Majors v. Reeves

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

DILLONGER J. MAJORS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:24-CV-00233 SNLJ

)

JACOB REEVES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of self-represented plaintiff Dillonger

Majors, an inmate at Southeastern Correctional Center (SECC), for leave to commence this action

without payment of the required filing fee. [ECF No. 16]. For the reasons stated below, the Court

finds that the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an

initial partial filing fee of $11.30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, after reviewing the

second amended complaint, the Court will partially dismiss the second amended complaint and

will order the Clerk to issue process or cause process to be issued on the non-frivolous portions of

the second amended complaint.

Initial Partial Filing Fee

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is

required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her

prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial

partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s

account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month

period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly

payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28

payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, until

the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement for

the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of

plaintiff’s account indicates an average monthly balance of $20.66 and an average monthly deposit

of $56.50. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will

assess an initial partial filing fee of $11.30, which is 20 percent of plaintiff’s average monthly

deposit.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere

possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as

true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir.

2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating

the court must accept factual allegations in the complaint as true but is not required to “accept as

true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even

self-represented complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a

matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry,

364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts

that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint”). In addition, affording a self-represented complaint the benefit of a liberal construction

does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse

mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993).

Background and the Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff Dillonger Majors, an inmate at SECC, brings this prisoner civil rights claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Jacob Reeves (Lieutenant); Patrick Smith (Sergeant); Kyle

Biler (Corrections Officer); Jesse May (Major); Gregory Hancock (Warden); Jason Lewis (Deputy

Division Director); Trevor Foley (Director); and Richard Trout (Functional Unit Manager).

Plaintiff sues defendants in their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff’s facts in his second amended complaint are somewhat difficult to discern. [ECF

No. 15]. Although the Court required plaintiff to amend his pleading on two separate occasions,

see ECF Nos. 2 and 8, plaintiff’s second amended complaint lacks a solid factual statement of

who, what, where and how he believes defendants violated his rights. See Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 8 and 10. Because the Court believes that having plaintiff submit a third amended

second amended complaint, ECF No. 15, with the grievance documents attached to his amended

complaint. [ECF No. 3, pp. 22-33].1

According to plaintiff’s second amended complaint, as well as his Institutional Resolution

Request (IRR) dated September 9, 2024, plaintiff alleges that on or about August 28, 2024, at

approximately 6:09 a.m., he and Officer Kyle Biler got into an altercation. Plaintiff has not

described the altercation except to say that he was written up by Officer Biler after the altercation,

which purportedly occurred at 6.09 a.m. See ECF No. 15, p. 9; ECF No. 3, p. 25. He claims that

Officer Biler gave him a conduct violation for a violation of a 2.1, which according to the Missouri

Department of Corrections (MDOC) Offender Rulebook equates to an assault, or “causing serious

physical injury to another.” [ECF No. 3, p. 25].

Plaintiff claims that after this altercation with Officer Biler, he was “attacked” by

defendants Reeves, Smith, and Biler in retaliation for the prior altercation. [ECF No. 15, p. 9; ECF

No. 3, p. 25]. He asserts that the defendants “held him down,” and although he was never given a

directive to submit to wrist restraints, Biler kneeled over his spine and repeatedly punched him in

the face while Smith repeatedly punched him in his mid-section. See id. Plaintiff states that despite

MDOC policy, the officers attacking him failed to activate their body cameras during the attack;

however, one Correctional Officer, who plaintiff identifies as Officer Unknown Reed, who is not

a named defendant in this action, apparently watched the altercation and did not intervene, but he

did activate his body camera. [ECF No. 15, p. 13].2

1Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c), “A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a

pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”

2It appears plaintiff’s second amended complaint was mistakenly scanned out of order. Although he

identifies Officer Reed on page 13 of the second amended complaint according to the scanned document,

the Court notes that plaintiff has written “page 3” at the bottom of his handwritten portion of his second

amended complaint.

and Smith came to Housing Unit 1 to “help” escort him to the shower. [ECF No. 15, p. 13]. Plaintiff

alleges that while he was in the shower, Reeves “used the opportunity” to take several items of

property from his cell, despite plaintiff having permission to have the property due to having a

“qualified legal claim.” See id. In the second amended complaint, plaintiff lists the property taken

as: (1) 4 pens; (2) 1 expandable folder; and (3) 19 white envelopes.3 Id. He asserts that Reeves also

took all the toothpaste and deodorant he had purchased from the commissary and left him only

with a “state issue” toothpaste. Id.

After taking plaintiff’s property, Reeves apparently placed plaintiff on “slider status” for

ten days, as another means of retaliation. Id. Plaintiff states that “slider status” is when a guard

covers an inmate’s cell window with a metal device to block their ability to see out. [ECF No. 15,

p. 12]. Plaintiff complains that at the time Reeves did this to him, he had a suicide risk score of 3

out of 5, and he was suffering from anxiety, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Anti-Social

Personality Disorder. Id. Plaintiff claims that use of the “slider status” was against policy at

MDOC, especially given his mental health conditions. Id.

Plaintiff states that he is seeking damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of his

rights.

Discussion

Based on a careful review and liberal construction of the filings before the Court, the Court

will issue process on plaintiff’s claims for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment

3Plaintiff attached a property list removal form dated November 26, 2024, filled out by Officer Reeves, to

his amended complaint. See ECF No. 3, p. 27. At the top of the form, Officer Reeves has written,

“Altered/Not authorized in AdSeg.” At the bottom of the form is a list of materials taken from plaintiff’s

cell, including: (1) 4 “security” pens; (2) 3 tubes of toothpaste; (3) 2 deodorants; (4) 3 toothbrushes –

security; (5) 4 white t-shirts; (6) a comb; (7) an expandable folder; (8) 19 white envelopes; (9) 4 books -

altered; (10) 2 state gray pants – no name; (11) one pair of unauthorized state gray shorts; and (12) one

pair altered state gray pants. Id.

Court will also issue process on plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim in violation of the Eighth

Amendment against defendant Unknown Correctional Officer Reed in his individual capacity. The

Court additionally issues process as to plaintiff’s claims for Eighth Amendment retaliatory

discipline against defendants Reeves, Biler and Smith in their individual capacities. Last, the Court

issues process on plaintiff’s Missouri State law claims for assault and battery against defendants

Reeves, Biler and Smith.

Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Jesse May, Gregory Hancock, Jason Lewis, Trevor

Foley and Richard Trout, however, are subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),

as are his claims against the remaining defendants (Jacob Reeves, Kyle Biler, Patrick Smith and

Unknown Reed) in their official capacities. Also subject to dismissal are plaintiff’s claims for

unconstitutional deprivation of property by defendant Jacob Reeves.

A. Lack of Personal Involvement

“Government officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” S.M. v.

Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). “Liability under § 1983

requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Madewell v.

Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338

(8th Cir. 1985) (to be cognizable under § 1983, a claim must allege that the defendant was

personally involved in or directly responsible for the incidents that deprived the plaintiff of his

constitutional rights).

Plaintiff has listed defendants Jesse May, Gregory Hancock, Jason Lewis, Trevor Foley

and Richard Trout in the caption of the second amended complaint, but he has failed to make

allegations that these defendants engaged in conduct that deprived him of a federally-protected

right. Therefore, the second amended complaint fails to state a valid § 1983 claim against them.

act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except

for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed, even under the liberal

construction to be given pro se complaints”); Krych v. Hvass, 83 F. App’x 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003)

(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint against defendants who were merely listed as defendants

in the caption and there were no allegations of constitutional harm against them). The Court

therefore concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

against defendants May, Hancock, Lewis, Foley and Trout.

B. Official Capacity Claims

A suit brought against a state official in his or her official capacity pursuant to § 1983 is

not a suit against the official, but rather a suit against the official’s office. Will v. Michigan Dep’t

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In other words, the real party in interest in an official-

capacity suit is not the named official, but the governmental entity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25

(1991). See also Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A suit against a public

official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an

agent”); and Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that a

“plaintiff who sues public employees in their official . . . capacities sues only the public

employer”). However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’

under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017)

(stating that a “suit for damages against a state official in his official capacity is a suit against the

State, and the State is not a person under § 1983”). Moreover, in the absence of a waiver, the

Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state official acting in his or her official capacity. Morstad

v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 147 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1998).

Charleston, Missouri. The SECC is part of the Missouri Department of Corrections, which is a

state agency of the State of Missouri. As noted above, plaintiff’s official capacity claims against

defendants are really claims against their employer. Accordingly, plaintiff’s official capacity

claims are against the State of Missouri. Such claims are barred because a state is not a “person”

for purposes of § 1983, and because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials

acting in their official capacity. They are therefore subject to dismissal.

C. Individual Capacity Claims

a. Excessive Force

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was designed to provide a

“broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs,

436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). One such federally protected right is the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment which limits the conditions in which a State may

confine convicted criminals. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337 (1981). The Supreme Court has explained this limit as a prohibition on punishments

that “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” including those that are “totally

without penological justification.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 173, 183 (1976)); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

“[Correctional] Officers may reasonably use force in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline but may not apply force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Johnson v.

Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992))

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Because the use of force is sometimes required in prison

settings, guards are liable only if they are completely unjustified in using force, i.e., they are using

it maliciously and sadistically.” Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing

on the following:

whether there was an objective need for force, the relationship between any such

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the

correctional officers, any efforts by the officers to temper the severity of their

forceful response, and the extent of the inmate’s injury.

Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). See also

Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1993) (“There is no question that prison officials may

compel compliance with legitimate prison regulations.); Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d 423, 426 (8th

Cir. 1990) (holding that inmate’s refusal to comply with a legitimate jail security regulation

constitutes a disturbance that poses a security risk to the safety of inmates and prison staff).

Plaintiff alleges that he was “attacked” by defendants Jacob Reeves, Patrick Smith, and

Kyle Biler on August 28, 2024. He asserts that defendants held him down, but it was not in an

attempt to subdue him for a security need. Rather, he claims it was because they wished to

maliciously and sadistically cause him harm. He specifically alleges that while Reeves and Smith

were holding him down, Biler was punching him in the face and Smith was punching him

repeatedly in the mid-section. Taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, as this Court is required to do,

the Court finds that he has alleged enough to pass initial review as to an excessive force claim

against defendants Reeves, Smith and Biler. The Court will issue process on this claim.

b. Failure to Intervene

A prisoner may also assert an Eighth Amendment claim against a correctional officer who

knew or had reason to know another officer was using excessive force, and who had the

opportunity to intervene to prevent the excessive use of force by his fellow correctional officer but

failed to do so. Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 360 (8th Cir. 2012); Putman v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d

415, 423 (8th Cir. 1981). The question is whether the officer’s inaction amounts to deliberate

1993).

The only officer named in this action who defendant indicates saw the alleged incident but

failed to intervene was Officer Unknown Reed. Although he has not named Reed as a defendant

in this action, the Court finds that plaintiff has alleged enough to indicate that Unknown Reed saw

the purported excessive force, allegedly videotaped the unlawful behavior, and failed to step in.

Thus, the Court will issue process as to this individual.

c. Retaliation Claims Under the Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges three separate claims for retaliation in this action. He first alleges that the

purported beating he suffered from defendants Reeves, Smith and Biler was done in retaliation for

the earlier altercation with Biler that morning. He next claims that Reeves removed property from

his cell in retaliation for his altercation with Biler. Last, plaintiff states that Reeves placed him on

“slider status” for ten days as retaliation for his altercation with Biler.

Under the Eighth Amendment, a “prima facie case of retaliatory discipline requires a

showing that: (1) the prisoner exercised a constitutionally protected right; (2) prison officials

disciplined the prisoner; and (3) exercising the right was the motivation for the discipline.” Meuir

v. Greene Cty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2007). However, a prisoner cannot state

a claim of retaliation if the discipline imposed on him or her was in fact imposed for an actual

violation of prisoner rules or regulations. See Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir.

1990) (“While a prisoner can state a claim of retaliation by alleging that disciplinary actions were

based upon false allegations, no claim can be stated when the alleged retaliation arose from

discipline imparted for acts that a prisoner was not entitled to perform”). Moreover, simply

alleging that an act was retaliatory insufficient. Meuir, 487 F.3d at 1119.

this case against defendants as set forth above. Mindful that this stage of the litigation is merely

initial review, the Court cannot determine whether the issues that plaintiff believes to be retaliatory

were perhaps done for disciplinary reasons. Those matters are more appropriately decided at

summary judgment.

d. Property Claims

Next is plaintiff’s allegations that Reeves unconstitutionally deprived him of his property

during his shower time. To state a constitutional violation for a deprivation of property, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that there is no meaningful post-deprivation remedy. See Clark v.

Kansas City Missouri Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 698, 702 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When a state employee’s

unauthorized, random acts deprive a person of property, the state employee’s acts do not violate

the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a

meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available”).

Missouri provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910

F.2d 526, 527 (8th Cir. 1990). Specifically, an individual claiming the right to possession of

personal property may bring an action in replevin. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.01. See also Allen v. City of

Kinloch, 763 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that plaintiff seeking return of personal

property under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 failed to establish any violation of his constitutional rights

because he could obtain adequate relief by filing a replevin action under Missouri law). As such,

plaintiff cannot make a constitutional claim for loss of property in this Court.

D. State Law Assault and Battery Claims

Last, plaintiff asserts claims against defendants Reeves, Biler and Smith for assault and

battery under Missouri state law.

14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1901) (Goode, J., for the Court). And a battery is the “consummation of an

assault.” Devitre v. Orthopedic Ctr. of St. Louis, LLC, 349 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Mo. banc 2011); Adler

v. Ewing, 347 S.W.2d 396, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961). Specifically, to state a claim for assault under

Missouri law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant acted with the intent to cause bodily

harm or offensive contact, or to create a reasonable apprehension of such harm or contact, (2) the

defendant’s conduct indicated such intent, and (3) the plaintiff experienced apprehension of

imminent bodily harm or offensive contact because of the defendant’s actions. Phelps v. Bross, 73

S.W.3d 651, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); see also Mo. Approved Jury Instr. (Civil) 23.01 (8th ed.).

To state a claim under Missouri law for battery, a plaintiff must show the defendant intentionally

made harmful or offensive bodily contact with plaintiff. See Phelps, 73 S.W.3d at 656.; see also

Mo. Approved Jury Instr. (Civil) 23.02 (8th ed.).

Here, plaintiff makes sufficient plausible allegations to state a claim for assault, and by

making plausible allegations of offensive bodily contact, he also states a claim for battery against

defendants Reeves, Biler and Smith. Plaintiff alleges that he was forcibly restrained and

subjected to offensive contact when he was held down by Reeves, Biler and Smith and punched

and hit. As such, the Court will issue process on these claims.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF

No. 16] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $11.30

within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance

payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison

registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.

Correctional Officer at SECC, as a defendant in this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process or cause process to issue

upon the second amended complaint as to plaintiff’s claims for excessive force in violation of the

Eighth Amendment against defendants Jacob Reeves, Kyle Biler and Patrick Smith, in their

individual capacities. Defendants, employees at SECC (MDOC) shall be served through the waiver

agreement this Court maintains with the Missouri Attorney General’s Office.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process or cause process to issue

upon the second amended complaint as to plaintiff’s claims for Eighth Amendment retaliatory

discipline against defendants Jacob Reeves, Kyle Biler and Patrick Smith, in their individual

capacities. Defendants, employees at SECC (MDOC) shall be served through the waiver

agreement this Court maintains with the Missouri Attorney General’s Office.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process or cause process to issue

upon the second amended complaint as to plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim in violation of the

Eighth Amendment against defendant Unknown Correctional Officer Reed in his individual

capacity. Defendant Reed, an employee at SECC (MDOC) shall be served through the waiver

agreement this Court maintains with the Missouri Attorney General’s Office.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process or cause process to issue

upon the second amended complaint as to plaintiff’s claims Missouri State law claims for assault

and battery against defendants Jacob Reeves, Kyle Biler and Patrick Smith. Defendants, employees

at SECC (MDOC) shall be served through the waiver agreement this Court maintains with the

Missouri Attorney General’s Office.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to

issue upon the second amended complaint as to defendants Jesse May, Gregory Hancock, Jason

Lewis, Trevor Foley and Richard Trout because the second amended complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, or both, with respect to these defendants. Those claims

are subject to DISMISSAL.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to

issue upon the second amended complaint as to plaintiff's claims against defendants in their

official capacities. Those claims are subject to DISMISSAL.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to

issue upon the second amended complaint as to plaintiff's claims for unconstitutional deprivation

of property by defendant Jacob Reeves. Those claims are subject to DISMISSAL.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal of this Order would not be taken in good

faith.

An Order of Partial Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 16™ day of May, 2025.

LE q Lf

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SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14