JEAVONS v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JENNIFER J.,1 :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

v. : No. 24-1863

:

FRANK BISIGNANO, :

Commissioner of Social Security, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HON. JOSÉ RAÚL ARTEAGA May 19, 2025

United States Magistrate Judge2

The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, through an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), determined that Jennifer J. was not disabled and

denied her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under

the Act’s Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383. Jennifer J. seeks review of the decision

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the ALJ’s assessment of her major depressive

disorder and generalized anxiety disorder as not severe and his consideration of the

1 Jennifer J. is referred to solely by her first name and last initial in accordance with

this Court’s standing order. See Standing Order, In re: Party

Identification in Social Security Cases (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2024),

https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/sites/paed/files/documents/locrules/standord/SO_

pty-id-ss.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2025).

2 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge

to conduct all proceedings, including the entry of a final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). (See ECF 4.)

impact of her mild mental limitations on her ability to perform her past relevant work.

(See ECF 9.) The Commissioner contends that the benefits denial should be affirmed

because the ALJ gave a valid explanation for his findings and they were supported by

substantial evidence. (See ECF 10.)

After careful review of the entire record, Jennifer J.’s request for review is DENIED,

and the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

Jennifer J. completed twelfth grade and three years of college courses. (Tr. 37, 207).

She has past relevant work as a bookkeeper and a bartender. (Tr. 46, 205-06, 212-13, 278-

81, 287-89.) After she testified at a telephonic hearing where she was represented by

counsel and the ALJ heard a vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony, the ALJ denied her

application for DIB and SSI. (See Tr. 14-24, 31-106, 112-33.)

Jennifer J. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged August

15, 2019 disability onset date. (Tr. 16.) The ALJ found that she had two severe

impairments—degenerative disc disease and obesity—and other non-severe

impairments, including major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 17-19.) He

determined that Jennifer J. had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light

work, except that she could “sit a total of 6 hours per workday but not more than 30

minutes at a time; stand a total of 4 hours but not more than 10 minutes at a time; and

walk a total of 5 hours but not more than 30 minutes at a time.” (Tr. 20.) Comparing

Jennifer J.’s RFC “with the physical and mental demands” of her past relevant work as a

bookkeeper, the ALJ found that she would be “able to perform it as generally performed,”

and, as a result, she was not disabled. (Tr. 24)

After the Appeals Council denied Jennifer J.’s request for review (Tr. 1-6), she filed

this action seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF 1.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine

whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),

416.920(a). He considers whether the claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful

activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has impairment(s) that meet or medically equal

a listed impairment3; (4) has the capacity to do past relevant work, considering her RFC4;

and (5) is able to do any other work, considering her RFC, age, education, and work

experience. Id. The burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five. Smith

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010). At step five, “the burden of

production shifts to the Commissioner, who must . . . show there are other jobs existing

in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform,

3 An extensive list of impairments that warrant a finding of disability based solely

on medical criteria, without considering vocational criteria, is set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

4 “Residual functional capacity” is the most a claimant can do in a work setting

despite the physical and mental limitations of his or her impairment(s) and any related

symptoms (e.g., pain). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). In assessing a claimant’s

RFC, the Commissioner considers all medically determinable impairments, including

those that are not severe. Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).

consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and

[RFC].” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 2001).

The limited question before the Court on review of the Commissioner’s final

determination is not whether Jennifer J. was disabled. Rather, the Court must determine

whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s finding that she was not and

whether the Commissioner, through the ALJ, correctly applied the relevant law. See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Courts review the Commissioner’s factual findings to see if

“substantial evidence” exists to support them by looking at the existing administrative

record.5 Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019); see also 42 U.S.C § 405(g). “[T]he

threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high . . . .” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103.

Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but

rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (citation omitted). It is “more

than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of evidence.”

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).

Where substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings, courts may not

“re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). “The presence of evidence in the record that

supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the

5 Any legal issues the ALJ decides are subject to “plenary review.” Johnson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).

record provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 306

F. App’x 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2011)

(holding that an “ALJ is entitled to weigh all evidence in making its finding,” even where

there is record evidence “suggesting a contrary conclusion”). The Court may “not

substitute [its] own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607,

611 (3d Cir. 2014).

The Social Security Act requires an ALJ to state the “reason or reasons upon which

[a denial of benefits] is based.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). Courts defer to the ALJ’s assessment

of the evidence so long as the ALJ “explain[s] what evidence he [or she] found not

credible and why.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 612 (citation omitted). Under the applicable

regulations for claims filed after March 27, 2017, an ALJ “will not defer or give any

specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or

prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant’s] medical

sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.416.920c(a). ALJs must “articulate how [they]

considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [they] find[ ] all of” them.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) and (b)(1); id. §§ 416.920c(a) and (b)(1).

An ALJ “may consider many factors” when determining the reason or reasons for

their decision, “yet base a decision on just one or two” factors. Zaborowski v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2024). ALJs need to “explain only the dispositive

reasons for their decisions, not everything else that they considered.” Id. Said otherwise,

ALJs “must always explain the reasons for their decisions. But that does not mean always

explaining all the factors.” Id. “[A] reviewing court must uphold even a decision of less

than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Garland v. Ming Dai,

593 U.S. 357, 369 (2021) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Supportability and

consistency are the “most important” persuasiveness factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2);

id. § 416.920c. “[S]upportability relates to the extent to which a medical source has

articulated support for the medical source’s own opinion, while consistency relates to the

relationship between a medical source’s opinion and other evidence within the record.”

Nolf v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-368, 2023 WL 8437872, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2023)

(citation and internal quotation omitted). An ALJ “need not reiterate the magic words

‘support’ and ‘consistent’ for each” medical opinion considered in reaching a

determination. Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 639. The ALJ’s opinion need only include

“sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful

review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000)). To decide whether the record was sufficiently

developed the Court reads the ALJ’s decision “as a whole.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.

Following review of the entire record on appeal from a denial of benefits, the Court

can enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner . . . , with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Jennifer J. bears the burden to explain how any “error to which she points could

have made any difference” in the ALJ’s determination. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396,

409, 413 (2009). Remand is not required if it would not affect the outcome of the case.

Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553.

III. DISCUSSION

Mindful of the threshold for substantial evidence—“only—’such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’” a

review of the record demonstrates that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s

determinations and remand is not required. Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103.

A. The ALJ Did Not Err by Failing to Classify Jennifer J.’s Major Depressive

Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder as Severe Impairments.

Jennifer J. contends that the ALJ committed a “reversible and harmful error of law

by failing to classify” her major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder as

severe impairments at step two and by then failing to address their impact on her RFC at

step five. (ECF 9 at 3.) In particular, she argues that the ALJ erred by failing to afford

sufficient weight to the findings of state agency psychologists Molly Haas Cowan, Psy.D.

and Virginia Carolyn Martin, Psy.D. and the mental limitations they assigned to Jennifer

J.’s ability to perform work activities. (Id. at 7.) Jennifer J. asserts that this alleged error

requires remand because it affected the ALJ’s formulation of her RFC. (Id.) The

Commissioner counters that her argument amounts only to an improper request for the

Court to reweigh the evidence when substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s

finding that Jennifer J. did not have a severe mental impairment. (ECF 10 at 7.) Upon

review of the record, remand is not required based on the ALJ’s failure to classify Jennifer

J.’s major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder as severe impairments.

A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or

mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An

impairment that is not severe “does not . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(a), 416.922(a). A

“mental impairment must be established by objective medical evidence from an

acceptable medical source.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. The Commissioner will not

use a claimant’s “statement of symptoms, a diagnosis, or a medical opinion to establish

the existence of an impairment[ ].” Id. Where mental impairments are at issue, the ALJ

may rate the claimant’s degree of limitation in “four broad functional areas” known as

the “Paragraph B” criteria: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information;

(2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and

(4) adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App’x 1 (Listings) §§ 12.00(A)(2)(b) and (E); see also 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1522(b)(3)-(6), 416.922(b)(3)-(6). The degree of limitation is rated on a five-point

scale: none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(4).

The ALJ’s determination that Jennifer J.’s major depressive disorder and

generalized anxiety disorder were not severe is supported by substantial evidence, i.e.,

“more than a mere scintilla,” which is all that is required to affirm the Commissioner’s

determination on appeal. Biestek, 587 U.S. at 97 (citation and internal quotation omitted).

Reaching his severity determination, the ALJ explained that the disorders “do not cause

more than minimal limitation” in Jennifer J.’s “ability to perform basic mental work

activities . . . .” (Tr. 18.) Citing to record evidence, the ALJ acknowledged that she has a

history of suicidal gestures (see Tr. 1739-40, 2658), but he considered them “to have been

acute, not chronic, episodes.” (Tr. 18.) He explained that she “often denied having

suicidal ideation” and that when she experienced it in July 2022 “in the context of

numerous stressors, . . . her psychotherapy, which she acknowledged was helpful, had

been discontinued.” (Id. (citing Tr. 997).) The ALJ found that the record did “not reveal

behavioral, emotional, or cognitive abnormalities resulting in significant work-related

limitations caused by any mental health impairment for a continuous 12-month[s].” (Id.)

According to the ALJ, Jennifer J.’s treatment records from December 2020 through

February 2022 revealed that her “attention, concentration, and memory were normal on

at least 20 occasions.” (Tr. 18 (citing Tr. 412-620).) She “specifically denied any problems

with concentration, and her cognition was found to be intact” as of January 2021. (Tr. 18

(citing Tr. 598, 602).) The ALJ cited records from Penn Behavioral Health with reports

that she “was doing well” in July and September 2022 and May 2023 (Id. (citing Tr. 2140,

2156, 2167).) In September 2022, she had been able to help a friend by waitressing

although it was “difficult.” (Id. (citing Tr. 2156).) In February 2023, after a hospitalization

and change of medication, she had improving anxiety and felt much better. (Id. (citing

Tr. 3268).) In May 2023, Jennifer J. was looking for a job. (Id. (citing Tr. 2140).) In July

2023, she “had normal attention, concentration, and memory.” (Id. (citing Tr. 2224).) The

ALJ noted that, “even after an overdose,” Jennifer J. “was alert and oriented with ability

to answer questions and follow commands.” (Id. (citing Tr. 889, 1740).)

The ALJ explained how he considered the Paragraph B criteria in reaching his

finding regarding the severity of Jennifer J.’s mental health impairments. He explained

that she had “no limitation” in “understanding, remembering or applying information.”

(Id.) He cited records showing that she did not report problems understanding or

remembering things and exams demonstrating that she had “normal memory.” (Id.

(citing Tr. 260, 303, 404, 449, 565, 575, 940, 2224).) He found that she had “no limitation”

in interacting with others, citing function reports which listed hobbies including “visiting

friends” and “entertaining,” social activities including talking, playing cards, dinners,

and going for coffee, and reported no “problems getting along with family friends,

neighbors, or others.” (Id. (citing Tr. 259, 304).) Jennifer J. also reported that she gets

along “fine” with authority figures and had never been fired or laid off because of

problems getting along with others. (Id. (citing Tr. 260, 303.)) The ALJ acknowledged

that Jennifer J. noted in June 2023 “that when she is in more pain than usual, she just

wants to be alone; she does not want to be a burden.” (Id. (citing Tr. 304).) He reviewed

exams showing that she was “generally cooperative, polite, and well-groomed with

normal speech and no psychosis.” (Tr. 18-19 (citing Tr. 416, 421, 427, 449, 476, 2143, 2159,

2170, 2190).) The ALJ also found that Jennifer J. had “no limitation” with respect to

“concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace.” (Tr. 19.) He supported his finding with

citations to exams showing “normal attention and concentration with ability to follow

commands.” (Id. (citing Tr. 416, 451, 453, 464, 565, 575, 941, 1740, 3427).) He also cited

her self-report that she can follow written and spoken instructions and finish what she

starts depending on her pain level at the time and that she reads and plays online social

media games. (Id. (citing Tr. 260, 1772).) Reaching his conclusion that Jennifer J. had a

mild limitation with respect to the fourth Paragraph B criteria—adapting or managing

herself, he explained that she reported that she “gets depressed” and had a depressed

mood at times, but also indicated that she was “okay at handling changes in routine and

sometimes okay at handling stress . . . .” (Tr. 19 (citing Tr. 449, 453, 464).) Specifically, he

explained that Jennifer J. “experienced occasional suicidal ideation” and overdosed on

medication in July 2022 after a breakup and again in January 2023 “due to difficulty

handling stressors,” but there was “no evidence of ongoing suicidal ideation” and she

was “independent in activities of daily living, including self-care activities, cooking,

cleaning, shopping, and doing laundry.” (Id. (citing Tr. 745, 863, 1771-72, 2648, 3583).)

Before proceeding to determine Jennifer J.’s RFC, the ALJ then explained that any

limitations under the Paragraph B criteria “are not a residual functional capacity

assessment” which “requires a more detailed assessment.” (Id.) He also explained that

his RFC “assessment reflects the degree of limitation” that he had “found in the

‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” (Id.)

Jennifer J. counters the ALJ’s severity findings by citing to record evidence of her

diagnoses, her medications, her mental health treatment, her 2022 and 2023

hospitalizations for suicide attempts, her disability report, and her own testimony. (See

ECF 9 at 3-5.) Although her brief includes citations to numerous pages in the record,

Jennifer J. does not argue that the ALJ failed to consider any of the evidence that she cites.

(Id.) Rather, the ALJ considered the same record in making his determination and reached

a different conclusion. The Court cannot replace the ALJ’s judgment with its own. See

Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 611. It is not enough that there is evidence in the record that would

support a conclusion that is contrary to the ALJ’s. See Malloy, 306 F. App’x 761. The Court

can only ask whether there is enough record evidence to allow a “reasonable mind” to

find that the ALJ’s assessment was adequate. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. There is.

Jennifer J. also argues that substantial evidence is lacking because, in her view, the

ALJ did not afford sufficient weight to the opinions of the state agency psychologists who

are “highly qualified” and “experts in Social Security disability evaluation.” (ECF 9 at 5-

7 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513a(b)(1), 416.913(a)(b)(1).) Dr. Cowan found that Jennifer J.

suffered from severe mental impairments and imposed moderate restrictions with

respect to concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace, and adapting or managing

herself. (Tr. 54-55, 65-66.) More specifically, she assessed moderate limitations with

respect to working in coordination with or in proximity to others without being

distracted by them; responding appropriately to changes in the work setting; and

completing a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from psychological

symptoms and performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and

length of rest periods. (Tr. 58-59, 69-70.) She found that Jennifer J. could “perform one-

or two-step, routine tasks in a stable environment.” (Tr. 59, 70.) Dr. Cowan’s assessment

also noted that Jennifer J. did “not participate in psychotherapy,” and her symptoms were

“improving with treatment.” (Tr. 59, 70.)

Dr. Martin found that Jennifer J. suffered from severe mental impairments and

imposed moderate restrictions with respect to certain aspects of her ability to interact

with others, concentrate and persist, and adapt or manage herself. (Tr. 77, 83, 91, 97.) Dr.

Martin’s assessment explained that Jennifer J.’s basic memory processes were intact. (Tr.

84.) She could understand, retain, and follow simple instructions; make simple decisions

without special supervision; perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a stable

environment; and perform within a schedule and at a consistent pace. (Id.) Dr. Martin

also explained that Jennifer J. was “able to maintain socially appropriate behavior” and

“an acceptable level of personal hygiene.” (Id.) She could ask simple questions, accept

instruction, interact appropriately with the general public, get along with others without

distracting them, and exercise appropriate judgment. (Id.)

Jennifer J. argues that the state agency psychologists’ opinions that her mental

impairments were severe were “consistent with the medical evidence,” and that the ALJ

could not substitute his lay opinion for theirs. (ECF 11 at 2.) However, the ALJ was not

required to give Dr. Cowan or Dr. Martin’s opinions any particular weight. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(a), 416.416.920c(a). Instead, he was required to explain how he had

considered their opinions and how persuasive he found them to be. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(a) and (b)(1); id. §§ 416.920c(a) and (b)(1). He did. The ALJ’s decision clearly

weighed both psychologists’ opinions and found that they were “not persuasive” because

the record did “not establish a mental health impairment that significantly restrict[ed

Jennifer J.’s] ability to perform basic work-related activities for a period of at least twelve

months . . . .” (Tr. 23.) He explained that the record showed that Jennifer J. “often denied

having diminished concentration, and exams repeatedly show [she] had normal

concentration. (Id. (citing Tr. 414, 416, 424, 436, 451, 470, 488, 493).) He also noted that

she had denied having any problems paying attention or following instructions. (Id.

(citing Tr. 303).) He did not make his decision in the absence of evidence, he did so in

view of the entire record, including abundant medical records. It is the ALJ—“not

treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants”—who ultimately

determines whether a claimant is disabled. Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361. Mindful that the

Court may not substitute its “own judgment for that of the factfinder,” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d

at 611, the ALJ’s analysis is supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support” his determination. Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. Remand

is not required based on his treatment of Dr. Cowan and Dr. Martin’s opinions.

Even if the ALJ had erred at step two, and he did not, he did not end his disability

inquiry there. The ALJ continued to consider Jennifer J.’s depression and anxiety in

determining her RFC at step four, acknowledging his obligation to “consider all of the

claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe.” (Tr. 26 (citing

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e) and 416.945).) The analysis at step two is “wholly independent”

of the analysis at later steps, and thus “not finding certain impairments severe at step two

does not affect the ultimate disability determination.” Alvarado v. Colvin, 147 F. Supp. 3d

297, 311 (E.D. Pa. 2015); see also Orr v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 805 F. App’x 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“[B]ecause the ALJ progressed to a later step, any error at Step Two would not alter that

remainder of the five-step process, much less the overall outcome.”); Salles v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 229 F. App’x 140, 145 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Because the ALJ found in [claimant’s]

favor at Step Two, even if he had erroneously concluded that some of her other

impairments were non-severe, any error was harmless.”) (citing Rutherford, 399 F.3d at

553). Any erroneous conclusion that Jennifer J.’s mental impairments were non-severe

was harmless because the ALJ considered them in crafting her RFC. Remand is not

required based on this argument.

B. The ALJ Did Not Err by Failing to Consider the Impact of Mild Mental

Limitations on Jennifer J.’s Ability to Perform Her Skilled Past Relevant

Work.

As explained above, when considering the Paragraph B criteria at step two of his

analysis, the ALJ found that Jennifer J. had a “mild limitation” in adapting or managing

herself. (Tr. 19.) Jennifer J. also argues remand is required because the ALJ did not

consider the impact that her mild limitations with adapting or managing herself would

have on her ability to perform the duties of a bookkeeper. (ECF 9 at 8.) She contends the

ALJ’s RFC determination and his hypothetical question to the VE should have included

additional restrictions based on her mild limitation. (Id.) The Commissioner responds

that the ALJ properly found that she could return to her past relevant work because her

non-severe mental impairments required no additional limitations in the RFC or

restrictions in the hypothetical question posed to the VE. (ECF 10 at 13.) Jennifer J.’s

argument on this issue is not well taken.

In Hess v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Third Circuit explained that “[w]hile

form is not irrelevant in the scripted analytical steps called for when determining if

someone is disabled,” an ALJ need not “chant every magic word correctly” to avoid the

remand of “an otherwise thorough and well-reasoned opinion . . . .” 931 F.3d 198, 200

(3d Cir. 2019). “[N]o incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a

particular finding has been made at steps two and three.” Id. at 209. Steps two and three

and steps four and five “serve distinct purposes and may be expressed in different ways.”

Id. “Unlike the findings at steps two and three, the RFC must be expressed in terms of

work-related functions” and the step two and three findings “will not necessarily

translate to the language used at steps four and five.” Id. At step four, “a wide range of

limitation language is permissible, regardless of what the ALJ found at earlier steps of

the analysis, so long as the chosen limitation language is explained.” Id. To withstand

remand, an “ALJ’s statement of the claimant’s limitation in the final analytical steps”

need only “be sufficient to reflect all of a claimant’s impairments.” Id. at 210.

Instead of applying Hess, Jennifer J. argues that the relevant law is “clear” and

relies on Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2013), a 2013 Tenth Circuit decision that,

in her view, has “perhaps explained [it] best.” (ECF 11 at 2.) She argues that Wells

requires a narrative discussion of the claimant’s mental impairments and the functional

limitations they caused,” including any mild limitations, “regardless of whether the

mental impairments in question were non-severe.” (Id. at 2-3.) However, Wells does not

bind this Court. Neither do any of the twenty-one other district court decisions that

Jennifer J. cites on pages four and five of her Reply. (Id. at 4-5.) Of those, only four were

decided in this District, with just four others decided by other district courts within the

Third Circuit. (Id.) The rest are out-of-circuit authority. (Id.) Moreover, Wells predates

the Third Circuit’s binding decision in Hess, which the Commissioner’s brief cites. (ECF

10 at 14.) Nevertheless, Jennifer J. does not address Hess anywhere in her papers,

including in her Reply to the Commissioner’s brief. 6 (See ECF 9, 11.) Rather, five of the

eight in-Circuit decisions that Jennifer J. cites in her Reply predate Hess. See Metelli v.

6 Jennifer J.’s attorney is reminded of the duty to disclose adverse authority to the

Court under Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. See Pa.

R.P.C. 3.3(a)(2) (Candor Toward the Tribunal).

Berryhill, No. 16-6094, 2017 WL 2570913, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2017); Green v. Colvin, 179

F. Supp. 3d 481 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342 (M.D. Pa. 2016); Balla v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-386, 2019 WL 2482661 (D.N.J. June 14, 2019); Curry v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 15-7515, 2017 WL 825196 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2017). As for the other three in-

circuit, post-Hess decisions she cites in her Reply, each fails to acknowledge Hess or to

address its implications, limiting their persuasiveness. See Leichter v. Kijazaki, No. 20-6147,

2021 WL 5904619 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2021); Meersand v. Kijakazi, No. 20-1084, 2021 WL

5003331 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2021); Carratura v. Saul, No. 20-5483, 2021 WL 4077565 (D.N.J.

Sept. 8, 2021). Gunn v. Kijakazi, 705 F. Supp. 3d 315 (E.D. Pa. 2023), which Jennifer J. cites

to support her argument addressing this issue in her initial brief also omits any citation

to Hess or discussion of its implications. (ECF 9 at 9-10.)

According to Hess, “the findings at steps two and three are important to the ALJ’s

statement of a claimant’s limitation but do not require the use of any particular language.”

931 F.3d at 209. What matters is that the ALJ’s statement of the limitation is “sufficient to

reflect all of a claimant’s impairments.” Id. at 210. So, an “ALJ’s failure to include

limitations related to mental impairments found mild at steps two and three does not

necessarily result in error at step four.” Kring-Schreifels v. Kijakazi, No. 22-110, 2023 WL

3097210, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2023).7 Thus, in Brumfield v. Saul, the District Court

accepted the ALJ’s RFC assessment, which contained no work-related limitations based

7 King-Schreifels was decided before Jennifer J. filed her briefs in this proceeding

and the plaintiff there was represented by the same attorney. Nevertheless, Jennifer J.

does not cite the decision in her papers.

on the claimant’s non-severe mental health impairments, because it was “consistent with

the substance of the analysis done at step two.” No. 19-4555, 2020 WL 4934315, at *6 (E.D.

Pa. Aug. 21, 2020). Evidence of the claimant’s mental health impairments was “sparse,”

“limited,” and “overwhelmingly normal.” Id. In addition, “[a]fter concluding that [the

claimant’s] depression and anxiety were nonsevere impairments, the ALJ addressed the

relationship between her severity analysis and the forthcoming RFC analysis.” Id.

Similarly, in King-Schreifels, the court held that the ALJ did not err where she had

“adequately addressed the mental health treatment evidence in the record in concluding

that the functional impact of [the claimant’s] mental health impairment was so slight that

it did not require inclusion in the RFC assessment or the hypothetical posed to the VE”

and “recognized and acknowledged the difference between the B criteria and the RFC

assessment and affirmatively noted that she considered the limitation found in

consideration of the B criteria in formulating the RFC assessment . . . .” 2023 WL 3097210,

at *7.

Likewise, in May v. Kijakazi, although the claimant argued that the ALJ’s opinion

was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ “failed to reasonably explain

her assessment of [the claimant’s] RFC as to his mental limitations,” the court found

otherwise. No. 21-4055, 2023 WL 3097652, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2023).8 The record

revealed “generally unremarkable mental status examinations” and the ALJ, again,

8 May also was decided before Jennifer J. filed her briefs in this proceeding and, as

in King-Schreifels, the plaintiff there was represented by the same law firm as is Jennifer J.

Jennifer J.’s briefs, however, include no reference to May.

“adequately addressed the mental health treatment evidence in the record in concluding

that the functional impact of Plaintiff’s mental health impairment was so slight that it did

not require inclusion in the RFC assessment or the hypothetical posed to the VE . . . .” Id.

at *16; see also Michael P. C. v. O’Malley, No. 22-1406, 2024 WL 4008749, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa.

Aug. 30, 2024) (holding that “the ALJ did not err by failing to explicitly include her

mild . . . Step Two findings in Plaintiff’s RFC” where the ALJ “adequately considered all

the evidence of Plaintiff’s mental health impairments and understood their impact before

determining Plaintiff’s RFC”).9

Here, the ALJ specifically explained that he considered all of Jennifer J.’s medically

determinable impairments, including those that are not severe, when assessing” her RFC.

(Tr. 17 (emphasis added).) He also explained that he had “considered all symptoms and

the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the

objective medical evidence and other evidence,” and “the medical opinion(s) and prior

administrative medical finding(s)” when determining Jennifer J.’s RFC. (Tr. 20.) He

considered record evidence that shows that she was “usually cooperative calm, polite,

friendly, and sociable.” (Tr. 22.) He reviewed exam findings “consistently showing” that

she was “fully oriented and alert with intact cognition, ability to obey commands, and

normal memory, attention and concentration.” (Id.) He also cited her repeated denials

9 Michael P. also was represented by the same law firm as Jennifer J. His case was

decided after she filed her initial brief in this proceeding, but before she filed her Reply.

Nevertheless, there is no citation to it among the twenty-one cases she cites to support

her argument on this point.

of “having diminished concentration.” (Id.) The ALJ weighed the prior administrative

medical findings of Dr. Cowan and Dr. Martin against other evidence in the record. (Tr.

23.) He also considered “mental status exams showing [that she] was generally alert,

oriented, and cooperative with no psychosis, no ongoing suicidal/homicidal ideation,

and normal memory, attention, and concentration . . . .” (Id.) Ultimately, Jennifer J. has

not shown that the ALJ failed to properly capture all of her limitations, including

limitations resulting from her mild mental impairments in reaching his determination

that she retained the ability to perform the duties of her past relevant work as a

bookkeeper. Remand is not required for further consideration at step four or five because,

following Hess, the ALJ was not required to specifically include limitations associated

with Jennifer J.’s mild impairment in adapting or managing herself when reaching his

RFC determination.

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon review, the ALJ’s decision and the underlying record show that his

evaluation of Jennifer J. was appropriately supported by “such evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate . . . .” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. Keeping in mind that the

threshold for “evidentiary sufficiency is not high,” id., and for the reasons stated above,

Jennifer J.’s request for review is DENIED. The Commissioner’s final decision is

AFFIRMED and this matter is DISMISSED.

An appropriate Order follows.