Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS GUILLERMO GONZALEZ- No. 21-927

JUAREZ,

Agency No.

A201-173-391

Petitioner,

v. OPINION

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 4, 2025 *

Pasadena, California

Filed May 20, 2025

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Morgan B. Christen, Circuit

Judges, and Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge. **

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

*

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

The Honorable Michael T. Liburdi, United States District Judge for

the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

2 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

SUMMARY ***

Immigration

Denying Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez’s petition for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal, the panel

held that: 1) the substantial evidence standard of review

applies to the hardship determination in cancellation of

removal cases; and 2) substantial evidence supported the

BIA’s hardship determination in this case.

For many years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), this court held

that it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether an alien had

established “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to

a qualifying relative—a requirement for cancellation of

removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). In Wilkinson, the

Supreme Court held that the application of this hardship

standard to an established set of facts is a mixed question of

law and fact over which courts have jurisdiction, but did not

expressly state the standard of review.

In light of Supreme Court precedent, the panel concluded

that, for review of immigration agency determinations on

mixed questions of law and fact that are primarily factual,

the court should adopt the standard of review that it generally

applies to the agency’s finding of facts: the substantial

evidence standard. Under that standard, as relevant here,

“administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

***

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 3

the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The panel wrote

that, in an analogous context presented in Zia v. Garland,

112 F.4th 1194 (9th Cir. 2024), this court applied the

substantial evidence standard to the primarily factual

question of whether a marriage was entered into in good

faith.

The panel also observed that, since Wilkinson, this court

has applied the abuse of discretion standard in two other

contexts: Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775 (9th Cir. 2024)

(habeas petition where mixed question was whether the alien

was a danger to the community), and Magana-Magana v.

Bondi, 129 F.4th 557 (9th Cir. 2025) (motion to reopen

where mixed question was whether the alien qualified for an

exception to the filing deadline). The panel concluded that

neither case dictates the standard of review here, and

observed that there is little practical difference between the

two standards.

Turning to the meaning of “exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship,” the panel drew from dictionary

definitions to conclude that the hardship must be out of the

ordinary and exceedingly uncommon, and must deviate, in

the extreme, from the norm. Thus, the agency must compare

the hardship in a given case to the hardship that results in the

ordinary course when an alien is removed.

Here, Gonzalez challenged the BIA’s conclusion that

country conditions reports on Mexico did not establish the

requisite hardship to his two sons, who planned to

accompany him to Mexico in the event of removal. The BIA

was not persuaded that the relatively high levels of crime and

violence in Mexico established the requisite hardship, and

rejected the argument that Gonzalez and his sons would be

the target of criminal violence due to their perceived

4 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

wealth. The panel concluded that substantial evidence

supported these conclusions, explaining that Gonzalez’s

other family members had lived in Mexico without harm and

that a country conditions report that applies equally to a large

proportion of cases does not compel the conclusion that the

hardship standard is met. The panel also rejected Gonzalez’s

argument that the BIA failed to consider the record evidence.

Accordingly, the panel concluded that substantial

evidence supported the BIA’s determination that Gonzalez

had not met his burden to show that his removal would result

in hardship to his qualifying relatives that is substantially

different from or beyond that normally encountered in the

course of removal.

COUNSEL

Roxana V. Muro, Law Offices of Roxana V. Muro, Los

Angeles, California, for Petitioner.

Zachary S. Hughbanks, Giovanni Di Maggio, and Jennifer

P. Williams, Trial Attorneys; Lindsay B. Glauner, Senior

Litigation Counsel; Song Park, Assistant Director; Office of

Immigration Litigation; Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General; Civil Division, United States

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 5

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez (Gonzalez) petitions

for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) that denied his application for cancellation of

removal. Because the evidence does not compel the

conclusion that his removal would result in “exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, 8

U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), we deny the petition.

I

We first consider the law applicable to this case. “The

Attorney General may cancel removal” of “inadmissible or

deportable” aliens in certain circumstances. Id. § 1229b(b).

For an alien such as Gonzalez, who is not a lawful permanent

resident of the United States, the cancellation of removal

statute proceeds in two steps. First, the alien must meet the

requirements of § 1229b(b)(1). Under this section, the alien

must (A) have been physically present in the United States

for a continuous period of ten years or more, (B) have been

a person of good moral character during that time, (C) have

not been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, and

(D) “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or

child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien

lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id.

§ 1229b(b)(1). Only the fourth criterion, whether the alien

has established “exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship” to a qualifying relative, is at issue in this appeal.

Second, if the alien meets the four requirements and

establishes eligibility under § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D), the

agency may exercise its discretion to cancel the alien’s

6 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

removal. 1 See id. § 1229b(b)(1) (“The Attorney General

may cancel removal . . . if the alien [meets the requirements

of subparagraphs (A)–(D)]” (emphasis added)); Wilkinson v.

Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212–13 & n.1 (2024) (describing

“two steps” of cancellation of removal).

A

For many years, we held that we lacked jurisdiction to

consider whether an alien had established “exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative under

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). See, e.g., Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey,

552 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2009); Martinez-Rosas v.

1

Section 1229b(b)(1) provides, in full:

(b) Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status

for certain nonpermanent residents

(1) In general

The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and

adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for

permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible

or deportable from the United States if the alien—

(A) has been physically present in the United

States for a continuous period of not less than 10

years immediately preceding the date of such

application;

(B) has been a person of good moral character

during such period;

(C) has not been convicted of an offense under

section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of

this title, subject to paragraph (5); and

(D) establishes that removal would result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the

alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of

the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for

permanent residence.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b.

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 7

Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005). We based this

conclusion on the statutory text. Congress deprived us of

jurisdiction “to review: (i) any judgment regarding the

granting of relief under section . . . 1229b [cancellation of

removal].” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). There is an exception

to this jurisdiction-stripping provision in § 1252(a)(2)(D):

“[n]othing in [§ 1252(a)(2)(B)] . . . shall be construed as

precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of

law raised upon a petition for review filed with an

appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”

Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Reading these sections together, we

concluded that whether the alien’s qualifying relative

suffered an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

was not a question of law pursuant to § 1252(a)(2)(D), but

rather was a subjective question, depending on the identity

and value judgment of the person examining the issue.

Mendez-Castro, 552 F.3d at 981. We therefore concluded

that we lacked jurisdiction to review an IJ’s application of

the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard

to the facts of a case. Id.

But our decision in Mendez-Castro has been superseded

by Supreme Court opinions. First, Guerrero-Lasprilla v.

Barr held that “a question, which has both factual and legal

elements” is a “mixed question of law and fact.” 589 U.S.

221, 228 (2020). Therefore, the “statutory phrase ‘questions

of law’” for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(D) “includes the

application of a legal standard to undisputed or established

facts.” Id. at 227. Subsequently, Wilkinson addressed our

jurisdiction over the exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship standard, and held that the application of this

standard “to an established set of facts” is a “mixed question

8 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

of law and fact,” over which we have jurisdiction under

§ 1252(a)(2)(D). 601 U.S. at 212. 2

B

Wilkinson did not expressly state what standard of

review applies to our review of the agency’s determination

that an alien had not established exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. We turn to that

question now.

1

The Supreme Court provided guidance on how to

determine the standard of review for a mixed question of law

and fact in Guerrero-Lasprilla. 589 U.S. at 228. When

reviewing an “agency decision that applies a legal standard

to underlying facts . . . . [t]he answer to the ‘proper standard’

question may turn on practical considerations, such as

whether the question primarily ‘require[s] courts to expound

on the law, particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a

broad legal standard’ (often calling for review de novo), or

rather ‘immerse[s] courts in case-specific factual issues’

(often calling for deferential review).” Id. (quoting U.S.

Bank N.A. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 396

2

Although we have jurisdiction over the “exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship” standard, the IJ’s second determination, “whether to

exercise his discretion favorably and grant the noncitizen relief in the

particular case,” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 212–13, is not a question of law

under § 1252(a)(2)(D), so our jurisdiction is precluded by

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Id. at 218, 225 n.4. Nor do we have jurisdiction over

the IJ’s finding of “facts underlying any determination on cancellation

of removal,” which “remain unreviewable.” Id. at 225. For example, we

may not review “an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the seriousness of a

family member’s medical condition, or the level of financial support a

noncitizen currently provides.” Id.

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 9

(2018)). Wilkinson described the exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship determination as one that “requires a court

to immerse itself in facts.” 601 U.S. at 222; see also id. at

225 (“Because this mixed question is primarily factual, that

review is deferential.”).

In discussing the standard of review that applies to a

mixed question of law and fact under § 1252(a)(2)(D), both

Wilkinson and Guerrero-Lasprilla relied on U.S. Bank, 583

U.S. at 394. Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 221–22; Guerrero-

Lasprilla, 589 U.S. at 228. In U.S. Bank, the Court

considered the standard of review applicable to a bankruptcy

court’s determination that a particular transaction had been

entered at arm’s length, which the Court determined was a

mixed question of law and fact. 583 U.S. at 397. The Court

first examined “the nature of the mixed question . . . and

which kind of court (bankruptcy or appellate) is better suited

to resolve it[.]” Id. at 395. Because “the standard of review

often reflects which ‘judicial actor is better positioned’ to

make the decision,” the Court reasoned, “[t]he standard of

review for a mixed question all depends—on whether

answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.” Id. at

395–96. When the answer requires an evaluation of “a raft

of case-specific historical facts,” and “[p]recious little” legal

work, then the inquiry “(primarily) belongs[] in the court that

has presided over the presentation of evidence, that has heard

all the witnesses, and that has both the closest and the

deepest understanding of the record.” Id. at 397–98.

Because the evaluation of case-specific historical facts is a

task better suited to the bankruptcy court than the appellate

court, U.S. Bank held that the appropriate standard of review

of the bankruptcy court’s decision of a mixed question of law

and facts is clear error, which is the same standard of review

10 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

that an appellate court applies to a bankruptcy court’s factual

findings. Id. at 394, 399.

Less than two years after U.S. Bank, the Supreme Court

decided the standard of review applicable to another

“primarily factual” mixed question in Monasky v. Taglieri,

589 U.S. 68, 71 (2020). Monasky involved review of a

district court’s determination of a child’s “habitual

residence” under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects

of International Child Abduction. Id. at 70–71. As in U.S.

Bank, the Court asked whether the determination entailed

“primarily legal or factual work,” and found it presented “a

task for factfinding courts, not appellate courts.” Id. at 84–

85 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Again

the Court held that the applicable standard of review was

clear error, the same standard of review that generally

applies to a trial court’s determination of “questions of fact.”

Id. at 83–84.

As in U.S. Bank and Monasky, the exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship determination is a mixed

question that “is primarily factual.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at

225. The description used in U.S. Bank fits here:

determining whether a particular alien has demonstrated

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship requires a court

to examine “a raft of case-specific historical facts,” and so

“(primarily) belongs[] in the court that has presided over the

presentation of evidence, that has heard all the witnesses,

and that has both the closest and the deepest understanding

of the record.” 583 U.S. at 397–98. Here, the court that has

the closest connection to the facts is the immigration court,

presided over by the IJ.

Although U.S. Bank held that the clear error standard

applies in reviewing another court’s factual finding, id. at

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 11

399, the Supreme Court has made clear that a different

standard of review applies when a court reviews agency

findings of fact (“court/agency” review) than when a court

reviews a court’s findings of fact (“court/court” review), see

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999). In Dickinson,

the Court held that the court/agency standard of review for

findings of fact is the “substantial evidence” standard from

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), while the

court/court standard is the “clearly erroneous” standard. Id.

at 162. Both standards “require[] judges to apply logic and

experience to an evidentiary record, whether that record was

made in a court or by an agency.” Id. at 163. Dickinson

therefore held that a court should review the finding of facts

made by the Patent and Trademark Office for substantial

evidence. Id. at 165.

The APA does not apply to petitions for review under the

Immigration and Nationality Act. See Martinez v.

Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining

that § 1252(a)(5) provides the “sole and exclusive” means of

judicial review of an order of removal and prohibits APA

claims). Nevertheless, Dickinson suggests that for a

court/agency review of mixed questions of law and fact that

are primarily factual, we should adopt the standard of review

that we generally apply to an agency’s finding of facts in the

immigration context. 527 U.S. at 156–57. This standard of

review for factual findings is the substantial evidence

standard, as defined by statute and case law. Under

§ 1252(b)(4)(B), with exceptions not applicable here, “the

administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Nasrallah

v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020) (defining the substantial

evidence standard by quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B));

12 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th

Cir. 2017) (same).

Applying the substantial evidence standard of review

here is consistent with how we have long reviewed other

eligibility determinations. See, e.g., Sharma v. Garland, 9

F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (stating that the agency’s

determination of ineligibility for withholding of removal is

reviewed for substantial evidence); Manzo-Fontes v. INS, 53

F.3d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[I]f the agency denies relief

because it determines that the alien is statutorily ineligible

for relief, we generally review the agency’s determination

for substantial evidence.”). We have explained that this

highly deferential standard reflects the fact that “‘the law

entrusts the agency to make the basic’ eligibility

determinations.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1060 (quoting INS v.

Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002)).

In an analogous context, we took this approach and

applied the substantial evidence standard of review to a

mixed question of law and fact that is primarily factual. See

Zia v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2024). In Zia,

the alien sought removal of the conditional basis for his

permanent resident status based on the “hardship waiver” set

forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). Id. at 1197. To qualify, he

needed to show that he had entered into a qualifying

marriage in good faith. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.

§ 1186a(c)(4)(B)). The agency determined that he had not

done so, and the alien therefore filed a petition for review.

Id. at 1198–99. Zia first held that the good-faith marriage

determination was a mixed question of law and fact over

which the court had jurisdiction under Wilkinson. Id. at

1201. Zia then reviewed the agency’s determination of this

primarily factual question for substantial evidence. See id.

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 13

at 1202 (“[T]he remaining documentary evidence does not

compel a conclusion that the BIA erred . . . .”).

Accordingly, we implement Wilkinson’s directive to

apply a deferential standard of review to the primarily

factual mixed question at hand—whether the BIA erred in

applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

standard to a given set of facts—by reviewing for substantial

evidence. 3

2

Since Wilkinson, we have applied a different standard of

review in two other contexts, but neither is applicable here.

See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775 (9th Cir. 2024);

Magana-Magana v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 557 (9th Cir. 2025).

Martinez involved a habeas petition from an alien who

was detained pending removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c). 124 F.4th at 780. The district court ordered the

IJ to conduct a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause,

at which the government had to “show by clear and

3

Our conclusion is consistent with the Third Circuit’s approach. On

remand from the Supreme Court in Wilkinson, the Third Circuit analyzed

U.S. Bank and Monasky and reasoned that “the deference afforded the

agency’s factual findings should also govern” review of the exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship determination. Wilkinson v. Attorney

General, 131 F.4th 134, 140 (3d Cir. 2025). The Third Circuit rejected

the alien’s argument that “the INA limits the substantial-evidence

standard [of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)] to findings of fact.” Id. at 140

n.28 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Third Circuit,

this argument “lack[ed] textual support.” Id. The Third Circuit went on

to explain that even if the standard were so limited, “it would not matter

because under U.S. Bank, we identify a standard for the mixed question

by drawing from the standard applicable to factual findings.” Id. The

Third Circuit accordingly held that substantial evidence was the

appropriate standard of review.

14 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

convincing evidence that [the alien] presents a flight risk or

a danger to the community at the time of the bond hearing.”

Id. The IJ held the hearing and concluded that the

government had satisfied its burden. Id. at 780–81. The BIA

affirmed, and the alien filed a federal habeas petition under

28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release from custody and arguing

that the agency had erred in concluding he was a danger to

the community. Id. at 781. The district court denied the

petition for habeas relief. Id. Relying on Wilkinson, we first

concluded that we had jurisdiction over the alien’s claim

because the BIA’s determination that the alien was a “danger

to the community” was a question of law. Id. at 782–84. We

recognized that “as a statutory matter, the detention process

under § 1226(c) doesn’t compare exactly to the cancellation-

of-removal process, which requires the IJ to find the

requisite ‘hardship’ at step one and to exercise discretion at

step two.” Id. at 784. But we distinguished the

dangerousness determination in that case because it arose in

the habeas context, and the district court had ordered the

bond hearing under the Due Process Clause. Id.

Turning to the standard of review for a dangerousness

determination, we noted that Wilkinson and Zia confirmed

that we apply a deferential standard of review. Id. We relied

on Konou v. Holder, which considered the standard of

review for a determination that an alien’s convictions

constituted a “particularly serious crime” for purposes of 8

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). 750 F.3d 1120, 1126–27 (9th

Cir. 2014). Konou held that the “BIA’s determination that

an alien was convicted of a particularly serious crime is a

discretionary decision, and we review such decisions under

an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 1127. Because of

the closeness of the “dangerousness” determination to the

“particularly serious crime” determination, Martinez held

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 15

that it was appropriate for the district court to review

“dangerousness” under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 124

F.4th at 784. But Martinez’s rationale does not map neatly

onto the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

standard, which does not arise in the unique contexts of a

habeas petition and court/court review, both of which lend

themselves to review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 28

Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 531–32 (1952) (reviewing

an agency’s bail determination under the Internal Security

Act of 1950 for an abuse of discretion); Barapind v. Reno,

225 F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing a district

court’s decision to dismiss a habeas petition under the

federal comity doctrine for an abuse of discretion).

The second opinion, Magana-Magana, likewise

involves a distinct context. This case addressed our

jurisdiction over a battered spouse’s application for a motion

to reopen her immigration removal proceedings. 129 F.4th

at 562. The immigration law allows such a motion if it is

“filed within 1 year of the entry of the final order of removal,

except that the Attorney General may, in the Attorney

General’s discretion, waive this time limitation in the case of

an alien who demonstrates extraordinary circumstances or

extreme hardship to the alien’s child.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). 4

In Magana-Magana, the alien filed a motion to reopen

her removal proceedings “well outside of the one-year filing

4

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) provides that “Any limitation under

this section [§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)] on the deadlines for filing such

motions shall not apply— . . . if the motion to reopen is filed within 1

year of the entry of the final order of removal, except that the Attorney

General may, in the Attorney General’s discretion, waive this time

limitation in the case of an alien who demonstrates extraordinary

circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child[.]”

16 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

period provided by statute.” 129 F.4th at 564. The alien

argued that under § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), the abuse she

suffered “constituted extraordinary circumstances that

should excuse her untimeliness.” Id. The BIA determined

that the alien’s motion was untimely, and the alien had not

demonstrated that she fell within the discretionary exception.

Id. In evaluating the alien’s petition for review, we first

considered whether we had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s

“extraordinary circumstances” determination. Id. at 566.

For purposes of this jurisdictional analysis, we held that

“[t]he ‘extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to

the alien’s child’ standard in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) is akin

to the due-diligence standard analyzed in Guerrero-

Lasprilla and the ‘exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship’ standard analyzed in Wilkinson,” both of which

involved “a legal standard that is applied to a set of facts.”

Id. at 570. Therefore, in light of Guerrero-Lasprilla and

Wilkinson, we concluded that this determination was a

mixed question of law and fact, and we had jurisdiction to

review the BIA’s determination whether the abuse

constituted “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 567–68.

Having “assured ourselves of our own jurisdiction,” id.

at 571, we turned to the merits of the question whether the

alien demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances or extreme

hardship to the alien’s child,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). Because we were considering the

denial of a motion to reopen, we relied on the deferential

standard of review that we articulated in Movsisian v.

Ashcroft, which held that “[w]e review the BIA’s denial of a

motion to reopen and remand for abuse of discretion.” 395

F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the abuse of

discretion standard of review, we held that the alien in

Magana-Magana could not succeed. 129 F.4th at 571.

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 17

Thus, Magana-Magana, like Martinez, does not dictate what

the standard of review should be for the “exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship” standard in § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

While neither Martinez nor Magana-Magana is directly

contrary to Zia, we recognize that they take different

approaches to applying Wilkinson’s deferential approach.

But there is little practical difference between the abuse of

discretion standard adopted in Martinez and Magana-

Magana and the substantial evidence standard adopted by

Zia. 5 Cf. United States v. Hill, 196 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir.

1999) (“[W]hether deferential review is denominated for

‘abuse of discretion’ or ‘clear error’ or ‘substantial evidence’

. . . makes little practical difference.”); Ass’n of Data

Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed Rsrv.

Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that

when the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”

standard performs the “function of assuring factual support,

there is no substantive difference between what it requires

and what would be required by the substantial evidence

test”) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, we use the standard

that more closely follows our circuit’s longstanding

approach for eligibility determinations and the Supreme

Court’s guidance in U.S. Bank and Monasky: the substantial

evidence standard.

C

Having determined our jurisdiction and standard of

review, we next address the meaning of the hardship

5

Whatever difference exists in this context is not a “compelling reason”

to create a circuit split, Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d 826, 836 (9th

Cir. 2017), given the Third Circuit’s decision to review the hardship

determination for substantial evidence, Wilkinson, 131 F.4th at 140.

18 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

standard set forth in § 1229b(b)(1)(D). To qualify for

cancellation of removal, the alien must show that his

removal would result in a certain kind of hardship—

“exceptional and extremely unusual”—to a qualifying

relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). This language is not

ambiguous. “Exceptional” means “out of the ordinary

course, unusual, special.” Exceptional, Oxford English

Dictionary (OED) (2024),

https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/6277146090. 6 “Extremely”

means “[i]n an extreme degree; exceedingly, very much.”

Extremely, OED (2023),

https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1068785790. “Unusual”

means “[n]ot usual; uncommon; exceptional.” Unusual,

OED (2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/3122717619.

Their legal definitions are no different. See Exceptional,

Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969) (“The rare—the

unusual or extraordinary case or circumstance”); Unusual,

Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) (“[u]ncommon; not

usual, rare”); Extreme, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.

1951) (“[g]reatest, highest, strongest, or the like”). These

definitions are unchanged from when Congress used the

phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual” in enacting the

INA in 1952 and from when Congress enacted the current

provision in 1996. 7 See Exceptional, OED (first published

6

This definition is unchanged from when it first entered the Oxford

English Dictionary in 1894. Exceptional, OED (2024).

7

The current statutory regime of cancellation of removal was enacted in

1996. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.

104-208, sec. 304, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, 110 Stat. 3009-594 (1996).

However, the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” was

included in the original Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952 as the

standard applicable to suspension of deportation. Immigration and

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 19

1894; not yet revised); Extremely, OED (first published

1894; not yet revised); Unusual, OED (first published 1926;

not yet revised); accord Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124

F.4th 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2024) (discussing dictionary

definitions and concluding that “‘exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship’ means hardship . . . that’s significantly

different from or greater than the hardship that a deported

alien’s family normally experiences”). Drawing from the

dictionary definitions, then, the hardship must be out of the

ordinary and exceedingly uncommon. It must deviate, in the

extreme, from the norm. The agency must compare the

hardship in a given case to the hardship that results in the

usual, ordinary course when an alien is removed.

This is consistent with how the BIA applies this statute.

See In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA

2001) (evaluating whether the alien’s relatives “would suffer

hardship that is substantially different from, or beyond, that

which would normally be expected from the deportation of

an alien with close family members here”). Although we no

longer defer to an agency’s interpretation of the meaning of

a statutory text, we may “seek aid from the interpretations of

those responsible for implementing particular statutes.”

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)

(citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).

While an agency’s interpretation is not binding, it may be

“especially informative to the extent it rests on factual

premises within the agency’s expertise.” Id. at 402 (internal

quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). In this

case, the BIA is “responsible for implementing”

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D), id. at 394, and the factual premises

Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, sec. 244, 8 U.S.C. § 155, 66 Stat.

163, 214 (1952).

20 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

underlying the cancellation of removal inquiry are “within

the agency’s expertise,” id. at 402 (brackets omitted).

Accordingly, while we are not bound by Monreal-Aguinaga,

we find it instructive here.

When the BIA applies this statute, it evaluates “the ages,

health, and circumstances” of qualifying relatives. Monreal-

Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63. In Monreal-Aguinaga, the

BIA offered hypothetical examples of hardship that might

meet the standard: elderly parents deprived of support by an

alien on whom they are solely dependent, or a qualifying

child “with very serious health issues” or “compelling

special needs in school” who would be removed from

supportive healthcare or educational environments. Id. But

the BIA also noted: “A lower standard of living or adverse

country conditions in the country of return . . . generally will

be insufficient in themselves to support a finding of

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. at 63–64.

The BIA stated that the hardship must be “substantially

beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when

a close family member leaves the country.” Id. at 62

(internal quotation marks omitted).

This comparative approach is likewise consistent with

how we applied this test in our circuit before Loper-Bright.

See, e.g., Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1013

(9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the emotional suffering that

results from the separation of parents from children is “sadly

common” in the removal context and thus does not satisfy

the exceptional and extremely unusual standard); Chete

Juarez v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 944, 949 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (the

hardship must be “substantially beyond that which would

ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s deportation”

(citation omitted)). We continue to apply such a

comparative approach here.

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 21

II

We now turn to the facts of this case to determine

whether the BIA erred in denying cancellation of removal,

reviewing its hardship determination for substantial

evidence.

Gonzalez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered

the United States most recently in 1999. After the

government commenced removal proceedings against him,

Gonzalez conceded removability and applied for

cancellation of removal. Relying primarily on country

conditions reports about crime and violence in Mexico, the

IJ granted Gonzalez’s application for cancellation of

removal. The BIA reversed, concluding that Gonzalez was

not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had not

demonstrated his removal would result in exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative.

At the time of the IJ’s decision, the record established the

following. Gonzalez had three children. His daughter was

an adult, who intended to stay in the United States to

continue her college education. Gonzalez’s two sons Jacob

and Brian were 15 and 18, respectively, and qualified as

children for purposes of the hardship determination. 8

U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (defining “child” as an “unmarried

person under twenty-one years of age”). The sons planned

to accompany Gonzalez and their mother to Mexico in the

event of removal. The sons spoke some Spanish, though

neither spoke it well, and they were close to their older sister.

Additionally, Jacob had eczema that he treated with a topical

cream.

On appeal, Gonzalez challenges the BIA’s conclusion

that the country conditions reports did not establish

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Gonzalez also

22 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI

contends that the BIA inadequately addressed the hardship

that would result to Brian and Jacob given their ages, their

lack of fluency in Spanish, and the financial impact of

removal. These arguments fail.

First, the BIA stated that it was “not persuaded that the

relatively high levels of crime and violence in Mexico

necessarily establishes the requisite level of hardship to the

qualifying relatives, as such general conditions would apply

to any qualifying relative who accompanies a noncitizen

back to the country to which removal is ordered.” The BIA

also rejected the argument that Gonzalez and his sons would

be the target of criminal violence in Mexico. The BIA

reasoned that Gonzalez’s perceived wealth would not

increase the risk of criminal violence “enough to show that

the hardship faced by the qualifying relatives is

extraordinary.”

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusions. As

the BIA noted, Gonzalez’s other family members had lived

in Mexico without harm. And as we have explained, the

hardship determination requires hardship that deviates, in the

extreme, from the hardship that ordinarily occurs in removal

cases. Thus, a country conditions report that applies equally

to a large proportion of removal cases does not compel the

conclusion that the hardship standard is met.

Second, Gonzalez’s remaining argument—that the BIA

failed to give meaningful consideration to Gonzalez’s

financial concerns, his sons’ lost educational opportunities,

their lack of fluency in Spanish, and their separation from

their older sister—also fails. While the BIA must consider

all the evidence before it, “that does not mean that the Board

must individually identify and discuss every piece of

evidence in the record.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th

GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI 23

757, 770 (9th Cir. 2022). In this case, the BIA recognized

the “lost educational opportunities” that Gonzalez’s sons

would experience as a result of their lack of fluency in

Spanish. It also recognized the sons’ separation from their

older sister. The BIA mentioned Gonzalez’s concerns about

finances, which encompass Gonzalez’s likely inability to

pay for his sons’ college education if removed. Because the

BIA discussed all evidence that was highly probative or

potentially dispositive, we reject Gonzalez’s argument that

the BIA failed to consider the evidence in the record.

The BIA weighed the hardship to the sons against other

ameliorating circumstances, such as “the presence of other

family members in Mexico, the absence of serious health

problems or special needs affecting the qualifying relatives,

the children’s ability to converse in Spanish, and

approximately $10,000 in assets to help the family transition

to life outside the United States.” Considering the totality of

the evidence, the BIA concluded that Gonzalez had not met

his burden to show that “his removal would result in

hardship to the qualifying relatives that is substantially

different from or beyond that normally encountered in the

course of removal.”

Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

determination that Gonzalez failed to demonstrate

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying

relatives, the BIA did not err when it denied his application

for cancellation of removal.

PETITION DENIED.