Ellis v. Chronister

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JEREMY ELLIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:22-cv-2508-KKM-CPT

CHAD CHRONISTER in

his official capacity as SHERIFF

of HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY,

Defendant.

___________________________________

ORDER

Jeremy Ellis sued Chad Chronister, acting in his capacity as Sheriff of

Hillsborough County, for claims related to Ellis’s former employment at the

Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office. Sec. Am. Compl. (Doc. 88). At trial, the

Sheriff’s Office moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of compensatory

damages, which I took under advisement. e jury found that the Sheriff’s Office

retaliated against Ellis by terminating him after filing a charge of discrimination

against the Sheriff’s Office and awarded Ellis damages, both for lost wages and

compensatory harm. Verdict (Doc. 101). e Sheriff’s Office now renews its Rule 50

motion. Mot. JMOL (Doc. 113); Resp. (Doc. 116). Because Ellis offered

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to award him compensatory damages, I deny

the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 2007, the Sheriff’s Office hired Ellis as a community service

officer. Tr. (Day One) (Doc. 110) 156-57. In 2010, the Sheriff’s Office promoted

Ellis to detention deputy, a position that he held until his termination in 2022.

158, 161.

e relevant events for purposes of his retaliation claim began in December

2021, the date upon which Ellis filed an EEOC charge of discrimination. 158-

59. On January 9, 2022, the Sheriff’s Office placed Ellis on a “fitness for duty”

evaluation because of its “review of the [December 2021] charge of discrimination,”

and Ellis was subsequently “cleared fit for duty.” Tr. (Day Two) (Doc. 111) 134, 136.

In May 2022, the Sheriff’s Office placed Ellis under an “Internal Affairs

investigation” based on charges of “falsification of [an] official document and public

disparagement” premised on Ellis’s EEOC complaint. Tr. (Day One) 162-63. After

being notified of the investigation, the Sheriff’s Office suspended Ellis without pay.

. 164-65. Around this time, Ellis started having “sleeping issues,” and he entered

an alcohol treatment facility because his drinking increased. 175-76; Tr. (Day

Two) 80-81.

In early July, the Sheriff’s Office notified Ellis that he may be subject to

termination because of the investigation of his December 2021 charge of

discrimination. Tr. (Day Two) 141. About a week later, the Sheriff’s Office held a

“predetermination hearing” and recommended termination. 140-44. Ellis

appealed to the Complaint Review Board, which reviewed Ellis’s file in late July and

agreed with the recommendation to terminate Ellis. . 145-46. e last step in the

Sheriff’s Office’s process was the Disciplinary Review Board. . 146. e Sheriff’s

Office decided to terminate Ellis on August 16, 2022, for “public disparagement and

falsification on an official document.” . 68; Tr. (Day One) 162-63.

In November 2022, Ellis sued the Sheriff’s Office, Compl. (Doc. 1),

bringing claims under both Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-5(k), and the

Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), § 760.10, Fla. Stat., Am. Compl. (Doc. 16)

¶¶ 44-71. In particular, Ellis alleged that the Sheriff’s Office retaliated against him

by terminating him after he filed his December 2021 EEOC charge of

discrimination. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54-63.

Trial began on March 24, 2025, and Ellis testified that day. (Doc. 92). At the

close of evidence, the Sheriff’s Office moved under Rule 50 on the issue of

compensatory damages, which I took under advisement. (Doc. 109). e jury

returned a verdict for Ellis, awarding $125,000 in damages for lost wages and

$125,000 in damages for compensatory, non-economic harm. Verdict. I permitted

the Sheriff’s Office to submit supplemental briefing on the Rule 50 motion regarding

non-economic, compensatory damages. (Doc. 109).

e Sheriff’s Office renews its motion under Rule 50, Mot. JMOL, and Ellis

opposes, Resp.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the Court must determine “whether the evidence is

‘legally sufficient to find for the party on that issue.’ ” ,

483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)). In other

words, judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if the evidence provides

no basis “for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.”

, 369 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2004). e standard that

applies to motions under Rule 50(a) “is precisely the same as the standard” that

applies to renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b).

, 483 F.3d at 1227 (quoting 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2537 (2d ed. 1995)).

e Court “should review all of the evidence in the record and must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” , 369 F.3d at 1192–

93 (citing , 530 U.S. 133, 148–151 (2000)). In

analyzing a renewed Rule 50 motion after a jury returns a verdict, the “court’s sole

consideration . . . is to assess whether that verdict is supported by sufficient evidence.”

, 483 F.3d at 1227. “It is the jury’s task”—not a court’s—“to weigh conflicting

evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.”

, 292 F.3d 712, 715 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting

, 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001)). A

court must not second-guess the jury or substitute its judgment for that of the jury.

If reasonable jurors could reach different results, a court may not enter judgment

as a matter of law.

III. ANALYSIS

Compensatory damages “need not be proven with a high degree of specificity,”

but “may be inferred from the circumstances as well as proved by the testimony.”

, 168 F.3d 468, 476 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting

, 704 F.2d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 1983)).

“A plaintiff may be compensated for intangible, psychological injuries as well

as financial, property, or physical harms.” , 408

F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005). “e standard of review for awards of

compensatory damages for intangible, emotional harms is ‘deferential to the fact

finder because the harm is subjective and evaluating it depends considerably on the

demeanor of the witnesses.’ ” , 168 F.3d at 476 (quoting

, 90 F.3d 927, 937-38 (5th Cir. 1996)).

“[A] plaintiff’s testimony, standing alone, can support an award of

compensatory damages for emotional distress.” , 408 F.3d at 1345.

“[C]onclusory statements” are not enough; the testimony must “sufficiently

articulate[]” “demonstrable emotional distress.” . (quoting

, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996)). But “[e]videntiary shortcomings ‘go

more to the amount, rather than the fact, of damage. ’ ” , 168 F.3d at 476

(quoting , 704 F.2d at 1220).

e Sheriff’s Office moves for judgment as a matter of law for two reasons.

First, the Sheriff’s Office contends that Ellis failed to present evidence of harm

caused by his termination. Mot. JMOL at 3-8. Second, the Sheriff’s Office argues

that, even if Ellis presented some evidence of harm caused by the termination, the

evidence is insufficient because it does not meet certain criteria. at 8-10. I disagree

for the reasons below.

A. Ellis Presented Evidence of Emotional Harm Caused by His

Termination

Ellis presented evidence of emotional harm caused by his termination that

would permit a reasonable jury to award him compensatory damages. For example,

when asked how “losing his job” “impacted [him] outside of the monetary impact,”

Ellis explained that “it was horrible” to have his “entire livelihood . . . taken away . . .

to where [he] couldn’t provide for [himself] and [his] family.” Tr. (Day One) 174-75.

For him, working at the Sheriff’s Office was “[his] avenue to establish something for

[him] and eventually for [his] family,” and he “[did not] have a Plan B” because he

planned to work at the Sheriff’s Office until he retired. . 174. Ellis emphasized that

he “would have never fathomed” that filing a charge of discrimination would lead

him to be “treated like that.” . 176. Ellis also opined that the “uncertainty” caused

by the termination weighed on him. 175.

When asked whether the termination affected his sleep, Ellis answered

affirmatively and explained that he “was having issues . . . getting good sleep and

good rest, and [he] was treated for it.” . As to his confidence, Ellis explained that

losing his career “definitely” decreased his confidence because he was “alienated” from

“people that [he had] known for over a decade.” . 175-76. Ellis’s testimony is

“sufficiently articulated” for purposes of compensatory damages, and I must “defer[]

to the fact finder.” , 408 F.3d at 1345 (quoting 93 F.3d at 1254); ,

168 F.3d at 476.

e Sheriff’s Office contends that much of Ellis’s testimony is conclusory and

unsupported by “objective evidence,” and that “any alleged distress that Ellis []

suffered predated the retaliatory act.” Mot. JMOL at 5, 7. Although true that Ellis

did not corroborate his testimony with other witnesses or documentary evidence, the

law does not require him to do so, and the jury may assess his credibility in awarding

compensatory damages. , 704 F.2d at 1220–21 (finding sufficient

evidence to support compensatory damages when the plaintiff suffered no physical

symptoms but testified that he was “embarrassed and humiliated” by the defendant’s

conduct); , 332 F.3d 1347, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003) (declining to

disturb the jury’s non-economic damages award where evidence consisted solely of

the plaintiffs’ testimony that they suffered emotional harm, including

embarrassment, anger, frustration, and betrayal, but no physical harm).

As explained above, Ellis testified about emotional effects caused by his

termination. Tr. (Day One) 174-76 (answering affirmatively to a question about

whether he experienced sleep issues as direct result from termination, that the

experience of losing his job was “horrible,” and that he felt “alienated”). Contrary to

the Sheriff’s Office’s argument, Ellis’s testimony is not insufficient because it is solely

based on Ellis’s “self-serving perception” without corroborating evidence, Mot.

JMOL at 6–8, because “a plaintiff’s testimony, standing alone, can support an award

of compensatory damages,” , 408 F.3d at 1345. In any case, “[e]videntiary

shortcomings ‘go more to the amount, rather than the fact, of damage. ’ ” , 168

F.3d at 476 (quoting , 704 F.2d at 1220).

As for the causation of worsening symptoms related to alcoholism and

depression, the jury could infer “from the circumstances” that those issues were made

worse by the termination. , 168 F.3d at 476 (quoting , 704 F.2d at

1220). While describing the overall impact that his termination had on him, Ellis

referenced his alcoholism and depression. Tr. (Day One) 175. And he continued

outpatient treatment at an alcohol treatment facility for “a couple of months,”

indicating it might have continued through his termination. . 176. Because proof

of compensatory damages may be “inferred from the circumstances” and “need not

be proven with a high degree of specificity,” this evidence—when combined with

Ellis’s other testimony discussed above—supports a reasonable jury’s finding of

compensatory damages. , 168 F.3d at 476 (quoting , 704 F.2d at 1220).

erefore, Ellis’s testimony was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to

award him non-economic, compensatory damages.

B. e Factors Are Non-Binding Dicta

e Sheriff’s Office contends that, even if Ellis presented evidence of harm,

Ellis should not be awarded compensatory damages because his evidence failed to

satisfy certain factors discussed in , 93 F.3d 1241;1 Mot.

JMOL at 8–10 (citing , 408 F.3d at 1345 n.5).

e Sheriff’s Office’s argument does not persuade. e Eleventh Circuit’s

footnote citation to the factors in was not necessary to the holding of

the case, , 408 F.3d at 1345 n.5, and therefore “is not binding on anyone for

any purpose,” , 147 F.3d 1301, 1314–15 (11th Cir.

1 In , the court compiled the following factors as guideposts for finders of fact to determine

whether an award of non-economic, compensatory damages is warranted: “(1) whether the plaintiff

lost the esteem of his/her peers; (2) whether the plaintiff suffered physical injury as a consequence

of her emotional distress; (3) whether the plaintiff received psychological counseling or other

medical treatment; (4) whether the plaintiff suffered a loss of income; (5) the degree of emotional

distress; (6) the context of the events surrounding the emotional distress; (7) the evidence tending

to corroborate the plaintiff's testimony; (8) the nexus between the challenged conduct and the

emotional distress; and (9) any mitigating circumstances.” 93 F.3d at 1254.

1998) (Carnes, J., concurring specially); , 373 F.3d 1140,

1144 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining dicta as “a statement that neither constitutes the

holding of a case, nor arises from a part of the opinion that is necessary to the holding

of the case”); , 507 F. Supp. 2d

1240, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (declining to apply the factors when analyzing

compensatory damages for purposes of a Rule 50 motion, concluding that they are

non-binding), , 229 F. App’x 820 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). In any event,

arguments about the lack of “pecuniary loss, psychiatric disturbance, effect on social

activity, or physical symptoms,” which the factors address, “go more to the

amount, rather than the fact, of damage.” , 704 F.2d at 1220; , 507

F. Supp. 2d at 1277.

Ellis is therefore not required to establish the factors, and his evidence

was sufficient for purposes of this motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

e evidence was “legally sufficient” for the jury to award Ellis non-economic,

compensatory damages for the emotional harm caused by the retaliation. ,

483 F.3d at 1227 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)).

Accordingly, the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 113) is

DENIED.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on May 16, 2025.

} onal at Mizelle

United States District Judge

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