Com. v. Pascual, M.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

MIGUEL PASCUAL :

:

Appellant : No. 1337 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-06-SA-0000153-2024

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: MAY 20, 2025

Miguel Pascual (Appellant) appeals, pro se,1 from the judgment of

sentence imposed following his summary convictions of driving while

operating privilege is suspended or revoked, carrying and exhibiting driver’s

license on demand (collectively, the traffic offenses), and direct criminal

contempt.2 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying factual history:

On January 2, 2024, [Pennsylvania State Police] Trooper Justin

Marderness [(Trooper Marderness)] attended a hearing for []

Appellant at Magisterial District Judge [Steven] Chieffo’s office.

The hearing was in relation to a driving while operating privilege[

is] suspended or revoked citation for [] Appellant. … [U]pon

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant represented himself at all relevant proceedings.

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1543(a), 1511(a); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3).

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conclusion of that hearing, [Trooper Marderness] exited Judge

Chieffo’s office and observed [] Appellant get into the driver’s seat

of a silver Toyota Sienna (the “vehicle”). [] Appellant started the

vehicle and drove onto Memorial Highway in Ruscombmanor

Township[,] Berks County, Pennsylvania. Trooper Marderness got

into his marked patrol vehicle, follow[ed] Appellant and initiated

a traffic stop. Trooper Marderness confirmed that Appellant was

the sole occupant and driver of the vehicle. Trooper Marderness

verified Appellant’s motor vehicle registration. [Trooper

Marderness] found and reviewed Appellant’s certified driver

history on [the police cruiser’s vehicle-mounted] mobile

computer. … [Trooper Marderness’s] verification revealed that

Appellant was the registered owner of the vehicle and that his

license was suspended. Trooper Marderness then informed

Appellant that he pulled [Appellant] over because he was driving

while his operating privilege was suspended. Trooper Marderness

… asked Appellant for his Pennsylvania state-issued driver’s

license or identification card. Appellant refused to produce either.

Upon Appellant’s refusal to furnish identification, Trooper

Marderness issued Appellant two (2) traffic citations: driving while

operating privilege is suspended or revoked and failure to carry

and exhibit a driver’s license on demand[ (the traffic offenses)].

… Appellant failed to provide his license within fifteen (15) days to

PennDOT or any police station per [75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1511(b)(1)

(providing that a driver may avoid any penalty for failure to exhibit

a driver’s license upon demand where he “produces at the

headquarters of the police officer who demanded to see the

person’s license, within 15 days of demand, a driver’s license valid

in this Commonwealth at the time of the demand”).] Trooper

Marderness … was in full uniform and in a marked vehicle when

he initiated the traffic stop.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/24, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

The matter was scheduled for a summary trial on March 26, 2024. On

March 21, 2024, Appellant filed a document he entitled “Writ of Discovery,

Plaintiff’s Requirement for Production of Documents, Electronically Stored

Information, Things and Interrogatories to Defendant” (Writ of Discovery).

Therein, Appellant demanded, inter alia, “any and all documentation[,]

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unredacted[,] from [the Commonwealth] …, regarding [Appellant.]” Writ of

Discovery, 3/21/24, at 5.

On March 26, 2024, following a summary trial, the magistrate court

convicted Appellant of the traffic offenses and imposed fines.3 Appellant filed

a timely appeal in the trial court, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 460 (detailing the

procedure for appealing a summary conviction). On May 29, 2024, Appellant

filed a discovery request nearly identical to his March 21, 2024, Writ of

Discovery. The Commonwealth did not respond to Appellant’s discovery

request.

The matter proceeded to a trial de novo on August 15, 2024. Trooper

Marderness testified consistent with the trial court’s factual summary, detailed

above. Pertinently, Appellant lodged numerous objections, each of which the

trial court overruled. Appellant, who identified himself as “Miguel Joaquin Bey,

express trust beneficial owner[,] first lienholder of Miguel Pascual,” repeatedly

argued that the matter could not proceed because he had not been provided

discovery. N.T., 8/15/24, at 3, 7, 8, 11, 12.4 In response to Appellant’s first

____________________________________________

3 The March 26, 2024, summary trial was not transcribed, and the record does

not disclose whether the magistrate court addressed Appellant’s discovery

request.

4 Appellant additionally objected when Trooper Marderness identified

Appellant for the record, stating, “Statement of counsel in their briefs and

argument, while enlightening to the [c]ourt, are insufficient and ask [sic] for

a granting [sic] motion to dismiss or summary judg[]ment.” N.T., 8/15/24,

at 5.

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discovery objection, the assistant district attorney (ADA) responded that “the

commentary to Rule 573 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure

indicates that the discovery rules only apply to court cases that will be

misdemeanors or felonies.” Id. at 7. The trial court overruled Appellant’s

objection. Id.5

Despite the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, Appellant continued to

complain of the Commonwealth’s purported discovery violations, including the

following, relevant exchange that formed the basis of Appellant’s contempt

conviction:

THE COURT: [Appellant], this is your opportunity to ask

questions of [Trooper Marderness].

[Appellant]: I am not prepared. I am not prepared because

I haven’t been given discovery. And, again, Article 1, Section 9[

of the Pennsylvania Constitution], which, Your Honor, you took an

oath to uphold [sic].

THE COURT: Sir.

[Appellant]: To demand the design and cause of the

accusations against him [sic]. And I submitted a discovery

request, Your Honor. And I have yet to receive any answer to my

discovery request. So I don’t see how this court in its legal -- in

its lawful capacity, can proceed to breach my unalienable rights

protected by this Commonwealth’s Constitution. It is clearly

____________________________________________

5 After the trial court overruled Appellant’s discovery objection a second time,

Appellant made a nearly inaudible statement that the court reporter was

unable to transcribe. See N.T., 8/15/24, at 8. The trial court asked Appellant

to repeat his statement, and Appellant stated, “My discovery due process is

being violated.” Id. The trial court asked the ADA to confirm whether that is

what Appellant said, and the ADA stated, “That is not what I heard, Your

Honor, but enough of it was mumbled that I don’t want to make a

representation to the [c]ourt.” Id.

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depicted in Article 1[,] Section 9. I have the right. No statutes,

no codes, no ordinances that are repugnant on [sic] the

Constitution can stand there. They are now null and void.

THE COURT: Okay. That means you don’t have any

questions. Trooper[ Mardnerness], you may step down.

[Appellant]: How do I ask questions, Your Honor, if I am not

prepared because I haven’t been given discovery?

….

THE COURT: [ADA], anything additional?

[ADA]: Commonwealth rests, Your Honor.

[Appellant]: Objection.

THE COURT: What is the basis of your objection?

[Appellant]: We are undergoing a discovery due process

violation.

THE COURT: All right. I ruled on that.

[Appellant]: Now I take exceptions[,] and I’d like to offer

proof of error.

THE COURT: It’s your opportunity to testify if you’d like.

[Appellant]: I’d like to offer proof of error and take exception

to your objections.

THE COURT: Noted.

[Appellant]: No. Sustained or overruled, ma’am?

THE COURT: Would you like to testify right now?

[Appellant]: Sustained or overruled, ma’am[?]

THE COURT: Would you like to testify?

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[Appellant]: I can’t testify because I am not prepared to

testify because I haven’t been given discovery.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any evidence for me?

[Appellant]: I would like to respectfully ask and demand that

you recuse yourself from violating your constitutional oath of

office.

THE COURT: That’s --

[Appellant]: You are sitting on the bench acting in the color

of the law and you’re stepping on my rights. Let the record reflect

that I have yet to be given discovery[,] and you’re violating my

discovery due process.

THE COURT: I heard your arguments. [ADA], what would

you like to tell me about the case in closing?

[ADA]: Your Honor, I would like to tell you that

[Appellant] drove on a highway or traffic[]way --

[Appellant]: Objection.

THE COURT: This is the last time I am telling you. Do not

interrupt [ADA].

[Appellant]: Objection. Statement of counsel in briefs and

argument, while enlightening to the court, are not sufficient for

purpose of granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment.

THE COURT: [Appellant].

[Appellant]: Ask for a granting --

THE COURT: All right. Deputy, put him in handcuffs.

[Appellant]: Are you trying to raise an army against me? I

am on American soil. Are you raising an army against me on

American soil?

Id. at 15-18 (some capitalization modified).

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After a brief recess, the trial court found that Appellant’s conduct

throughout the trial de novo was designed to obstruct the proceedings. Id.

at 19. The trial court deferred its ruling on contempt sanctions until the

conclusion of the trial. Id. at 21.

Following closing arguments, the trial court convicted Appellant of the

traffic offenses, reinstated the fines originally imposed by the magistrate

court, and ordered no further sanction for Appellant’s contempt conviction.

Id. at 23. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925 concise statement. The trial court has also complied with Rule 1925.

Appellant raises the following six issues:

1. Failure to Respond to Discovery Requests

Whether the [Commonwealth’s] failure to respond to Appellant’s

discovery requests violated Article I, Sections 9 and 11 of the []

Pennsylvania Constitution and Pa.R.Crim.P. 573, depriving

Appellant of access to material, exculpatory, and impeachment

evidence necessary to understand the nature and cause of

accusations, prepare an adequate defense, and obtain justice

without denial or delay[?]

2. Prosecution’s Failure to Disclose Evidence

Whether the [Commonwealth’s] failure to disclose material,

exculpatory, and impeachment evidence violated Article I,

Sections 9 and 11 of the [] Pennsylvania Constitution and Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), denying Appellant due process,

remedy by due course of law, and resulting in a fundamentally

unfair trial[?]

3. Admission of Undisclosed Evidence

Whether the trial court’s admission of evidence not disclosed

during discovery violated Article I, Sections 9 and 11 of the []

Pennsylvania Constitution and Pa.R.Crim.P. 573, prejudicing

Appellant and undermining the fairness of the proceedings by

denying justice and procedural remedies[?]

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4. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Whether the [Commonwealth] engaged in misconduct by

misrepresenting discovery obligations, providing unsworn

statements as evidence, and leading witnesses, … thereby

denying Appellant the right to a fair trial and remedy by due

course of law[?]

5. Judicial Bias and Misuse of Contempt Powers

Whether the trial court demonstrated judicial bias and abused its

contempt powers, in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the []

Pennsylvania Constitution, by silencing Appellant’s valid

constitutional objections, thereby depriving Appellant of the right

to be heard, justice without sale or denial, and an impartial

tribunal[?]

6. Systemic Implications of Misconduct

Whether the cumulative effect of judicial and prosecutorial

misconduct—including discovery violations, improper evidentiary

rulings, and bias—violated Article I, Sections 9 and 11 of the []

Pennsylvania Constitution, demonstrating systemic issues

requiring appellate intervention to safeguard constitutional rights

and uphold public confidence in the justice system[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (issues reordered; some formatting modified).

Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s brief fails to comply with

Pa.R.A.P. 2119’s requirement that the “argument section shall be divided into

as many parts as there are questions to be argued[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

Although Appellant’s argument is divided into six primary sections, these

sections seldom correspond to the claims presented in his statement of

questions involved. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 10 (wherein Appellant

broadly entitles his first claim “Constitutional Violations”); id. at 12 (Appellant

entitling his second claim “Procedural Violations…”); id. at 19 (Appellant

entitling his sixth claim “Jurisdictional Impact”). Further, each section of

Appellant’s argument consists of numerous subsections, which are repetitive,

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duplicative of subsections contained under the headings of other issues, and

lack coherent structure.

We observe that

when issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when

the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for

review, a court will not consider the merits thereof. Although this

Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se

litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit. Any

layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding

must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of

expertise and legal training will prove his undoing.

Commonwealth v. Westlake, 295 A.3d 1281, 1286 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “Briefs … shall conform in

all material respects with the requirements of” the Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure “as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will

admit.” Pa.R.A.P. 2101. If the defects in an appellant’s brief “are substantial,

the appeal … may be quashed or dismissed.” Id.

Nevertheless, as the trial court addressed Appellant’s issues in its Rule

1925(a) opinion, and because we are able to glean the substance of

Appellant’s issues from his brief, we decline to quash Appellant’s appeal, and

address the merits of Appellant’s claims.

We consider Appellant’s first two issues together, as they are related.

In both issues, Appellant faults the trial court for overruling his objections

seeking dismissal of his charges based on the Commonwealth’s alleged

discovery violations. Appellant’s Brief at 10-13. Appellant argues that the

“trial court failed to address the [Commonwealth’s] discovery violations and

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refused to compel compliance. The [trial] court’s inaction left Appellant

without access to critical evidence necessary for a fair defense.” Id. at 11.

Citing Brady, supra, Appellant contends:

The [Commonwealth’s] failure to disclose [Appellant’s certified

driver history] during discovery, combined with its reliance on

unsworn statements, exemplifies [the Commonwealth’s due

process] violation. These actions deprived Appellant of the

opportunity to verify evidence accuracy, challenge its

admissibility, or present mitigating arguments, irreparably

prejudicing the defense.

Id. at 12.

The Commonwealth responds that Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 (Pretrial Discovery

and Inspection) does not apply to summary cases. Commonwealth Brief at 9.

The Commonwealth further argues that Appellant

has not identified any exculpatory or impeachment information

which should have been disclosed prior to the commencement of

the trial de novo. The only evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt that was

admitted at that proceeding was the testimony of Trooper

Marderness and a copy of [Appellant’s certified driver history],

neither of which contained exculpatory or impeachment

information. Additionally, all the information contained within the

certified driver history … is already within [Appellant’s] personal

knowledge, and thus no new information could have been

disclosed. Notably, while [Appellant] now has possession of []his

certified driver history … he fails to make any argument that

information contained therein is exculpatory or impeaching.

Id.

Our standard of review is well settled:

The resolution of issues regarding pre-trial discovery in criminal

cases is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion and will be upheld

absent an abuse of that discretion. Discretion is abused when the

trial court misapplies the law, or where its judgment is manifestly

unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

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Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 548 (Pa. 2022) (citations omitted).

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held “that the suppression

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

Brady, 373 U.S. at 1196-97. In order to establish a Brady violation, an

appellant must prove: 1) “the evidence was favorable to the accused, either

because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches”; 2) “the evidence was

suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently”; and 3)

“prejudice ensued.” Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715, 726 (Pa.

2023) (citation omitted).

In order to qualify as Brady material subject to mandatory disclosure

by the Commonwealth, an appellant is “required to identify and explain the

actual evidence at issue.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 884

(Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Further, “Brady is not violated when

the appellant knew or, with reasonable diligence, could have uncovered the

evidence in question, or when the evidence was available to the defense from

other sources.” Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 608 (Pa. 2013)

(citations omitted).

Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 was “promulgated in response to the

dictates of Brady.” Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 32 (Pa. Super.

2014) (citation omitted). Rule 573 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

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(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.

(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the

defendant, and subject to any protective order which the

Commonwealth might obtain under this rule, the Commonwealth

shall disclose to the defendant’s attorney all of the following

requested items or information, provided they are material to the

instant case. The Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit

the defendant’s attorney to inspect and copy or photograph such

items.

(a) Any evidence favorable to the accused that is material

either to guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession

or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth;

(b) any written confession or inculpatory statement, or the

substance of any oral confession or inculpatory statement, and

the identity of the person to whom the confession or

inculpatory statement was made that is in the possession or

control of the attorney for the Commonwealth;

(c) the defendant’s prior criminal record;

(d) the circumstances and results of any identification of the

defendant by voice, photograph, or in-person identification;

(e) any results or reports of scientific tests, expert opinions,

and written or recorded reports of polygraph examinations or

other physical or mental examinations of the defendant that

are within the possession or control of the attorney for the

Commonwealth;

(f) any tangible objects, including documents, photographs,

fingerprints, or other tangible evidence; and

(g) the transcripts and recordings of any electronic

surveillance, and the authority by which the said transcripts

and recordings were obtained.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B) (emphasis added).

Significantly, the comment to Rule 573 explains that, with the exception

of Brady material, “[t]his rule is intended to apply only to court cases.”

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 573, cmt.; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 103 (defining a “court case”

as “a case in which one or more of the offenses charged is a misdemeanor,

felony, or murder of the first, second, or third degree.”). We have observed,

specifically in relation to Rule 573’s comment, that “‘Comments’ to the Rules

of Criminal Procedure are not part of the rules; however, this Court is entitled

to treat the ‘Comments’ as effective aids and to consider them when

interpreting the meaning of a particular Rule and any amendments thereto.”

Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 959 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2002); see

also id. at 960 (relying on Rule 573’s comment, and concluding that “[s]ince

summary cases are not ‘court cases,’ pretrial discovery” rules did not apply to

a defendant charged with summary offenses, where Brady material was not

implicated).

Instantly, the trial court rejected Appellant’s first two issues,

determining that Appellant 1) was not entitled to pretrial discovery pursuant

to Rule 573; and 2) failed to establish that the Commonwealth committed a

Brady violation. Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/24, at 4-5. We agree.

As detailed above, Rule 573 does not entitle defendants charged with

summary offenses to pretrial discovery. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573, cmt.6

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6 Even if Rule 573 applied to summary cases, we observe that Appellant failed

to comply with its dictates. The record discloses that Appellant did not

informally inquire with the Commonwealth concerning his discovery request,

or thereafter “make appropriate motion” “set[ting] forth the fact that a good

faith effort to discuss the requested material ha[d] taken place and proved

unsuccessful.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(A).

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Therefore, the trial court had no authority to order the Commonwealth to

provide discovery in Appellant’s summary case under Rule 573. Id.

Further, concerning his claim that the Commonwealth withheld Brady

material, Appellant failed to identify, either at his trial de novo or in his brief,

any exculpatory evidence material to his guilt or punishment, the withholding

of which prejudiced him. See Conforti, 303 A.3d at 726. The only evidence

Appellant specifically identifies in his brief is his certified driver history, which

Appellant could have readily obtained with reasonable diligence. See Roney,

79 A.3d at 608. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

denying Appellant’s request for discovery. See Holt, 273 A.3d at 548.

Appellant’s first two issues are meritless.

We consider Appellant’s third and fourth issues together, as they each

concern the admission of evidence. Appellant argues that 1) the trial court

improperly admitted evidence not disclosed in discovery; 2) the trial court

permitted the admission of “unsworn statements”7 into evidence; and 3) the

Commonwealth “misrepresented its discovery obligations[,]” presumably

inducing the trial court to admit improper evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at

9, 14-16.8

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7 Appellant does not identify in his brief the “unsworn statements” upon which

the trial court purportedly relied.

8 Although Appellant included, in his statement of questions involved, a claim

that the ADA asked leading questions of Trooper Marderness, the argument

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Our standard of review is well settled:

[E]videntiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial

courts. Accordingly, when a party adverse to a trial court’s

evidentiary ruling seeks appellate review of that determination,

that party carries a heavy burden to demonstrate that the trial

court abused its discretion. An appellant cannot meet this burden

by simply persuading an appellate court that it may have reached

a different conclusion than that reached by the trial court; rather,

to overcome this heavy burden, the appellant must demonstrate

that the trial court actually abused its discretionary power.

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 297 (Pa. 2021) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

As set forth above, Appellant had no right to pretrial discovery pursuant

to Rule 573, and Appellant failed to establish that the Commonwealth withheld

Brady material. Consequently, Appellant’s claims that the trial court

improperly considered evidence that was not disclosed during discovery, and

that the Commonwealth misrepresented its discovery obligations are

meritless. Further, Appellant’s claim that the trial court improperly relied on

“unsworn statements” is unsupported by the record and baseless.

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section of Appellant’s brief makes no mention of allegedly leading questions.

Accordingly, this issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d

577, 590 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“[T]he failure to develop an adequate argument

in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim[.]” (citing Pa.R.A.P.

2119)). Further, the record discloses that none of Appellant’s numerous

objections were to the form of any question asked by the ADA. Therefore, to

the extent Appellant attempts to challenge the trial court’s failure to sustain

an objection based on the form of a question, this claim is likewise waived.

See Commonwealth v. Smith, 213 A.3d 307, 309 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(“[F]ailure to offer a timely and specific objection results in waiver of the

claim[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

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Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the

evidence presented at the summary appeal hearing. See DiStefano, 265

A.3d at 297. Appellant’s third and fourth issues are meritless.

In his fifth issue, Appellant argues the trial court 1) exhibited judicial

bias by overruling his objections and refusing to direct the Commonwealth to

provide pretrial discovery; and 2) “silenced Appellant’s valid constitutional

objections through improper use of contempt powers.” Appellant’s Brief at

12, 13. Appellant argues that, due to the trial court’s alleged bias, he is

entitled to “dismissal of all charges with prejudice or, alternatively, reversal

of the conviction and remand for a new trial before an impartial tribunal, with

suppression of all improperly admitted evidence.” Id. at 9.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant

fails to demonstrate that the trial court exhibited any bias at all at

trial, let alone that which would be sufficient to warrant recusal.

[Appellant] identifies instances which[,] he alleges[,]

demonstrated bias of the [trial] court, including the failure to order

the disclosure of discovery to which he was not entitled …. A

review of the record … reveals [that] when [Appellant’s] continued

complaints regarding the alleged discovery violation were

overruled, [Appellant] began speaking over the trial court and the

[ADA] during closing arguments, preventing the proceedings from

continuing. … It was these actions that caused the trial court to

take the additional measure of [having Appellant] handcuff[ed]

and [convicting] him [of] direct criminal contempt. Thus[,] while

[Appellant] argues that [the] trial court was biased, the record

reflects that the evidence was properly admitted and [Appellant’s]

own obstreperous conduct caused the trial court to take action to

maintain the decorum of the courtroom.

Commonwealth Brief at 12-13 (record citations omitted).

Our standard of review for a denial of recusal is well settled:

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Our Supreme Court presumes judges of this Commonwealth are

“honorable, fair and competent,” and, when confronted with a

recusal demand, have the ability to determine whether they can

rule impartially and without prejudice. Commonwealth v.

White, 734 A.2d 374, 384 (Pa. 1999). The party who asserts a

trial judge must be disqualified bears the burden of producing

evidence establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessitating

recusal, and the “decision by a judge against whom a plea of

prejudice is made will not be disturbed except for an abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Darush, 459 A.2d 727, 731 (Pa.

1983).

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 60 (Pa. Super. 2014) (brackets

and some citations omitted; citations modified).

Significantly, we have observed that

[o]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of … events occurring

in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,

do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they

display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make

fair judgment impossible.

Id. at 61 (citation omitted).

“[E]vidence of the trial judge’s efforts to maintain orderly proceedings

in the courtroom, in the face of [a defendant’s] acknowledged intransigence

and impertinence, falls far short of proof of bias ….” Id. at 62. “[S]imply

because a judge rules against a defendant does not establish any bias

on the part of the judge against that defendant.” Commonwealth v.

Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 367 (Pa. 1995) (emphasis added). Further,

“[w]hen reviewing a contempt conviction, this Court places great reliance on

the trial court’s discretion. Each court is the exclusive judge of contempts

against its process, and the court’s actions will be reversed on appeal only

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when a plain abuse of discretion occurs.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 700

A.2d 1008, 1011 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“Direct criminal contempt consists of misconduct in the presence of the

court or misconduct so near thereto as to interfere with the immediate

business of the court[,] or disobedience to the lawful process of the court.”

Commonwealth v. Outlaw, 306 A.3d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted). “A conviction for direct criminal contempt under Section 4132(3)

requires “proof beyond reasonable doubt (1) of misconduct, (2) in the

presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the

proceedings, (4) that obstructs the administration of justice.” Id. “To

obstruct justice, conduct must significantly disrupt judicial proceedings ...

[C]ontempt requires actual, imminent prejudice to a fair proceeding or

prejudice to the preservation of the court’s orderly procedure and

authority.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 753 A.2d 856, 863 (Pa. Super.

2000) (citation omitted; emphasis in original).

Instantly, the trial court rejected Appellant’s claim of judicial bias, and

explained as follows concerning its decision to hold Appellant in contempt of

court:

Appellant continually disrupted courtroom proceedings from the

moment the case was called. [] Appellant raised eight (8)

objections, all of which were overruled. Appellant first objected

to the Commonwealth[] witness’s identification of Appellant and

[moved] to dismiss the case or to receive summary judgment.

N.T., 8/15/24, at 5. The [trial c]ourt ruled that it was an improper

objection. Id. In his next five (5) objections, Appellant

repeatedly said the [trial c]ourt committed a discovery due

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process violation and [that Appellant] could not proceed because

the Commonwealth failed to provide discovery. Id. at 6, 7, 11,

16. The [trial c]ourt overruled each objection, ruling that

Appellant did not have a right to discovery. Appellant then

inaudibly mumbled something allegedly inappropriate under his

breath and refused to repeat it for the [trial c]ourt. Id. at 8.

….

… Appellant refused to follow instructions and obstructed the

proceedings. Appellant’s remarks were more than just a passing

comment. [Appellant] deliberately spoke over the [ADA] and the

[trial c]ourt with complete disregard. Appellant refused to accept

the [trial c]ourt’s rulings to his objections and continued to

interrupt. Appellant demonstrated disrespect for the [trial c]ourt

and engaged in “a clear effort … to brazenly demonstrate his

repudiation of the [c]ourt’s[] ruling and authority.” Williams,

753 A.2d at 863.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/24, at 8-9 (citations modified).

The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and its

legal conclusion is sound. See Kearney, 92 A.3d at 60; Jones, 700 A.2d at

1011. The trial court’s refusal to sustain Appellant’s groundless objections

does not evidence judicial bias or any deprivation of Appellant’s right to due

process. See Travaglia, 661 A.2d at 367.

Our review of the record discloses that the trial court patiently

entertained, and then rejected, Appellant’s arguments throughout the

underlying proceedings, until Appellant’s conduct effectively obstructed the

trial. Outlaw, 306 A.3d at 409. On several occasions during the trial,

Appellant evidenced his intent to obstruct the proceedings by talking over the

ADA and trial court, and by specifically stating that the matter could not

proceed due to alleged discovery violations. See N.T., 8/15/24, at 7

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(Appellant stating, “We can’t proceed. There is no discovery.”); id. at 16

(Appellant stating, “I don’t see how this [c]ourt … can proceed to breach my

unalienable rights protected by this Commonwealth’s Constitution.”); id.

(Appellant stating, “How can I ask questions, Your Honor, if I am not prepared

because I haven’t been given discovery?”); id. at 17 (Appellant stating, “I

can’t testify because I am not prepared to testify because I have not been

given discovery.”).

As Appellant has failed to establish either judicial bias or the improper

use of contempt powers, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in

refusing to recuse from Appellant’s case or its imposition of contempt

sanctions. See Kearney, 92 A.3d at 60; Jones, 700 A.2d at 1011.

Appellant’s fifth issue entitles him to no relief.

In his final issue, Appellant “requests the dismissal of all charges with

prejudice. This remedy is necessary due to the cumulative impact of

constitutional and procedural violations that irreparably prejudiced Appellant’s

right to a fair trial[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 21.

Appellant did not include this issue in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b)

concise statement; consequently, this issue is waived. See Commonwealth

v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“[A]ny issue not raised

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in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived for appellate review.”

(citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)).9

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/20/2025

____________________________________________

9 Even if preserved, this issue would entitle Appellant to no relief, as we have

already concluded Appellant’s rights were not violated.

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