Cal. App. 2d 316, 318 (1967) (“The
17 doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies unconditionally, or ‘as a matter of law,’
18 when undisputed evidence establishes that plaintiff’s car was stationary when
19 struck from behind by defendants’ vehicle[.]”). Defendant, having presented no
20 argument that Chavez was exercising ordinary care when the accident occurred,
21 has failed to rebut the presumption that Chavez was negligently operating his
22 postal truck. See Slappey v. Schiller, 116 Cal. App. 274, 277 (1931) (explaining
23 that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “raises a presumption of the defendant’s
negligence, and casts upon the defendant the burden of showing that ordinary
24
25
26
27
1 care was exercised”) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff has established that
2 Chavez breached the duty of care he owed to Plaintiff.
3 ii. Causation
4 47. “Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a causal connection
between [Chavez’s] negligence and [his] injuries.” Pedroza v. United States,
5
2021 WL 4441974, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2021) (citing Mitchell v. Gonzales,
6
54 Cal. 3d 1041, 1052 (1991), and Skinner v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 37
7
Cal. App. 4th 31, 42 (1995)).
8
48. “Causation is established for purposes of California tort law if the defendant’s
9
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injury.” Liberty
10
Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Ledesma & Meyer Constr. Co., 5 Cal. 5th 216, 223 (2018),
11
as modified (July 25, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
49. “A tortfeasor must take a plaintiff as []he is—even if, by reason of some
13
preexisting condition, the plaintiff is more susceptible to injury than an ordinary
14
person and incurred more harm because of the defendant’s conduct than an
15
ordinary person would.” Id. (citing Rideau v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 124
16 Cal.App.2d 466, 471 (1954)). However, “[a] tortfeasor is not liable for a
17 plaintiff’s pre-existing conditions or the natural progression of those
18 conditions.” Lewis v. United States, 2017 WL 2311874, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May
19 24, 2017) (citing Whyatt v. Kukura, 157 Cal. App. 2d 803, 805 (1958), and
20 Carruthers v. Cunha, 133 Cal. App. 2d 91, 96 (1955)). Thus, the burden is on
21 the plaintiff to prove that it is more likely than not “that his damages were
22 caused by the tort and would not have occurred anyway because of his pre-
23 existing conditions.” Id. (citation omitted).
50. The Court concludes that Chavez’s negligence was a substantial factor in
24
causing some, but not all, of Plaintiff’s claimed injuries.
25
51. The evidence establishes that Chavez’s negligence was a substantial factor in
26
causing damage to the back of Plaintiff’s 2012 Scion iQ2 door Hatchback. (T1
27
at 57:12–20.)
1 52. The evidence also establishes that Chavez’s negligence was a substantial factor
2 in causing Plaintiff to suffer a low back strain, which caused pain in his back
3 and neck. (Id. at 192:13–193:8, 214:2–15.)
4 53. However, Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof in establishing that any
other injuries he experienced after the Accident—i.e., his herniated spinal discs
5
and bulges, spinal degeneration, and any neurologic issues or pain arising
6
therefrom—were caused by Chavez’s negligence, let alone that Chavez’s
7
negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about such injuries. As
8
explained in detail in the Findings of Fact section above, Dr. Rudin opined—
9
based on his review of Plaintiff’s pre- and post-Accident medical imaging, his
10
review of Plaintiff’s medical reports, and his examination of Plaintiff—that
11
Plaintiff’s post-Accident herniated spinal discs and bulges and spinal
12
degeneration were caused by Plaintiff’s pre-existing chronic disc degeneration
13
disease and spinal stenosis. (Id. at 176:15–23, 177:14–178:2, 180:11–21,
14
183:18–25, 190:16–192:12, 196:3–19, 209:12–23.) Dr. Rudin further opined
15
that it is highly unlikely that the Accident caused Plaintiff to suffer from an
16 acute disc herniation, because the medical report from Plaintiff’s emergency
17 room visit several hours after the Accident shows that Plaintiff had no
18 neurologic issues and normal gait, and because Plaintiff’s post-Accident medical
19 imaging is more consistent with chronic degenerative disease than acute disc
20 herniation. (Id. at 174:23–175:6, 190:16–192:12.) Lastly, Dr. Rudin opined that
21 the low back strain caused by the Accident would likely have resolved on its
22 own within a number of weeks, and that neither spinal surgeries nor epidural
23 injections would have been recommended as treatment for a low back strain.
(Id. at 192:13–193:2.) Plaintiff presented no medical expert testimony to rebut
24
Dr. Rudin’s opinions, and, for the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact
25
section, the Court found Dr. Rudin’s opinions to be both credible and reasonably
26
supported. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to establish by a preponderance of the
27
evidence that his post-Accident back injuries—with the exception of his low
1 back strain and any pain arising therefrom—were caused by Chavez’s
2 negligence.
3 B. Damages
4 i. Property Damage
53. Plaintiff has proven that he is entitled to recover the cost to repair the damage to
5
his 2012 Scion iQ2 door Hatchback caused by the Accident, which amounts to
6
$4,464.44. (T1 at 57:12–20.)
7
ii. Economic Damages: Past Medical Expenses
8
54. California law permits a plaintiff to recover for past medical expenses that were
9
both actually incurred and reasonable. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions,
10
Inc., 52 Cal. 4th 541, 555 (2011). “To recover for past medical expenses, a
11
plaintiff must prove: (1) the amount of each expense; (2) that each of the charges
12
was reasonable; (3) that each of the services was actually given, and was
13
reasonably necessary to diagnose and treat the injuries; and (4) that the condition
14
which necessitated the treatment was the legal result of the injury caused by the
15 defendant.” Peltier v. United States, 2017 WL 4621544, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
16 16, 2017) (citing Ochoa v. Dorado, 228 Cal. App. 4th 120, 137 (2014)).
17 55. Plaintiff seeks $360,000 in past medical expenses—the amount that Plaintiff
18 purportedly owes in medical bills for the fourth post-Accident spinal surgery
19 that he underwent on a lien basis. (T1 at 74:12–14; P’s Proposed Findings of
20 Fact and Conclusions of Law at 22.)
21 56. Because Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
22 spinal injuries warranting his post-Accident spinal surgeries were caused by
Chavez’s negligence, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover past medical expenses he
23
incurred in undergoing those surgeries.5 See Peltier, 2017 WL 4621544, at *4.
24
25
5 The Court also notes that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that $360,000 is a
26 reasonable amount for the services rendered while he was uninsured. While the amount billed by
a medical provider is relevant to this inquiry, a “medical care provider’s billed price for particular
27
services is not necessarily representative of either the cost of providing those services or their
1 57. As to the injuries that were caused by the Accident—i.e., Plaintiff’s low back
2 strain and pain arising therefrom—Dr. Rudin opined that these injuries likely
3 would have resolved on their own within a number of weeks after the Accident.
4 (T1 at 192:13–193:2). Plaintiff has presented no evidence or argument
indicating that he incurred any medical expenses attributable to these injuries.
5
58. Accordingly, the Court declines to award Plaintiff past medical expenses.
6
iii. Economic Damages: Future Medical Expenses
7
59. A plaintiff may recover future medical expenses if he establishes “that from all
8
the evidence, including the expert testimony, if there be any, it satisfactorily
9
appears that such disability will occur with reasonable certainty.” Garcia v.
10
Duro Dyne Corp., 156 Cal. App. 4th 92, 97–98 (2007). “Future damages should
11
not be awarded if they are speculative.” Cantu v. United States, 2015 WL
12
4720580, at *28 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3283).
13
60. The Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff may need medical care in the future,
14
it is speculative and not causally related to the accident. Indeed, even Plaintiff’s
15 post-trial submission describes his need for future treatment as “uncertain[].”
16 (Pl’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 23.) Therefore,
17 Plaintiff is not entitled to damages for future medical expenses.
18 iv. Non-Economic Damages
19 61. “In California, a plaintiff who has established liability may recover
20 noneconomic damages for a wide variety of harms, including emotional distress
21 and pain and suffering, which may include not only physical pain but also
22 ‘fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation,
indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal.’” Seferaj v. United
23
States, 2023 WL 5530026, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2023) (quoting Capelouto
24
25
market value.” Ochoa, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 135. “The uninsured plaintiff also must present
26 additional evidence, generally in the form of expert opinion testimony, to establish that the amount
billed is a reasonable value for the service rendered.” Pebley v. Santa Clara Organics, LLC, 22
27
Cal. App. 5th 1266, 1275 (2018). Here, Plaintiff has presented no expert testimony or other
1 v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892–93 (1972)). The test for
2 determining noneconomic damages “is one of reasonable compensation.”
3 Hilliard v. A. H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 374, 412 (1983). A plaintiff may
4 recover for future noneconomic damages that are reasonably certain to occur.
5
Garcia v. Duro Dyne Corp., 156 Cal. App. 4th 92, 97 (2007).
62. The Court finds Plaintiff’s proposal of $3,140,000 in past non-economic
6
damages to be excessive and unsupported. (Pl’s Proposed Findings of Fact and
7
Conclusions of Law at 22.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages
8
for the pain and suffering attributable to the low back strain he suffered due to
9
Chavez’s negligence. Although this soft tissue injury likely resolved within a
10
number of weeks after the Accident, Plaintiff testified that the pain he
11
experienced during those weeks prevented him from engaging in certain
12
activities, affected his relationship with his wife, and caused him emotional
13
distress. (T1 at 78:18–23, 192:13–193:2). Having considered the evidence
14
presented, and having reviewed other cases as benchmarks,6 the Court concludes
15 that $15,000 is a reasonable amount for past non-economic damages in this case.
16 63. Lastly, the Court declines to award Plaintiff future non-economic damages, as
17 any award of future non-economic damages would be speculative and
18 unsupported.
19 IV. CONCLUSION
20 For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s damages include
21 $4,464.44 in property damages and $15,000 in past non-economic damages, for a total of
22
6 See, e.g., Peltier, 2017 WL 4621544, at *2, 5 (awarding $2,500 in non-economic damages
23
for back pain, suffering, and anxiety stemming from minor rear-end collision); Seferaj, 2023 WL
24 5530026, at *6 (awarding $18,000 in non-economic damages for back, neck, and leg pain that had
continued several years after an accident where a postal truck struck plaintiff’s driver door and
25 injured Plaintiff); Madrigal v. United States, 2021 WL 3589328, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021)
(awarding $40,000 in non-economic damages for pain, suffering, and loss of ability to hike or
26 travel as plaintiff did before the accident, which exacerbated plaintiff’s pre-existing spinal
injuries); Cantu, 2015 WL 4720580, at *2–5, 13–15, 36 (awarding $15,000 in non-economic
27
damages for past mild back, neck, and shoulder pain stemming from a moderately severe collision
1 $19,464.44. The Court ORDERS the parties to prepare and submit a Proposed Judgment
2 consistent with this Order. The Proposed Judgment shall be submitted within seven (7)
3 days of the issuance of this Order.
4
5 DATED: May 20, 2025
JOSEPHINE L. STATON
6 _________________________________________
HON. JOSEPHINE L. STATON
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27