Felicie v. James

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BOBBY FELICIE,

Plaintiff,

-against-

24-CV-7446 (KMW)

LATISHA BROWN SUPREME COURT

CLERK; CHELSEA JOHN (DIVISION OF ORDER OF DISMISSAL

HUMAN RIGHTS REGIONAL DIRECTOR); WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

LETICIA JAMES (STATE ATTORNEY

GENERAL),

Defendant.

KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Bobby Felicie, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that Defendants violated his federally protected rights. By order dated October 4, 2024,

ECF No. 5, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is,

without prepayment of fees. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint, with

30 days’ leave to replead.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Although the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to

interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” courts provide to pro se litigants ,

id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –- to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply

with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short

and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but

it need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are

essentially just legal conclusions. Id. at 678-79. After separating legal conclusions from well-

pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –-

not merely possible –- that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action against: (1) Bronx County Supreme Court Clerk Latisha

Brown; (2) New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”) Regional Director Chelsea

John; and (3) New York State Attorney General Letitia James.1 The complaint, which is

handwritten and largely illegible, contains few facts about the events giving rise to this action.

(ECF 1.). Attachments to the complaint suggest that Plaintiff’s claims arise from four Bronx

County Supreme Court cases in which he is or was a party. (Id. at 8-33.) Following is a list of

the state court matters and information that the Court was able to glean from documents that

Plaintiff attached to this complaint.

In Felicie v. Div. of Human Rights, Ind. No. 28069/17, the state court sealed the

Defendant’s answer on June 7, 2023. (Id. at 31.) In Felicie v. HHRMC, Ind. No. 10077/19,

defense counsel moved for an order directing Plaintiff to fill out Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) forms and to comply with discovery demands. (Id. at 10-11, 14-

15.) In 3203 Oxford Realty v. Felicie, Ind. No. LT-12089/20, the parties entered into a

stipulation of settlement on July 7, 2021. (Id. at 8.) In Felicie v. Bronx Cnty. Div. of Human

Rights, Ind. No. 1623/23, the NYSDHR admitted in its answer that it found no probable cause to

believe that Oxford Realty or HHRMC engaged in discriminatory or retaliatory housing practices

against Plaintiff. (Id. at 29-30.) The state court denied Plaintiff’s motion to strike the answer for

allegedly failing to redact confidential information. (Id. at 33-38.)

Other attachments to the complaint show that on June 5, 2023, and March 19, 2024, the

Administrative Judge of the Bronx County Supreme Court issued orders barring Plaintiff “from

filing any future actions or making any motions [in the Bronx County Supreme Court] without

prior permission,” because he “abuse[d] . . . the judicial process through vexatious litigation.”

(Id. at 25-26.)

1 On the same day that Plaintiff filed this complaint, he filed another one that also named

Chelsea John and Letitia James, among other Defendants, and asserted some of the same causes

of action. See Felicie v. Hill, ECF 1:24-CV-7447, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 30, 2024).

Also attached to the complaint are: an email2 from Plaintiff to lawyers and other parties

in the state-court matters stating his intention to seek unspecified injunctive relief against the

NYSDHR; a note stating that Plaintiff is under a doctor’s care; blurry photographs; part of

Plaintiff’s Experian profile; a document discussing “confidentiality” of “HIV and AIDS related

information” generally; and “Incident Information Slips” from the New York City Police

Department suggesting that Plaintiff was charged with harassment on January 24, 2024, and

February 29, 2024. (Id. at 13, 16, 18-24, 27-28.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “withheld . . . privileged information” from him, which

“adversely” affected him before he could “be heard first and/or correct any wrongdoing or

errors.”3 (Id. ¶ III.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendants disclosed “confidential medical

information”; that Defendant Brown “provided copies [of unspecified documents] to other

judges, which “allow[ed]” them to “make pre judgment conviction and monitor anything related

to [Plaintiff’s] name [and] identity”; and that Defendant John permitted a NYSDHR staff

member to “upload” unspecified documents “through [a] public access website.” (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and

due process (Id. ¶ II.) He seeks declaratory relief “affirming” that his right to privacy and to due

process have been violated, injunctive relief “to prevent further violations” of his “HIPAA

rights,” and damages. (Id. ¶ V.) Plaintiff also moved for appointment of pro bono counsel. (ECF

3.)

2 The email is dated April 17, and may be from 2024, but it is not clear. (Id. at 16.)

3 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original, unless noted otherwise.

DISCUSSION

A. Claims Seeking Relief from State Court Proceedings

Anti-Injunction Act

It appears that Plaintiff is asking this Court for injunctive relief in connection with state

court proceedings. The Anti-Injunction Act provides that “[a] court of the United States may not

grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of

Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”

28 U.S.C. § 2283. “[A]ny injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper . . . must

be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions [in the Act] if it is to be upheld.” Atl. Coast

Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970); Sinisgallo v. Town of

Islip Hous. Auth., 865 F. Supp. 2d 307, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the Anti-Injunction

Act imposes “an absolute ban on enjoining any state court proceeding, unless the facts of the

case bring the matter within one of the three narrowly construed exceptions” (citation omitted)).

State-court proceedings “should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of

the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and

ultimately” the United States Supreme Court. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 398 U.S. at 287.

Here, Plaintiff seems to seek this Court’s intervention in connection with various state

court actions. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any facts suggesting that any of the exceptions

to the Act’s prohibition against federal court intervention into state court proceedings applies.

The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims in which he asks this Court to intervene in his

pending state court litigation, as prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act.

Younger Abstention

Even if the Court had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s complaint, the Younger

abstention doctrine also cautions against enjoining or otherwise interfering in ongoing state

proceedings. See Sprint Comms., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S 69, 77-78 (2013) (defining “Younger’s

scope”); see generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). Younger abstention is

appropriate in three categories of state court proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions;

(2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecutions”; and (3) civil

proceedings “that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.”

Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72-73.

In Sprint, the United States Supreme Court held that, among other circumstances, the

Younger abstention doctrine must be applied to federal-court actions that would, in the absence

of this doctrine, intervene in state-court civil proceedings that implicate a State’s interest in

enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Id. at 72-73. When a plaintiff “seek[s]

injunctive relief relating to the same property that is the subject matter of the underlying state

court action[,] [this] Sprint prong applies.” Abbatiello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-CV-

4210, 2015 WL 5884797, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2015).

Plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief in his various state court

proceedings, by directing the state courts to take certain actions, implicates the state’s interest in

enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts. Younger abstention therefore applies and bars

the relief Plaintiff is seeking. Ultimately, if Plaintiff is aggrieved at the process and outcomes of

the state court proceedings, he can avail himself of the New York State appellate process by

appealing any decisions to the New York State Appellate Division.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

To the extent that Plaintiff challenges the final outcome of any of his state court

proceedings, his claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine –- created

by two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) –- precludes

federal district courts from reviewing final judgments of the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that federal district courts are

barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.”). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies

where the federal-court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) complains of injuries caused by the

state-court judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment,

and (4) commenced the district court proceedings after the state-court judgment was rendered.

Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).

To the extent Plaintiff is asking this Court to review or reject the holdings of final state-

court judgments or orders that he alleges have caused him injury, such claims are barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and are dismissed.

B. Issues with the Named Defendants

Bronx County Clerk Latisha Brown

Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the

scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts

arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.”

Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice

cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. at 209. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout

insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v.

Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes

action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in

nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d

at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s

jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).

Judicial immunity has been extended to court clerks and “others who perform functions

closely associated with the judicial process” when they are performing discretionary acts of a

judicial nature which are essential to the judicial process, especially the filing of court documents

and managing a court’s calendar. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985); see Rodriguez

v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) (extending judicial immunity to state court clerks who

were ordered by Appellate Division judges not to provide a litigant with documents and not to

expand the record on appeal).

Courts have held that “Clerk’s Office activities of filing and docketing legal documents”

are an “integral part of the judicial process” and are thus entitled to absolute immunity.

McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 434 F. App’x 32 (2d

Cir. 2011); see Bey v. New York, No. 11-CV-3296, 2012 WL 4370272, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,

2012) (holding that court clerks were entitled to “absolute quasi judicial immunity” in a suit

alleging they refused to file documents, and citing cases); Humphrey v. Court Clerk for the

Second Circuit, No. 08-CV-0363, 2008 WL 1945308, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008) (court

clerks enjoy absolute immunity “if the task was undertaken pursuant to the explicit direction of a

judicial officer or pursuant to the established practice of the court” (citing Rodriguez, 116 F.3d at

67)). Where a plaintiff is prevented from initiating a new action, some courts have found a

possible violation of her rights. See Humphrey, 2008 WL 1945308, at *2 (relying on LeGrand v.

Evan, 702 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing decision dismissing as frivolous a complaint

that alleged that clerk of the New York Supreme Court, Kings County, refused to accept

applications for a writ of habeas corpus, and noting that “many courts have accorded clerks only

a qualified ‘good faith’ immunity from liability arising from ministerial acts.”)).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Brown’s actions were taken outside the scope of the

functions associated with her position as a court clerk. Moreover, nothing in the complaint

suggests that Plaintiff was prohibited from “commenc[ing] an action under a state statute” or that

his constitutional rights were violated. See Humphry, 2008 WL 1945308, at *2. The Court

therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Brown under the doctrine of absolute judicial

immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

NYSDHR Regional Director Johns

Plaintiff’s claims against Regional Director Johns must be dismissed. Government

attorneys are immune from any liability arising from their conduct connected to NYSDHR

proceedings. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 396 (2d Cir. 2006) (“As a general

principle, a government attorney is entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as an

advocate of the [government] in a way that is intimately associated with the judicial process.”)

(citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); Hines v. Blum, No. 21-CV-5528 (LTS),

2021 WL 3193034, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2021) (dismissing claims against NYSDHR

attorney). This doctrine of absolute immunity for government attorneys covers “the functions of

a government attorney ‘that can fairly be characterized as closely associated with the conduct of

litigation or potential litigation’ in civil suits – including the defense of such actions.” Id.

(quoting Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1986)).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Johns are based on actions within the scope of her official

duties and associated with the Plaintiff’s administrative proceedings before the NYSDHR.

Therefore, these claims are dismissed because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii).

New York State Attorney General Letitia James

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for damages against New York State Attorney General

Letitia James must be dismissed because they are barred under the Eleventh Amendment. “[A]s

a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their

Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The

immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state

agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate

the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park

Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Attorney General James are therefore barred by

the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

C. Motion for Counsel

The factors to be considered in ruling on an indigent litigant’s request for counsel include

the merits of the case, plaintiff’s efforts to obtain a lawyer, and plaintiff’s ability to gather the

facts and present the case if unassisted by counsel. See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170,

172 (2d Cir. 1989); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60-62 (2d Cir. 1986). Of these, the

merits are “[t]he factor which command[s] the most attention.” Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172.

Because the Court is dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim and on immunity

grounds and granting Plaintiff leave to replead, the motion for counsel is, at this stage, denied

without prejudice.

D. Leave to Amend

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). In

an abundance of caution, and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave

to file a neatly handwritten amended complaint, should he wish to do so, to replead his claims.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii), with 30 days leave to replead. The motion for pro bono counsel

is denied without prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate that motion. (ECF 3.)

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil

judgment is entered.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 19, 2025

New York, New York

/s/ Kimba M. Wood

KIMBA M. WOOD

United States District Judge