In Re countryman/morgan/smith Minors

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

May 21, 2025

2:59 PM

In re COUNTRYMAN/MORGAN/SMITH, Minors.

No. 371548

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2020-000316-NA

Before: WALLACE, P.J., and RICK and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother1 appeals as of right an order terminating her parental rights to the

minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to

exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody),

and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if the child is returned to the parent). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mother has three children: JDC, DDM, and KDS. In January 2020, Children’s Protective

Services (CPS) received a complaint relating to an injury suffered by KMB, who is mother’s 12-

year-old sister. At that time, mother was KMB’s guardian. The record indicates that KMB was

hospitalized for a severe burn. KMB is developmentally delayed. A CPS worker investigated. At

some point in February 2020, KMB reported that she burned herself after mother refused to “give

her cereal. . . .”

On March 3, 2020, the CPS worker made an unannounced visit to the house where mother

and the children were living, precipitated by mother’s refusal to return the worker’s telephone

calls. JDC, DDM, and the children’s 96-year-old grandmother, Freddie Smith, who also lived in

the home, were present. The CPS worker determined that mother had left Smith to care for JDC

and DDM, who were two and three years old at the time, respectively. KMB was at school. Mother

1

The children’s fathers are not parties to this appeal.

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and six-month-old KDS were not in the house. Smith suffers from dementia and has mobility

issues.

The CPS worker observed that JDC and DDM were in “completely soiled clothing” and

diapers. The home “was very dirty [and] messy[,]” smelled of urine, and was littered with holes

in the walls and ceiling. Freddie told Barnes that she fell at 10:00 a.m. that morning and could not

get up. Because KMB was at school, no one was in the house to assist Freddie or help care for the

children. Freddie reported that she had not eaten anything that day. When asked if DDM and JDC

had eaten, Freddie stated that “they fed themselves.” Given the children’s young ages, the CPS

worker did not believe this was possible. The CPS worker spoke to mother over the telephone and

asked her to return home. In response to this, mother threatened the worker, who then called the

police.

Mother eventually arrived at the home with KDS. She admitted to the CPS worker that

she had not been home since Sunday, March 1, 2020. Mother gave inconsistent statements about

her and KDS’s whereabouts during that time. The CPS worker attempted to locate a relative to

care for the children and KMB, but was unsuccessful. The children were ultimately taken into

custody by law enforcement. Law enforcement also contacted adult protective services on Smith’s

behalf.

That same day, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), filed a

petition for the children’s removal, alleging that mother’s housing was unsuitable for children and

that she failed to properly care for and supervise the children.2 DHHS requested that the trial court

authorize the petition, place the children in DHHS’s care, and exercise jurisdiction. The court

entered an ex parte order removing the children from mother’s care and placing them with DHHS.

The children were thereafter placed in a nonrelative foster home. They remained in foster care for

the duration of the proceedings. The petition was later amended. After a preliminary hearing, the

trial court authorized the amended petition. Mother was granted parenting time.

In June 2020, following a bench trial, the court exercised jurisdiction. The court ordered

reasonable efforts toward reunification be made. After the initial dispositional hearing, mother

was ordered to comply with and benefit from a case service plan (CSP). The CSP required mother

to (1) complete a psychological evaluation; (2) participate in infant mental health (IMH) services;

(3) obtain and maintain suitable housing and a legal income; (4) remain in contact with

caseworkers; and (5) attend parenting time. The court also ordered mother to submit to a

psychological evaluation to better determine her needs. Mother did so, and was later referred to

virtual individual therapy, online parenting classes, and parent-partner services. Mother’s progress

was limited, and she often failed to attend parenting time.

In January 2022, DHHS filed a supplemental petition for termination of mother’s parental

rights. In relevant part, the petition alleged that the children were taken into care because of

unsuitable housing and improper supervision. The petition further alleged that mother failed to

make progress on her CSP and failed to resolve her issues with housing and parenting skills. The

2

A petition was also filed concerning KMB, who was placed in Children’s Village, a residential

care facility. Mother’s guardianship over KMB later “lapsed” and terminated.

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petition indicated that mother lacked legal income. It stated that termination was in the children’s

best interests.

At the June 2022 termination hearing, a caseworker testified about mother’s lack of

sufficient progress. The worker noted that mother had completed a parenting class, a

psychological evaluation, and participated in individual therapy, but failed to complete the IMH

services, despite being referred five times. The caseworker was unsure whether mother’s housing

was suitable for children, stating that mother was currently living in a home with an unidentified

“friend” and that the home had yet to be assessed. As for income, mother told the caseworker that

a health condition rendered her unable to work. Mother further informed the caseworker that she

applied for disability benefits and was awaiting the decision.

Over the course of the proceedings, mother participated in 124 parenting time sessions, 73

of which were virtual. She failed to attend 109 sessions. DHHS provided mother with

transportation, but mother failed to meet the transportation worker outside the home on 15

occasions. Mother was required to confirm her parenting time appointments by 10:30 a.m., and

again by 2:00 p.m., on the day of the parenting time, but sometimes failed to do so, resulting in

parenting time being canceled. The caseworker indicated that, prior to offering direct

transportation, DHHS also provided mother with gas cards and bus tickets in an effort to help with

her transportation issues. Mother reported that she was unable to ride the bus because of “her

physical problems.” The caseworker indicated that mother had an unidentified issue with her

kidneys, but testified that she did not know why mother’s health issues prevented her from riding

the bus. She was likewise unsure of whether mother’s health issues would inhibit her ability to

parent.

The caseworker testified that mother was not bonded with the children and opined that

termination was in their best interests. The caseworker explained that the children had been in the

same foster care placement for most of the prior two years and that the foster parents were willing

to adopt them. The caseworker also testified that she observed mother and the children during a

parenting time. She agreed that the children “engaged” with mother, but noted that JDC and KDS

often tried to run out of the room.

The referee declined to terminate mother’s parental rights, noting that mother participated

in individual therapy and completed a parenting class, indicating that she had made some progress

toward reunification. The referee expressed concern that mother had not been provided adequate

assistance relating to housing. The referee further stated that he wanted to know “exactly what is

wrong health-wise, what are the conditions or whatever, what are the ailments, but there was no

documentation presented by either side as to what these issues were.” He indicated that mother

would only be granted “a short period of time to prove that she’s going to try to get her act

together.” The referee noted that mother required assistance with getting disability benefits,

attending parenting time, and “reestablishing a bond with the kids . . . .” Mother was instructed to

be ready to leave when the DHHS transporter arrived at her home for parenting time. Following

the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying DHHS’s petition to terminate mother’s

parental rights.

In January 2023, DHHS filed a second supplemental petition for termination of mother’s

parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). In relevant part, DHHS alleged

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that the children were taken into care because of unsuitable housing and improper supervision.

DHHS alleged that mother failed to make progress on her CSP and failed to resolve her issues with

housing and parenting skills. It was further alleged that mother lacked legal income and that

termination was in the children’s best interests.

After a series of scheduling issues, the termination hearing was held on March 26, 2024,

and May 1, 2024. Mother did not appear on either date. The referee heard extensive testimony

from the children’s foster care caseworker. The caseworker testified that mother was sporadically

employed and failed to provide documentation showing proof of employment. DHHS offered her

assistance with finding employment through Michigan Works, but mother never found a steady

job. Her housing situation was equally concerning. According to the caseworker, mother had

moved back to the home in Detroit from which the children were originally removed. The

caseworker stated that the home was assessed in March 2024 and was found unsuitable for

children. Specifically, the house was “still deplorable.” It had “safety risks” because of exposed

wires. The foundation of the home was rotting. The house also did not have beds for the children.

The caseworker testified that mother was given housing resources, but mother failed to meet with

a caseworker for help filling out housing applications, despite being given the opportunity.

Mother additionally failed to consistently participate in therapy or parenting time. She was

first terminated from individual therapy in May 2022, and was re-referred for individual therapy

seven times after that. Mother was last referred in March 2024, and was not participating in

therapy at the time of the termination hearing. Mother was additionally referred for IMH services

in August 2020 but failed to comply with those services. She was terminated from the program in

June 2021. Mother was re-referred to IMH services five more times during the proceedings, but

was always terminated from the service because she failed to comply with certain requirements.

With respect to parenting time, mother was offered two in-person parenting time sessions each

week. Throughout the case, mother was offered 366 parenting time sessions. Mother failed to

attend 184 sessions. Mother was never able to exercise unsupervised parenting time during the

pendency of the proceedings.

The caseworker testified that mother had not demonstrated an ability to parent the children

and keep them safe. He described parenting time sessions as chaotic, with the children constantly

acting out. Mother attempted to redirect the children, who did not take these attempts seriously.

Mother additionally (1) failed to have activities planned for parenting time; (2) rarely brought

things, such as food and toys, to parenting time; (3) did not read to the children; and (4) did not do

“anything of meaning” with the children. She also failed to comfort the children when they cried,

and rarely showed them affection. When mother was “present,” she failed to “demonstrate any

basic parenting skills.” The caseworker indicated that mother had completed a parenting class,

but had not benefited from it.

The caseworker did not believe the children were bonded with mother. The children would

act out when they had to attend parenting time, including crying and asking for their foster parents.

The children referred to the foster mother as “mommy,” and the foster residence as “home.” They

referred to mother, in part, by her legal first name. Mother tried to correct the children and inform

them they only had one mother. According to the caseworker, this was “confusing for kids their

age.”

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The caseworker acknowledged that mother had issues with transportation. However, he

testified that she was provided with bus tickets and gas cards during the proceedings. Mother was

also offered transportation through Uber. At times during the proceedings, caseworkers from

DHHS transported mother to and from parenting time. However, she was often unresponsive when

issues would come up with regard to parenting time.

The caseworker additionally testified that all three children had significant health issues

that would require treatment. Despite knowing about these issues and being invited to participate

in the children’s care, mother never got involved and did not attend medical appointments. The

foster parents appeared willing and able to care for the children, while mother did not. The

caseworker did not believe that mother would demonstrate improvement within a reasonable time.

He believed the children would be at risk of harm if returned to her care.

Following the close of testimony, the referee found that reasonable efforts toward

reunification had been made, but that statutory grounds for termination existed under

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). The referee further concluded that termination of

mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The trial court thereafter entered an

order terminating mother’s parental rights. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. REASONABLE EFFORTS

Mother first argues that she was entitled to enhanced protections under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., and that DHHS failed to accommodate her. As a

result, she argues that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification. We

disagree.

“We review for clear error the trial court’s factual finding that [DHHS] made reasonable

efforts to reunify [a] respondent[] with the child.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 338; 990

NW2d 685 (2022). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special

opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

Generally, DHHS “has a statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and

the family. . . .” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 338 (quotation marks and citation omitted), citing

MCL 712A.19a(2). There is likewise “a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents

to participate in the services that are offered,” and to benefit from them. Id. at 339 (quotation

marks and citation omitted). “If a parent cannot or will not meet her irreducible minimum parental

responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over the needs of the parent.” In re Terry, 240

Mich App 14, 28; 610 NW2d 563 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Title II of the ADA requires that ‘no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.’ ”

In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 86; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), quoting 42 USC 12132. If a parent

suffers from a disability under the ADA, DHHS must “modify its standard procedures in ways that

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are reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under the ADA.” Id. “[E]fforts at

reunification cannot be reasonable . . . if the [DHHS] has failed to modify its standard procedures

in ways that are reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under the ADA.” Id. However,

DHHS cannot be required to provide reasonable accommodations for a disability of which it is

unaware. Id. at 87.

In this case, mother argues that she was not provided with appropriate services to address

barriers to reunification, even though DHHS was aware she had issues with her kidneys. Mother

alleges that her health issues impeded her ability to participate in services, locate housing, and

secure employment. However, mother never provided DHHS with medical documentation of (1)

her alleged disability; (2) the limitations caused by the alleged disability; or (3) accommodations

she required. DHHS was made aware, at different points during the proceedings, that mother had

kidney issues requiring her to take medication. Mother also implied that she was fatigued, had

limited mobility, and could not ride the bus because of her kidney issues. However, aside from

mother’s vague assertions, there is no record evidence to support the claim that she suffered from

a cognizable disability under the ADA requiring accommodations and “services designed to

facilitate the child[ren’s] return to [mother’s] home. . . .” See In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 86.

While mother failed to provide DHHS medical documentation confirming an alleged

disability, DHHS nonetheless took steps to accommodate mother as best it could. Mother was

offered virtual parenting time, virtual parenting classes, and virtual individual therapy. Mother

was terminated from individual therapy for failure to comply, and she was re-referred to the service

several times. Despite DHHS’s continued attempts to get mother engaged in therapy, mother

either did not comply or show a benefit from therapy. And while mother completed virtual

parenting classes, she failed to benefit from them, as evidenced by a lack of demonstrable parenting

skills during parenting time. Mother was also repeatedly referred to IMH services and to a parent-

partner service during the proceedings, to no avail.

Beyond that, mother was offered bus passes and gas cards to assist her with transportation

to services and to parenting time. DHHS mailed the bus passes to mother on at least two occasions.

When the bus passes and gas cards proved to be unhelpful, DHHS offered mother direct

transportation to and from parenting time. Mother was required to confirm her attendance at

parenting time prior to a transporter being dispatched. When the transporter arrived at mother’s

home at the agreed-upon time, the transporter then alerted her. If mother did not get in the vehicle

within 15 minutes, the transporter left and parenting time was canceled. While mother repeatedly

complained that she was not provided adequate notice of the transporter’s arrival, mother’s

parenting time schedule did not vary. Mother was instructed to watch for the transporter,

beginning at 3:10 p.m., either from a window or the front porch, to ensure she was picked up in a

timely fashion. Nonetheless, mother often missed her pickup and failed to attend a significant

amount of parenting time. Additionally, caseworkers offered to transport mother to certain

locations to assist her with applying for employment and housing, but mother did not avail herself

of these offers.

Mother also implies on appeal that she suffers from a cognitive limitation or issues

communicating in a socially acceptable manner. But apart from a comment by a referee at the

June 2022 termination hearing, there is no indication that mother was cognitively impaired or had

significant mental health concerns. Additionally, the record demonstrates that DHHS provided

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services that comported with the recommendations in mother’s psychological evaluation, which

demonstrates that DHHS was responsive to mother’s needs.

Mother merely provides conclusory statements about the services she was provided and

how they were inappropriate given her alleged disabilities. This is insufficient to establish error.

See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 267; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (stating that it is not enough for

a parent to simply deny “that the services offered were sufficient in light of her intellectual

disability, without identifying any services that would have been appropriate in light of such

disability or how the services that were offered were deficient”). Despite the efforts made by

DHHS to accommodate her, mother still failed to benefit from the services offered during the four-

year proceedings. In short, mother failed to uphold her “commensurate responsibility” to engage

in and benefit from the services offered by DHHS. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 339.

Contrary to mother’s arguments on appeal, there is no indication that she would have fared better

if DHHS had offered other services or accommodations to assist her. See In re Fried, 266 Mich

App 535, 543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). The trial court did not clearly err by finding that DHHS

made reasonable efforts toward reunification, and that mother was provided with adequate services

and accommodations to aid in reunification.

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Mother next argues her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request ADA

accommodations and by failing to ensure that DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reunification.

We disagree.

Mother did not take steps to preserve her ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and

instead raises the issue for the first time on appeal. See People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829

NW2d 266 (2012); People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 227; 966 NW2d 437 (2020).3

The argument is unpreserved, and our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People

v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). Claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel are mixed questions of fact and law. In re Casto, 344 Mich App 590, 610; 2 NW3d 102

(2022). This Court “review[s] for clear error a trial court’s factual findings, and questions of

constitutional law are reviewed de novo.” Id.

“Both the Michigan and federal Constitutions guarantee the right to the assistance of

counsel in criminal cases. Given the nature of accusations and consequences in child-protective

proceedings, this right has been extended to these civil proceedings.” Id. at 611 (citations omitted).

Therefore, a parent has a right to a lawyer in child protective proceedings, including the right to

appointed counsel. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 275-276, 779 NW2d 286 (2009);

3

“In the context of child protective proceedings . . ., this Court has determined that constitutional

due process indirectly guarantees a right to the effective assistance of counsel.” In re Londowski,

340 Mich App 495, 506; 986 NW2d 659 (2022). “The principles applicable to claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel in the arena of criminal law also apply by analogy in child protective

proceedings. . . .” In re Martin, 316 Mich App 73, 85; 896 NW2d 452 (2016).

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MCR 3.915(B)(1). The right to counsel guarantees effective assistance of counsel. See In re HRC,

286 Mich App 444, 458; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

To be constitutionally effective, counsel’s performance must meet an

objective standard of reasonableness. . . . To obtain relief for the denial of the

effective assistance of counsel, the [respondent] must show that counsel’s

performance fell short of this objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for

counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome

of the [respondent’s] trial would have been different. The effective assistance of

counsel is presumed, and a party claiming ineffective assistance bears a heavy

burden of proving otherwise. [In re Casto, 344 Mich App at 611-612 (alterations

in original; quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Mother argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that she was

afforded protections under the ADA and failing to ensure that DHHS made reasonable efforts to

reunify her with the children. However, as already discussed, mother never provided DHHS with

medical documentation explaining her disability or the accommodations necessary to address it.

Because there is no indication that mother provided this information to her trial counsel either,

mother has failed to establish the factual predicate for her claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. See People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001) (“the defendant

necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his [or her] claim” of

ineffective assistance of counsel).

Additionally, the existing record does not support mother’s argument on appeal. Even

though DHHS was never given medical documentation of mother’s alleged disability, mother’s

trial counsel repeatedly challenged the services that mother was provided. Counsel also questioned

witnesses about mother’s kidney issues and transportation issues during review hearings,

permanency planning hearings, and the 2022 termination hearings. It is clear that trial counsel

made a concerted effort to ensure that DHHS took steps to accommodate mother. Mother offers

no substantive argument demonstrating that the services were deficient, or how different services

would have been reasonable and appropriate in light of her alleged disability. Without an

identification of services, we are left to speculate as to what other services and accommodations

DHHS could have offered. We likewise fail to see what additional services or accommodations

could have been requested by trial counsel. In short, mother cannot establish that her trial counsel’s

performance was deficient, and she is not entitled to relief.

C. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Mother additionally argues the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds for

termination of her parental rights. We disagree.

“We review for clear error the trial court’s finding that there are statutory grounds for

termination of a respondent’s parental rights.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 343. “A finding of

fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the

witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 80 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory

grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”

In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). The clear and convincing evidence standard is “the most demanding standard applied in

civil cases[.]” Id. (alteration in original; quotation marks and citation omitted).

We conclude that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), which permits

termination when “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s

parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of the parent.” Exhibiting

behavior that would put a child at a risk of harm justifies terminating parental rights under

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 712-713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The harm

contemplated under (j) includes emotional harm and physical harm. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App

261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). “[A] parent’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions

of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home.”

See In re White, 303 Mich App at 711.

The children were removed from mother’s care because of unsuitable housing conditions

and her failure to ensure that the children received proper care and supervision. Mother was

referred to a myriad of services throughout the lengthy proceedings to address the barriers to

reunification. She either failed to participate or failed to benefit. Mother was never granted

unsupervised parenting time during the four-year proceedings. Mother repeatedly failed to attend

parenting time despite being provided transportation. She did not know how to care for the

children’s medical needs because she failed to attend their appointments. There were consistent

concerns about mother’s ability to care for the children and keep them safe if they were to be

returned to her custody.

At the time of termination, mother continued to lack suitable housing. She reported that

she planned to live in the home from which the children were removed. However, the home was

not habitable and did not pass a housing assessment. Unsuitable housing could undoubtedly cause

harm to the children. Mother additionally failed to put the children’s needs first, as evidenced by

her failure to consistently attend parenting time, failure to participate in the children’s medical

treatments, and failure to appear at the 2024 termination hearings. Children require consistency,

stability, and a knowledgeable caretaker to continue thriving. Mother could not, or would not,

provide these things. Because there is a reasonable likelihood that the children would experience

harm if returned to mother, the trial court’s finding that termination of mother’s parental rights

was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was not clearly erroneous.4

4

Because termination was proper under (j), we need not address the additional grounds relied upon

by the trial court to terminate mother’s parental rights. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461;

781 NW2d 105 (2009) (noting that DHHS need only establish one statutory ground for

termination).

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D. BEST INTERESTS

Finally, mother argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best

interests. We disagree.

We review a trial court’s best-interest determination for clear error. In re White, 303 Mich

App at 713. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special

opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 80 (quotation marks and

citation omitted).

“The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if the Department has established

a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a

preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best

interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. “The trial court should weigh all the evidence

available to determine the children’s best interests.” Id. This Court focuses on the child—not the

parent—when reviewing best interests. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346. In making its

determination,

the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond

to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency,

stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.

The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the

parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history

with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of

adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations

omitted).]

The trial court “has a duty to decide the best interests of each child individually.” In re Olive/Metts

Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “[I]f the best interests of the individual

children significantly differ, the trial court should address those differences when making its

determination of the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 715.

To the extent that mother and the children were bonded, the bond was not healthy for the

children. The children entered protective care in 2020 because of neglect and unsuitable housing.

DDM, who is mother’s oldest child, had significant health and learning issues that needed to be

addressed immediately. The other children also had health issues. Over the four-year period in

which mother had the opportunity to work toward developing a bond with the children, mother

declined to be involved in their health treatment. She likewise failed to benefit from her CSP,

including a parenting class that was designed to assist her with interacting with the children.

Additionally, mother frequently failed to attend parenting time despite being provided with

transportation. When mother attended parenting time, she often failed to appropriately engage

with the children or discipline them. The children, who did not want to attend parenting time,

exhibited poor behavior toward each other and toward mother. The children often asked for the

foster parents and exhibited dysregulated behavior after parenting time ended for the day.

Testimony at the 2024 termination hearing indicated that discontinuing parenting time would

provide the children with much needed stability. In sum, mother’s bond with the children, if one

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existed, was not healthy for them. See In re Pederson, 331 Mich App at 477 (“[T]he parent-child

bond is a blade that is capable of cutting both ways; whether it benefits or harms a child depends

on how the parent wields it”).

However, the parent-child bond is only one factor for the trial court to consider. In re

Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. As already discussed at length, mother failed to participate

in, and benefit from, the CSP. Mother was either unable, or unwilling, to effectively parent despite

completing parenting classes and being offered other services. The children required permanency

and stability, and were reportedly thriving in foster care. The children had a healthy bond with the

foster parents, who were devoted to their well-being and wanted to adopt them. Conversely, it is

unclear how mother, who did not seek to understand the children’s needs, would provide

appropriate care. It is also unclear how mother would ensure that the children attended school and

medical appointments. Safety remained a concern as well; again, mother had a history of

unsuitable housing and lacked suitable housing at the time of termination.

In sum, a preponderance of the evidence established that termination of mother’s parental

rights was in the children’s best interests. The trial court did not clearly err by terminating mother’s

parental rights.5

Affirmed.

/s/ Randy J. Wallace

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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JDC’s and KDS’s legal fathers were reportedly working on CSPs at the time of termination.

Nevertheless, the evidence establishes that termination of mother’s parental rights was proper for

the reasons already discussed. Importantly, “the parental rights of one parent may be terminated

without the termination of the parental rights of the other parent. . . .” In re Medina, 317 Mich

App 219, 232; 894 NW2d 653 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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