Sheets v. Prummell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ANDREW BRYANT SHEETS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-943-SPC-NPM

SHERIFF BILL PRUMMELL and

DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER SCOTT

WILLIAMS,

Defendants.

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant Sheriff Bill Prummell’s Motion to

Dismiss Counts Three and Four (Doc. 83) and Plaintiff Andrew Bryant Sheets’

response (Doc. 90). For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion.

Plaintiff, proceeding without a lawyer, brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (Doc. 71). He alleges that Defendant Deputy Christopher Scott

Williams issued him a trespass warning after he tried to file an internal affairs

complaint at the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office. (Id. ¶ 13). He brings First

Amendment viewpoint discrimination and retaliation claims against Deputy

Williams. (Id. ¶¶ 40–56). He also alleges that Sheriff Prummell has

established a policy or custom of issuing trespass warnings (1) in response to

speech critical of the Sheriff’s Office and (2) without providing due process. (Id.

¶¶ 58, 73). So he brings two Monell claims to that effect. (Id. ¶¶ 57–91).

Sheriff Prummell moves to dismiss. (Doc. 83).

This is not the first time the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations.

After the last round of briefing, the Court dismissed his Monell claims with

leave to amend. (Doc. 43 at 12–16). The Court instructed Plaintiff that “[t]o

impose Monell liability, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights

were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted

deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or

custom caused the violation.” (Id. at 12 (quoting Underwood v. City of

Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2021)). Because Plaintiff alleged only

one incident that could support count three and two incidents that could

support count four, the Court dismissed those claims. Such thin allegations

were insufficient to establish a custom. (Id. at 15 (citing Wakefield v. City of

Pembroke Pines, 269 F. App’x 936, 940 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Two incidents,

occurring approximately thirteen months apart, are insufficient to establish a

custom.”))). Plaintiff has amended those claims, but Sheriff Prummell argues

that they remain deficient. The Court agrees.

Both of Plaintiff’s Monell claims challenge Sheriff Prummell’s use of

trespass warnings.1 He claims in count three that Sheriff Prummell

1 Plaintiff revised his Monell claims since the last round of briefing. Counts three and four

now specifically target the Sheriff’s use of trespass warnings. Elsewhere in his second

maintained a policy or custom of issuing trespass warnings based on speakers’

viewpoints (speech critical of the Sheriff’s Office), in violation of the First

Amendment. (Doc. 71 ¶ 58). And he claims in count four that Sheriff Prummell

maintains a policy or custom of issuing trespass warnings without due process

protections, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶ 73). Plaintiff

relies on, at most, four trespass warnings to establish a policy or custom and

support his claims. (Id. ¶¶ 60–67, 74–87).

Two of the trespass warnings, however, do not support count three,

Plaintiff’s Monell claim based on viewpoint discrimination. He alleges that he

was issued a trespass warning at the Charlotte County Murdock Building in

2018. (Id. ¶ 62). And he alleges that the Charlotte County Board of County

Commissioners issued a trespass warning to Ian McGuire in 2018. (Doc. 71-1

at 44). But his allegations provide nothing about the viewpoints expressed

during those incidents.

He states in a conclusory fashion that the Murdock Building incident

was “one more incident that shows viewpoint discrimination.” (Doc. 71 ¶ 28b).

And he alleges that he was exercising his First Amendment rights. (Id. ¶¶

28d–28f). But he does not explain what viewpoint allegedly led to the incident.

amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff’s Office employees have hidden his

Facebook posts and kicked him off a sidewalk during a protest in 2021. (Doc. 71 ¶¶ 29–32).

But Plaintiff does not allege that either of these incidents involved a trespass warning.

Nor does he provide what viewpoint allegedly led to the Ian McGuire incident.

As alleged, neither trespass warning is linked to “speech critical of the

Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office.” (Id. ¶ 58). So these two incidents do not

support his Monell claim based on viewpoint discrimination. In fact, his

allegations seem to suggest only the 2020 and 2022 trespass warnings involved

speech critical of the Sheriff’s Office. He repeatedly highlights only those two

incidents as involving “internal affairs complaints” and “criticism of public

officials[.]” (Id. ¶ 64). But as the Court has already instructed Plaintiff, two

incidents cannot carry this Monell claim. See Wakefield, 269 F. App’x at 940

(“Two incidents, occurring approximately thirteen months apart, are

insufficient to establish a custom.”).

Similarly, two of the trespass warnings do not support count four,

Plaintiff’s Monell claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges

that the Ian McGuire warning did not violate due process. (Doc. 71 ¶¶ 39, 81–

84). And he does not allege that the warning from the Murdock Building

incident violated due process. Much like his earlier Monell claim, he

specifically cites only the 2020 and 2022 citations as lacking due process

protections. (Id. ¶¶ 76–80). Once again, two incidents aren’t enough.2 See

Wakefield, 269 F. App’x at 940.

2 Plaintiff also added allegations to counts three and four incorporating all preceding

paragraphs. (Doc. 71 ¶¶ 57, 72). These allegations render his second amended complaint an

The Court already gave Plaintiff a chance to amend counts three and

four. (Doc. 43 at 16). And he is no stranger to amending his pleadings in

federal court.3 Because counts three and four remain deficient, the Court now

dismisses them with prejudice. See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927

F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Our cases make clear that a pro se plaintiff

must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district

court dismisses the action with prejudice[.]”) (cleaned up). This leaves only

counts one and two against Deputy Williams in his individual capacity left in

this case.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

(1) Counts three and four of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 71)

are DISMISSED with prejudice.

(2) The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate Sheriff Bill Prummell as a

defendant.

improper shotgun pleading. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,

1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The most common type [of shotgun pleading]—by a long shot—is a

complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding

counts[.]”). But fixing this deficiency is unnecessary as the Court will not allow further

amendment of counts three and four.

3 Plaintiff currently has six other cases pending in the Middle District of Florida. See Sheets

v. Presseller, 2:24-cv-495-JLB-KCD; Sheets v. Jimenez, 2:24-cv-704-SPC-KCD; Sheets v.

Charlotte County, 2:24-cv-958-JES-KCD; Sheets v. Woelk, 2:25-cv-61-JLB-KCD; Sheets v.

Davoult, 2:25-cv-130-JLB-KCD. And another three cases are closed. See Sheets v. Punta

Gorda, 2:19-cv-484-SPC; Sheets v. Punta Gorda, 2:22-cv-246-SPC-NPM; Sheets v. Bell, 2:23-

cv-35-JLB-KCD.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 16, 2025.

tit WOblatet he

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record