Sonny Austin Ramdeo v. United States

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11699

____________________

SONNY AUSTIN RAMDEO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 9:23-cv-80295-KAM,

9:12-cr-80226-KAM-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11699

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Coram nobis, like other ancient writs, is rare—

“extraordinary” even. But of the many barriers to issuing coram

nobis, both substantive and procedural, a complete bar on seeking

that writ while in custody is not one of them. For Sonny Ramdeo,

who seeks coram nobis to escape restitution rather than

imprisonment, the fact that he remains in custody does not mean

he is ineligible for the writ.

I.

While working as a payroll director for a hospital-

management company called Promise Healthcare, Sonny Ramdeo

recommended that Promise hire a firm called PayServ Tax to help

facilitate tax payments. PayServ, he said, was a subsidiary of

Ceridian Corporation, a company that Promise had hired before

for similar services. Not true—PayServ was really Ramdeo’s

company and had no connection to Ceridian.

Promise, however, was none the wiser. Perhaps

predictably, the funds Promise sent PayServ did not go to the IRS.

Ramdeo instead used the money—all told, more than $20

million—to start a charter airline service.

But nothing lasts forever. Both Ramdeo’s scheme and his

airline met their end when Promise’s auditors noticed problems

and requested more information about PayServ. Despite

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Ramdeo’s best efforts to cover his tracks—including a fake website,

a fake email address, and a fake email confirming that PayServ was

collecting and disbursing payroll taxes for Promise—he was

arrested, eventually pleading guilty to one count of wire fraud and

one count of money laundering. The district court sentenced him

to twenty years in prison, followed by three years of supervised

release. It also ordered him to pay $21,442,173 in restitution.

Ramdeo unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and

sentence, including the restitution amount, on direct appeal—but

that was only the beginning of his journey through the judiciary.

United States v. Ramdeo, 682 F. App’x 751, 752 (11th Cir. 2017)

(unpublished). About six months after completing his direct

appeal, Ramdeo again sought to challenge the restitution amount,

this time seeking a writ of audita querela. That writ is used to

challenge a judgment rendered infirm by matters “arising

subsequent to the rendition of the judgment.” United States v. Holt,

417 F.3d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court first

recharacterized his petition as one for a writ of coram nobis and

then rejected that petition. On appeal, this Court said that because

Ramdeo’s claim did “not justify a writ of audita querela,” it would

decline to address whether audita querela could ever be used to

challenge a restitution order or whether coram nobis was

“available under the particular facts” of his case. See Ramdeo v.

United States, 760 F. App’x 900, 903 n.2 (11th Cir. 2019)

(unpublished) (italics omitted).

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11699

While the audita querela petition was pending, Ramdeo also

filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, again attempting to contest

(among other things) the amount of restitution set by the district

court. The district court denied his motion as “frivolous” and

“meritless”—at least under § 2255, which does not support

restitution challenges. This Court granted a limited certificate of

appealability and affirmed the district court’s order rejecting

Ramdeo’s claims. 1 See Ramdeo v. United States, No. 21-10112, 2022

WL 3418674, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (unpublished).

Ramdeo was still not finished. Roughly six months later, he

again challenged his restitution order, this time with a pro se

petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The new petition argued

that the restitution order violated due process because of

ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, plus

new financial evidence showing that the restitution amount had

been miscalculated.

Rather than addressing the merits of Ramdeo’s fourth

challenge to the restitution order, the district court denied the

petition on the basis that prisoners in federal custody are “ineligible

for coram nobis relief.” Ramdeo now appeals.

1 The only issue this Court reviewed was whether the district court erred by

limiting the claims that Ramdeo could raise in his second amended § 2255

motion. We said no, citing “Ramdeo’s abusive litigation habits.” Ramdeo,

2022 WL 3418674, at *2.

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II.

We review a district court’s denial of coram nobis relief for

abuse of discretion. Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734 (11th

Cir. 2000). “A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling

rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion

of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” United States v.

Harding, 104 F.4th 1291, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation

omitted).

III.

As Ramdeo’s consistent presence in the federal courts

proves, a criminal conviction is not always the end of the line for

defendants. To begin, direct appeal is always available absent a

plea waiver or other affirmative choice by a defendant. See Fed. R.

App. P. 3. Even after that, federal courts retain the authority to

issue some forms of relief after appeal—though interests in finality

and comity make it much harder to come by.

One way federal courts can offer relief is by issuing various

common law writs “necessary or appropriate in aid of their

respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles

of law.” All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). But these writs operate

only to “fill the interstices of the federal postconviction remedial

framework” when no statutory authority covers the same ground.

Holt, 417 F.3d at 1175 (quotation omitted); see Pennsylvania Bureau

of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).

Habeas corpus has long been the most commonly known—

and used—among these. In 1948, Congress passed statutes

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11699

codifying federal habeas authority.2 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254–

55. Still, that codification does not mean the All Writs Act is a dead

letter. “Habeas corpus may be the Great Writ, but it isn’t the only

writ.” Rudolph v. United States, 92 F.4th 1038, 1048 (11th Cir. 2024).

Two others that are relevant here are audita querela, the writ

sought by Ramdeo in his earlier action, and coram nobis, the one

he seeks here. Neither, to be sure, is common in the modern era,

but both remain available.

The distinction between the two is largely one of timing.

Audita querela, as we said above, is employed to attack the

enforcement of a judgment that was “just and unimpeachable”

when entered, but is no longer so. United States v. Miller, 599 F.3d

484, 487 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Holt, 417 F.3d at 1174. Coram nobis,

on the other hand, is used to attack a judgment that “was infirm at

the time it was rendered.” Miller, 599 F.3d at 487; see also United

States v. Reyes, 945 F.2d 862, 863 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991).

The writ traces its origins to English courts, where it was

“directed to a court for review of its own judgment and predicated

2 One example is § 2255, the section Ramdeo tried to use in an earlier action.

That provision is “an outgrowth of the historic habeas corpus powers of the

federal courts as applied to the special case of federal prisoners.” Jones v.

Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 472 (2023). Section 2254 deals with habeas review for

state prisoners, and § 2241 makes habeas available “for all those who are not

challenging a criminal judgment, including those imprisoned in violation of

federal law without any conviction at all.” Nancy J. King & Joseph L.

Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the

Great Writ 10 (2011).

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on alleged errors of fact.” Coram Nobis, Black’s Law Dictionary

(12th ed. 2024). Coram nobis enabled the “same court where the

action was commenced and where the judgment was rendered to

avoid the rigid strictures of judgment finality by correcting

technical errors” like clerical mistakes. United States v. Denedo, 556

U.S. 904, 910–11 (2009) (quotation omitted).

The modern iteration of coram nobis, however, is “broader

than its common-law predecessor.” Id. at 911. The writ is no

longer confined to technical errors—it extends to factual and legal

errors too. See id. at 911–13. But the standard for relief is high.

Whether factual or legal, only “errors of the most fundamental

character” qualify.3 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954)

(quotation omitted). In fact, review is “allowed through this

extraordinary remedy only under circumstances compelling such

action to achieve justice.” Id. at 511. And because coram nobis is

“a limited remedy of last resort,” it “may not issue when alternative

remedies, such as habeas corpus, are available.” United States v.

Swindall, 107 F.3d 831, 834 (11th Cir. 1997); Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911;

see United States v. Mills, 221 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2000). The

Supreme Court has even said that “it is difficult to conceive of a

situation in a federal criminal case today where that remedy would

be necessary or appropriate.” United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469,

3 Fundamental errors may include constitutional violations—such as

deprivation of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment—and

jurisdictional defects. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512; United States v. Peter, 310

F.3d 709, 715 (11th Cir. 2002).

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475–76 n.4 (1947). The writ of coram nobis, in short, lives up to its

characterization as extraordinary.

Here, though, the question is not whether Ramdeo’s claims

substantively reach the high standard required for the writ of

coram nobis—it is whether he can file for the writ at all. The

government says no, arguing that it is “well established that coram

nobis relief is generally not available to petitioners who are still in

custody.” And to be fair, some of our precedents may suggest

that—but only at first glance.

The government’s primary authority is United States v. Peter,

where we stated that “coram nobis is a remedy available to vacate

a conviction when the petitioner has served his sentence and is no

longer in custody, as is required for post-conviction relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2255.” 310 F.3d 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2002). The

government also relies on United States v. Garcia—decided three

years before Peter—which explained that “[c]oram nobis relief is

unavailable to a person, such as the appellant, who is still in

custody.” 181 F.3d 1274, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999). But a closer look at

these cases and the earlier precedents that they draw from reveals

not a categorical rule about custody, but a specific application of

the more general rule: coram nobis relief is unavailable to prisoners

in federal custody when other avenues of relief, such as § 2255, are

available.

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First, consider Correa-Negron v. United States, 473 F.2d 684

(5th Cir. 1973). 4 There, a federal prisoner petitioned for release

from custody through coram nobis, and we explained that coram

nobis “is only available to correct errors of the most fundamental

character where the circumstances are compelling to achieve

justice.” Id. at 685. We went on to note that “coram nobis normally

lies only when the petitioner is no longer in federal custody.” Id.

(emphasis added). But the reason? The writ is “open to a prisoner

only when his statutory remedies are unavailable or inadequate.”

Id. And while “a petitioner is still in federal custody, relief from a

prior invalid conviction must be sought by means of § 2255.” Id.

So after confirming that the petitioner’s challenge was cognizable

under § 2255, we affirmed the denial of the coram nobis petition.

Id. What Correa-Negron established is that prisoners in custody can

only challenge their custodial sentences under § 2255—a non-

controversial point. But that has no bearing on restitution

challenges because they do not qualify for relief under § 2255,

whether the petitioner is in or out of custody. See Blaik v. United

States, 161 F.3d 1341, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 1998).

Next came United States v. Brown, where we again concluded

that coram nobis was not allowed because the petitioner, who

sought release from custody, had a remedy under § 2255. 117 F.3d

471, 475 (11th Cir. 1997). “Because Brown was in custody within

4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, this Court adopted as binding precedent all

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. See

661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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the meaning of § 2255 when he filed his petition in the district

court,” the “statutory remedies of that provision were available to

him, and coram nobis relief was unavailable as a matter of law.”

Id.

And Garcia is more of the same. The petitioner there sought

to vacate his sentence of custody through a writ of coram nobis.

Garcia, 181 F.3d at 1274. But he had already attacked his sentence

under § 2255 and lost. Id. We explained in a short per curiam

opinion that the coram nobis petition was not the proper vehicle

for his challenge. Id. at 1275. The opinion’s statement that

“[c]oram nobis relief is unavailable to a person, such as the

appellant, who is still in custody” was perhaps too broad, but it

cited only Brown in support, which made no such categorical rule.

Id. at 1274. The court did not have before it, and did not consider,

a case like this one where the in-custody petitioner did not seek

release.

Finally, Peter—the government’s chief authority—does not

alter our conclusion. There, the petitioner sought to vacate his

conviction after he had been released from custody, and the Court

ultimately determined that coram nobis relief was available. Peter,

310 F.3d at 711, 716. The government overreads the opinion’s

statement that “coram nobis is a remedy available to vacate a

conviction when the petitioner has served his sentence and is no

longer in custody, as is required for post-conviction relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. at 712. Yes, a petitioner seeking to vacate his

conviction—something directly covered by § 2255—cannot use

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coram nobis unless he is out of custody and unable to use § 2255.

But Peter says nothing about challenges to restitution orders, which

cannot be brought under § 2255.

All that these precedents instruct, then, is that coram nobis

relief is unavailable to an in-custody prisoner who seeks release

from custody. Any such request may only come under § 2255. But

the unavailability of coram nobis for release from custody says

nothing about whether that writ can touch restitution. After all,

common law writs like coram nobis remain available to “fill the

interstices of the federal postconviction remedial framework.”

Holt, 417 F.3d at 1175 (quotation omitted). And we have been clear

that § 2255 cannot be used to challenge restitution orders. See

Blaik, 161 F.3d at 1342–43.

Why? One of the “technical limitations” of habeas corpus

relief under § 2255 is that it can only be used to seek release from

custody.5 Peter, 310 F.3d at 712; see Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.

236, 238 (1963). “A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court

established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be

released . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to

vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)

(emphasis added); see also Rudolph, 92 F.4th at 1044–45. Plus,

habeas corpus cannot be extended to challenges to non-custodial

aspects of a sentence, even when a non-custodial claim is brought

in the same petition as a custodial one. See Mamone v. United States,

5 Both parole and supervised release satisfy the “in custody” requirement. See

Jones, 371 U.S. at 243; Brown, 117 F.3d at 475.

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559 F.3d 1209, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2009); Blaik, 161 F.3d at 1342–43.

A reduction in restitution is plainly not a release from custody, so

§ 2255 cannot be used to attack “the restitution portion” of a

sentence. Blaik, 161 F.3d at 1343. That means Ramdeo’s present

challenge is not cognizable under § 2255.

But the “unavailability of relief under § 2255 does not leave

a deserving petitioner entirely without recourse.” Barnickel v.

United States, 113 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1997). Though a coram

nobis petition and a petition under § 2255 are “of the same general

character,” § 2255 does not “cover the entire field of remedies in

the nature of coram nobis in federal courts.” Morgan, 346 U.S. at

505–06 n.4, 510 (italics omitted). In fact, “the writ of error coram

nobis acts as an assurance that deserved relief will not be denied as

a result of the technical limitations of other post-conviction

remedies.” Peter, 310 F.3d at 712. That’s not to say we are certain

that a writ of coram nobis can correct a restitution order—we have

never decided that one way or the other. See Arnaiz v. Warden, Fed.

Satellite Low, 594 F.3d 1326, 1329 n.3 (11th Cir. 2010). But what we

can say is that it does not depend on whether the petitioner is in

custody.

IV.

This determination that coram nobis is not categorically

barred for those in custody also does nothing to lower the high bar

that any petitioner must clear to qualify for such relief. Because

coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy, relief may only issue

when (1) “no other remedy is available and the petitioner presents

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sound reasons for failing to seek relief earlier”; and (2) “the error

involves a matter of fact of the most fundamental character which

has not been put in issue or passed upon and which renders the

proceeding itself irregular and invalid.” Mills, 221 F.3d at 1204;

Alikhani, 200 F.3d at 734 (quotation omitted).

The government contends that even if being in custody does

not thwart Ramdeo’s coram nobis petition, his claim still fails on

the merits. That may well be true. The government argues several

alternative bases for affirming the district court: (1) Ramdeo failed

to show there are or were no other available avenues for relief;

(2) Ramdeo failed to show a fundamental error not previously put

in issue or passed upon; (3) Ramdeo did not provide sound reasons

for failing to seek coram nobis relief earlier; and (4) principles of

finality counsel against affording Ramdeo this extraordinary relief.

But the district court did not address any of these issues, and we

decline to do so here. We conclude only that there is no out-of-

custody requirement for prisoners challenging a non-custodial

aspect of their sentence through the writ of error coram nobis.

* * *

We VACATE the district court’s order and REMAND this

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.