S.P. v. K.& B.H.

J-A11005-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

S.P. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

K.H. : No. 1558 MDA 2024

v. :

:

:

B.H. :

Appeal from the Order Entered October 8, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):

2021-FC-001007-03

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: MAY 16, 2025

S.P. (Mother) appeals1 from the order finding her in civil contempt for

violating the trial court’s prior orders related to the underlying child custody

action, and imposing sanctions against Mother. Mother claims the trial court

improperly (1) held her in contempt, where there is no evidence that she acted

with wrongful intent in disobeying court orders; and (2) denied Mother’s

motion for recusal of the trial court judge, the Honorable N. Christopher

Menges (Judge Menges). After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother proceeds with the assistance of court-appointed counsel, Thomas W.

Gregory, Jr., Esquire (contempt counsel).

J-A11005-25

This Court previously summarized the underlying procedural history:2

Mother and K.H[.] (Father) have been involved in [child] custody

proceedings since 2018. The original custody order, entered on

January 23, 2019, granted Mother and Father shared legal and

physical custody of A.E.P. (born December 2013) and R.J.H. (born

April 2015) (collectively, Children [or the Children]).[FN1] Father

was subsequently charged with sexual offenses [unrelated to

Children],[FN2] prompting Mother to file a petition to modify

custody, seeking sole legal and physical custody of Children.

[Children’s p]aternal [g]randfather[, B.H. (Grandfather),][FN3] filed

a petition to intervene seeking visitation with Children.

[FN1] Although Father is the biological father of R.J.H[.], he is not

the biological father of A.E.P.

[FN2] Father pleaded no contest to various sexual offenses

[involving an unrelated minor,] and was sentenced to a term of

4½ to 10 years’ incarceration.

[FN3] Grandfather is the biological grandfather of R.J.H., but not

A.E.P.

On April 11, 2022, the first day of the custody trial, the trial

court issued a temporary custody order granting Mother sole legal

and physical custody of Children and permitting Grandfather to

have phone calls with Children at least three times a month, as

well as partial physical custody once a month for ten hours. On

June 3, 2022, the court entered an order granting Mother sole

legal and [primary] physical custody, and granting Grandfather

phone calls with Children on the first, third, and fifth Monday of

every month at 6[:00 p.m.], and partial physical custody on the

second and fourth Saturdays of every month from 9[:00 a.m.] to

7[:00 p.m.] The court ordered all parties to sign up for the “Our

Family Wizard” app, a platform where families can communicate

and share information, including schedules, expenses, and

messages. Finally, the court ordered Mother to provide Father

and Grandfather access to the Children’s school portal for

information and records.

____________________________________________

2 Judge Menges presided over all proceedings relevant to this appeal.

-2-

J-A11005-25

S.P. v. K.H., 313 A.3d 156, 772 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 2024) (unpublished

memorandum at 1-2) (three footnotes in original; remaining footnotes

omitted).

Judge Menges explained what transpired thereafter in his

comprehensive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

[D]ue to testimony regarding Mother’s lack of compliance [with

the June 3, 2022, custody order], the [trial] court scheduled a

follow-up hearing, on September 6, 2022, to assess how phone

contact with Grandfather was going [and other matters] …. Order,

6/2/22, at 3. The court contemplated potentially expanding

Father’s and/or Grandfather’s [custodial] rights or hearing any

contempt petition during the review hearing if Mother was still not

abiding by the court’s orders. Id.

Alternatively, [the] parties could file a stipulation letting the

court know that things were going well instead of appearing for a

hearing. Id., at 4. At the follow-up hearing on September 6,

202[2], Mother remained non-compliant. The court admonished

Mother to comply with the court’s orders and scheduled an

additional follow-up hearing for December 13, 2022, [and]

advis[ed] Mother that she had the right to appeal. Order,

9/6/2022, at 1-4. Mother did appeal the April 7, 2022, June 2,

2022, and September 6, 2022 orders. However, upon appellate

review, on March 8, 2023, the Pennsylvania Superior Court

[quashed the appeals and] determined that there was no final

order of custody yet, since the [trial] court [had] indicated that it

could still make changes to Father’s or Grandfather’s rights[; the

Superior Court] determined [that it] did not yet have jurisdiction

to hear the appeal. S.P. v. K.H. & B.H., No. 1417 MDA 2022,

2023[] WL 2397382, at * 1, *2 (Pa. Super. Mar. 8, 2023)

[(unpublished memorandum); see also Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1)

(defining a “final order,” inter alia, as an order that “disposes of

all claims and all parties”).]

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/24, at 2.

This Court summarized the subsequent procedural history:

-3-

J-A11005-25

On April 10, 2023, Grandfather filed a contempt petition alleging

Mother had violated the [trial] court’s prior custody orders by

refusing to comply with the phone call provisions outlined

in the orders, … speaking ill and derogator[ily] about

Grandfather in front of Children, … refusing to

communicate or furnish records to Grandfather about

Children, including but not limited to school reports,

conferences, pictures, mental health [records], and

counseling, … not informing Grandfather of parent[-

]teacher conferences for Children, and refus[ing] to allow

Grandfather to order school pictures of Children.[FN8]

[] Contempt Petition, 4/10/23, at 2-3 [(capitalization and

punctuation modified)]. The court held a status/contempt hearing

on May 9, 2023, where Grandfather testified; Mother, who was

pro se, failed to testify, and also offered no witnesses or other

evidence on her behalf at the contempt hearing.

[FN8] That same day, Mother filed a recusal motion, which [Judge

Menges] denied.

On May 11, 2023, the court entered an order finding Mother

in contempt for the following reasons:

(1) Failing to have Children make phone contact

with Grandfather regularly as set forth in court order;

(2) Failing to provide medical, educational, and other

records for the Children to Grandfather;

(3) Failing to reimburse Grandfather $150.00 for half of

the cost of the Our Family Wizard app; and

(4) Failing to participate in Our Family Wizard “in a

meaningful way.”

Contempt Order, 5/11/23, at 2. The court also ordered that: (1)

Grandfather was entitled to additional custodial time on Saturday,

June 17, 2023, from 9[:00 a.m.] to 7[:00 p.m.], representing

“make-up time” for the failure to have his court-ordered phone

calls with Children; (2) Mother buy Children a non-smart cell

-4-

J-A11005-25

phone, at her own expense and within 20 days, so Children may

call Grandfather whenever they wish and vice versa; (3) Mother

continue to pay the monthly fee for Children’s cell phone; (4)

Mother, at the very least, provide Grandfather with school portals,

passwords, etc., so he may access Children’s school information;

and (5) Mother reimburse Grandfather $750.00 in attorneys’ fees

within 120 days. Id. at 2-4. Finally, the court reiterated that all

provisions in the court’s prior custody orders (dated April 7, 2022,

June 3, 2022, and September 6, 2022) remained “in full force and

effect and Mother is to obey those.” Id. at 4.

S.P., 313 A.3d 156 (unpublished memorandum at 2-5) (one footnote in

original; remaining footnotes omitted).

Mother timely appealed the May 11, 2023, order.3 On appeal, Mother

challenged, inter alia, Judge Menges’s finding her in civil contempt and

imposition of sanctions. See id. (unpublished memorandum at 5). On

January 3, 2024, this Court affirmed, based on the reasoning set forth in Judge

Menges’s June 21, 2023, trial court opinion. We concluded that

we can find no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s decision to

hold Mother in contempt for failing to comply with prior custody

orders that were clear, definite, and specific and of which Mother

had notice. The court’s contempt order properly imposed non-

punitive sanctions against Mother, which included reimbursing

Grandfather $750.00 for his legal fees and adding back lost

[custodial] time to Grandfather’s visits due to Mother’s intentional,

obstructionist actions. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(g) [(governing

contempt for noncompliance with child custody orders)]. Notably,

the court did not modify or expand any of the parties’ pre-existing

custodial rights when imposing sanctions. See J.M. v. K.W., …

164 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2017) [(“[A] trial court’s ability

to alter custody as a contempt sanction is restricted to

circumstances where the responding party is given express notice

that custody will be at issue during the contempt proceeding and

____________________________________________

3 On June 21, 2023, Judge Menges issued a thorough Rule 1925(a) opinion

rejecting Mother’s numerous claims of error.

-5-

J-A11005-25

the modification is based upon the determination of the child’s

best interest.”)]. Furthermore, the court’s factual findings are

supported in the record, in large part based on Grandfather’s

uncontradicted testimony, and we find no error of law.

S.P., 313 A.3d 156 (unpublished memorandum at 7) (footnote and some

citations omitted).

On March 29, 2024, Mother, acting pro se, filed suit in federal court

(federal case or federal lawsuit) naming as defendants Judge Menges,

Grandfather, Father, and private counsel representing Grandfather and

Father, Joshua Harshberger, Esquire (Attorney Harshberger). See Pickett v.

Menges, No. 1:24-CV-537, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196144, at *5 (M.D. Pa.

Oct. 29, 2024). Mother claimed that the defendants had conspired together

and violated her civil rights in connection with the underlying custody case.

Id. at *6. Judge Menges filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s claims in the

federal case, “arguing that judicial immunity applies to bar the claims against

him.” Id. On October 29, 2024, the Chief Magistrate Judge for the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania issued a Report

and Recommendation that Judge Menges’s motion to dismiss be granted and

the case be dismissed with prejudice. See generally id.; see also id. at *12

(concluding that “judicial immunity applies to bar the claims against Judge

Menges.”).4

____________________________________________

4 In the federal case, “final review by a District Court judge is pending.” Trial

Court Opinion, 11/20/24, at 22 (capitalization modified).

-6-

J-A11005-25

In the instant case, on October 4, 2024, Mother filed a petition for

recusal,5 emphasizing the federal case naming Judge Menges as a defendant.

Mother argued that

having a defendant in a civil rights action preside over a case in

which he determines the issue of whether the plaintiff retains

custody [of the Children] and is found in contempt clearly presents

an appearance of impropriety whether or not [Judge Menges]

believes an actual impropriety exists.

Petition for Recusal, 10/4/24, ¶ 17 (emphasis omitted; capitalization

modified); see also id. ¶ 15 (“If a custody hearing and contempt hearing are

held and [Judge Menges] finds Mother in contempt, he has the discretion to

jail Mother.”). Mother cited our Supreme Court’s decision in Malinowski v.

Nanticoke Micro Techs., 2010 Pa. LEXIS 712 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam),

wherein the Court observed as follows:

The Supreme Court has made clear that even the “appearance of

impropriety is sufficient justification for the grant of new

proceedings before another judge…. A jurist’s impartiality is called

____________________________________________

5 Mother previously filed motions for Judge Menges’s recusal or disqualification

on April 10, 2023, and May 18, 2023, which Judge Menges denied. Regarding

the latter motion, Judge Menges explained that

Mother appealed the court’s denial of the May 18, 2023 order, and

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quashed the appeal as

interlocutory on September 15, 2023. [Order (1111 MDA 2023),

9/15/23 (per curiam).] On February 20, 2024, Mother filed a

petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing [Judge Menges’s] failure to

recuse despite grounds for disqualification based on bias. The

Supreme Court denied the petition on July 24, 2024. [Order (18

MM 2024), 7/24/24 (per curiam).]

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/24, at 21-22.

-7-

J-A11005-25

into question whenever there are factors or circumstances that

may reasonably question the jurist’s impartiality in the matter.

[Joseph v. The Scranton Times L.P.,] 987 A.2d [633,] 634

[(Pa. 2009)] (citing In Interest of McFall, … 617 A.2d 707, 712-

713 (Pa. 1992)). “[A] tribunal is either fair or unfair. There is no

need to find actual prejudice, but rather, the appearance of

prejudice is sufficient to warrant the grant of new proceedings. A

trial judge should not only avoid impropriety but must also avoid

the appearance of impropriety. [Joseph,] 987 A.2d at 634 (citing

McFall, 617 A.2d at 714).

Malinowski, 2010 Pa. LEXIS 712, at *19-20; see also Petition for Recusal,

10/4/24, ¶ 13.

Judge Menges scheduled a hearing on Grandfather’s petition for

contempt and Mother’s petition for recusal for October 7, 2024. Order,

10/4/24.6 At the October 7, 2024, hearing7 (2024 contempt hearing), Mother,

Father, and Grandfather testified. At the beginning of the 2024 contempt

hearing, Judge Menges denied Mother’s petition for recusal, reasoning as

follows:

I want to make it clear on the record that I have no personal bias

or prejudice either for or against any party or any counsel in this

matter, [and] didn’t have any ex parte communications. I have

no personal knowledge, … no economic interest, and yet I could

recuse if circumstances would reveal that there’s a reason why I

should not participate.

____________________________________________

6 Judge Menges noted in his scheduling order that Mother also filed a pro se

motion for disqualification on September 26, 2024. Order, 10/4/24.

7 That same day, the trial court also conducted a hearing regarding a petition

for modification of custody that Grandfather previously filed on July 28, 2023,

wherein he sought shared legal and shared physical custody of Children.

Following the hearing in that matter, the trial court entered a final order of

custody, the details of which are not pertinent to our disposition. Mother

appealed, and that case is before this Court at 1654 MDA 2024.

-8-

J-A11005-25

I’ll put on the record that [M]other did file a … federal

lawsuit. I was concerned whether [the federal lawsuit] might

affect recusal or disqualification, so I sought a formal opinion from

the [Pennsylvania] Judicial Ethics Advisory Board. They issued an

opinion [(Advisory Board Opinion)] and indicated that just

because there was a pending federal lawsuit does not mean that

I need to recuse.8 The recusal is up to me….

So I am not granting [Mother’s] petition to disqualify nor am

I granting the petition[] for recusal. … [T]hose petitions are

denied.

N.T., 10/7/24, at 3-4 (footnote added).

At the conclusion of the 2024 contempt hearing, Judge Menges entered

an order (Contempt Order) holding Mother in civil contempt and imposing

sanctions against her. See generally Contempt Order, 10/8/24; see also

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(g), supra. Judge Menges found Mother had violated

several trial court orders, based on her failure to, inter alia, (1) afford

Grandfather his scheduled telephone calls and partial physical custody time

____________________________________________

8Judge Menges attached a copy of the Advisory Board Opinion to his Rule

1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/24, Exhibit 2. The Advisory

Board Opinion concluded as follows:

The mere fact that a disgruntled litigant has named [Judge Menges]

as a party in federal and state litigation does not in and of itself

require [Judge Menges’s] disqualification or prevent [Judge Menges]

from continuing to preside over the [] custody-related hearings. Nor

[is Judge Menges] precluded from responding to [Mother’s] motions

for disqualification and change of venue. If the opposite were true,

disappointed litigants could rid themselves of a jurist by simply filing

a motion for disqualification.

Id. at 1 (unpaginated).

-9-

J-A11005-25

with Children; (2) provide Grandfather with Children’s medical and schooling

information; (3) enroll Children in psychological therapy; and (4) make any

payments toward court-ordered attorney’s fees of $750.00. See Contempt

Order, 10/8/24, at 1-2; see also id. at 2 (emphasizing that “this is at least a

second finding of [Mother’s] contempt”). Judge Menges sentenced Mother to

serve six months in York County Prison, beginning immediately, and imposed

the following purge conditions:

1. Purchase each child a cell phone to contact Grandfather;

2. Unblock Grandfather’s contact from Mother’s phone;

3. Write a “letter of apology” to Children, which must be approved

by Grandfather’s counsel;

4. Sign releases with various medical and educational providers

for Children, which gave Grandfather access to information;

5. Enroll Children in psychological therapy with a free service

available to Children; and

6. Pay $400 toward the outstanding $750.00 in attorney’s fees

Mother owed Grandfather.

Id. at 3-4.

The Contempt Order provided that if Mother completed all of the purge

conditions, she would immediately be released from incarceration. Id. at 5.

As the trial court explained, the Contempt Order further

provided that if Mother encountered a roadblock in meeting the

purge conditions, [contempt] counsel could file a petition,

explaining the situation and seeking Mother’s release. … [W]hen

[contempt] counsel filed such a petition, the [trial] court granted

it, and Mother was released. Mother [later] fulfilled the purge

- 10 -

J-A11005-25

conditions, and she was released from incarceration on October

17, 2024, after serving only ten days.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/24, at 26; see also generally Petition for Release

From Incarceration, 10/16/24 (detailing Mother’s completion of the purge

conditions).9

On October 21, 2024, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal,

contemporaneously with a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. Judge Menges issued his Rule 1925(a) opinion on

November 20, 2024.

On appeal, Mother presents two issues for our review:

1. Did [Judge Menges] err in denying the Petition for Recusal as

it was clearly improper or, at a minimum, had the appearance

of impropriety for [Judge Menges] to hear this case based on

the circumstances, which included a lawsuit filed by Mother

against [Judge Menges] pending in federal court?

2. Did the lower court err in finding that Mother willfully failed to

comply with the court orders?

____________________________________________

9 In the Contempt Order, Judge Menges further stated that “[i]n addition to

the six months [of] imprisonment, Mother will reimburse Grandfather an

additional $750 associated with [Grandfather’s] petition for contempt and will

have nine months to pay that.” Contempt Order, 10/8/24, at 5 (capitalization

modified). Further, Judge Menges added that he

is hopeful that these sanctions will in the future cause Mother to

comply with court orders as her attitude today, and in prior

hearings, has been very contemptuous. She just simply believes

she does not need to obey court orders.

Id. (capitalization and punctuation modified).

- 11 -

J-A11005-25

Mother’s Brief at 4 (issues enumerated; capitalization and punctuation

modified).10

In her first issue, Mother claims Judge Menges improperly denied her

petition seeking his recusal. See id. at 13-18. Mother argues Judge Menges

was incapable of presiding impartially over the proceedings, or an appearance

of his impropriety existed under the circumstances, particularly in light of the

federal case wherein Judge Menges is a named defendant. See id. at 17-18.

Mother cites our Supreme Court’s decision in McFall, which stated that “[i]n

order for the integrity of the judiciary to be compromised, we have held that

a judge’s behavior is not required to rise to a level of actual prejudice, but the

appearance of impropriety is sufficient.” McFall, 617 A.2d at 710 (citations

omitted); see also Mother’s Brief at 17. According to Mother, “[t]here is no

indication that [Judge Menges] considered how it appeared for him to” preside

over the instant case. Mother’s Brief at 18; see also id. at 17 (“It appears

that no consideration was given to the appearance” of impropriety). Mother

further points out that “York County is not a county with only one [j]udge who

hears custody contempt matters. There were a number of other judges who

could have heard this case.” Id. at 18.

“Where a jurist rules that he can hear and dispose of a case fairly and

without prejudice, that decision will not be overturned on appeal but for an

____________________________________________

10Grandfather and Father filed a joint appellee’s brief, through Attorney

Harshberger.

- 12 -

J-A11005-25

abuse of discretion.” In re C.A.J., 319 A.3d 564, 570 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(citation and ellipses omitted); Commonwealth v. Postie, 110 A.3d 1034,

1037 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Our standard of review of a trial court’s

determination not to recuse from hearing a case is exceptionally deferential.”

(citation omitted)). “Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents

not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Commonwealth

v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 939 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. King, 839 A.2d 237, 240 (Pa. 2003) (“The term

‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach

a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law[.]”).

“A party seeking recusal bears the burden of producing evidence to

establish bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to

the jurist’s ability to preside impartially.” Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108

A.3d 692, 734 (Pa. 2014); see also Ware v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 577 A.2d

902, 904 (Pa. Super. 1990) (“[A] mere recitation of unfavorable rulings …

does not satisfy the burden of proving judicial bias, prejudice or unfairness.”).

Pennsylvania law presumes that “judges of this Commonwealth are honorable,

fair and competent, and, when confronted with a recusal demand, have the

ability to determine whether they can rule impartially and without prejudice.”

2303 Bainbridge, LLC v. Steel River Bldg. Sys., Inc., 239 A.3d 1107, 1118

- 13 -

J-A11005-25

(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “Recusal is not to be granted lightly,

lest a jurist abdicate his ‘responsibility to decide.’” League of Women

Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 1080, 1083 (Pa. 2018) (quoting

Pa. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A)).

“Generally, a motion for recusal is properly directed to and decided by,

in the first instance, the jurist whose participation is being challenged.”

C.A.J., 319 A.3d at 570 (citation omitted); see also League of Women

Voters, 179 A.3d at 1083 (“In disposing of a recusal request, a jurist must

first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case

before the court in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in

the outcome. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist

can make.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). “A jurist’s impartiality

is called into question whenever there are factors or circumstances that may

reasonably question the jurist’s impartiality in the matter.” In re Lokuta, 11

A.3d 427, 435 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). “If the judge determines he or

she can be impartial, the judge must then decide whether his or her continued

involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would

tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.” Lomas v. Kravitz, 130

A.3d 107, 122 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see

also Pa. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 1.2 (“A judge shall act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and

- 14 -

J-A11005-25

impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance

of impropriety.”).11

Instantly, Judge Menges concluded in his Rule 1925(a) opinion that he

does not believe that reasonable minds, assessing the facts and

circumstances in this case[,] would conclude that [Judge Menges]

has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct or engaged in other

conduct that reflects adversely on his honesty, impartiality,

temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge. Thus, there is no

appearance of impropriety in this matter. The prevailing facts and

circumstances would not engender in reasonable minds whether

recusal should be required, but whether Mother is simply judge[-

]shopping, which the court frowns upon. [See Lomas v. Kravitz,

170 A.3d 380, 394 (Pa. 2017) (stating that recusal requests for

the purpose of “judge-shopping… impair the judicial process.”).]

[Judge Menges] has made determinations in prior

proceedings involving Mother based on the law and on the facts

presented. Likewise, [Judge Menges concludes] that he is able to

conduct additional proceedings in an impartial manner, without

personal bias or interest in the outcome. As the moving party,

Mother had the burden to demonstrate that recusal was required.

Watkins, 108 A.3d [at] 734…. Because there is no per se failure

of the test of impropriety based on an unhappy, pro se litigant’s

filing of a lawsuit naming a judge as a party, and given the facts

and circumstances in this particular case, Mother did not meet her

burden. Therefore, [Judge Menges] did not err in denying

Mother’s recusal motion.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/24, at 22-23 (citation modified).

Judge Menges further reasoned that

____________________________________________

11 The comment to Rule 1.2 provides that, “[t]he test for appearance of

impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a

perception that the judge violated [the] Code [of Judicial Conduct] or engaged

in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality,

temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.” Pa. Code Jud. Conduct Rule

1.2, cmt. 5.

- 15 -

J-A11005-25

[Mother] seems to [believe] that Mother’s filing of [the federal

case] against [Judge Menges] automatically meets the

appearance-of-impropriety standard requiring recusal. The court

acknowledges [Mother’s] concern, but respectfully disagrees with

this perspective, which would allow a litigant to automatically

disqualify a judge simply by filing a lawsuit against the judge.

Id. at 19-20; see also id., Exhibit 2 (Advisory Board Opinion).

Judge Menges’s reasoning is supported by the record, and we discern

no abuse of discretion or error of law. We conclude Mother has failed to meet

her burden of presenting any evidence of bias, prejudice, or unfairness that

raises a substantial doubt as to Judge Menges’s ability to preside over the

proceedings impartially. See Watkins, 108 A.3d at 734. Our review of the

record reflects no legitimate basis to conclude that Judge Menges’s continued

involvement in the case creates any appearance of impropriety that would

necessitate recusal. See Lomas, 130 A.3d at 122. Moreover, we emphasize

that allowing litigants to manufacture a judge’s recusal by merely filing a

lawsuit against that judge permits litigants to engage in judge-shopping and

is not condoned. See Lomas, 170 A.3d at 394; see also Reilly v. Se. Pa.

Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291, 1299 (Pa. 1985) (stating that cases “may not

be unfairly prejudiced, unduly delayed, or discontent created through

unfounded charges of prejudice or unfairness made against the judge”

presiding over the matter (citation omitted)); M.O. v. F.W., 42 A.3d 1068,

1071 (Pa. Super. 2012) (per curiam) (holding the trial court in a child custody

action “correctly denied [f]ather’s motion[] to recuse,” and “commend[ing the

trial court judge] for her refusal to allow [] a blatant attempt of forum

- 16 -

J-A11005-25

shopping to occur during a hotly contested custody battle.”). Accordingly,

Mother’s first issue merits no relief.

In her second issue, Mother contends the trial court improperly entered

the Contempt Order holding her in civil contempt, as the record belies its

finding that she willfully disobeyed court orders. See Mother’s Brief at 19-22.

Mother maintains she “sincerely believes that the court’s custody orders are

in violation of the law and therefore[,] there was no wrongful intent when

considered in [the] context of the entire case.” Id. at 21-22 (capitalization

modified). According to Mother, she

did comply with the [trial court’s] provision regarding

[Grandfather’s] visitation [with the Children]. When the parties

appeared in court in 2023, it was determined that Grandfather

[was entitled to] a make-up visit. He got that visit. Since that

time[,] there were two occasions where Grandfather did not get

[visits with] the Children and [these occasions] were significantly

after [Grandfather’s] filing of the petition for contempt. On [] one

occasion, Grandfather intentionally chose not to get the Children

from a location closer to him. His refusal cannot be deemed a

willful failure to comply on the part of Mother.

Id. at 21 (capitalization modified); see also id. at 22 (Mother pointing out

that she “provided testimony that Grandfather was in fact not consistent with

his telephone calls [with the Children,] and that the [C]hildren did not want

to speak to him.”). Mother asserts she had no wrongful intent in disobeying

- 17 -

J-A11005-25

the trial court’s orders, as she “is acting in what she believes is the best

interests of [the C]hildren.” Id. at 22.12

Grandfather and Father counter the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in finding Mother in civil contempt and imposing sanctions against

her. See Appellee’s Brief at 6-7.

At the [2024] contempt hearing, Mother refused to offer any

affirmative defense to Grandfather’s allegations and testimony.

The record was clear and uncontroverted that Mother refused to

allow phone calls, spoke about Grandfather in a derogatory

manner to the [C]hildren, refused to share legal information

____________________________________________

12 Mother also briefly mentions, without citation to authority, that she “has

questioned Grandfather’s [custodial] rights for a significant period of time,” as

well as the “issue of standing[.]” Mother’s Brief at 20. However, Mother did

not raise this issue in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925 concise statement or her brief’s

statement of questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not

included in the Statement … are waived.”); In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462,

466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that appellant waived an issue on appeal for

failing to include it in a Rule 1925 concise statement, stating, “[T]his Court

has no discretion in choosing whether to find waiver. Waiver is mandatory,

and this Court may not craft ad hoc exceptions or engage in selective

enforcement.” (citation omitted)); Krebs v. United Ref. Co., 893 A.2d 776,

797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) and observing that issues not

presented in a brief’s statement of questions are generally deemed waived).

Further, Mother waived this claim for her failure to adequately develop it in

the instant appeal. In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. Super.

2013) (“When an appellant fails to develop h[er] issue in an argument and

fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is waived. Moreover, mere issue

spotting without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes

our appellate review of a matter.” (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted; formatting modified)).

Moreover, we observe that “[w]hether a party has standing to maintain an

action is not a jurisdictional question.” In re Nomination Petition of

deYoung, 903 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Beers

v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 633 A.2d 1158, 1160 n.6 (Pa.

1993); see also id. (“[A] court is prohibited from raising the issue of standing

sua sponte.”).

- 18 -

J-A11005-25

required in the court orders, and refused [Grandfather] periods of

physical custody as ordered. The court properly found Mother’s

violations were both volitional and with wrongful intent.

Id. at 6. Grandfather and Father further claim that “the trial court’s sanctions

were specific to redress Grandfather[’s] loss and not punitive.” Id. at 7.

In reviewing a challenge to a contempt order, we are mindful that

[e]ach court is the exclusive judge of contempts against its

process. The contempt power is essential to the preservation of

the court’s authority and prevents the administration of justice

from falling into disrepute. When reviewing an appeal from a

contempt order, the appellate court must place great reliance

upon the discretion of the trial judge. On appeal from a court’s

order holding a party in contempt of court, our scope of review is

very narrow. We are limited to determining whether the trial

court committed a clear abuse of discretion.

Barna v. Langendoerfer, 246 A.3d 343, 346 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted).

The power to punish for contempt, including the power to

inflict summary punishment, is a right inherent in the courts and

is incidental to the grant of judicial power under the Constitution.

The court may order civil or criminal contempt. The characteristic

that distinguishes civil from criminal contempt is the ability of the

contemnor to purge [herself] of [civil] contempt by complying with

the court’s directive.

In re Estate of Disabato, 165 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal

citations and paragraph break omitted). “The purpose of civil contempt is to

compel performance of lawful orders, and in some instances, to compensate

the complainant for the loss sustained.” Gunther v. Bolus, 853 A.2d 1014,

1018 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “It is [] common in civil contempt

for a court to impose a conditional prison sentence, giving the contemnor an

- 19 -

J-A11005-25

opportunity to purge the contempt and avoid the sentence by compensating

the opposing party, paying counsel fees, or doing some other affirmative act

within a certain time period.” Rhoades v. Pryce, 874 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa.

Super. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also id. (stating purge

conditions are not sanctions and are instead, “a means of avoiding the

sanction.”).

In order to establish that a party is in civil contempt, there

must be proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the

contemnor had notice of the specific order that he or she is alleged

to have disobeyed, that the act that constituted the contemnor’s

violation was volitional, and that the contemnor acted with

wrongful intent.

B.A.W. v. T.L.W., 230 A.3d 402, 406 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted;

emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Reese, 156 A.3d 1250, 1258

(Pa. Super. 2017) (stating that the elements of civil contempt may be proven

by circumstantial evidence and logical inferences from the facts).

Regarding the wrongful intent element of civil contempt, this Court has

stated that

[a] mere showing of noncompliance with a court order, or even

misconduct, is never sufficient alone to prove civil contempt.

Unless the evidence establishes an intentional disobedience or an

intentional disregard of the lawful process of the court, no

contempt has been proven.

Hanbicki v. Leader, 294 A.3d 1234, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

When making a determination regarding whether a defendant

acted with wrongful intent, the court should use common sense

and consider context, and wrongful intent can be imputed

- 20 -

J-A11005-25

to a defendant by virtue of the substantial certainty that h[er]

actions will violate the court order.

Gross v. Mintz, 284 A.3d 479, 492-93 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation and

brackets omitted; emphasis added).

Further, it is well-established that “[a]ssessments of credibility and

conflicts in evidence are for the trial court to resolve; this Court is not

permitted to reexamine the weight and credibility determinations or substitute

our judgments for those of the factfinder.” Gutteridge v. J3 Energy Grp.,

Inc., 165 A.3d 908, 916 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (citation omitted). “This

Court defers to the credibility determinations of the trial court with regard to

the witnesses who appeared before it, as that court has had the opportunity

to observe their demeanor.” Harcar v. Harcar, 982 A.2d 1230, 1236 (Pa.

Super. 2009) (citations and brackets omitted).

Instantly, we are guided by our decision in Luminella v. Marcocci, 814

A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. 2002). In Luminella, the parties were “embroiled in a

bitter custody battle” regarding their three minor daughters. Id. at 714. The

trial court entered a custody order awarding the parties shared legal and

physical custody. Id. The trial court subsequently found the

appellant/mother in contempt of the custody order, after she withheld custody

from the children’s father. Id. at 715. The trial court “placed mother on

probation for a period of six months, compelled mother to undergo

psychological testing, and compelled mother to pay to father a fine of $500.00

plus attorney’s fees of $1,000.00.” Id. at 719.

- 21 -

J-A11005-25

On appeal in Luminella, the mother argued that “she was not in willful

contempt” of the custody order because she (1) feared for the children’s safety

while they were in father’s custody; and (2) was “unable to force her children

to comply with the order[.]” Id. We affirmed and rejected the mother’s claim,

reasoning as follows:

To accept mother’s argument is to accept anarchy. By relying on

fears for the children’s safety as a reason that she could not

comply with the court order, mother relies on factors she should

have argued during the development of the custody order[.] ….

Mother is not permitted to ignore the order and unilaterally

institute measures she feels appropriate instead of the order.

Id. (capitalization modified).

Instantly, Judge Menges opined he properly found Mother in civil

contempt, and that her disobedience of the court’s orders was volitional and

with wrongful intent:

The court’s orders of April 7, 2022, June 2, 2022, September 6,

2022, and May 9, 2023 are clear, definite, and specific. Mother

had notice of the orders that she is alleged to have disobeyed.

The court found that Mother’s violations of orders the court

entered in Children’s best interests were both volitional and with

wrongful intent. At the contempt hearings on July 17, 2023 and

October 7, 2024, Mother acknowledged disobeying the

court’s various orders for reasons related more to her

disagreement with the orders rather than to an inability to

perform or of making a good-faith effort to comply with the

court’s orders.13 It is not entirely clear why Mother is so resistant

____________________________________________

13 See, e.g., N.T. (2024 contempt hearing), 10/7/24, at 59 (Mother stating

that “[t]he biggest problem here is that the [c]ourt orders that we’re operating

under are a direct contradiction of what’s in [the Children’s] best interest, but

I have done my best to follow the orders to the best of my ability in the present

situation.”); id. at 63 (Mother confirming that she “ha[s] not fully complied

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

- 22 -

J-A11005-25

to following the court’s orders regarding allowing Grandfather to

have information and contact with Children.

Mother seems to believe that she is not obligated to follow

court orders and is justified in not following interlocutory orders

that have yet to be appealed or any order that she deems not to

be in Children’s best interest. Mother persists in this belief, even

after Mother received the Superior Court’s ruling on her appeal of

the court’s prior finding of contempt on May 9, 2023. [See

generally S.P., 313 A.3d 156.]

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/24, at 23-24 (emphasis and footnote added).

The evidence of record supports Judge Menges’s findings. See id.

Contrary to Mother’s claim, the record leaves no doubt that wrongful intent

could be imputed to Mother by her repeated disobedience of multiple, specific

court orders, of which Mother had adequate notice. See S.P., 313 A.3d 156

(unpublished memorandum at 7) (holding Judge Menges “properly imposed

non-punitive sanctions against Mother… due to Mother’s intentional,

obstructionist actions.” (emphasis added)); Gross, supra; Luminella,

supra; see also Godfrey v. Godfrey, 894 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(concluding the evidence of record supported the trial court’s holding

father/appellant in civil contempt, where father willfully violated a child

support order by never complying with the order and accumulating substantial

arrearages). Accordingly, we discern no clear abuse of Judge Menges’s

____________________________________________

with the physical custody [order] over the past year,” explaining that the

“[C]hildren were absolutely distraught about the Court decision.”).

- 23 -

J-A11005-25

discretion in holding Mother in civil contempt. Mother’s final issue merits no

relief.

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the Contempt Order finding Mother

in civil contempt and imposing sanctions against her.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/16/2025

- 24 -